People v. Williams CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCD114531
- Trial judge
- David J. Danielsen
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Patricia D. Benke (author), Richard D. Huffman, Sr., Gilbert Nares
Analysis
The trial court denied defendant's petition for resentencing under Propositions 36 and 47 and *People v. Vargas*, determining that his second-degree robbery convictions were ineligible for reduction. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, agreeing that the convictions did not qualify for sentence reduction and finding no prejudice in the trial court's failure to explicitly rule on the other claims.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of petition for resentencing under Proposition 47 (Pen. Code, § 1170.18) for second-degree robbery convictions.“The trial court concluded no counts and, thus, no convictions were eligible for reduction under section 1170.18. We agree.” | de novo | correct | agree with court The appellate court correctly applied the statutory limitation of Proposition 47, which excludes second-degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) from the list of offenses eligible for reclassification to a misdemeanor. The trial court's determination that the convictions were ineligible was a correct application of the law. |
Failure to explicitly rule on claims under Proposition 36 and *People v. Vargas*.“Any failure to specifically address Proposition 36 and Vargas is not prejudicial.” | abuse of discretion | not reached | agree with court The appellate court found that because the defendant was ineligible for relief under Proposition 47, any procedural error in the trial court's handling of the other petitions was not prejudicial. This is a standard harmless error analysis. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 — Requires appellate counsel to review the record for error when no issues are raised, and the court to independently review the record if counsel finds no arguable issues.
- relied: Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 — Establishes the procedure for appointed counsel to file a brief identifying no arguable issues and inviting the court to review the record.
- relied: Penson v. Ohio (1988) 488 U.S. 75 — Requires the court to order counsel to brief an issue if the court finds good cause to conclude that an arguable issue exists during its independent review.
- relied: People v. Vargas (2014) 59 Cal.4th 635 — Holds that a defendant may petition for resentencing based on a prior conviction that was reclassified as a nonserious or nonviolent offense after the defendant's sentencing.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is procedurally sound, correctly applying the *Wende/Anders* framework to conduct an independent review of the record. It correctly identifies that second-degree robbery is not eligible for reduction under Proposition 47, rendering the other claims moot or non-prejudicial.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe trial court denied Bobby Williams's letter request for resentencing under Propositions 36 and 47 and People v. Vargas, finding his second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) convictions ineligible for sentence reduction. On appeal, appointed counsel filed a Wende brief; the Court of Appeal independently reviewed the record, agreed the robbery convictions were not eligible under section 1170.18, found any failure to address Proposition 36 and Vargas nonprejudicial, and affirmed.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of Proposition 47 (Pen. Code, § 1170.18) resentencing petition on the ground that second degree robbery convictions under section 211 are not eligible for reduction“The trial court concluded no counts and, thus, no convictions were eligible for reduction under section 1170.18. We agree.” | unclear | correct | agree with court Section 1170.18 reduces only enumerated theft and drug offenses to misdemeanors; robbery under section 211 is not among them and is a serious and violent felony (§§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(19), 667.5, subd. (c)(9)). The opinion does not state a standard of review, but eligibility is a legal question on undisputed facts and the court's conclusion follows directly from the statute. |
Failure to expressly rule on the Proposition 36 (Pen. Code, § 1170.126) resentencing request, held nonprejudicial“Any failure to specifically address Proposition 36 and Vargas is not prejudicial.” | unclear | harmless error | agree with court Proposition 36 resentencing is available only to third-strike defendants whose current commitment offense is not a serious or violent felony; robbery is both serious and violent, so defendant was categorically ineligible and any omission in the trial court's ruling could not have affected the outcome. The appellate court's conclusion is correct although it gives no statutory analysis. |
Failure to expressly rule on the claim under People v. Vargas (2014) 59 Cal.4th 635 that prior strikes should be treated as a single strike, held nonprejudicial“(3) whether the failure, if any, to rule on the motion under Proposition 36 and Vargas was prejudicial.” | unclear | harmless error | unsure Vargas holds that two strike priors arising from a single act against a single victim must be treated as one strike. The opinion recites that the two serious felony priors were found true under different subdivisions of section 1192.7 ((c)(19) and (c)(19),(23)) but says nothing about whether they arose from one act, and it does not explain why Vargas provides no relief or whether a letter request for resentencing is the proper vehicle. The result may well be right, but the opinion supplies no reasoning on this point, so I cannot verify it. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 — When appointed appellate counsel finds no arguable issues, the Court of Appeal must independently review the entire record for error.
- relied: Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 — Appointed counsel who finds an appeal wholly frivolous may so advise the court and refer to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal; the court then reviews the record.
