People v. Ibarra CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCS267211
- Trial judge
- Ana Espana
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Richard D. Huffman, Sr. (author), Judith D. McConnell, Cynthia Aaron
Analysis
The trial court revoked Ibarra's probation following a contested evidentiary hearing and sentenced him to 16 months in prison. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that Ibarra forfeited his due process claims by failing to object in the trial court, and further finding that no due process violation occurred or that any error was harmless.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Forfeiture of due process claims regarding the timing of the probation revocation hearing and the lack of a preliminary probable cause hearing.“We are convinced the due process claims have been forfeited by failure to raise the issue in the trial court.” | unclear | error | agree with court The court correctly applies the well-established principle that issues not raised in the trial court are forfeited on appeal unless plain error or fundamental fairness is shown. The opinion notes Ibarra never objected to the procedure or requested a probable cause hearing, supporting the forfeiture finding. |
Merits of the due process claim that Ibarra was denied a probable cause hearing within a specific timeframe.“In any event, we will determine Ibarra was not denied due process and to the extent there may have been an error, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” | de novo | not reached | agree with court The court analyzes the merits under the standard from People v. Woodall, distinguishing the parole-specific timelines in Williams v. Superior Court. It concludes that because Ibarra had counsel, was not surprised, and did not challenge the evidence, any procedural delay was harmless. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Woodall (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1221 — A probationer is entitled to a probable cause hearing or its functional equivalent if detained for a significant period before a final revocation hearing, but two separate hearings are not always required if the final hearing occurs relatively soon after custody.
- relied: Williams v. Superior Court (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 636 — Parolees are entitled to a probable cause hearing within 15 days and an arraignment within 10 days under specific parole statutes (Section 3044), which the court distinguishes from probation proceedings.
- relied: People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867 — Morrissey does not mandate precise procedures for probation revocation as long as equivalent due process safeguards prevent arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
- relied: Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 498 U.S. 471 — Establishes the minimum due process requirements for parole and probation revocation hearings.
- relied: People v. Hawkins (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 958 — Absent an objection to notice, a court will not imply inadequate notice from a silent record.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the forfeiture doctrine and distinguishes the parole-specific statutory timelines in Williams from the probation context governed by Woodall. It provides a clear rationale for why the lack of a preliminary hearing did not prejudice the defendant given the full evidentiary hearing and representation by counsel.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe San Diego Superior Court, after a contested evidentiary hearing held about six weeks after Ibarra's arrest by probation and 13 days after his first court appearance, found Ibarra violated probation, revoked it, and sentenced him to the 16-month lower term with 448 days of credit. On appeal Ibarra argued for the first time that due process required an arraignment within 10 days and a separate probable cause hearing; the Court of Appeal held the claims forfeited and moot, rejected them on the merits under People v. Woodall while distinguishing Williams v. Superior Court, found any error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and affirmed.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Conducting the probation revocation proceeding where Ibarra first appeared in court 13 days after the probation department's October 3, 2014 arrest and notice to show cause, without an earlier 'arraignment'“Ibarra was informed of the basis of his probation revocation when he was arrested by the probation officer. When Ibarra appeared in court 13 days later, he had counsel and obviously had been advised by counsel before the court proceedings.” | unclear | correct | agree with court The opinion never articulates a standard of review, though a due process challenge is a legal question. The court correctly notes that Williams' 10-day arraignment rule arose from parole revocation under section 3044 and a writ challenging a county-wide system, and has no statutory footing for probation revocations; section 1203.2(b)(2) expressly allows notice at the first court appearance. With no objection below, Woodall and Hawkins support declining to infer inadequate notice from a silent record. The 13-day gap, followed by a full adversarial hearing within about six weeks, does not plausibly show arbitrary deprivation of conditional liberty for a significant period, and Ibarra identifies no concrete prejudice. |
Proceeding directly to a contested final revocation hearing without a separate preliminary probable cause hearing, then revoking probation and imposing the 16-month lower term“First Williams was interpreting statutes principally aimed at parolees. Section 3044, from which the court extracted the 15-day probable cause hearing deadline has no applicability to probation revocations.” | unclear | correct | agree with court Woodall, relying on People v. Coleman, holds that Morrissey does not require two hearings where a final revocation hearing with full Morrissey protections occurs relatively soon after the probationer's loss of liberty; the court read section 1203.2 to require a probable cause hearing only when there is significant delay. Here Ibarra, with counsel, denied the allegations at his first appearance, never requested a probable cause hearing, and received a full evidentiary hearing roughly a month later at which he cross-examined and testified; he does not challenge sufficiency or admissibility. The court's alternative holding that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt is supported because the asserted prejudice (a 'better challenge') is speculative. Forfeiture for failure to object is also a sound independent ground. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Woodall (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1221 — A probationer need not receive a separate probable cause hearing where a final revocation hearing with full Morrissey protections occurs relatively soon after the loss of liberty; section 1203.2 impliedly requires a probable cause hearing only if there is significant delay, and inadequate notice will not be inferred from a silent record absent objection.
