In re T.C. CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from an order
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. J235509
- Trial judge
- Roderick Shelton
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed.
- Area
- delinquency
- Panel
- Judith L. Haller (author), Alex C. McDonald, Joan K. Irion
Analysis
The juvenile court denied the minor's motion to seal the records of her first delinquency petition, finding she had not satisfactorily completed probation for that specific offense. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the statute requires a specific finding of satisfactory completion for each petition and the record did not support such a finding for the first petition.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of motion to dismiss and seal records for Petition G6762“In summary, there is no indication in the record that Minor satisfactorily completed probation for her first offense, and the court correctly declined to seal records relating to her first petition.” | de novo | correct | agree with court The appellate court correctly applied the plain language of former Welfare and Institutions Code section 786, which mandates sealing only upon a finding that the minor satisfactorily completed probation for the specific offense in the petition. The court properly relied on *In re Y.A.* to reject the argument that completion of probation for a later, unrelated petition automatically triggers sealing of prior records. The factual finding that the trial court did not make the requisite finding for the first petition is supported by the record, as the probation officer did not recommend it and the trial court explicitly limited its finding to the second petition. |
Authorities
- relied: In re Y.A. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 523 — Former section 786 does not authorize sealing records of a prior petition based merely on a minor's satisfactorily completing probation for an offense alleged in a later-filed petition.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly interprets the statutory requirement for individual findings of satisfactory probation completion for each petition. It effectively distinguishes the two unrelated petitions and relies on binding precedent (*In re Y.A.*) to reject the minor's argument that joint supervision or completion of a later petition implies completion of the earlier one.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe juvenile court, after finding T.C. had satisfactorily completed probation on her second petition (G7823) and sealing those records, denied her later motion to dismiss and seal the records of her first petition (G6762), stating it only seals open petitions. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that former Welfare and Institutions Code section 786 required a finding of satisfactory completion of probation on the offense in the particular petition, no such finding was made or supported for the first petition, and the record did not show the court mistakenly believed the first petition was already dismissed.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of Minor's motion to dismiss and seal the records of her first petition (G6762) under former Welfare and Institutions Code section 786“Former section 786 does not authorize a juvenile court to seal the records of a prior petition based merely on a minor's satisfactorily completing probation for an offense alleged in a later-filed petition.” | mixed | correct | agree with court The court read the plain text of former section 786, which ties mandatory dismissal and sealing to satisfactory completion of probation for the offense alleged in 'that' petition, and relied on In re Y.A., which held the former statute contains no reference to prior petitions. The record showed the September 2015 satisfactory-completion finding was limited to G7823, the probation officer recommended sealing only that petition, and Minor sustained a new offense while on probation for the first petition, so no satisfactory completion finding could be implied for G6762. The result follows from the statute and the cited authority. |
Refusal to remand on the ground the juvenile court mistakenly believed the first petition was already dismissed or 'closed' when it denied the sealing request“Viewed in context, we are satisfied the court did not believe the first petition was already dismissed.” | unclear | correct | agree with court The trial court's remark 'I only seal the open ones' is ambiguous and counsel's reference to a 'closed petition' could have invited confusion, so the appellate court's reading of the colloquy is somewhat generous. However, the appellate court correctly reasoned that any misimpression was immaterial because the dispositive September finding of satisfactory completion was expressly limited to G7823, and nothing in the record could support a satisfactory-completion finding for G6762 given the sustained second petition; remand would therefore be futile under former section 786. |
Authorities
- relied: In re Y.A. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 523 — Former Welfare and Institutions Code section 786 required a finding that the minor satisfactorily completed probation for the offense alleged in the specific petition before its records could be sealed, and did not authorize sealing a prior petition based on completion of probation on a later petition; combined supervision of probation terms is irrelevant.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion applies the plain language of former section 786 and the directly on-point Y.A. decision, and its conclusion that no satisfactory-completion finding existed for the first petition is well supported by the record of a new sustained offense during that probation. It does not state a standard of review, treats the trial court's ambiguous 'open ones' remark somewhat generously, and, while noting Minor may seek relief under section 781, does not discuss whether the version of section 786 in effect by the time of decision gave the juvenile court discretion to seal prior petitions, which bears on the practical remedy available to Minor.
Opinion
Filed 7/12/16 In re T.C. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re T.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. D068983 THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. J235509)
v. T.C., Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Roderick Shelton, Judge. Affirmed.
Rex A. Williams, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Peter Quon, Jr. and Anthony Da Silva, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. In 2014, the district attorney filed two petitions against T.C. (Minor) for unrelated incidents. For each petition, the juvenile court declared Minor a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 6021 and placed or continued her on probation. In 2015, the court found that Minor satisfactorily completed her terms of probation for the offense alleged in the later-filed petition and sealed the records relating to that petition, but denied her request to seal the records relating to her first petition. Minor contends the court was misinformed about the first petition's status when it denied her request and former section 7862 required the court to seal the records pertaining to her first petition.
