Williams v. Nordstrom, Inc. CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D069051 · 2016-07-15 · Unpublished

Proceeding: appeal from an order
Trial court: Superior Court of San Diego County · No. 37-2014-00007604-CU-CR-CTL
Trial judge: Judith F. Hayes
Outcome: reversed — Reversed.
Area: civil
Panel: Judith D. McConnell (author), Gilbert Nares, Patricia D. Benke

Analysis

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:30Z · confidence low

The San Diego Superior Court granted Nordstrom's motion to compel further discovery responses from plaintiff Williams and imposed $14,419 in discovery sanctions on Williams and his counsel, and later, while the appeal from that order was pending, dismissed the entire action without prejudice after the parties settled. The Court of Appeal accepted the parties' stipulated request under Neary and Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(8), reversed the discovery and sanctions order without reaching its merits, vacated the dismissal order on its own motion as void for having been entered while the appeal was pending, and remanded with leave for the superior court to enter a new dismissal order after remittitur.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
August 7, 2015 order compelling further discovery responses and imposing $14,419 in discovery sanctions on plaintiff and his counsel (reversed pursuant to the parties' stipulation under CCP § 128(a)(8)) “The superior court compelled Williams to provide additional discovery responses and imposed $14,419 in discovery sanctions on Williams and his counsel of record, of which $1,000 was payable within 20 days.”	unclear	not reached	unsure The appellate court never evaluated whether the discovery order or sanctions were erroneous; it reversed solely because the parties stipulated to reversal as part of a settlement and the court made the two findings required by Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(8). The findings are conclusory and the court recited 'no reasonable probability' rather than the statutory 'no reasonable possibility' that nonparty or public interests would be affected. More significantly, because the sanctions ran against counsel in an amount triggering State Bar reporting (Bus. & Prof. Code § 6086.7), there was an arguable public interest in preserving the sanctions order that the court did not discuss, and prior published authority (Hardisty v. Hinton & Alfert) refused a stipulated reversal of an attorney sanctions order on that basis. The court also did not address appealability of the portion of the order compelling discovery (as opposed to the sanctions exceeding $5,000) or whether section 128(a)(8), which speaks of a 'judgment,' governs an interlocutory order. Because the merits were not examined and the record on appeal discloses nothing about the underlying dispute, I cannot say whether the trial court's order was right or wrong.
June 16, 2016 order dismissing the entire action without prejudice based on the parties' settlement, entered while the appeal from the discovery order was pending (vacated as void) “conclude the superior court exceeded its jurisdiction by dismissing the action while appeal of the August 7, 2015 discovery order remained pending.”	de novo	error (procedure)	agree with court Whether a trial court had jurisdiction to act while an appeal was pending is a question of law. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 916 and Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino, the perfecting of an appeal stays trial court proceedings on matters embraced in or affected by the appealed order, and Sonoqui squarely holds a trial court may not dismiss the action while an appeal is pending even with all parties' consent. A dismissal of the whole action is irreconcilable with the pending appeal of an order in that action, so the court correctly treated the dismissal as void on its face and vacated it, while sensibly permitting re-entry after remittitur. Taking judicial notice of the later order on the court's own motion and vacating it was within the appellate court's authority.

Authorities

relied: Neary v. Regents of University of California (1992) 3 Cal.4th 273 — When parties settle and stipulate to reversal of the trial court judgment, the Court of Appeal should grant the stipulated reversal absent extraordinary circumstances, determined case by case.
relied: People v. Sonoqui (1934) 1 Cal.2d 364 — Pending an appeal, the trial court may not dismiss the action, even with the consent of all parties.
relied: Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180 — An appeal stays trial court proceedings when the possible outcomes on appeal and the actual or possible results of the trial court proceeding are irreconcilable, and acts in excess of that jurisdiction are void on their face.
missed: Hardisty v. Hinton & Alfert (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 999 — A stipulated reversal of a sanctions order against an attorney should be denied under CCP § 128(a)(8) because the public and the State Bar have an interest in attorney sanctions orders that would be adversely affected by nullifying them.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court correctly identified the governing framework for stipulated reversals (Neary as modified by CCP § 128(a)(8)) and correctly vacated the premature dismissal order under Sonoqui and Varian, so the result is defensible. But its section 128(a)(8) findings are conclusory, it did not confront the public interest in preserving a sanctions order against counsel large enough to trigger State Bar reporting or the published authority refusing stipulated reversal in that setting, and it did not address appealability of the order compelling discovery.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition record incomplete

