People v. Golding CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of Imperial County · No. JCF34947
- Trial judge
- Diane B. Altamirano
- Outcome
- modified — Affirmed as modified.
- Area
- delinquency
- Panel
- Alex C. McDonald (author), Judith L. Haller, Cynthia Aaron
Analysis
The trial court modified a probation travel restriction to allow Golding to leave the county but not the state without permission, intending to accommodate his residence on the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment as modified, finding the trial court's condition impermissibly vague and rewriting it to explicitly permit travel within the reservation.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Trial court's modification of probation condition restricting travel to 'not leave the state without permission'“The trial court did not modify the condition to meet this concern because the trial court only struck the county clause, which does not allow Golding to enter the Arizona portion of the reservation.” | unclear | error | agree with court agree with court |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375 — The trial court has broad discretion in determining conditions of probation.
- relied: People v. Forrest (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1074 — Constitutional challenges to probation conditions are reviewed independently.
- relied: In re Shaun R. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1129 — Constitutional challenges to probation conditions are reviewed independently.
- relied: People v. Reinertson (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 320 — A probation condition must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required and for the court to determine violations.
- relied: In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875 — An appellate court may modify a probation condition that is not sufficiently precise or narrowly drawn and affirm as modified.
- relied: People v. Lopez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 615 — An appellate court may modify a probation condition that is not sufficiently precise or narrowly drawn and affirm as modified.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion correctly applies the independent review standard for constitutional vagueness challenges and cites appropriate authority for the power to modify conditions. It accurately identifies that the trial court's literal modification failed to achieve its stated intent, rendering the condition vague.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe Imperial County Superior Court placed Golding on three years' formal probation after a no contest plea to battery with serious bodily injury, and, after striking the county clause from the probation department's recommended travel restriction, imposed a condition that he not leave the state without his probation officer's permission, intending to let him move within the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation which straddles California and Arizona. On appeal, with the Attorney General conceding, the Court of Appeal held the condition impermissibly vague because it did not carry out the trial court's stated intent, modified the condition to permit out-of-state travel only as necessary to move within the reservation, and affirmed the judgment as modified.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Imposition of probation condition no. 22 forbidding Golding from leaving the state without the probation officer's permission (after striking only the 'county' clause), despite the trial court's stated intent to allow travel within the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation“Here, we find the travel restriction is impermissibly vague because it does not give Golding notice of where he may travel.” | de novo | error (other) | unsure The result is defensible: the written condition plainly did not accomplish what the trial court said it intended, and Sheena K. authorizes appellate modification of a probation condition. But the doctrinal label is a poor fit. Under the Reinertson standard the court itself quotes, a condition is vague when the probationer cannot tell what is required of him; 'shall not leave the state without permission' is perfectly precise. The real defect was a mismatch between the court's expressed intent and the condition as imposed, which is more naturally corrected as a failure to effectuate the court's sentencing choice than as a constitutional vagueness problem. Because the parties agreed on the outcome and the modification is sensible, I agree with the disposition but not with the characterization. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375 — Trial courts have broad discretion in setting conditions of probation.
- relied: People v. Forrest (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1074 — Constitutional challenges to probation conditions are reviewed independently.
- relied: In re Shaun R. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1129 — Constitutional challenges to probation conditions are reviewed de novo.
- relied: People v. Reinertson (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 320 — A probation condition must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required and for the court to determine whether it has been violated.
- relied: In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875 — An appellate court may modify an imprecise or overbroad probation condition and affirm as modified.
- relied: People v. Lopez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 615 — Appellate courts may modify vague or overbroad probation conditions rather than strike them.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion reaches a sensible, conceded result and correctly invokes Sheena K. for its power to modify the condition, so the disposition is sound. It stretches the vagueness doctrine, however, by labeling a facially clear 'do not leave the state' condition as vague when the actual problem was that the condition did not match the trial court's stated intent, and it does not explain that gap.
Opinion
Filed 3/15/16 P. v. Golding CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D068542
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. JCF34947)
WENDLEN MATTHEW GOLDING,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Imperial County, Diane B.