- relied: Williams v. Superior Court (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 636 — Cited by appellant and distinguished by the court: in parole revocation proceedings under realignment, parolees are entitled to arraignment within 10 days, a probable cause hearing within 15 days under section 3044, and a final hearing within 45 days; the court held these parole-specific rules do not govern probation revocation.
- relied: Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471 — Due process requires minimum procedural safeguards, including a preliminary probable cause determination and a final hearing, before revocation of conditional liberty; the opinion miscites the reporter volume as 498 U.S. 471.
- relied: People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867 — Morrissey does not mandate precise procedures; two separate hearings are not required in every case so long as equivalent due process safeguards ensure the probationer is not arbitrarily deprived of conditional liberty for a significant period.
- relied: People v. Hawkins (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 958 — Absent objection by defendant or counsel that notice of probation violation charges was inadequate, a reviewing court will not imply inadequate notice from a record silent as to how notice was given.
- missed: People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451 — The California Supreme Court's foundational decision extending Morrissey protections to probationers and recognizing that a prompt unitary formal hearing may satisfy due process without a separate preliminary hearing; the court reached a result consistent with Vickers but addressed it only indirectly through Coleman and Woodall.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court properly rested on forfeiture and mootness, then persuasively distinguished Williams as a parole-specific writ decision tied to section 3044 and applied its own binding-on-itself precedent in Woodall and the Supreme Court's Coleman to find no due process violation and no prejudice. Gaps remain: the opinion cites no authority for forfeiture or for the Chapman harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard it invokes, miscites Morrissey's reporter volume, does not cite Vickers, and expressly declines to engage Ibarra's argument that Woodall was wrongly decided.
Opinion
Filed 11/20/15 P. v. Ibarra CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D067378
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCS267211)
GERMAN IBARRA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Ana España, Judge. Affirmed.
Elizabeth Garfinkle, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Sabrina Y. Lane-Erwin and Seth M. Friedman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. In November 2013, German Ibarra entered a guilty plea to felony vandalism (Pen.
Code,1 § 594, subds. (a), (b)(1)). He also admitted a serious/violent felony prior conviction (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)). In February 2014, the court struck the prior and placed Ibarra on probation for three years.
On October 3, 2014, the probation department filed a notice to show cause why Ibarra's probation should not be revoked. On October 16, 2014, Ibarra denied the allegations and the court set an evidentiary hearing for November 14, 2014.
Following a contested evidentiary hearing, the court found Ibarra violated the terms of his probation and formally revoked probation. Later the court sentenced Ibarra to 16 months, the lower term of imprisonment. Ibarra was granted 448 days of custody credits.
Ibarra appeals raising several issues for the first time on appeal. He contends he was denied due process because he did not appear in court until 13 days following the revocation of probation by the probation department on October 3, 2014. Ibarra argues he was entitled to an "arraignment" on the notice to show cause within 10 days.
Ibarra also contends he was denied due process because he did not receive a probable cause hearing prior to the evidentiary hearing. Although Ibarra never objected to the procedure in the trial court or ask for a probable cause hearing or object to any dates set, he contends he was prejudiced by the denial of due process and we should overturn the revocation decision.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified. 2 Appellate counsel recognizes the issues raised are technically moot, because he has served his term and there is no practical relief we can grant. However, counsel argues we should still consider the merits of the claims.
We are convinced the due process claims have been forfeited by failure to raise the issue in the trial court. In any event, we will determine Ibarra was not denied due process and to the extent there may have been an error, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.2
DISCUSSION
As we have noted, none of the issues presented on this appeal was ever raised in the trial court. There was literally no objection to any of the procedures followed by the trial court. Accordingly, we believe Ibarra has forfeited these issues on appeal. Although we are satisfied the claims have been forfeited, and are also moot, we will exercise our discretion and discuss the merits, out of an abundance of caution.
Essentially, Ibarra's contentions are based almost exclusively on Williams v. Superior Court (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 636, decided by Division Three of this court, dealing with the procedures used by the Orange County Superior Court in parole revocation proceedings. However, this court has discussed the timing of probation revocation proceedings in People v. Woodall (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1221 (Woodall).
2 Since Ibarra does not challenge the sufficiency or the admissibility of the evidence at the revocation hearing we will not include the traditional statement of facts. Further, the facts on which the revocation was based are not relevant to the resolution of the issues before us. 3 Following the reasoning of our court in Woodall, we will reject the due process arguments raised here.
