People v. King CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from an order
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCD234016
- Trial judge
- David J. Danielsen
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- McINTYRE (author), Patricia D. Benke, Joan K. Irion
Analysis
The trial court granted King's petition to re-designate his 2007 felony drug conviction to a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 1170.18 but denied his request to strike the associated one-year prison prior enhancement from his current sentence. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that section 1170.18 does not provide a mechanism to strike prior enhancements based on convictions reduced after the current offense was committed.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of petition to strike one-year prison prior enhancement based on 2007 conviction re-designated as misdemeanor under Penal Code section 1170.18.“Section 1170.18 provides a mechanism for reducing felony convictions to misdemeanors, but contains no procedure for striking a prison prior if the felony underlying the enhancement has subsequently been reduced to a misdemeanor.” | de novo | correct | agree with court The court correctly applied de novo review to the statutory interpretation question. It properly distinguished the current case from People v. Park and People v. Flores, noting that in those cases the prior convictions were reduced before the current offense was committed, whereas here the reduction occurred after sentencing. The court relied on the prospective application presumption of Penal Code section 3 and the specific language of section 1170.18, which lacks a procedure for striking enhancements, to conclude the trial court did not err in denying the petition. |
Denial of equal protection claim regarding the failure to strike the prison prior enhancement.“The Legislature properly may specify that . . . statutes are prospective only, to assure that penal laws will maintain their desired deterrent effect by carrying out the original prescribed punishment as written.” | de novo | correct | agree with court The court correctly applied rational basis review to the equal protection claim. It reasoned that the voters, like the Legislature, have the prerogative to specify that statutes apply prospectively only. Since the initiative did not provide for retroactive application to strike enhancements for offenses committed before the initiative's passage, the differential treatment of King (whose offense predated the initiative) compared to others is rationally related to the legitimate government interest in maintaining the deterrent effect of penal laws. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Park (2013) 56 Cal.4th 782 — When a court reduces a wobbler to a misdemeanor, the defendant is not subject to enhancements for subsequent offenses; however, if the offense was committed before the reduction, the enhancement may still apply.
- relied: People v. Flores (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 461 — It is error to use a felony conviction to impose a sentence enhancement if the statute has been amended to reduce that offense to a misdemeanor before the current offense is committed.
- relied: People v. Gokey (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 932 — Sentence enhancements for prior prison terms are based on the defendant's status as a recidivist, not the underlying criminal conduct.
- relied: People v. Rivera (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1085 — Proposition 47 reclassified certain theft and drug-related crimes from felonies to misdemeanors and established a procedure for recall and modification of prior convictions.
- relied: People v. Taylor (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1084 — Statutory interpretation is a question of law reviewed independently by appellate courts.
- relied: Hermosa Beach Stop Oil Coalition v. City of Hermosa Beach (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 534 — Measures adopted by voters through the initiative process are subject to ordinary rules and canons of statutory construction.