- relied: Penson v. Ohio (1988) 488 U.S. 75 — If the reviewing court finds an arguable issue on independent review, it must appoint or direct counsel to brief the issue.
- relied: People v. Vargas (2014) 59 Cal.4th 635 — Two prior convictions arising from a single act against a single victim cannot be treated as two separate strikes under the Three Strikes law.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The affirmance is correct because robbery is a serious and violent felony that is categorically ineligible for relief under both Proposition 47 and Proposition 36, and the court properly conducted Wende review. The opinion, however, offers no statutory reasoning for either conclusion and does not explain why the Vargas claim lacked merit, leaving a gap on the one issue whose answer depends on facts not described in the opinion.
Opinion
Filed 3/24/16 P. v. Williams CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D068638
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD114531)
BOBBY WILLIAMS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, David J.
Danielsen, Judge. Affirmed.
Amanda Fates, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
BACKGROUND
Defendant and appellant Bobby Williams was charged with violations of Penal Code section 211 (counts 1 & 2); Vehicle Code section 2800.2 (count 3); Penal Code section 469, subdivision (a) (count 4); Health and Safety Code section 11550, subdivision (a) (count 5); Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (a) (count 6); and Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (b) (count 7). Three prior strikes under Penal Code section 667, subdivisions (d) and (e) were also charged. Counts 1 and 2 carried special allegations that defendant violated Penal Code sections 1192.7, subdivision (c), 1203, subdivision (e), 1203.06, subdivision (a)(1), and 12022.5.1 Defendant was convicted by a jury of counts 1 through 6. Count 7 was dismissed.
Pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b), the first and second priors were found true by the court. The court also found true the first mandatory serious felony prior under sections 667, subdivision (a)(1) and 1192.7, subdivision (c)(19). The second serious felony prior under sections 667, subdivision (a)(1) and 1192.7, subdivision (c)(19), (23)
was found true. Finally, the first and second strike priors under sections 667, subdivisions (b)-(i) and 1170.12 were also found true.
On September 24, 1997, defendant was sentenced to 60 years to life in prison on counts 1, 2, and 4. Defendant's sentence was later modified to reflect that count 4 was dismissed and that the first and second prison priors were stricken.
By an undated letter, defendant sought resentencing under Propositions 36 and 47, as well as People v. Vargas (2014) 59 Cal.4th 635 (Vargas). The court found defendant's convictions for violation of section 211 are not eligible for sentence reduction. On that basis, it denied defendant's request for resentencing.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 Defendant filed a notice of appeal and request for a certificate of probable cause.
He indicated his appeal would be based on the argument that at the time of his convictions, his priors were for second degree robbery and were considered nonserious and nonviolent at the time they were committed. The court denied his request for a certificate of probable cause. In doing so, the court stated the appeal asserts legal error after denial of a postjudgment petition under section 1170.18. With respect to the request for a certificate of probable cause, the court concluded that because the denial of the petition was not " 'a judgement of conviction upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or revocation of probation following an admission of violation,' " a certificate of probable cause is not necessary. With respect to the petition for reduction of the sentences, the trial court concluded the convictions for violation of section 211 are not eligible for reduction.
DISCUSSION
Defendant's appointed counsel has filed a brief presenting no argument for reversal but invites us to review the record for error in accordance with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders). If the court in reviewing the record finds good cause to conclude that an arguable issue exists, the court must order counsel to brief the issue. (Penson v. Ohio (1988) 488 U.S.
75, 88.) We have given defendant an opportunity to file a brief on his own behalf. He has declined to do so. We have independently reviewed the entire record as is required by Wende and Anders.
In particular, we note that we have considered the three potential issues raised by 3 appointed counsel, in particular: (1) whether the trial court erred when it denied defendant's motion for resentencing under Proposition 47 to reduce his conviction for second degree robbery under section 211; (2) whether the trial court erred in failing to rule on defendant's claims under Proposition 36 and Vargas; and (3) whether the failure, if any, to rule on the motion under Proposition 36 and Vargas was prejudicial.
The operative question is whether defendant's convictions for second degree robbery qualify for sentence reduction under either Propositions 36 or 47, or Vargas.
The trial court concluded no counts and, thus, no convictions were eligible for reduction under section 1170.18. We agree. Any failure to specifically address Proposition 36 and Vargas is not prejudicial.
Defendant has been represented by competent counsel on this appeal.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
BENKE, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, J.
NARES, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Vargas S203744 · 2014-07-10
- People v. Wende Crim. 20851 · 1979-10-12