People v. Thamracksa CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from an order
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCD240759, SCD242508
- Trial judge
- Laura H. Halgren
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- O'Rourke (author), Gilbert Nares, McINTYRE
Analysis
The trial court denied the defendant's motion to recall her sentence, reasoning that although the term for one specific count increased, her aggregate sentence was reduced from six years and four months to five years. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision (e) prohibits only an increase in the aggregate sentence, not an increase in individual subordinate terms when the principal term is removed.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of motion to recall sentence under Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision (b) and (e) after resentencing increased the term for a subordinate count but decreased the aggregate term.“The court denied the motion, reasoning that the new sentence met Proposition 47's objective because Thamracksa's aggregate sentence was decreased.” | de novo | correct | agree with court The appellate court correctly applied the statutory language of Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision (e), which limits the 'term' to the aggregate sentence in the context of consecutive sentencing. By relying on People v. Sellner, the court accurately interpreted that the prohibition against a 'longer' term refers to the total aggregate term, not individual subordinate counts, especially when the principal term is removed and subordinate terms must be recomputed under Penal Code section 1170.1. The reasoning is consistent with the legislative intent of Proposition 47 to reduce overall incarceration time for eligible offenses. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Sellner (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 699 — When a principal term is removed under Proposition 47, subordinate terms may be recomputed; the prohibition in Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision (e) applies to the aggregate sentence, not individual counts, provided the new aggregate is less than the original.
- relied: People v. Begnaud (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1548 — Consecutive sentences are viewed as interlocking pieces consisting of a principal term and subordinate terms, with restrictions on subordinate terms under Penal Code section 1170.1.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly interprets the statutory language of Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision (e) in conjunction with the sentencing structure of Penal Code section 1170.1. It relies on the published authority People v. Sellner to resolve the specific issue of whether individual count terms can increase when the aggregate term decreases, providing a clear and legally supported rationale for affirming the trial court's decision.
The trial court granted Thamracksa's Proposition 47 petition and restructured her aggregate sentence from six years four months to five years, but in doing so increased the term on one reduced count (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377) from eight months to 364 days, and then denied her second motion arguing this violated Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision (e). The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding under People v. Sellner that subdivision (e) is measured against the aggregate sentence, not individual counts, and that no double jeopardy violation occurred because the overall term was reduced.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of second motion to recall sentence: Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision (e) does not bar increasing the term on an individual reduced count where the aggregate resentence is shorter than the original aggregate sentence“The court denied the motion, reasoning that the new sentence met Proposition 47's objective because Thamracksa's aggregate sentence was decreased.” | de novo | correct | agree with court The opinion does not expressly state a standard of review, but the question is one of statutory interpretation reviewed independently. The court correctly applied Penal Code section 1170.1's interlocking principal/subordinate term framework (Begnaud) and followed the directly on-point published decision in Sellner, which holds that subdivision (e) governs the aggregate term and that when the principal term is eliminated the subordinate terms must be recomputed. The aggregate fell from six years four months to five years, so the statutory limit was honored. |
Rejection of claim that increasing the term on the reduced count from eight months to 364 days violated double jeopardy principles“As long as the recomputed term is less than the prior aggregate term, the defendant has not been punished more severely for the successful filing of a Proposition 47 petition.” | de novo | correct | agree with court The court disposed of the double jeopardy argument by adopting Sellner's 'big picture' reasoning that the relevant comparison is the aggregate sentence. This is consistent with the settled California rule that on resentencing after part of an aggregate term is vacated, the court may restructure the entire sentence so long as the new aggregate does not exceed the original. The treatment is brief but the conclusion is supported by the cited authority. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Sellner (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 699 — Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision (e) does not trump section 1170.1, subdivision (a); when the principal term is eliminated by Proposition 47 relief the subordinate terms must be recomputed, and so long as the recomputed aggregate term is less than the prior aggregate term the defendant has not been punished more severely or subjected to double jeopardy.
- relied: People v. Begnaud (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1548 — When a defendant is sentenced consecutively for multiple convictions, whether in the same or different proceedings, the aggregate determinate term is viewed as interlocking pieces consisting of a principal term and subordinate terms under Penal Code section 1170.1.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court reached the correct result by following the directly applicable published decision in Sellner and the interlocking-terms rule of Begnaud and Penal Code section 1170.1, and the aggregate sentence was plainly reduced. The opinion is thin, however: it does not state a standard of review and addresses the double jeopardy argument only by quoting Sellner rather than engaging with it independently.