- relied: People v. Torres (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1131 — Section 667.5, subdivision (b) provides for sentence enhancements for felony prison priors.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the presumption of prospective application to the initiative and distinguishes prior case law based on the timing of the conviction reduction relative to the current offense. It relies on the specific language of section 1170.18, which lacks a procedure for striking enhancements, to support its conclusion.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe San Diego Superior Court granted King's petition to redesignate his 2007 felony drug possession conviction as a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision (k), but refused to strike the one-year prison prior enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) that had been imposed in 2011 on that conviction in his evading-an-officer case. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding under its then-recent decision in People v. Valenzuela that Proposition 47 does not require striking a prison prior enhancement where the underlying felony was reduced after the defendant committed and was sentenced for the current offense, and that the prospective-only rule does not violate equal protection.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of request to strike the section 667.5, subdivision (b) prison prior enhancement after the underlying 2007 felony was redesignated a misdemeanor under section 1170.18, subdivision (k)“section 1170.18 does not require the court to strike a prison prior enhancement that is based on a felony conviction that was reduced to a misdemeanor after the defendant committed and was convicted of the current offense.” | de novo | correct | agree with court The court correctly treated the question as one of statutory interpretation reviewed independently, and applied the presumption of prospectivity in Penal Code section 3. Its distinction of Park and Flores is accurate: in both, the reduction to a misdemeanor preceded the commission of the new offense, and Park itself acknowledges the enhancement would apply had the new crime been committed before the reduction. King's 2011 judgment was long final when Proposition 47 passed, and section 1170.18 contains no mechanism for striking enhancements in final judgments. The opinion relies almost entirely on Valenzuela without independent analysis of the finality/Estrada question, but on these facts (final judgment) the result is consistent with the statutory text and with the later Supreme Court resolution in Buycks, which limited relief to nonfinal judgments. |
Rejection of the claim that refusing to strike the enhancement violates federal and state equal protection guarantees“Accordingly, failure to strike the prison prior enhancement does not constitute an equal protection violation.” | unclear | correct | agree with court The court did not state a standard of review but resolved the constitutional claim as a matter of law. Its rationale—that the electorate, like the Legislature, may make ameliorative penal statutes prospective only to preserve deterrent effect and the originally prescribed punishment—is the settled rational-basis answer to claims that a sentencing reform's effective date creates an unconstitutional classification. The analysis is brief and simply adopts Valenzuela's reasoning, but the conclusion is correct under established equal protection principles governing prospective-only sentencing changes. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Valenzuela (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 692 — Section 1170.18 provides a mechanism for reducing felony convictions to misdemeanors but contains no procedure for striking a prison prior enhancement when the underlying felony is later reduced; Proposition 47 was intended to have limited prospective application and the prospective-only rule does not violate equal protection.
- relied: People v. Park (2013) 56 Cal.4th 782 — When a wobbler is reduced to a misdemeanor before the defendant commits the new offense, it cannot support a prior-felony enhancement; but a defendant would be subject to the enhancement if the new crime was committed and adjudicated before the reduction.
- relied: People v. Flores (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 461 — Distinguished: a felony marijuana possession conviction could not support an enhancement where the offense had been statutorily reduced to a misdemeanor before the current offense.
- relied: People v. Gokey (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 932 — Prison prior enhancements are based on the defendant's recidivist status, not the underlying conduct of the current offense.
- relied: People v. Rivera (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1085 — Proposition 47, effective November 5, 2014, reclassified certain theft and drug offenses as misdemeanors and created a petition procedure for recall and modification of prior convictions and sentences.
- relied: People v. Taylor (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1084 — Statutory interpretation is a question of law reviewed independently on appeal.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion reaches the correct result for a defendant whose judgment was final before Proposition 47, properly distinguishes Park and Flores, and invokes the section 3 presumption of prospectivity. It is thin, however, resting almost wholly on the court's own Valenzuela decision without independent analysis of the finality question or of King's separate jurisdictional argument, and without discussing In re Estrada retroactivity principles that frame whether 'misdemeanor for all purposes' reaches enhancements in pending cases.
Opinion
Filed 2/17/16 P. v. King CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D068424
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD234016)
TERRANCE KING,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, David J.
Danielsen, Judge. Affirmed.
Nancy E. Olsen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Marvin Mizell and Allison V. Hawley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Terrance King appeals from an order denying his petition to dismiss a prior prison term enhancement from his sentence. He contends the prison prior sentence enhancement must be stricken because, in May 2015, the trial court re-designated the 2007 prior felony conviction on which the prison prior enhancement was based to a misdemeanor pursuant to Penal Code, section 1170.18, subdivision (k). (Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.) King argues the plain language of Proposition 47 and the voters' intent requires this court to strike the prison prior enhancement. He further argues that failure to strike the enhancement violated his right to equal protection. We reject King's arguments and affirm.
