gno.law

People v. Poole CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D067249 · 2016-05-04 · Unpublished

Proceeding
appeal from a judgment
Trial court
Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCS274807
Trial judge
Dwayne K. Moring
Outcome
affirmed — Affirmed.
Area
criminal
Panel
McINTYRE (author), Richard D. Huffman, Sr., Judith D. McConnell

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T05:51Z · confidence high

The trial court denied Poole's motion to represent himself, finding the request untimely and based on dissatisfaction with counsel rather than a clear desire to waive the right to counsel. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the denial was within the trial court's discretion because the motion was made on the day of trial and the Windham factors weighed against granting it.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Denial of motion to represent himself (Faretta motion)
“We therefore affirm the trial court's denial of the Faretta motion as within the court's discretion.”
abuse of discretioncorrectagree with court
The appellate court correctly applied the standard of review for untimely Faretta motions, which is abuse of discretion. The court relied on established California precedent (People v. Clark, People v. Windham) to determine that a motion made on the day of trial is untimely and subject to the trial court's discretion. The court properly identified that the trial court considered the relevant Windham factors, such as the defendant's dissatisfaction with counsel and the potential for delay, which supported the denial. The reasoning is consistent with binding California authority regarding the timeliness and discretion involved in self-representation requests.

Authorities

  • relied: Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 — Defendants have a constitutional right to represent themselves in criminal trials.
  • relied: People v. Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693 — A trial court must grant a motion for self-representation if the request is knowing, intelligent, unequivocal, and timely.
  • relied: People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41 — A knowing, intelligent, and unequivocal motion for self-representation made after the reasonable time prior to trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.
  • relied: People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121 — In exercising discretion over untimely Faretta motions, courts should consider factors such as the quality of counsel, the defendant's prior proclivity to substitute counsel, reasons for the request, and potential disruption or delay.
  • relied: People v. Scott (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1197 — Motions for self-representation made just prior to the start of trial are not timely.
  • relied: People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843 — A Faretta request made when the case is called for trial and counsel is ready is within the court's discretion to deny.
  • relied: People v. Moore (1988) 47 Cal.3d 63 — A Faretta motion on the day trial is set to begin is within the court's discretion to deny.
  • relied: People v. Hill (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 744 — A Faretta motion made five days before trial is untimely.
  • relied: People v. Ruiz (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 780 — A Faretta motion made six days before trial is untimely.
  • relied: People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390 — A trial court may not measure a defendant's competence to waive the right to counsel by evaluating technical legal knowledge or ability to represent himself.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the established legal standard that untimely Faretta motions are subject to the trial court's discretion. It properly cites binding California authority to support the conclusion that a motion made on the day of trial is untimely and that the Windham factors supported the denial.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:30Z · confidence medium

The trial court denied Juan Poole's Faretta motion for self-representation, made on the day set for trial after three unsuccessful Marsden motions, finding the request untimely, grounded in dissatisfaction with counsel, and likely to require delay given Poole's unfamiliarity with the law and jury instructions. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding the day-of-trial motion was untimely and therefore addressed to the trial court's discretion, which was properly exercised under the Windham factors.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Finding that the Faretta motion, made on the day set for trial, was untimely and therefore addressed to the trial court's discretion rather than mandatory
“The court properly found Poole's request for self-representation was untimely because Poole made it on the date the case was set for trial.”
unclearcorrectagree with court
Supreme Court authority (Clark, Burton, Moore) and Court of Appeal cases (Scott, Hill, Ruiz) uniformly treat Faretta requests made on the eve of or day of trial as untimely and discretionary; Poole made no earlier request despite three Marsden hearings. The conclusion follows directly from the cited authorities.
Discretionary denial of the untimely Faretta motion based on the Windham factors (dissatisfaction with counsel as the motive, counsel's readiness versus defendant's need for further preparation and an evidentiary hearing, resulting delay)
“The trial court properly evaluated factors weighing against granting Poole's Faretta motion, including that Poole had been displeased with his attorney and his request to represent himself was based on that dissatisfaction.”
abuse of discretioncorrectagree with court
Windham expressly lists the reasons for the request, proclivity to substitute counsel, stage of proceedings, and anticipated delay as proper considerations; Poole's three prior Marsden motions, his statement that he was being forced into self-representation by counsel's failings, and his request for an evidentiary hearing on 'many issues with the evidence' support each factor. The appellate court's inference about counsel's readiness is reasonable, though the opinion did not squarely say whether the trial court's reliance on Poole's lack of legal knowledge was itself improper under Doolin, instead noting that the untimeliness made the motion discretionary.