Opinion
Filed 4/4/16 P. v. Thamracksa CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D068142
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. Nos. SCD240759, SCD242508) MINA THAMRACKSA, Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Laura H.
Halgren, Judge. Affirmed.
Sheila Ann Quinlan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler and Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorneys General, Arlene A. Sevidal and Allison V. Hawley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Mina Thamracksa appeals an order resentencing her under Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision (b) (Proposition 47). We affirm the judgment. BACKGROUND Mina Thamracksa pleaded guilty to possession of narcotics (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)) in case No. SCD240759. The court sentenced her in this case and two pending cases to a total of six years four months in jail as follows: it selected a receiving stolen property conviction (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)) in case No. SCD240759 as the principal term and sentenced her to the upper term of three years; it imposed consecutive terms of eight months for unauthorized use of personal identifying information of another (Pen. Code, § 530.5, subd. (a)) and two years for felony committed while out on bail (Pen. Code, § 12022.1, subd. (b)) in case No. SCD248704; and it imposed eight months for possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)) in case No. SCD242508.
Thamracksa petitioned to recall her sentence under Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision (b), requesting that she be resentenced to a misdemeanor in case No.
SCD240759. The court, noting Thamracksa's long criminal history, reduced her sentence to a total of five years in jail by imposing the upper term of three years in case No.
SCD248074 (Pen. Code, § 530.5, subd. (a)), and reducing the Penal Code section 496, subdivision (a) conviction in case No. SCD240759 and Health and Safety Code section 11377, subdivision (a) conviction in case No. SCD242508 to misdemeanors, imposing consecutive 364-day jail terms on each count.
Thereafter, Thamracksa again moved to recall her sentence, arguing that under Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision (e), the court erred in resentencing her because the original sentence imposed in case No. SCD242508 (Health & Saf. Code, 2 § 11377) was eight months, but after resentencing it had increased to 364 days. The court denied the motion, reasoning that the new sentence met Proposition 47's objective because Thamracksa's aggregate sentence was decreased.
On appeal, Thamracksa contends that under Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision (e) and principles of double jeopardy, the court was barred from increasing the term of her reduced misdemeanor count in excess of the term originally imposed on that count as a felony. She argues that the statute bars higher sentences on individual counts rather than on the aggregate sentence.
DISCUSSION
Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision (e) provides: "Under no circumstances may resentencing under this section result in the imposition of a term longer than the original sentence." "[W]hen a defendant is sentenced consecutively for multiple convictions, whether in the same proceeding or in different proceedings, the judgment or aggregate determinate term is to be viewed as interlocking pieces consisting of a principal term and one or more subordinate terms. ([Pen. Code], § 1170.1, subd. (a).)
[Penal Code s]ection 1170.1, with certain exceptions, also places certain restrictions on the sentencing judge's discretion such as limiting the term of imprisonment for a subordinate term to no more than one-third the middle term of imprisonment for such conviction." (People v. Begnaud (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1548, 1552.)
The same issues presented here were raised in People v. Sellner (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 699, a case with which we agree. That court concluded: "Appellant claims that the increased sentence presents a jeopardy issue because appellant has been subjected 3 to a sentence greater than originally imposed. Were one to put horse blinders on and view only the sentence in [one case], appellant would be correct. We must, however, look at the big picture." (Sellner, at p. 702.)
Thamracksa's initial aggregate sentence was six years four months. But her petition to recall succeeded and her sentence was reduced to five years. Therefore, consistent with Proposition 47, she received a lesser sentence. "When the principal term is no longer in existence, the subordinate term must be recomputed. That is the case here.
As long as the recomputed term is less than the prior aggregate term, the defendant has not been punished more severely for the successful filing of a Proposition 47 petition."
(People v. Sellner, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 702.) Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision (e) "does not trump [Penal Code] section 1170.1, subdivision (a) or govern aggregate consecutive sentences which are treated as interlocking pieces." (Ibid.)
4 DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
O'ROURKE, J.
WE CONCUR:
NARES, Acting P. J.
McINTYRE, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Sellner B261487 · 2015-09-24
- People v. Begnaud E009064 · 1991-11-15