gno.law

People v. Hatfield CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D068756 · 2016-04-08 · Unpublished

Proceeding
appeal from a judgment
Trial court
Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCE207071
Trial judge
David J. Danielsen
Outcome
affirmed — Affirmed.
Area
criminal
Panel
Patricia D. Benke (author), Judith L. Haller, Cynthia Aaron

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T05:53Z · confidence high

The trial court denied the defendant's motion to recall his sentence under Penal Code section 1170.126, finding he was ineligible for relief because he was 'armed' during the commission of his current offense. The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial, holding that the record of conviction established by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was armed.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Denial of motion to recall sentence under Penal Code section 1170.126 based on the 'armed' disqualifying factor.
“The trial court concluded from the record of conviction that defendant was armed. Defendant was in the backseat of the car, and the gun was under clothing on the backseat next to him, where it was readily available for use.”
unclearcorrectagree with court
agree with court

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Bland (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991 — Defines 'armed' as having the prohibited weapon available for offensive or defensive use.
  • relied: People v. Gonzales (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1658 — Interprets 'armed' to mean ready access to a firearm, creating a real danger it can be used.
  • relied: People v. Moore (1956) 143 Cal.App.2d 333 — Supports the interpretation that 'armed' involves ready access to a firearm.
  • relied: People v. Wandick (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 918 — Holds a defendant can be 'armed' even if not holding the gun or having it on their person.
  • relied: People v. Searle (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1091 — Holds a defendant can be 'armed' even if not holding the gun or having it on their person.
  • relied: People v. Osuna (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1020 — Establishes that a trial court need only find the existence of a disqualifying factor by a preponderance of the evidence.
  • relied: People v. Guerrero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 343 — Authorizes review of the entire record of conviction to determine the conduct underlying the crime, prohibiting the use of outside evidence.
  • relied: People v. Trujillo (2006) 40 Cal.4th 165 — Prohibits the use of incriminating statements in a postplea probation report for resentencing purposes.
  • relied: People v. Yearwood (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 161 — Explains the procedural framework of the Three Strikes Reform Act and the postconviction release proceeding.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the broad definition of 'armed' from binding California authority to the specific facts found in the record of conviction. It properly distinguishes between permissible review of the record of conviction and impermissible relitigation using outside evidence.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:31Z · confidence low

The trial court denied Ronald Hatfield's Penal Code section 1170.126 petition to recall his 29-years-to-life three strikes sentence for felon in possession of a firearm, finding by a preponderance of the evidence from the record of conviction that he was armed with a firearm during the offense and therefore ineligible. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding the record showed the gun was readily available to defendant under clothing on the back seat next to him, that the trial court properly relied on the record of conviction rather than relitigating facts, and that nothing in the statutes requires the arming to be tethered to an offense other than possession.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Denial of Proposition 36 resentencing petition on the ground defendant was 'armed with a firearm' during the commission of the felon-in-possession offense, rendering him ineligible under section 1170.126, subdivision (e)(2).
“Defendant was in the backseat of the car, and the gun was under clothing on the backseat next to him, where it was readily available for use.”
unclearcorrectagree with court
The opinion applies the settled definition of 'armed' from Bland (weapon available for offensive or defensive use) and Court of Appeal cases holding that ready access suffices even without the gun on the person. The facts recited—shirtless defendant in the rear seat with a gun concealed under clothing immediately next to him—support a finding of ready availability by a preponderance, which Osuna holds is the applicable burden. The court does not articulate a standard of review, but the result follows under either substantial evidence or independent review of the record.
Rejection of defendant's argument that the trial court improperly relitigated the circumstances of the crime in violation of People v. Guerrero and People v. Trujillo.
“People v. Guerrero authorizes a review of the entire record of conviction in order to determine the conduct that underlies the crime. It is the use of evidence derived from outside the record that is prohibited.”
unclearcorrectagree with court
The court correctly characterizes Guerrero as permitting examination of the entire record of conviction and Trujillo as barring reliance on post-plea statements outside that record. The trial court here used trial testimony and the prior appellate opinion in the same case, both part of the record of conviction. Relying on the court's own earlier unpublished opinion in the same case is permitted by rule 8.1115(b). The analysis is consistent with how other published Proposition 36 cases treat the record of conviction.
Rejection of defendant's argument that the 'armed' disqualifier must be tethered to an underlying offense other than the possession offense itself.
“We find no language in the statutes that supports such an argument.”
unclearcorrectagree with court
The conclusion is consistent with the text of sections 667(e)(2)(C)(iii) and 1170.12(c)(2)(C)(iii), which ask only whether the defendant was armed 'during the commission of the current offense,' and with multiple published decisions (including this division's own People v. White) rejecting the identical tethering argument. The opinion reaches the right result but gives only a one-sentence textual answer without citing the published authority directly on point.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Yearwood (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 161 — Describes the structure of the Three Strikes Reform Act and its postconviction resentencing procedure under section 1170.126.
  • relied: People v. Osuna (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1020 — A trial court need find a disqualifying factor under section 1170.126 only by a preponderance of the evidence; also held a felon in possession with ready access to the firearm was 'armed' and ineligible.
  • relied: People v. Bland (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991 — 'Armed' means having the weapon available for offensive or defensive use.
  • relied: People v. Gonzales (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1658 — 'Armed' includes ready access to a firearm creating a real danger it can be used.
  • relied: People v. Moore (1956) 143 Cal.App.2d 333 — Arming requires only that the weapon be readily accessible for use.
  • relied: People v. Wandick (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 918 — A defendant may be armed even without holding the gun or having it on his person.
  • relied: People v. Searle (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1091 — A defendant may be armed where the firearm is accessible in a vehicle even if not on his person.
  • relied: People v. Guerrero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 343 — A court may look to the entire record of conviction to determine the conduct underlying a conviction, but not to evidence outside that record.
  • relied: People v. Trujillo (2006) 40 Cal.4th 165 — A defendant's post-plea statements in a probation report are not part of the record of conviction and cannot be used to establish the nature of the offense.
  • missed: People v. White (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 512 — Fourth District, Division One decision holding that a felon in possession who had a firearm readily available was 'armed' during the commission of that offense and ineligible for Proposition 36 resentencing, rejecting the argument that arming must be tethered to a separate offense.
  • missed: People v. Blakely (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1042 — Held the 'armed with a firearm' exclusion applies to a felon-in-possession conviction where the defendant had the gun available for use, and that no tethering to a separate offense is required.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion reaches the correct result under the settled definition of 'armed' and properly distinguishes Guerrero and Trujillo, and the facts recited plainly support ready availability of the firearm. It is thin, however: it does not state a standard of review and disposes of the tethering argument in one sentence without citing the published decisions (including this division's own White, as well as Osuna, Blakely, and others) that had already rejected it.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 4/8/16 P. v. Hatfield CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D068756

