People v. Wallace CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D067537 · 2016-07-19 · Unpublished

Proceeding: appeal from a judgment
Trial court: Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCD252950
Trial judge: Runston G. Maino
Outcome: affirmed — Affirmed.
Area: criminal
Panel: Richard D. Huffman, Sr. (author), Cynthia Aaron, Patricia D. Benke

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T05:45Z · confidence high

The trial court denied the defendant's Romero motion to strike a prior strike conviction, resulting in a 17-year sentence, while granting the codefendant's Romero motion, resulting in an 11-year sentence. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that the defendant forfeited the issue by failing to challenge the denial of his Romero motion and that the disparate sentences did not violate due process or equal protection because the defendants were not similarly situated.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Denial of defendant's Romero motion to strike prior strike conviction “By failing to challenge the court's denial of his Romero motion, Wallace forfeited this issue on appeal.”	unclear	error	agree with court The appellate court held that the defendant forfeited the issue on appeal because he did not specifically challenge the denial of his Romero motion in his brief, relying on the principle that unargued issues are deemed abandoned. This is a standard procedural rule in California appellate practice.
Substantive review of the denial of the Romero motion (hypothetical) “We review an assertion that the court erred in denying a Romero motion under the deferential abuse of discretion standard.”	abuse of discretion	not reached	agree with court The court stated that even if the issue had been properly raised, the trial court's denial of the Romero motion would not be reversed because it was not an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion, having balanced the relevant factors. This is a hypothetical analysis since the primary ground for affirmance was forfeiture.
Claim that disparate sentencing between codefendants violates due process and equal protection “Wallace and Dean were subjected to parallel proceedings, therefore a comparison of the two raises no question of due process.”	de novo	not reached	agree with court The court rejected the constitutional claims, reasoning that parallel proceedings do not raise due process issues and that the defendants were not 'similarly situated' for equal protection purposes because the Romero motions were decided based on individual-specific facts. This is a substantive legal conclusion on the merits of the constitutional claims.

Authorities

relied: People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 — Establishes the standard for striking prior strike convictions and the abuse of discretion standard for reviewing such denials.
relied: MacDonald v. Joslyn (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 282 — Issues not argued in an appellate brief are deemed abandoned.
relied: Adoption of Mathew B. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1239 — Supports the forfeiture rule for unargued issues on appeal.
relied: People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825 — A Romero denial is not an abuse of discretion if it is not arbitrary or capricious.
relied: People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148 — The trial court has discretion to deny a Romero motion after balancing the relevant factors.
relied: People v. Wilkenson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821 — Defendants are not 'similarly situated' for equal protection purposes if their sentences are based on individual-specific facts.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the forfeiture rule to dismiss the primary argument and provides a legally correct hypothetical analysis of the Romero motion and constitutional claims using appropriate standards of review and authorities.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:31Z · confidence low

The trial court convicted Wallace of first degree robbery and related offenses, denied his Romero motion to strike a 2013 robbery strike prior, and sentenced him to 17 years, while granting codefendant Dean's Romero motion and sentencing Dean to 11 years. On appeal Wallace argued the sentencing disparity violated equal protection, due process, Penal Code sections 1170 and 1170.3, and rule 4.410; the Court of Appeal held the Romero denial was unchallenged and in any event within the court's discretion, and affirmed.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Denial of Wallace's Romero motion to strike his 2013 robbery strike prior for sentencing purposes “There is no evidence in this record of an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion by the court.”	abuse of discretion	correct	agree with court The appellate court first treated the Romero denial as unchallenged and therefore forfeited, then alternatively reviewed it for abuse of discretion under Romero, Sandoval and Williams, noting the trial court weighed the nature, seriousness and temporal proximity of the prior and current offenses against Wallace's youth, upbringing and role. That is the correct framework, and a 2013 robbery strike followed closely by a violent home-invasion robbery places the denial well within discretion; the court did not cite People v. Carmony, the leading authority on review of Romero denials, but Williams and Sandoval supply the same standard.
Imposition of a 17-year sentence on Wallace versus 11 years on codefendant Dean, challenged as violating equal protection, due process, Penal Code sections 1170 and 1170.3, and rule 4.410 “Wallace and Dean were subjected to parallel proceedings, therefore a comparison of the two raises no question of due process.”	mixed	correct	agree with court The court corrected Wallace's factual premise (both received the midterm of six years; the difference flowed entirely from the Romero rulings) and held that because each Romero ruling turned on individualized facts about each defendant's background and character, the two were not similarly situated for equal protection purposes under Wilkinson, and the uniformity policy of sections 1170 and 1170.3 and rule 4.410 was not offended. Individualized sentencing discretion based on each defendant's record is a rational basis for differing outcomes, and Wallace cited no binding authority requiring parity between codefendants; the result follows from the opinion's reasoning.