A. People v. Woodall In Woodall, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th 1221, the court addressed the due process rights of probationers to revocation hearings. At page 1236, the court addressed whether Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 498 U.S. 471 require both a probable cause hearing and a separate revocation hearing when authorities seek to revoke probation. The court said:
"When applying Morrissey's principles to California's probation revocation proceedings, the courts have concluded that a trial court may summarily revoke probation to preserve jurisdiction and acquire physical custody of the offender, as long as the probationer is accorded a hearing or hearings that conform to Morrissey standards after being taken into custody. [Citations.] Further, although a preliminary probable cause hearing distinct from a final revocation hearing may be required in some cases, two hearings are not necessarily required in all cases. (People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867, 894-896.) The Coleman court explained that Morrissey does not mandate the precise procedures that a state must follow, so long as ' "equivalent due process safeguards' assure that a probationer is not arbitrarily deprived of his conditional liberty for any significant period of time . . . ." ' (Coleman, supra, at pp. 894- 895.) For example, there is no need for a probable cause hearing if a final revocation hearing 'with its full panoply of Morrissey procedural rights occurs relatively soon after the probationer has been deprived of his conditional liberty,' or if a preliminary hearing held on new criminal charges committed by the probationer can serve as a preliminary revocation hearing as well." (Woodall, supra, at p. 1236.)
The court went on to interpret section 1203.2, subdivision (a)3 relating to probation revocations. The court found the statute facially constitutional and found it 3 Section 1203.2, subdivision (a)(5) states in relevant part: "Upon such rearrest, or upon the issuance of a warrant for rearrest the court may revoke and terminate the 4 constitutional as applied to Woodall. It found that "[t]he courts have long recognized that a probationer is entitled to a probable cause hearing or its functional equivalent if he or she is to be detained for any significant period of time before a final revocation hearing.
[Citations.] Given this well-established case authority, we construe section 1203.2 to impliedly require a probable cause hearing if there is any significant delay between the probationer's arrest and a final revocation hearing." (Woodall, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 1237.)
B. Williams v. Superior Court In Williams the court addressed the due process issues surrounding parole revocation proceedings after the realignment legislation placed responsibility for parole revocation proceedings in the courts. The Williams case was a writ proceeding in which Williams complained about the scheduling of parole revocation proceedings in the Orange County Superior Court. The Williams court, in part interpreting section 3044, determined that parolees are entitled to a probable cause hearing on parole revocations within 15 days. (Williams, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at pp. 658-660.)
The court then held, without reference to statute or case law that the Orange County Superior Court could, and must hold the final revocation hearings within 45 days.
[probation] if the interests of justice so require and the court, in its judgment, has reason to believe from the report of the probation . . . officer or otherwise that the person has violated any of the conditions of his or her [probation]." Section 1203.2, subdivision (b)(1) states in relevant part: "The court shall give notice of its motion [to revoke probation], and the probation . . . officer or the district attorney shall give notice of his or her petition to the [probationer]." Subdivision (b)(2) of this section, provides in part: "The notice required by this subdivision may be given to the [probationer] upon his or her first court appearance in the proceeding." 5 (Williams, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 664.) Additionally, the court held that the trial court must arraign the parolee within 10 days of his or her arrest. (Id. at pp. 663-664.)
C. This Case Ibarra contends Williams, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th 636 is controlling and that Woodall, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th 1221 was wrongly decided. We decline to consider such argument on the record of this case. First Williams was interpreting statutes principally aimed at parolees. Section 3044, from which the court extracted the 15-day probable cause hearing deadline has no applicability to probation revocations. Williams involved a writ proceeding challenging the procedure used by a single court system.
Here, however, Ibarra is challenging the procedure used, after the fact with no reasonable claim of prejudice.
Ibarra was informed of the basis of his probation revocation when he was arrested by the probation officer. When Ibarra appeared in court 13 days later, he had counsel and obviously had been advised by counsel before the court proceedings. Ibarra initially indicated he would admit the violation. However, after lengthy discussion with the court and counsel elected to have an evidentiary hearing. At the evidentiary hearing, Ibarra was represented by counsel, cross-examined the prosecution witness and testified in his own behalf. Finally, Ibarra does not contend the evidence was insufficient to support the revocation. Nor, does he challenge the admissibility of the evidence to prove the violation. One must wonder, what possible prejudice did Ibarra suffer in this case?
Counsel argues that if Ibarra had the benefit of a probable cause hearing he could have developed a better challenge to the prosecution case. Of course, nothing supports 6 that contention. At the risk of being overly repetitive, Ibarra, represented by counsel never complained about scheduling or contended there was a need for additional time or hearings. To argue he might have presented a better case had there been a probable cause hearing is to engage in utter speculation.
As we said in Woodall regarding the defendant in that case "[d]efendant has not pointed to anything in the record suggesting that when he arrived at the February hearing he was surprised at the reason he was there or the potential consequence of his probation violation. (See People v. Hawkins [(1975)] 44 Cal.App.3d [958,] 967 [" 'Neither the defendant nor his counsel objected that they had inadequate notice of the [probation violation] charges and thus, absent objection, we will not imply inadequate notice from a record which is silent as to exactly how the defendant was given notice of the charges.'].)" (Woodall, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 1239.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
HUFFMAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
AARON, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- Williams v. Superior Court G050280 · 2014-10-14
- P. v. Woodall CA4/1 D062005 · 2013-05-13
- People v. Coleman Crim. 17822 · 1975-04-03