People v. Veliz CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D068526 · 2016-04-15 · Unpublished

Proceeding: appeal from a judgment
Trial court: Superior Court of Imperial County · No. JCF34597
Trial judge: Raymond A. Cota
Outcome: reversed in part — Affirmed in part and reversed in part with directions.
Area: delinquency
Panel: Richard D. Huffman, Sr. (author), Judith D. McConnell, O'Rourke

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T05:52Z · confidence high

The trial court imposed a criminal protective order preventing the defendant from contacting the victim upon release from prison. The Court of Appeal reversed this portion of the judgment, holding the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue such an order beyond the entry of judgment.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Imposition of a criminal protective order preventing contact with the victim upon release from prison “we are satisfied the trial court was without jurisdiction to issue the protective order in this case and that the People's concession was appropriate.”	unclear	error	agree with court agree with court

Authorities

relied: People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378 — Trial courts lack jurisdiction to extend protective orders under section 136.2 beyond the entry of judgment.
relied: Babaloa v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 948 — Trial courts lack jurisdiction to extend protective orders beyond the entry of judgment.
relied: People v. Stone (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 153 — Section 136.2 does not allow protective orders beyond the date of judgment because such an interpretation would usurp civil restraining order procedures.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies established case law (Ponce, Stone, Babaloa) to determine that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue a post-judgment protective order under Penal Code section 136.2. The reasoning is concise and directly addresses the lack of statutory authority for the order.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:31Z · confidence medium

At sentencing on a negotiated two-year prison term for assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)), the Imperial County Superior Court granted the prosecution's request for a criminal protective order barring Veliz from contacting the victim or the victim's family after his release from prison, without citing any statutory authority. On appeal, with the Attorney General conceding error, the Court of Appeal held the trial court lacked jurisdiction under section 136.2 to issue a protective order extending beyond entry of judgment, reversed the protective order with directions to deny the request, and otherwise affirmed the judgment.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Issuance at sentencing of a criminal protective order under Penal Code section 136.2 prohibiting the defendant from contacting the victim and the victim's family after release from prison, i.e., extending beyond the entry of judgment “Based upon our review of the record and the relevant case law, we are satisfied the trial court was without jurisdiction to issue the protective order in this case and that the People's concession was appropriate.”	de novo	error (statutory interpretation)	agree with court The opinion does not expressly state a standard of review, but it treats the question as one of statutory authority and jurisdiction, which is a pure question of law. Section 136.2, subdivision (a) authorizes protective orders for victims and witnesses only during the pendency of the criminal proceedings; Ponce, Babalola and Stone all hold that a trial court lacks jurisdiction to extend such an order beyond judgment absent a specific statutory exception (e.g., § 136.2, subd. (i)(1) for domestic violence and certain enumerated offenses). Nothing in the opinion suggests any exception applied to a section 245(a)(1) conviction against a non-domestic victim, the prosecutor and trial judge cited no authority, and the People conceded. The reversal is correct on the authorities cited.

Authorities

relied: People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378 — Section 136.2, subdivision (a) authorizes protective orders for victims and witnesses only before entry of judgment; a trial court lacks jurisdiction to extend such an order beyond the conclusion of the criminal proceedings, and courts have no inherent authority to do so.
relied: Babalola v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 948 — Cited (with the name misspelled 'Babaloa' in the opinion) for the rule that protective orders under section 136.2 are limited to the duration of the criminal proceedings and cannot be extended past judgment.
relied: People v. Stone (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 153 — Section 136.2 contains no express authority for post-judgment protective orders; reading it broadly would usurp the restraining-order procedure of Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 and bypass that statute's procedural protections for the restrained person.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion correctly identifies section 136.2 as the only plausible source of authority, applies Ponce, Babalola and Stone, which squarely hold that such orders may not extend beyond judgment, and reaches the result both parties agreed on. It does not state a standard of review, speculates about what authority the trial court 'may have considered' because none was cited below, and does not address the post-judgment exceptions in section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1) or other offense-specific protective-order statutes, though none appear applicable to a section 245(a)(1) conviction.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 4/15/16 P. v. Veliz CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D068526

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. JCF34597)

TOMAS VALLES VELIZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Imperial County, Raymond A.

Cota, Judge. Affirmed in part and reversed in part with directions.

Andrea S. Bitar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Scott C. Taylor and Junichi P.

Semitsu, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Tomas Valles Veliz entered a guilty plea to one count of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code,1 § 245, 1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified. subd. (a)(1)). The remaining charges and allegations were dismissed and the parties agreed to a two-year term of imprisonment.

Veliz was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement. However, at sentencing the prosecution requested a criminal protective order preventing Veliz from contacting the victim or his family upon release from prison.

Veliz appeals challenging only the protective order. He contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose the order. The People also agree there is no statutory or inherent authority for the order issued by the court in this case. We agree with the parties and will reverse that portion of the judgment authorizing the protective order.2

DISCUSSION

Part of the difficulty in analyzing this case is that neither the prosecutor nor the trial judge cited any authority for a criminal protective order extending beyond the duration of the criminal proceedings. The court may have considered section 136.2, subdivision (a), which authorizes a court to grant a protective order for victims and witnesses prior to the entry of judgment. (People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378, 382-383.) The court in Ponce, however, held that trial courts lack jurisdiction to extend such protective orders beyond the entry of judgment. (Ibid.; Babaloa v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 948, 965.)

In People v. Stone (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 153, the court discussed the reasons that section 136.2 does not allow protective orders beyond the date of judgment. The 2 The facts of the underlying offense are not relevant to the issue presented in this case. Thus, we will omit the traditional statement of facts. 2 court noted no such authority was expressed in the statute, and that an overly broad interpretation of the statute "would usurp the similar restraining orders obtainable under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6, and undermine the numerous procedural protections for the restrainee afforded by that section." (Stone, supra, at pp. 159-160.)

Based upon our review of the record and the relevant case law, we are satisfied the trial court was without jurisdiction to issue the protective order in this case and that the People's concession was appropriate.

DISPOSITION

The order granting a criminal protective order is reversed. The trial court is directed to enter a different order denying the request. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed.

HUFFMAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

O'ROURKE, J.

Cites, in this corpus

Babalola v. Superior Court No. B226170 · 2011-02-14
People v. Ponce B209918 · 2009-03-25
People v. Stone B169504 · 2004-10-28