King also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus (In re Terrance King (D069184)), which we ordered considered with this appeal. We deny the petition by separate order. We also deny King's motion to consolidate the appeal with the petition.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In August 2011, King pleaded guilty to evading an officer with reckless driving and admitted to a strike prior and two prison priors. One of those prison priors pertained to a 2007 felony conviction for possession of a controlled substance in violation Health and Safety Code, section 11350, subdivision (a). The court sentenced King to eight years in prison, which consisted of six years for the evading offense and two one-year terms for the prison prior enhancements.
In 2015, King filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the superior court to reduce his 2007 possession of a controlled substance conviction to a misdemeanor under section 1170.18. King also requested that the court strike the one-year prison prior enhancement based on the 2007 conviction from his current sentence in the evading an officer case. The trial court granted King's request to re-designate the 2007 conviction to a misdemeanor, but denied his request to strike the prison prior sentence enhancement.
2 DISCUSSION
I. Prison Prior Enhancement King argues the prison prior enhancement based on his 2007 possession of a controlled substance conviction must be stricken because that conviction was reduced to a "misdemeanor for all purposes" under section 1170.18, subdivision (k). Specifically, he contends the plain language of section 1170.18 and the voters' intent in passing Proposition 47 establish that a prior prison enhancement cannot be based on a conviction that has been re-designated a misdemeanor. He also contends the trial court has jurisdiction under section 1170.18 to strike the prison prior enhancement.
A. General Legal Principles King's claim raises an issue of statutory interpretation. "[S]tatutory interpretation is a question of law [citation], and appellate courts review such issues independently."
(People v. Taylor (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1090-1091.) "Measures adopted by the voters through the initiative process . . . are subject to the ordinary rules and canons of statutory construction." (Hermosa Beach Stop Oil Coalition v. City of Hermosa Beach (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 534, 549.)
Section 667.5, subdivision (b) provides for a sentence enhancement for felony prison priors. (People v. Torres (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1131. 1149.) Specifically, that section provides, "where the new offense is any felony for which a prison sentence . . . is imposed . . . , in addition and consecutive to any other sentence therefor, the court shall impose a one-year term for each prior separate prison term . . . for any felony." (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) "Sentence enhancements for prior prison terms are based on the defendant's 3 status as a recidivist, and not the underlying criminal conduct, or the act or omission, giving rise to the current conviction." (People v. Gokey (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 932, 936.)
On November 4, 2014, California voters approved Proposition 47, which became effective the next day. (People v. Rivera (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1089.) The initiative reclassified certain theft- and drug-related crimes from felonies to misdemeanors unless they were committed by ineligible defendants. (Id. at p. 1091.) It also established a procedure for qualifying defendants to petition for recall and modification of their prior convictions and sentences. (§ 1170.18, subd. (a).)
Under the initiative's resentencing and reclassification mechanism, persons who have completed felony sentences for offenses that would be misdemeanors under Proposition 47 may file an application to have their felony convictions "designated as misdemeanors." (§ 1170.18, subds. (f)-(h).) Subdivision (k) of section 1170.18 provides that convictions that are resentenced or designated as a misdemeanor "shall be considered a misdemeanor for all purposes," except for purposes relating to ownership, possession and custody of firearms.
B. Analysis King's arguments are nearly identical to those rejected by this Court in People v. Valenzuela (Feb. 3, 2016, D066907) ___ Cal.App.4th ___ [pp. 22-25] (Valenzuela). In that case, the Court considered defendant's request to strike a prison prior enhancement based on a felony conviction that had been reduced to a misdemeanor under section 1170.18 after the imposition of sentence on the current offense. (Valenzuela, supra, at ___ [pp. 20, 22].) The defendant argued that section 1170.18, subdivision (k), " 'suggests 4 the electorate wanted eligible offenders like [her] to be shielded from the collateral consequences of prior prison terms stemming from felonies that the law now recognizes as misdemeanors.' " (Id. at p. 22.) This Court rejected the argument, concluding "[s]ection 1170.18 provides a mechanism for reducing felony convictions to misdemeanors, but contains no procedure for striking a prison prior if the felony underlying the enhancement has subsequently been reduced to a misdemeanor." (Ibid.)
