In re John L. CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D068410 · 2016-04-29 · Unpublished

Proceeding: appeal from a judgment
Trial court: Superior Court of San Diego County · No. J234303
Trial judge: Browder A. Willis III
Outcome: affirmed — Affirmed.
Area: delinquency
Panel: Judith L. Haller (author), Alex C. McDonald, Joan K. Irion

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T05:51Z · confidence high

The juvenile court dismissed and sealed the records of the minor's second petition (G6253) after he satisfactorily completed probation for that specific offense, but declined to seal the records of his prior petition (G5243). The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that Welfare and Institutions Code section 786 requires a specific finding of satisfactory probation completion for the offense alleged in the petition to be sealed, which was not present for the prior petition.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
The juvenile court's decision to seal only the records of the second petition (G6253) and not the prior petition (G5243). “Under section 786, a juvenile court may not seal the records of a prior petition based merely on a minor's satisfactorily completing probation for an offense alleged in a later-filed petition.”	de novo	correct	agree with court agree with court

Authorities

relied: People v. Lopez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1051 — In construing a statute, the court's role is to ascertain legislative intent, looking first to the words of the statute as the most reliable indicator; if language is clear, plain meaning governs.
relied: People v. Cochran (2002) 28 Cal.4th 396 — If there is no ambiguity in statutory language, the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said, and legislative history is not necessary.
relied: People v. Connor (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 669 — Courts may not add provisions to a statute or rewrite it to conform to an assumed intent that does not appear from its plain language.
relied: Gorham Co., Inc. v. First Financial Ins. Co. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1532 — Courts should disregard unambiguous statutory language only in 'extreme cases' where, as a matter of law, the Legislature did not intend the statute to have its literal effect.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion correctly applies the plain meaning rule to Welfare and Institutions Code section 786, noting that the statute ties the sealing of records to the specific petition for which probation was satisfactorily completed. The court properly rejects the argument that completing probation for a later offense automatically seals prior records, citing the lack of a finding of satisfactory completion for the prior offense and the prohibition against judicial rewriting of statutes.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:30Z · confidence low

The juvenile court terminated wardship, found John L. had satisfactorily completed probation on his later-filed petition (G6253), and dismissed and sealed that petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 786 while declining to seal the records of his earlier elder-abuse petition (G5243). The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the plain language of the 2015 version of section 786 limits mandatory sealing to the petition on which the minor satisfactorily completed probation and that the record contained no finding of satisfactory completion on the prior petition.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Interpretation of section 786 (2015 version) as authorizing sealing only of the petition whose probation term was satisfactorily completed, not prior petitions “The court correctly sealed the records relating to that offense alone.”	de novo	correct	agree with court The court did not expressly state a standard but applied the de novo plain-meaning methodology of People v. Lopez and People v. Cochran to the statutory text, which ties sealing to 'that dismissed petition.' The reading is faithful to the words of the 2015 statute, consistent with the same division's published decision in In re Y.A., and the refusal to add language is supported by People v. Connor and Gorham. Minor's counsel conceded below that section 786 did not reach 'all petitions.' The result is correct under the statute as it stood at the 2015 hearing, though the opinion does not address the January 1, 2016 amendment to section 786 that was in effect when the appeal was decided.
Rejection of Minor's claim that the juvenile court 'necessarily' found satisfactory completion of probation on the prior petition “Based on our review of the record, the court did not find that Minor satisfactorily completed probation for the offense alleged in his prior petition.”	substantial evidence	correct	agree with court The record showed Minor committed a new offense (battery on a school employee) while on probation for the prior petition, the probation officer sought sealing only of G6253, and the court expressly sealed only the 'most recent petition.' Nothing supports an implied finding of satisfactory completion on G5243, so the appellate court's reading of the record is sound.

Authorities

relied: People v. Lopez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1051 — Courts ascertain legislative intent first from the statutory words; if the language is clear and unambiguous, its plain meaning governs.
relied: People v. Cochran (2002) 28 Cal.4th 396 — Where statutory language is unambiguous the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said and resort to legislative history is unnecessary.
relied: In re Y.A. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 523 — Under section 786 a juvenile court may not seal records of a prior petition merely because the minor satisfactorily completed probation on a later-filed petition.
relied: People v. Connor (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 669 — Courts may not add provisions to a statute or rewrite it to conform to an assumed intent not appearing from its plain language.
relied: Gorham Co., Inc. v. First Financial Ins. Co. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1532 — Courts disregard unambiguous statutory language only in extreme cases where the Legislature as a matter of law did not intend the literal effect.
missed: In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 — An ameliorative statutory amendment presumptively applies to all cases not yet final on appeal absent a contrary legislative indication; section 786 was amended effective January 1, 2016, before this appeal was decided, to address sealing of prior petitions, and the opinion does not consider whether the amended statute should govern.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion correctly applies plain-meaning principles to the 2015 text of section 786 and accurately reads the record to show no finding of satisfactory probation completion on the prior petition, consistent with the division's published In re Y.A. decision. It does not, however, address whether the amendment to section 786 effective January 1, 2016, which was in force when the appeal was decided, should apply to this nonfinal case, a question later appellate courts took up.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 4/29/16 In re John L. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re JOHN L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. D068410 THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. J234303)

v. JOHN L., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Browder A. Willis III, Judge. Affirmed.

Steven S. Lubliner, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and Christine L. Bergman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. In 2013 and 2014, John L. (Minor) had two petitions filed against him alleging offenses for unrelated incidents. For each petition, he was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 6021 and placed on probation.

