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People v. Poisson

California Court of Appeal · D067962 · 2016-03-30 · Published · 246 Cal. App. 4th 121 · 200 Cal. Rptr. 3d 542 · 2016 Cal. App. LEXIS 248

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JAMES MICHAEL POISSON, Defendant and Appellant

Proceeding
appeal from an order
Trial court
Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCD254615
Trial judge
Runston G. Maino
Outcome
affirmed — Affirmed.
Area
criminal
Panel
Richard D. Huffman, Sr. (author), Judith L. Haller, Cynthia Aaron

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T05:53Z · confidence high

The trial court convicted the defendant of mayhem and battery with serious bodily injury and sentenced him to 12 years in prison. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that battery with serious bodily injury is not a lesser included offense of mayhem because mayhem does not require proof of serious bodily injury.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Conviction for mayhem and battery with serious bodily injury based on the same act
“Poisson's contention fails because battery with serious bodily injury is not a lesser included offense of mayhem. (People v. Santana (2013) 56 Cal.4th 999, 1005-1011 & fn. 6 (Santana).)”
de novocorrectagree with court
agree with court

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Santana (2013) 56 Cal.4th 999 — Mayhem does not require proof of serious bodily injury; therefore, battery with serious bodily injury is not a lesser included offense of mayhem.
  • relied: People v. Montoya (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1031 — California law prohibits convicting a defendant of two offenses arising from a single criminal act when one is a lesser offense necessarily included in the other.
  • relied: People v. Lopez (1998) 19 Cal.4th 282 — The elements test determines if a lesser offense is necessarily included in a greater offense.
  • relied: People v. Ausbie (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 855 — The court noted this case was disapproved by the Supreme Court in Santana regarding the elements of mayhem.
  • relied: People v. Quintero (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1152 — The court distinguished this case, noting its conclusion was based on the People's concession and reliance on the disapproved Ausbie case.
  • relied: Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450 — Appellate courts cannot disregard binding precedent from the Supreme Court.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion correctly applies the elements test from Montoya and Lopez to determine that battery with serious bodily injury is not a lesser included offense of mayhem. It relies on the controlling Supreme Court precedent in People v. Santana, which explicitly held that mayhem does not require proof of serious bodily injury, thereby distinguishing the defendant's reliance on older, disapproved cases like Ausbie and Quintero.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:30Z · confidence high

A San Diego jury convicted Poisson of mayhem (Pen. Code, § 203) and battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)) arising from a single blow that cut the victim's ear, and the trial court entered judgment on both counts and imposed a 12-year prison term. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding under People v. Santana (2013) 56 Cal.4th 999 that serious bodily injury is not an element of simple mayhem, so battery with serious bodily injury is not a lesser included offense and dual convictions were permissible.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Entry of judgment on both the mayhem conviction (count 1) and the battery with serious bodily injury conviction (count 3) rather than treating the battery as a lesser included offense of mayhem
“Because Santana makes clear that serious bodily injury is not an element required to be proven for the crime of simple mayhem, the offense of battery with serious bodily injury is not a lesser included offense of mayhem. There was no error below.”
de novocorrectagree with court
Whether one offense is necessarily included in another under the statutory elements test is a pure question of law; the court did not expressly state a standard but applied the elements test from Montoya and Lopez as a legal matter. Santana squarely held that section 203 mayhem does not require proof of 'serious bodily injury' as defined in section 243, subdivision (f)(4), because the enumerated acts (slitting an ear, lip, or nose) need not involve protracted impairment, extensive suturing, or serious disfigurement. Since the greater offense can be committed without the serious-bodily-injury element of the lesser, the elements test is not satisfied. The court properly rejected Ausbie (disapproved in Santana) and Quintero (which rested on a concession and on Ausbie), and properly refused to equate 'great bodily injury' with 'serious bodily injury' given Santana's express rejection of that bootstrapping argument. Under Auto Equity Sales the Court of Appeal was bound by Santana.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Santana (2013) 56 Cal.4th 999 — Serious bodily injury is not an element of simple mayhem under section 203; it was error to import the felony-battery definition of serious bodily injury into the mayhem instruction, and Ausbie did not hold otherwise.
  • relied: People v. Montoya (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1031 — California law bars dual convictions for a single act when one offense is necessarily included in the other; the statutory elements test governs.
  • relied: People v. Lopez (1998) 19 Cal.4th 282 — If a crime cannot be committed without also necessarily committing a lesser offense, the latter is a lesser included offense.
  • relied: People v. Ortega (1998) 19 Cal.4th 686 — A defendant may generally be convicted of multiple offenses based on the same act or course of conduct under section 954.
  • relied: People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224 — Multiple convictions for a single act are generally permitted, subject to the lesser-included-offense rule.
  • relied: Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450 — Courts of Appeal are bound to follow decisions of the California Supreme Court.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion directly answers the only argument raised with the controlling Supreme Court decision, Santana, which forecloses treating serious bodily injury as an element of mayhem, and it correctly explains why Ausbie, Quintero, and the great-bodily-injury analogy do not survive Santana. The opinion does not discuss Penal Code section 654 even though both counts arose from a single blow, but that issue was not raised by appellant and the opinion does not detail how the 12-year sentence was computed, so the omission does not undermine the holding actually made.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion — Huffman