Authorities

  • relied: Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 — Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right of self-representation.
  • relied: People v. Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693 — A Faretta motion must be granted if knowing, intelligent, unequivocal, and made within a reasonable time before trial commences.
  • relied: People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41 — An untimely (eve-of-trial) Faretta request is addressed to the trial court's sound discretion.
  • relied: People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121 — Factors governing discretionary denial of an untimely Faretta motion: quality of counsel, proclivity to substitute counsel, reasons for the request, stage of proceedings, and likely disruption or delay.
  • relied: People v. Scott (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1197 — Faretta motions made just before the start of trial are untimely.
  • relied: People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843 — Faretta request made after the case was called for trial and counsel answered ready is directed to the trial court's discretion.
  • relied: People v. Moore (1988) 47 Cal.3d 63 — Faretta motion on the day trial was set to begin may be denied in the court's discretion even if trial is later continued.
  • relied: People v. Hill (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 744 — Faretta motion made five days before trial was untimely.
  • relied: People v. Ruiz (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 780 — Faretta motion made six days before trial was untimely.
  • relied: People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390 — A court may not judge a defendant's competence to waive counsel by his technical legal knowledge or ability to represent himself.
  • relied: People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 — Procedure for a defendant's motion to substitute appointed counsel for inadequate representation.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion correctly identifies the controlling framework—day-of-trial Faretta motions are untimely and reviewed for abuse of discretion—and ties each Windham factor to record facts, answering both of Poole's arguments. It leaves a small gap by not expressly stating whether the trial court's reliance on Poole's unfamiliarity with the law was improper under Doolin (resolving the point only by pivoting to timeliness), and it does not note that Poole's stated willingness to accept a different attorney could also have rendered the request equivocal.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 5/4/16 P. v. Poole CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D067249

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCS274807)

JUAN LATREZ POOLE II,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Dwayne K. Moring, Judge. Affirmed.

Janice R. Mazur, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Randall E. Einhorn and Peter Quon, Jr., Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Juan Latrez Poole II appeals a judgment of conviction for unlawfully taking a vehicle and grand theft of a vehicle. Poole contends the trial court erred in denying his request to represent himself at trial pursuant to Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta). We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In September 2014, three men parked their company's van outside of a restaurant and left the keys in it while they went inside for lunch. (Undesignated date references are to the year 2014.) While eating, the men saw an unfamiliar male get into the van and drive away. A good Samaritan followed the van to a nearby motel. Police eventually apprehended Poole for the crime.

The People charged Poole with unlawful taking and driving of a vehicle, grand theft of a vehicle, and possessing less than 28.5 grams of marijuana. The People also alleged that Poole had four probation denial priors and a prison prior for computer fraud, auto theft, and grand theft of a vehicle. The People ultimately dismissed the marijuana charge.

Between October 3 and November 26, Poole requested new counsel three times pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118. After hearings on the matters, the trial court denied all three motions. On December 3, the day set for trial to commence, Poole requested to represent himself. The court provided Poole a form "Acknowledgment Regarding Self-Representation and Waiver of Right to Counsel."

After Poole completed the form, the trial court reviewed it and engaged in a discussion with Poole regarding its contents.

When the court inquired as to whether Poole understood the consequences of representing himself, Poole repeatedly stated that he believed he was being forced to 2 represent himself as a result of his counsel's inadequacies. Poole explained that his counsel had not provided him with transcripts and court minutes and had not obtained certain evidence despite his requests that she do so. Poole suggested that he was willing to have a different attorney.