Authorities

relied: People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 — Trial courts have discretion under section 1385 to strike a prior strike conviction, and denial of a motion to strike is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
relied: People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825 — Sentencing decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion and will be upheld absent an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion.
relied: People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148 — In ruling on a Romero motion the court must consider the nature and circumstances of the present and prior offenses and the defendant's background, character and prospects to decide whether he falls outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law.
relied: People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821 — An equal protection claim requires a showing that the state has adopted a classification affecting two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner; defendants treated differently through individualized discretion are not similarly situated.
relied: MacDonald v. Joslyn (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 282 — An appeal from an order is deemed abandoned where the appellant's brief contains no argument directed to it.
relied: Adoption of Mathew B. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1239 — Issues not argued in the appellate brief are deemed forfeited or abandoned.
missed: People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367 — A trial court's refusal to strike a prior strike is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and only in extraordinary cases where no reasonable person could disagree that the defendant falls outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law would denial be an abuse.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion correctly identifies that the sentencing disparity flowed solely from the differing Romero rulings, applies the deferential abuse of discretion standard to the unchallenged Romero denial, and disposes of the equal protection and uniformity claims with the appropriate Supreme Court authority. It omits People v. Carmony, the leading Romero-review case, relies on civil cases for forfeiture, and does not describe what distinguished Dean's record so as to justify granting his motion, leaving the comparative analysis somewhat thin.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 7/19/16 P. v. Wallace CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D067537

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD252950)

PATRICK WALLACE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Runston G. Maino, Judge. Affirmed.

John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal and Minh U.

Le, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. A jury convicted Patrick Wallace of first degree robbery (Pen. Code,1 § 211), burglary (§ 459), false imprisonment (§§ 236\237, subd. (a)), attempting to dissuade a witness from reporting a crime (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1)), and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)). The jury also found true allegations that the burglary was of an inhabited dwelling house and committed in the presence of a person other than an accomplice (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(21); § 460); and that the robbery was perpetrated in an inhabited dwelling house and committed in concert with two or more persons (§ 212.5, subd. (a); § 213, subd. (a)(1)(A)).

The court found true allegations Wallace sustained a prior robbery conviction in 2013, which qualifies both as a strike prior and a serious felony prior (§ 667, subd. (e)(1);

§ 667, subd. (a)(1)); and in doing so, denied Wallace's Romero2 motion to strike his strike prior for sentencing purposes. At Wallace's sentencing, the court imposed the midterm of six years for first degree robbery and stayed the remaining counts per section 654. (§ 213.) Based upon his strike prior, Wallace's six-year term was doubled to 12 years. The court added five years to Wallace's term for the serious felony prior, resulting in a total sentence of 17 years. (§ 667, subd. (e)(1); § 667, subd. (a)(1).)

Wallace's codefendant, Kevin Dean, also was convicted of first degree robbery (§ 211). Dean admitted a prior robbery conviction from 2008, which qualified both as a strike prior and serious felony prior. The court found a factual basis for that admission, 1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.

2 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497. 2 and like it did for Wallace, imposed on Dean the midterm of six years for first degree robbery and stayed the remaining counts per section 654. (§ 213.) Contrary to the court's action regarding Wallace, the court granted Dean's Romero motion to strike his strike prior for sentencing purposes. As a result, Dean's base term of six years was not doubled.

Instead, the court increased Dean's sentence only by the addition of five years for having a serious felony prior. In summary, the court sentenced Dean to prison for 11 years, while it sentenced Wallace to prison for 17 years.