The Court reasoned that "[n]othing in th[e] language [of section 1170.18, subdivision (k)]
or the ballot materials for Proposition 47 indicates that this provision was intended to have the retroactive collateral consequences that [the defendant] advances. To the contrary, . . . the procedures set forth in section 1170.18 that must be followed to obtain the resentencing and reclassification benefits of Proposition 47 indicate the electorate's intent for a specific, limited prospective application of the relief available under the new law." (Ibid.)
Like King, the defendant in Valenzuela, relied on People v. Park (2013) 56 Cal.4th 782, 796 (Park) and People v. Flores (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 461 (Flores) to support her assertion that her sentence must be reduced under section 1170.18, subdivision (k). In Park, our high court noted that "[w]hen the court properly exercises its discretion to reduce a wobbler to a misdemeanor, it has found that felony punishment, and its consequences, are not appropriate for that particular defendant. . . . [B]y virtue of the court's proper exercise of discretion, neither is such defendant a member of the class of criminals convicted of a prior serious felony whom the voters intended to subject to increased punishment for a subsequent offense." (Park, at pp. 801-802.) In Flores, the 5 court considered a 1975 statutory amendment reducing marijuana possession to a misdemeanor and held that it was error to use a felony marijuana possession conviction to impose a sentence enhancement. (Flores, at pp. 470, 474.)
Similarly to the defendant in Valenzuela, King's reliance on Park and Flores is misplaced because the felony convictions that served as the basis for sentence enhancements in those cases were reduced to misdemeanors before the defendant committed and was convicted of the offense subject to the current appeal. (Valenzuela [Feb. 3, 2016, D066907] ___ Cal.App.4th ___ [p. 23].) In the case before us, there is no dispute that King's drug offense conviction was reduced to a misdemeanor after he committed and was sentenced for the current evading an officer offense. Thus, Park and Flores are inapplicable. Moreover, Park supports our conclusion as the Supreme Court stated in that case that "there is no dispute that . . . defendant would be subject to the [sentence] enhancement had he committed and been convicted of the present crimes before the court reduced the earlier offense to a misdemeanor." (Park, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 802, italics added.)
King has not pointed to anything in the language of section 1170.18 or Proposition 47 ballot materials that overcomes the presumed prospective effect of any provision added to the Penal Code. (§ 3.) Further, King has not pointed to any authority convincing us to depart from the reasoning and conclusion in Valenzuela that section 1170.18 does not require the court to strike a prison prior enhancement that is based on a felony conviction that was reduced to a misdemeanor after the defendant committed and was convicted of the current offense.
6 II. Equal Protection Claim King argues that failure to strike the one-year sentence enhancement for the prison prior which was re-designated a misdemeanor violates his right to equal protection under the federal and state constitutions. He argues that "no rational basis can justify [his] exclusion from the benefits of Proposition 47, since he meets the requirements for relief and only differs from other possession offenders by the fact that his criminal judgment was issued prior to the passage of the initiative." This argument was rejected in Valenzuela [Feb. 3, 2016, D066907] ___ Cal.App.4th ___ [p. 25]. We reject it for the same reason that " ' "[t]he Legislature properly may specify that . . . statutes are prospective only, to assure that penal laws will maintain their desired deterrent effect by carrying out the original prescribed punishment as written." [Citations.] The voters have the same prerogative." ' " (Ibid.) Accordingly, failure to strike the prison prior enhancement does not constitute an equal protection violation. (Ibid.)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
McINTYRE, J.
WE CONCUR:
BENKE, Acting P. J.
IRION, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Rivera H041742 · 2015-01-29
- People v. Park S193938 · 2013-05-13
- People v. Torres No. H035626 · 2011-08-30
- Hermosa Beach Stop Oil Coalition v. City of Hermosa Beach B138557 · 2001-01-24
- People v. Gokey A076192 · 1998-03-30
- People v. Taylor G010516 · 1992-05-21
- People v. Flores Crim. 9973 · 1979-04-26