Altamirano, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Devin Burstein, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Kristen Hernandez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Defendant Wendlen Matthew Golding pleaded no contest to battery with serious bodily injury. (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d).)1 Golding was sentenced to three years' formal probation with imposed conditions, including a restriction on the right to leave the state without the permission of the probation officer. Golding contends, and the Attorney General concedes, that the probation condition restricting travel is impermissibly vague.
We modify the probation condition to the extent it is vague and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In June 2015, the Imperial County Sheriff Department arrested Golding for fighting. A complaint charged him with battery with serious bodily injury under section 243, subdivision (d), and resisting, obstructing, or delaying a peace officer under section 148, subdivision (a)(1). Golding pleaded no contest to battery with serious bodily injury.
At sentencing, the probation department recommended various conditions of Golding's probation to the trial court, including a travel restriction, which provided "[i]f legally in the United States, the defendant shall not leave the county or the state without the permission of the probation officer."
At sentencing, Golding objected to the travel restriction and requested that the court modify the probation condition to allow him to travel to the portion of Arizona within the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation. The Fort Yuma Indian Reservation is where Golding resides as a member of the Quechan Tribe. The reservation extends from California into Arizona and, as a result, Golding travels to the Arizona side of the 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 reservation for health care and groceries. Golding further argued the travel restriction was unnecessary because it had no nexus to the charged offense and would not reduce or prevent future criminality. The People argued that a travel restriction is a standard probation condition in felony cases and stated concerns about controlling and contacting Golding while on probation.
The trial court modified the probation condition restricting travel to "[i]f legally in the U.S., the defendant shall not leave the state without the permission of probation."
The trial court explained, "the reason I did that is because, my understanding as well, is that the reservation is in Arizona as well. So just staying on the reservation, he could be violating the terms of his probation if I don't strike the county clause." The trial court then addressed other conditions of Golding's probation and remanded him into custody.
DISCUSSION
Golding contends, and the Attorney General concedes, that the trial court intended to modify the travel restriction to allow him to leave California to enter the Arizona portion of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation without first seeking permission of his probation officer. Golding argues, and the Attorney General agrees, that the probation condition is impermissibly vague because it conflicts with the trial court's intention and does not inform Golding of where he is restricted from traveling.
The trial court has broad discretion in determining conditions of probation.
(People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379.) However, constitutional challenges to 3 probation conditions are reviewed independently. (People v. Forrest (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1080; In re Shaun R. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1143.)
To withstand a constitutional challenge on the ground of vagueness, a probation condition "must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated." (People v. Reinertson (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 320, 324-325.) In certain cases, an appellate court may modify a probation condition that is not sufficiently precise or narrowly drawn and affirm as modified. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 892; People v. Lopez (1998)
66 Cal.App.4th 615, 629.)
Here, we find the travel restriction is impermissibly vague because it does not give Golding notice of where he may travel. The trial court intended to give Golding unrestricted travel within the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation. The trial court showed this intention in its willingness to modify the travel restriction and its expressed concern that Golding would violate probation by staying on the reservation. The trial court did not modify the condition to meet this concern because the trial court only struck the county clause, which does not allow Golding to enter the Arizona portion of the reservation. By only modifying the county clause, the trial court did not sufficiently specify the terms of Golding's travel restriction as a condition of his probation, leaving the terms of Golding's probation impermissibly vague. Because we conclude the trial court intended to allow Golding to travel freely within the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation, but did not succeed in doing so, we modify the probation condition to meet this objective.
4 DISPOSITION
Probation condition number 22 is modified to provide as follows, "Defendant may leave the state without the probation officer's permission only as necessary to move within the confines of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation." Judgment is affirmed as modified.
McDONALD, J.
WE CONCUR:
HALLER, Acting P. J.
AARON, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Forrest No. D065056 · 2015-06-18
- People v. Shaun R. H035112 · 2010-09-29
- People v. Olguin S149303 · 2008-12-29
- People v. Lopez F028223 · 1998-08-26
- People v. Reinertson Crim. 13676 · 1986-03-03