In response to the court's inquiries, Poole confirmed that he understood the charges against him and potential penalties. When the court informed Poole that he would be governed by the same rules as an attorney, Poole stated that he understood, but was not versed in the law and was not familiar with jury instructions or how to present them. Poole also questioned how he would be able to bring forth exculpatory evidence that had been "neglected" in the case given that trial was scheduled to proceed that day.

When the court inquired as to whether Poole was ready to proceed with trial that day, Poole responded that he was "ready to go," but went on to state that he was requesting an evidentiary hearing because "there's many issues with the evidence that's being presented in this case that was not acquired and does not meet the Evidence Code."

The trial court denied Poole's Faretta motion, noting Poole was unfamiliar with the law and jury instructions, his request was based on his dissatisfaction with his attorney, and his attorney was ready to proceed with trial. The trial court also found the motion was untimely as it was made on the day set for trial.

DISCUSSION

Under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, defendants have a right to represent themselves in criminal trials. (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 819.) A trial court must grant a defendant's motion for self-representation if the request is 3 knowing, intelligent, unequivocal, and timely, that is, made within "a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial." (People v. Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693, 721, 722.)

A knowing, intelligent, and unequivocal motion made after this period is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. (People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 98 (Clark).) In exercising its discretion, the court should consider factors such as "quality of counsel's representation of the defendant, the defendant's prior proclivity to substitute counsel, the reasons for the request, the length and stage of the proceedings, and the disruption or delay which might reasonably be expected to follow the granting of such a motion."

(People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 128, 129 (Windham).)

Motions for self-representation made just prior to the start of trial are not timely.

(People v. Scott (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1205; Clark, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 99-100 ["eve of trial" self-representation request was within the court's discretion to deny];

People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843, 852-853 [Faretta request was clearly directed to the trial court's discretion where the case had been called for trial, both counsel had answered ready, and defendant asserted he needed unspecified period for preparation];

People v. Moore (1988) 47 Cal.3d 63, 80-81 [Faretta motion on the day trial was set to begin would be well within the court's discretion to deny even though the trial was continued beyond that date]; People v. Hill (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 744, 757-758 [Faretta motion made five days before trial was untimely]; People v. Ruiz (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 780, 791 [Faretta motion made six days before trial was untimely].)

Poole argues the trial court erred in denying his motion based on his purported unfamiliarity with the law. While "a trial court may not measure a defendant's 4 competence to waive his right to counsel by evaluating the defendant's 'technical legal knowledge' [citation] or his ability to represent himself." (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 454), defendant's motion must be timely. The court properly found Poole's request for self-representation was untimely because Poole made it on the date the case was set for trial. Significantly, there is no indication that Poole tried to make a Faretta request at any point prior to the date set for trial, including at the time the trial court denied any of his three Marsden motions. Where a Faretta motion is untimely, it is addressed to the "sound discretion of the trial court." (Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p.

128.)

The trial court properly evaluated factors weighing against granting Poole's Faretta motion, including that Poole had been displeased with his attorney and his request to represent himself was based on that dissatisfaction. (Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 128.) The trial court also noted that Poole's counsel was ready to proceed with trial. Poole argues the trial court improperly considered his counsel's level of preparedness. However, given Poole's request for an evidentiary hearing to resolve "many issues with the evidence," we infer that the trial court was contrasting counsel's readiness to proceed with trial versus Poole's readiness. The court noted that allowing Poole to represent himself at that point would require additional time for preparation and investigation. Potential disruption or delay that may result from granting a Faretta motion is a proper consideration. (Windham, at pp. 128-129.) In sum, the Windham factors militated against granting Poole's untimely request to represent himself in propria 5 persona. We therefore affirm the trial court's denial of the Faretta motion as within the court's discretion.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

McINTYRE, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

HUFFMAN, J.

Cites, in this corpus