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE207071)

RONALD HATFIELD,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, David J.

Danielsen, Judge. Affirmed.

Anthony J. Dain, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Scott C. Taylor and Warren J.

Williams, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. BACKGROUND On July 29, 2000, James Schmidt went to a neighbor's apartment, where he encountered defendant and appellant Ronald Hatfield. Defendant struck Schmidt in the face and took his keys. Defendant then handed the keys to his companions. Later, two people entered Schmidt's apartment and stole guns. Two days later, an El Cajon police officer detained defendant and two companions at a gas station after the officer recognized defendant as an individual who might have been involved in the July 29 crimes. The automobile was searched, and a gun stolen from Schmidt was recovered.

The driver denied knowledge of the gun. Defendant was riding in the rear passenger seat;

he was not wearing a shirt. The arresting officer testified the gun was found concealed by a T-shirt and other clothing on the rear seat. Defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of Penal Code former section 12021, subdivision (a)(1), for which he received a sentence of 25 years to life. He received an additional one year for each of four prison priors, for a total sentence of 29 years to life. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. This court affirmed his conviction and sentence in 2001.

(People v. Hatfield (Nov. 14, 2001, D037240) [nonpub. opn.].)

On March 14, 2015, defendant filed a motion, and later, addendums, to recall his sentence pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.126. On August 12, 2015, defendant's motion was denied based on the trial court's finding he was armed during the commission of his current offense and was therefore ineligible for relief. He filed a timely notice of appeal.

Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion to 2 reduce his sentence.

ANALYSIS

On November 6, 2012, California voters approved Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (the Act), which modified Penal Code sections 667 and 1170.12 and added Penal Code section 1170.126. Under Penal Code section 1170.126, the three strikes law was diluted by reserving life sentences for cases where the current crime is a serious or violent felony or the prosecution has pled and proved an enumerated disqualifying factor. In all other cases, the recidivist will be sentenced as a second strike offender. The Act also created a postconviction release proceeding whereby a prisoner serving an indeterminate life sentence imposed under the three strikes law for a crime that is not a serious or violent felony, and who is not disqualified, may have his or her sentence recalled and be sentenced as a second strike offender, unless the court determines that resentencing would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.

(§ 1170.126; see People v. Yearwood (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 161, 167-168.)

One of the disqualifying factors in the Act is whether, during the commission of the current offense, the defendant was "armed with a firearm or deadly weapon." (See Pen. Code, §§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iii), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)(iii); see also Pen. Code, § 1170.126, subd. (e)(2).) A trial court need only find the existence of a disqualifying factor by a preponderance of the evidence. (People v. Osuna (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1040.)

The definition of "armed" is quite broad. Our Supreme Court has ruled that "armed" means that the defendant had the prohibited weapon available for offensive or 3 defensive use. (People v. Bland (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991, 1002.) The term "armed" has also been interpreted to mean ready access to a firearm, which creates a real danger it can be used. (People v. Gonzales (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1658, 1662-1663; People v. Moore (1956) 143 Cal.App.2d 333, 336.) Even when a defendant is not holding a gun, or did not have it on his or her person, it has been held the defendant was "armed." (People v. Wandick (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 918, 921; People v. Searle (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1091, 1099.)

Here, the jury found defendant possessed the gun. The trial court concluded from the record of conviction that defendant was armed. Defendant was in the backseat of the car, and the gun was under clothing on the backseat next to him, where it was readily available for use. This provided the evidence necessary under the preponderance of the evidence test. Contrary to defendant's argument, the trial court did not engage in improper relitigation of the circumstances of the crime, which would run afoul of People v. Guerrero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 343 and People v. Trujillo (2006) 40 Cal.4th 165. People v. Guerrero authorizes a review of the entire record of conviction in order to determine the conduct that underlies the crime. It is the use of evidence derived from outside the record that is prohibited. People v. Trujillo prohibited the use of incriminating statements in a postplea probation report. Here, the facts used by the trial court to determine the circumstances of the crime were clear. Defendant was not wearing a shirt. He was sitting in the backseat and next to him, under clothing, was a gun. The unpublished opinion of this court confirms this factual circumstance.

Defendant also argues the "arming" must be anchored to an offense that does not 4 include a possession charge. We find no language in the statutes that supports such an argument. The facts surrounding the crime of possession in this case more than adequately meet the definition of "armed." They certainly meet the burden of proof establishing defendant was armed, that is, a preponderance of the evidence.

DISPOSITION

The conclusion of the court denying reduction of defendant's conviction is affirmed.

BENKE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

HALLER, J.

AARON, J.

Cites, in this corpus