In re Devon A. CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D068543 · 2016-06-20 · Unpublished

Proceeding: appeal from a judgment
Trial court: Superior Court of San Diego County · No. J225688
Trial judge: Robert J. Trentacosta
Outcome: affirmed — Affirmed.
Area: delinquency
Panel: Judith L. Haller (author), Alex C. McDonald, Joan K. Irion

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T05:47Z · confidence high

The trial court sealed the juvenile records for the minor's second petition but declined to seal the records for a prior, dismissed petition because the minor did not request it and the applicable statute did not mandate retroactive sealing. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the statute requiring sealing upon completion of probation or informal supervision applies prospectively only and does not require the court to seal records from petitions dismissed before the statute's effective date.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
The juvenile court's order sealing records only for the current petition (G6574) and not the prior dismissed petition (F4525). “We conclude the court did not err and affirm.”	de novo	correct	agree with court The appellate court correctly applied the presumption against retroactivity, noting that the statute's plain language links dismissal and sealing prospectively and contains no explicit retroactive intent. The court properly identified that the minor had an alternative remedy under Section 781, making the trial court's refusal to seal the older records under Section 786 legally sound.

Authorities

relied: People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641 — A new or amended statute applies prospectively only, unless the Legislature clearly expresses an intent that it operate retroactively.
relied: Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188 — It is an established canon of interpretation that statutes are not to be given a retrospective operation unless it is clearly made to appear that such was the legislative intent.
relied: Green v. State of California (2007) 42 Cal.4th 254 — The statute's plain meaning controls the court's interpretation unless its words are ambiguous; if unambiguous, no court need go beyond that pure expression of legislative intent.
relied: In re Y.A. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 523 — The plain language of section 786 does not support the proposition that it was intended to be a panacea for all sealing issues.
relied: People v. Connor (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 669 — Courts may not interpret a statute in a way that effectively adds provisions or rewrites it to conform to an assumed intent that does not appear from its plain language.
relied: In re G.Y. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1196 — The right to have juvenile records sealed is governed by section 781.
relied: In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875 — Appellate courts may exercise discretion to consider a legal question even if the issue was not raised in the trial court (waiver/forfeiture context).

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the standard presumption against retroactivity and relies on the plain language of the statute to conclude that no retroactive sealing was required. It also appropriately notes the availability of Section 781 as an alternative remedy, addressing the practical impact of its ruling.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:30Z · confidence low

The juvenile court, after finding that the minor satisfactorily completed probation on his 2014 petition (G6574), dismissed that petition and sealed the records pertaining to it under Welfare and Institutions Code section 786, but did not seal the records of a 2010 petition (F4525) that had been dismissed in 2011 after the minor completed informal supervision under section 654.2. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the version of section 786 effective January 1, 2015 operates prospectively only and did not require or authorize sealing of a petition dismissed before the statute's effective date, while noting that section 781 remains available to the minor.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Order sealing only the records of the current petition (G6574) under section 786 and not sealing the records of the previously dismissed 2010 petition (F4525). “The juvenile court did not misconstrue the scope of section 786 and properly limited its sealing order to Minor's most recent petition, G6574.”	de novo	correct	agree with court The issue is pure statutory interpretation, which the court effectively reviewed independently. The 2015 version of section 786 ties mandatory sealing to the dismissal that occurs upon satisfactory completion of informal supervision or probation; it contains no language extending sealing to petitions dismissed years earlier, and the presumption against retroactivity (Ledesma, Evangelatos) applies absent a clear expression of legislative intent. The F4525 petition was dismissed in 2011 and that disposition was long final, so even the Estrada rule for nonfinal cases would not help the minor. The court also correctly noted section 781 provides an existing remedy. The court reached the merits despite a valid forfeiture argument, which is within its discretion under Sheena K.

Authorities

relied: People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641 — A new or amended statute applies prospectively only unless the Legislature clearly expresses an intent that it operate retroactively.
relied: Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188 — Statutes are not given retrospective operation unless legislative intent to do so clearly appears.
relied: Green v. State of California (2007) 42 Cal.4th 254 — Courts give statutory words their usual and ordinary meaning; unambiguous plain language controls and courts need not go beyond it.
relied: In re Y.A. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 523 — The plain language of section 786 does not support treating it as a panacea for all juvenile record sealing issues; it does not reach petitions dismissed before its effective date.
relied: People v. Connor (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 669 — Courts may not interpret a statute so as to add provisions or rewrite it to conform to an assumed intent not appearing in its plain language.
relied: In re G.Y. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1196 — The right to have juvenile records sealed is governed by section 781.
relied: In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875 — An appellate court has discretion to reach a forfeited claim that presents a pure question of law.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion correctly applies the presumption against retroactivity and the plain-language rule to the 2015 version of section 786, and its reliance on In re Y.A. and the continued availability of section 781 relief supports the result. It does not expressly address the In re Estrada line of authority on retroactive application of ameliorative statutes to nonfinal cases, though that omission is immaterial because the 2011 dismissal was long final before section 786 took effect.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 6/20/16 In re Devon A. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re DEVON A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. D068543 THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. J225688)

v. DEVON A., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Robert J.

Trentacosta, Judge. Affirmed.

Heather L. Beugen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal and Michael Pulos, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. In 2010, the district attorney filed a petition against Devon A. (Minor), which was dismissed a year later after Minor completed an informal program of supervision. In 2014, the district attorney filed a new petition against Minor for an unrelated incident.