Wallace appeals contending the duration of his sentence relative to that of his codefendant violates due process and equal protection under the federal and California Constitutions, sections 1170 and 1170.3, and California Rules of Court,3 rule 4.410. We disagree, and thus affirm the judgment.4

DISCUSSION

Wallace argues that, at most, he is no more culpable than Dean in the underlying offense. As such, he claims his longer prison sentence is unlawful. In support of his argument, Wallace relies on rule 4.410 as well as sections 1170 and 1170.3, which acknowledge the court's objective of uniformity in sentencing. Section 1170 provides that the purpose of sentencing ". . . is best served by terms proportionate to the 3 All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.

4 Because Wallace does not challenge his conviction for the underlying offense, we will not set forth a statement of facts. It is sufficient to note that Wallace, Dean, and others, broke into the victim's apartment while she was home; and the group forced her to sever her 911 call, hit her several times, and threatened her with a gun before stealing several of the victim's and her cohabitant's belongings. 3 seriousness of the offense with provisions for uniformity in the sentences of offenders committing the same offense under similar circumstances." (§ 1170, subd. (a)(1).)

Wallace asserts further that his rights to equal protection and due process under the federal and California Constitutions were violated because he and Dean were similarly situated but treated differently and there was no rational basis for that disparate treatment.

Wallace emphasizes that he and Dean were involved in the same crime, convicted of the same charge, and each have a prior conviction that qualifies both as a strike prior and serious felony prior. Wallace claims the court abused its discretion by imposing on him, the midterm sentence of six years, and on Dean, the low term sentence of three years.

A review of the record however, reveals that Wallace is mistaken. The court sentenced both he and Dean to the midterm sentence for first degree robbery. Wallace's sentence is greater than Dean's because Wallace's Romero motion to strike his strike prior for sentencing purposes was denied, and Dean's was not. As the Attorney General points out, Wallace does not contest the denial of his Romero motion, and therefore, cannot establish that the difference between his and Dean's sentence is not justified. By failing to challenge the court's denial of his Romero motion, Wallace forfeited this issue on appeal. (MacDonald v. Joslyn (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 282, 285 ["Defendant has appealed from the judgment and the order denying his motion to strike the cost bill.

Since his brief contains no argument directed to the appeal from the order, it must be deemed abandoned."]; Adoption of Mathew B. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1239, 1267, fn. 16.) For this reason alone, Wallace's challenge here is without merit.

4 Yet, even if Wallace challenged the denial of his Romero motion, his claim would fare no better. We review an assertion that the court erred in denying a Romero motion under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th 497 at p. 532.) There is no evidence in this record of an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion by the court. (People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847.) To the contrary, the court balanced the nature, seriousness, and temporal proximity of Wallace's prior and instant offenses with Wallace's youth, upbringing, and role in the crimes on his record. The court concluded that balance favored denying Wallace's Romero motion, and it was within the court's discretion to conclude as such. (See People v. Williams (1998)

17 Cal.4th 148, 158.)

With that foundation in mind, Wallace cites no binding authority suggesting the difference between his and Dean's sentences raises questions of equal protection or due process. Wallace and Dean were subjected to parallel proceedings, therefore a comparison of the two raises no question of due process. The discretion exercised to grant or deny each defendant's Romero motion hinged on facts specific to each defendant's background and character; therefore, the defendants were not "similarly situated" sufficient to raise a question of equal protection. (See People v. Wilkenson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 836.) For the same reason, the court's decision to grant Dean's but not Wallace's Romero motion does not undermine the policy of uniformity of sentencing set forth in general terms in sections 1170 and 1170.3, and rule 4.410(a)(7).

5 DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

HUFFMAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

BENKE, Acting P. J.

AARON, J.

Cites, in this corpus

People v. Sandoval S148917 · 2007-07-19
People v. Wilkinson S111028 · 2004-07-29
People v. Williams S057534 · 1998-01-05
People v. Superior Court (Romero) S045097 · 1996-06-20
Nancy B. v. Charlotte M. Docket Nos. A044280, A045711 · 1991-07-30
MacDonald v. Joslyn Civ. 32710 · 1969-07-29