Filed 3/30/16

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D067962

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD254615)

JAMES MICHAEL POISSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Runston G.

Maino, Judge. Affirmed.

Alex Kreit, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal and Britton B.

Lacy, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

A jury convicted James Michael Poisson of mayhem (Pen. Code,1 § 203, count 1)

and battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d), count 3). The trial court 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified. sentenced Poisson to prison for 12 years, consisting of eight years for mayhem and four years for battery with serious bodily injury. Poisson appeals, contending he could not be convicted separately of both mayhem and battery with serious bodily injury because the latter is a lesser included offense of the former.

Poisson's contention fails because battery with serious bodily injury is not a lesser included offense of mayhem. (People v. Santana (2013) 56 Cal.4th 999, 1005-1011 & fn. 6 (Santana).)

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 2, 2014, at about 1:55 a.m., Robert Gerari was standing near his motorcycle outside of Gilly's Bar located at 2306 El Cajon Blvd. Poisson walked by Gerari and said, "nice bike," to which Gerari replied, "thank you." Poisson then struck Gerari on the side of his head and attempted to run away. In response, Gerari chased Poisson, took him to the ground, and began punching him. Witnesses soon interrupted the fight and Poisson fled on foot.

Gerari felt blood running down his face and went back to Gilly's Bar to examine his injury. When Gerari looked at his injury, he noticed that his right ear had been cut horizontally. A bartender at Gilly's then called the police. When San Diego Police Department Officer Luis Angulo arrived, Gerari provided a statement to the officer and handed him a cell phone, which Poisson had dropped on the ground during the incident.

On March 6, 2014, San Diego Harbor Police Officer David Bulthuis found Poisson walking westbound on California Street in San Diego and arrested him.

Thereafter, on March 11, 2014, Poisson was charged by felony complaint with mayhem 2 (§ 203, count 1), assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1), count 2), and battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d), count 3).

DISCUSSION

Poisson contends that battery with serious bodily injury is a lesser included offense of mayhem because it is impossible to commit mayhem without also committing battery with serious bodily injury. We disagree.

Generally, a defendant may be convicted of multiple offenses based on the same act or a single course of conduct. (§ 954; People v. Ortega (1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 692;

People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 1226.) However, "California law prohibits convicting a defendant of two offenses arising from a single criminal act when one is a lesser offense necessarily included in the other." (People v. Montoya (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1031, 1033.) "In deciding whether an offense is necessarily included in another, we apply the elements test, asking whether ' " 'all the legal ingredients of the corpus delicti of the lesser offense are included in the elements of the greater offense.' [Citation.]" ' In other words, 'if a crime cannot be committed without also necessarily committing a lesser offense, the latter is a lesser included offense within the former.' " (Id. at p. 1034, quoting People v. Lopez (1998) 19 Cal.4th 282, 288.)