In 2015, the court found that Minor satisfactorily completed his terms of probation for the offense alleged in the later-filed petition, which was then dismissed and sealed. The court did not seal records relating to his prior petition. Minor contends the court erred by not sealing the records pertaining to his prior petition under section 786.2 Based on the plain language of the statute, we conclude the court did not err. Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. Petition No. 1: G5243 In November 2013, the juvenile court declared Minor to be a ward after he admitted to committing felony elder abuse in violation of Penal Code section 368, subdivision (b)(1). The court placed Minor with his mother, subject to supervision by a probation officer. Minor was ordered to obey all federal, state, county, and city laws.

2. Petition No. 2: G6253 In March 2014, a new petition (G6253) was filed against Minor, relating to an incident at his school. He admitted to one count alleged in the new petition of battering a 1 Subsequent unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2 Subsequent unspecified references to section 786 are to the version effective January 1, 2015, to December 31, 2015. (Stats. 2014, ch. 249, § 2, p. 2506.)

2 school employee (Pen. Code, § 243.6). The juvenile court continued Minor's wardship and ordered him to be supervised by a probation officer.

In April 2015, Minor's probation officer applied for an order terminating wardship and requesting the records for G6253 be sealed, noting Minor's satisfactory compliance with his probation terms. At a hearing, Minor's counsel acknowledged that section 786 did not permit the court to seal records pertaining to "all petitions." The juvenile court terminated jurisdiction, found Minor had satisfactorily completed the terms and conditions of probation, and dismissed and sealed his "most recent petition [G6253]."

Minor timely appealed on the ground that records pertaining to his prior petition, G5243, should have also been sealed.

DISCUSSION

Minor contends the juvenile court misinterpreted or misapplied section 786 and erred by not sealing his prior petition. He argues that the court "necessarily" found that he satisfactorily completed probation for the offense alleged in his prior petition despite the lack of an explicit finding to that effect.

Section 786 provides in pertinent part: "If the minor satisfactorily completes . . . a term of probation for any offense not listed in subdivision (b) of Section 707, the court shall order the petition dismissed, and the arrest upon which the judgment was deferred shall be deemed not to have occurred. The court shall order sealed all records pertaining to that dismissed petition in the custody of the juvenile court. . . ." (Italics added.) It is undisputed that Minor's offenses are not listed in section 707, subdivision (b).

"In construing a statute, our role is to ascertain the Legislature's intent so as to 3 effectuate the purpose of the law. [Citation.] In determining intent, we must look first to the words of the statute because they are the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.

[Citation.] If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the plain meaning of the statute governs." (People v. Lopez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1051, 1056.) In other words, if there is "no ambiguity or uncertainty in the language, the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said," and it is not necessary to "resort to legislative history to determine the statute's true meaning." (People v. Cochran (2002) 28 Cal.4th 396, 400-401.)

Under section 786, a juvenile court may not seal the records of a prior petition based merely on a minor's satisfactorily completing probation for an offense alleged in a later-filed petition. (In re Y.A. (Apr. 14, 2016, D068405) __ Cal.App.4th __ [2016 Cal.App. Lexis 282, pp. *1-*2].) The unambiguous language of section 786 requires the court to seal records pertaining to a "dismissed petition" based upon first finding that a minor has satisfactorily completed probation for an offense alleged in the petition.

Based on our review of the record, the court did not find that Minor satisfactorily completed probation for the offense alleged in his prior petition. To the contrary, the probation officer reported that, while Minor was on probation for his prior offense, Minor violated a state law by punching a school counselor who had been trying to stop him from fighting. The new incident resulted in a second petition being filed against Minor. The probation officer did not request or recommend the dismissal and sealing of Minor's prior petition. Therefore, the court's findings regarding satisfactorily completed probation were limited to the offense alleged in the second petition, G6253. The court correctly sealed the records relating to that offense alone.

4 We are not convinced by Minor's contention that section 786 should be interpreted to require a juvenile court to seal a minor's entire juvenile record based on findings that relate only to the most recently filed petition. Doing so would compel us to include language omitted from the statute in violation of "the cardinal rule that courts may not add provisions to a statute or rewrite it to conform to an assumed intent that does not appear from its plain language." (People v. Connor (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 669, 692.)

We presume the Legislature meant what it said in section 786 and need not look to the legislative history.

Minor argues the trial court's interpretation of the statute yields convoluted and/or absurd results. He contends the Legislature intended to streamline the sealing process for minors, yet now only a portion of his juvenile record is sealed and minors like him will have to understand and remember to request sealing of the remaining portion at a later date.

As we have indicated, the plain language of section 786 does not support the proposition that it was intended to be a panacea for all sealing issues. Section 786 provides for automatic sealing of records only if a minor first satisfactorily completes probation for the offense. Otherwise, a person retains his or her ability to request sealing of juvenile records at a later date. (See § 781; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.830.) This is not an extreme case in which it is appropriate to disregard unambiguous statutory language. (Gorham Co., Inc. v. First Financial Ins. Co. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1543-1544 [courts should disregard unambiguous language "only in 'extreme cases'— those in which, as a matter of law, the Legislature did not intend the statute to have its 5 literal effect"].)

Because there is nothing in the record to suggest that Minor satisfactorily completed probation on the offense alleged in his prior petition, the juvenile court correctly limited its sealing order to Minor's later-filed petition.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

HALLER, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

McDONALD, J.

IRION, J.

Cites, in this corpus

Gorham Co. v. First Financial Insurance B183477 · 2006-05-30
People v. Connor H024743 · 2004-02-06
People v. Lopez S106681 · 2003-11-24
People v. Cochran S099260 · 2002-07-11