Opinion

Filed 7/15/16 Williams v. Nordstrom, Inc. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

JOENATHAN WILLIAMS, D069051

Plaintiff and Appellant, v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2014-00007604- CU-CR-CTL) NORDSTROM, INC., Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Judith F.

Hayes, Judge. Reversed.

The McMillan Law Firm, Scott A. McMillan and Marilyn S. Phelps for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Haight, Brown & Bonsteel, S. Christian Stouder and Elizabeth Trent Schaus for Defendant and Respondent.

The parties have stipulated the superior court's August 7, 2015 discovery order compelling discovery responses and imposing sanctions on Plaintiff JoeNathan Williams and his counsel of record be reversed, that the matter be remanded to the superior court, and that each party bear its own costs on appeal.

In Neary v. Regents of University of California (1992) 3 Cal.4th 273 (Neary), the Supreme Court held that "when the parties to an action agree to settle their dispute and as part of their settlement stipulate to a reversal of the trial court judgment, the Court of Appeal should grant their request for the stipulated reversal absent a showing of extraordinary circumstances that warrant an exception to this general rule. Any determination that such circumstances exist must be made on a case-by-case basis." (Id.

at p. 284.)

After Neary, the Legislature modified the appellate court's power to accept a stipulated reversal. Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(8) provides that an appellate court may not accept a stipulated reversal or vacation unless it finds both of the following: "(A) There is no reasonable possibility that the interests of nonparties or the public will be adversely affected by the reversal. (B) The reasons of the parties for requesting reversal outweigh the erosion of public trust that may result from the nullification of a judgment and the risk that the availability of stipulated reversal will reduce the incentive for pretrial settlement."

This appeal is taken from the August 7, 2015 order on the parties' competing discovery motions. The superior court compelled Williams to provide additional discovery responses and imposed $14,419 in discovery sanctions on Williams and his counsel of record, of which $1,000 was payable within 20 days. After Williams filed this appeal, the parties executed a Settlement Agreement settling the entire case. Among the 2 terms of the Settlement Agreement was the joint submission of the present stipulated request for reversal of the August 7, 2015 discovery order.

The court is satisfied there is no reasonable probability the interests of nonparties or the public will be adversely affected by the reversal. Further, the private settlement and reversal of the court's August 7, 2015 order does not in the circumstances of this case erode the public trust or reduce the incentive for pretrial settlement.

As a separate matter, we address the propriety of the superior court's June 16, 2016 order dismissing the entire action without prejudice on account of the parties' settlement.

On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the June 16th order and conclude the superior court exceeded its jurisdiction by dismissing the action while appeal of the August 7, 2015 discovery order remained pending. (People v. Sonoqui (1934) 1 Cal.2d 364, 367 ["pending an appeal the trial court may not dismiss the action, even with the consent of all the parties"]; Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 190 [an appeal stays trial court proceedings "if the possible outcomes on appeal and the actual or possible results of the proceeding are irreconcilable"] (Varian).) Because the court acted in excess of its jurisdiction, its dismissal order is " 'void on its face.' "

(Varian, at p. 200.) We therefore vacate the June 16, 2016 dismissal order. The superior court may issue a new dismissal order following remittitur.

3 DISPOSITION

We reverse the August 7, 2015 order compelling discovery responses and imposing sanctions on Williams and his counsel of record; we vacate the June 16, 2016 dismissal order; and we remand the matter to the superior court. The remittitur shall issue immediately. Following remittitur, the superior court may issue a new dismissal order. Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.

McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

BENKE, J.

NARES, J.

Cites, in this corpus

Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino S121400 · 2005-03-03
Neary v. Regents of University of California S020515 · 1992-08-13
People v. Sonoqui Crim. 3692 · 1934-07-28