We conclude the court did not err and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Petition No. 1: G6762 In May 2014, Minor was found driving a stolen vehicle. She subsequently admitted a felony offense (Pen. Code, § 496d) alleged in petition G6762, and the juvenile court declared her a ward. The court placed Minor on probation, imposed a number of conditions relating to her probation, and ordered her to obey all federal, state, county, and city laws.
1 Subsequent unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2 Subsequent unspecified references to "former section 786" are to the version effective January 1, 2015, to December 31, 2015. (Stats. 2014, ch. 249, § 2, p. 2506.)
2 Petition No. 2: G7823 Several months later while on probation for her prior offense, a campus security officer found Minor carrying a knife on school grounds. She ran away from the officer before he could detain her in the school's office. The district attorney filed a new petition (G7823) against Minor. In addition to one count of possessing a knife on school grounds (Pen. Code, § 626.10, subd. (a)(1)), the petition alleges she violated the terms of probation on her prior offense and her performance on probation had been unsatisfactory.
Minor admitted the knife possession offense, and the court sustained the petition. The court continued Minor's wardship, placed her on probation, imposed new terms and conditions, and ordered her to complete several classes and community service.
By the September 2015 annual review hearing, Minor's probation officer recommended sealing the records for G7823, noting her satisfactory compliance with probation terms. The probation officer's report informed the court that Minor had sustained a true finding on her knife possession offense while she was on probation for her prior felony; however, Minor reportedly demonstrated progress in 2015 and earned passing grades in school. Accepting the probation department's recommendations, the juvenile court found that Minor had satisfactorily completed the terms and conditions of probation for petition G7823, dismissed it, ordered that "the arrest upon which G7823 is based is deemed never to have occurred[,]" sealed all records relating to her current petition, and terminated jurisdiction.
3 Motion to Dismiss and Seal First Petition At an October 2015 hearing, Minor moved to "dismiss and seal petition G6762."
Her counsel stated "this is one of those situations where the minor successfully completed probation," recapped the court's dismissal and sealing of Minor's most recent petition, and requested that G6762, which she referred to as Minor's "closed petition," be dismissed and sealed as well. The court responded: "I'm not going to seal that one. They have to file a motion. I only seal the open ones." Counsel then requested "a minute order that reflects the court's denial of my motion."
Minor timely appealed the order denying her motion to seal the records pertaining to her first petition, G6762.
DISCUSSION
Minor contends the juvenile court erred by not sealing her first petition under former section 786 based on its mistaken impression that the first petition was already dismissed or "closed" by October 2015. She also argues the court's September 2015 finding of her satisfactorily completing probation necessarily applied to both the first and second petitions.
Former section 786 provides in pertinent part: "If the minor satisfactorily completes . . . a term of probation for any offense not listed in subdivision (b) of Section 707, the court shall order the petition dismissed, and the arrest upon which the judgment was deferred shall be deemed not to have occurred. The court shall order sealed all records pertaining to that dismissed petition in the custody of the juvenile court. . . ."
(Italics added.)
4 When the sealing order was issued, the unambiguous language of former section 786 required the court to seal records pertaining to a petition based upon first finding that the minor satisfactorily completed probation for an offense alleged in the petition. (In re Y.A. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 523, 526-527 (Y.A.).) Former section 786 does not authorize a juvenile court to seal the records of a prior petition based merely on a minor's satisfactorily completing probation for an offense alleged in a later-filed petition. (Y.A., at p. 527 ["Nowhere in the statute is there any reference to a prior petition."].) The fact that a minor's probation terms for offenses alleged in different petitions are combined or jointly supervised is not relevant to the sealing inquiry under section 786. (See Y.A., at p. 527.)
Based on our review of the record, only Minor's last petition qualified for sealing under former section 786. At Minor's annual review hearing, her probation officer did not request or recommend the dismissal and sealing of her first petition despite summarizing her performance on probation for both offenses. The court accordingly limited its satisfactory completion of probation finding to the knife possession offense alleged in G7823, commending Minor on her improved classwork, which occurred in 2015 after she was continued on probation for her second offense. The court did not find that Minor satisfactorily completed probation for her first offense, and there is nothing in the record to suggest she successfully did so given her sustained second petition.
Minor argues remand is required based on the court's erroneous belief the first petition was already dismissed when it denied her request. We disagree remand is required. Viewed in context, we are satisfied the court did not believe the first petition 5 was already dismissed. Counsel explicitly and repeatedly stated that she was moving to "dismiss and seal" the first petition, which would seemingly refute any notion the petition was already dismissed. In any event, the record indicates the court decided in September that Minor satisfactorily completed probation for only her last offense, knowing Minor was on probation for two different and unrelated offenses. Based on the October 2015 colloquy, which occurred after the court terminated jurisdiction, Minor's primary objective was merely to preserve her appellate argument; the court's September finding remained unchanged.
In summary, there is no indication in the record that Minor satisfactorily completed probation for her first offense, and the court correctly declined to seal records relating to her first petition. Minor retains the ability to request sealing for those records at a later date. (See § 781; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.830.)
DISPOSITION
The order denying Minor's motion to seal G6762 is affirmed.
HALLER, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
McDONALD, J.
IRION, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Y.A. D068405 · 2016-04-14