Section 203 defines simple mayhem: "Every person who unlawfully and maliciously deprives a human being of a member of his body, or disables, disfigures, or renders it useless, or cuts or disables the tongue, or puts out an eye, or slits the nose, ear, or lip, is guilty of mayhem." In Santana, supra, 56 Cal.4th 999, our high court addressed whether it was proper for the trial court to instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 801 3 (mayhem), which, then, required the prosecution to prove the defendant had caused the victim "serious bodily injury."2 Noting that mayhem, as defined in section 203, includes among the acts constituting mayhem, cutting or disabling the tongue and slitting the nose, ear or lip, the Supreme Court stated: "Nothing suggests that these injuries must involve protracted loss or impairment of function, require extensive suturing, or amount to serious disfigurement." 3 (Santana, supra, at p. 1010.) The court stated that the examples are "merely illustrative and do not constitute serious bodily injuries as a matter of law," and that it was error "to superimpose a wholesale definition of 'serious bodily injury' from [felony battery on the mayhem] instruction." (Ibid.)

Poisson argues that Santana is distinguishable from the instant matter. He asserts that Santana only addressed whether the jury instruction for mayhem should include a serious bodily injury component. However, Poisson's argument ignores the court's conclusion in Santana that proof of serious bodily injury is not required for a conviction of mayhem. (Santana, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1011.) In other words, battery with serious bodily injury is not a lesser included offense of mayhem.

2 CALCRIM No. 801, which has since been amended, provided in part: "To prove that the defendant is guilty of mayhem, the People must prove that the defendant caused serious bodily injury when (he/she) unlawfully and maliciously: [¶] [1. Removed a part of someone's body (;/.)] [¶] [OR] [¶] [2. Disabled or made useless a part of someone's body and the disability was more than slight or temporary (;/.)]. . . ." Serious bodily injury has since been removed from this instruction.

3 For purposes of battery, section 243, subdivision (f)(4) defines serious bodily injury as "a serious impairment of physical condition, including, but not limited to, the following: loss of consciousness; concussion; bone fracture; protracted loss or impairment of function of any bodily member or organ; a wound requiring extensive suturing; and serious disfigurement." 4 The flaw in Poisson's contention is further illuminated by the cases on which he relies. For example, he relies on People v. Ausbie (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 855 (Ausbie)

to support his position, but that case preceded the Supreme Court's opinion in Santana.

In fact, our high court explicitly disapproved Ausbie and stated, "the Ausbie court did not hold that serious bodily injury is a separate element of mayhem." (Santana, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1011.)

Similarly, we are unpersuaded by Poisson's reliance on People v. Quintero (2006)

135 Cal.App.4th 1152. In that case, the Court of Appeal's conclusion that battery with serious bodily injury is a lesser included offense of simple mayhem was based on "the People's concession" as well as the court's reliance on Ausbie, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th 855. (Quintero, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 1168.)

Finally, Poisson's contention that mayhem cannot be committed without the infliction of great bodily injury does not support his position here. (See People v. Brown (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 256, 272.) He implies that the terms, great bodily injury and serious bodily injury, should be used interchangeably. However, our high court rejected a similar argument seeking to bootstrap a serious bodily injury element to mayhem by equating serious bodily injury with great bodily injury. (See Santana, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1009 ["[W]e cannot conclude that the offense of mayhem includes a serious bodily injury requirement simply based on cases holding that mayhem includes a great bodily injury component."].) Poisson offers no compelling argument that we should disregard this portion of Santana.

5 In short, none of the cases on which Poisson relies leads us to conclude that battery with serious bodily injury is a lesser included offense of mayhem. In essence, Poisson is asking us to ignore Santana, supra, 56 Cal.4th 999. This we cannot do. (See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.) Because Santana makes clear that serious bodily injury is not an element required to be proven for the crime of simple mayhem, the offense of battery with serious bodily injury is not a lesser included offense of mayhem. There was no error below.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

HALLER, J.

AARON, J.

Cites, in this corpus

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