The court declared him a ward under Welfare and Institutions Code section 6021 and placed him on probation. In 2015, the court found that Minor satisfactorily completed the terms of probation for his latest offense and sealed the records relating to it. The court did not seal the records relating to his first, previously dismissed petition. Minor contends the court erred by not sealing the records pertaining to his prior dismissed petition under section 786.2 We conclude the court did not err and affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. Petition No. 1: F4525 In 2010, the district attorney filed petition F4525 against then-12-year-old Minor, alleging he had a switchblade on school grounds in violation of Penal Code section 626.10, subdivision (a). The juvenile court ordered Minor to participate in an informal program of supervision under section 654.2. In 2011, the court found that Minor had complied with the terms of his informal program and dismissed the petition under section 782.

1 Subsequent unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2 Subsequent unspecified references to section 786 are to the version effective January 1, 2015, to December 31, 2015. (Stats. 2014, ch. 249, § 2, p. 2506.)

2 2. Petition No. 2: G6574 In May 2014, the district attorney filed a new petition, G6574, against Minor, alleging the offense of petty theft (Pen. Code, § 484). Minor admitted the offense, and the court declared him a ward and placed him on probation. Minor subsequently tested positive for marijuana use, and in October, was ordered to participate in drug court. On June 1, 2015, the court commended Minor on graduating from drug court, found that he had successfully complied with his conditions of probation, dismissed petition G6574, and requested that Minor's probation officer submit a recommendation regarding the sealing of records. On June 9, the court followed the probation officer's unopposed recommendation and sealed Minor's records relating to his current petition, G6574. The probation officer did not recommend, and Minor did not request, sealing the records relating to Minor's first, previously dismissed petition.

Minor timely appealed the court's June 9, 2015 order on the ground that records pertaining to his prior petition, F4525, were not sealed.

DISCUSSION

Minor contends the juvenile court erred by not sealing the records relating to his first dismissed petition for which he completed an informal program of supervision.

According to Minor, the version of section 786 that became effective on January 1, 2015, required the court to seal his prior petition. The People respond that the court had no 3 power to apply section 786 retroactively to seal a petition that was dismissed in 2011, prior to the statute's effective date.3 We agree with the People.

We are guided by the well-established rule that a "new or amended statute applies prospectively only, unless the Legislature clearly expresses an intent that it operate retroactively." (People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 664; see Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1207 [" '[it] is an established canon of interpretation that statutes are not to be given a retrospective operation unless it is clearly made to appear that such was the legislative intent' "].)

Furthermore, to ascertain the Legislature's intent, "we must look to the statute's words and give them their usual and ordinary meaning. [Citation.] The statute's plain meaning controls the court's interpretation unless its words are ambiguous. If the plain language of a statute is unambiguous, no court need, or should, go beyond that pure expression of legislative intent." (Green v. State of California (2007) 42 Cal.4th 254, 260.)

Applying the above principles, we conclude the juvenile court did not err because section 786 does not operate retroactively. Section 786 became effective on January 1, 2015, and provides in pertinent part:

"If the minor satisfactorily completes (a) an informal program of supervision pursuant to Section 654.2, . . . or (c) a term of probation for any offense not listed in subdivision (b) of Section 707, the court 3 The People preliminarily argue that Minor forfeited his claim since he never requested the juvenile court to seal his prior petition. The People's argument regarding forfeiture is well taken, however, we will exercise our discretion to consider the legal question presented. (See In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 887.) 4 shall order the petition dismissed, and the arrest upon which the judgment was deferred shall be deemed not to have occurred. The court shall order sealed all records pertaining to that dismissed petition in the custody of the juvenile court . . . ." (Italics added.)

Section 786 does not contain any language permitting a court to seal records pertaining to a petition that was dismissed prior to the statute's enactment, and instead, the plain and unambiguous language describes dismissal and sealing together, prospectively. Minor fails to identify any ambiguous or uncertain statutory language.

Contrary to Minor's position, the Legislature has not expressed an intent for the automatic sealing provisions of section 786 to operate retroactively. (See In re Y.A.

(2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 523, 527 ["[T]he plain language of section 786 does not support the proposition that it was intended to be a panacea for all sealing issues."].) Courts may not interpret a statute in a way that effectively adds provisions or rewrites it to conform to an assumed intent that does not appear from its plain language. (People v. Connor (2004)

115 Cal.App.4th 669, 692.) Before and after the enactment of section 786, section 781 has provided a method for individuals to petition the court to seal their juvenile records.4 (§ 781; In re G.Y. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1196, 1200 ["The right to have juvenile records sealed is governed by section 781."].) The juvenile court did not misconstrue the scope of section 786 and properly limited its sealing order to Minor's most recent petition, G6574.

4 As the People state, the remedy found in section 781 and California Rules of Court, rule 5.830 is currently available to Minor, who has reached the age of 18. 5 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

HALLER, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

McDONALD, J.

IRION, J.

Cites, in this corpus

People v. Y.A. D068405 · 2016-04-14
People v. G.Y. H040722 · 2015-03-03
Green v. State S137770 · 2007-08-23
People v. Ledesma S014394 · 2006-08-17
People v. Connor H024743 · 2004-02-06
Evangelatos v. Superior Court S000194 · 1988-04-21