gno.law

People v. Hiles CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D067230 · 2015-11-09 · Unpublished

Proceeding
appeal from an order
Trial court
Superior Court of Imperial County · No. JCF33154
Trial judge
Donal B. Donnelly
Outcome
reversed — Reversed.
Area
delinquency
Panel
Alex C. McDonald (author), O'Rourke, Cynthia Aaron

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T06:05Z · confidence high

The trial court denied the defendant's motion to terminate a criminal protective order, relying on the argument that the offense constituted domestic violence under a statute amended after the crime was committed. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to maintain the order after the defendant was sentenced to state prison because the applicable domestic violence exception did not cover parent-child relationships at the time of the offense.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Denial of motion to terminate criminal protective order under Penal Code section 136.2
“We agree, reverse the order, and remand with directions.”
de novoerroragree with court
The appellate court correctly applied the presumption of prospective application to statutes, noting that the 2014 amendment to section 136.2(i) (incorporating Family Code section 6211) took effect after the May 2014 offense. Since the pre-amendment definition in section 13700 did not cover parent-child relationships, the trial court lacked statutory authority to extend the order post-sentencing. The court also correctly noted the lack of jurisdiction under section 136.2(a) after a state prison commitment, consistent with prior case law.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378 — A trial court has no authority to issue a protective order under section 136.2 extending beyond the pronouncement of judgment.
  • relied: People v. Hamlin (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1412 — Supports the preconviction limitation on section 136.2 protective orders.
  • relied: People v. Selga (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 113 — Supports the preconviction limitation on section 136.2 protective orders.
  • relied: People v. Stone (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 153 — Section 136.2 authorizes injunctions only by courts with jurisdiction over criminal proceedings and is aimed at protecting victims or witnesses during the proceeding.
  • relied: Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282 — A new statute is presumed to operate prospectively absent an express declaration of retroactivity.
  • relied: People v. Hayes (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1260 — Supports the presumption of prospective application of statutes.
  • relied: Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188 — Supports the presumption of prospective application of statutes.
  • relied: Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1947) 30 Cal.2d 388 — Supports the presumption of prospective application of statutes.
  • relied: Jones v. Union Oil Co. (1933) 218 Cal. 775 — Supports the presumption of prospective application of statutes.
  • relied: In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 — Cited in contrast to the general rule of prospective application.
  • relied: People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314 — Applies the generally applicable declaration that no part of a statute is retroactive unless expressly so declared.
  • misapplied: People v. Beckemeyer (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 461 — The People relied on this case to argue the Legislature did not intend to narrow the scope of postconviction protective orders, but the court found this reliance misplaced because Beckemeyer applied the section 13700 definition (dating relationship) rather than Family Code section 6211.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly identifies the temporal mismatch between the offense date and the statutory amendment, applying the well-established presumption of prospective application to deny the People's argument. It also correctly distinguishes the cited authority (Beckemeyer) based on the specific statutory definitions applicable at the time of the offense.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:31Z · confidence medium

The Imperial County Superior Court sentenced Hiles to three years in prison for battery with serious bodily injury on her mother and then denied her motion to terminate a Penal Code section 136.2 criminal protective order barring contact with her mother. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding the trial court lost jurisdiction over the section 136.2 order upon imposing a state prison commitment and that the 2015 amendment adding the Family Code section 6211 definition of domestic violence to section 136.2, subdivision (i), did not apply retroactively to Hiles's May 2014 offense; it remanded with directions to terminate the order.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Denial of motion to terminate the section 136.2 criminal protective order after imposition of a state prison sentence (jurisdiction under section 136.2, subdivision (a))
“Under this statute, a trial court has jurisdiction to issue protective orders that apply during the pendency of a criminal matter, but has no authority to issue a protective order extending beyond the pronouncement of judgment.”
de novoerror (statutory interpretation)agree with court
The court did not expressly articulate a standard, but the question whether the trial court retained jurisdiction under section 136.2 is a pure question of statutory interpretation reviewed independently. Ponce, Stone, Selga and Hamlin uniformly hold that section 136.2, subdivision (a) orders are limited to the pendency of the criminal proceeding and do not survive judgment, and the Judicial Council form itself (CR-160) says the order is not valid after a state prison commitment. The conclusion follows directly from the cited authority.
Continuation of the protective order under the domestic violence exception in section 136.2, subdivision (i), based on Family Code section 6211's definition (relatives within the second degree)
“At the time of Hiles's offense, the exception in section 136.2, subdivision (i), did not encompass domestic violence as defined in Family Code section 6211, and the definition set forth in section 13700 did not apply.”
de novoerror (statutory interpretation)agree with court
When Hiles committed the offense (May 2014), section 136.2, subdivision (i) defined domestic violence by reference to section 13700, whose 'cohabitant' definition covers only unrelated adults, so a mother-daughter battery did not qualify. The amendment adding Family Code section 6211 took effect January 1, 2015, after both the offense and the November 2014 ruling, and nothing in the statute or legislative history declares retroactivity; Tapia and Brown establish the presumption of prospective operation. The court correctly distinguished Beckemeyer, which involved a dating relationship squarely within section 13700. The result is correct, though the court could have noted more simply that the amendment was not even in effect when the trial court ruled.
Rejection of the People's arguments that the order survived because it was part of the plea agreement and because the face of the form order stated a three-year default duration
“The record contains no reference to the criminal protective order as a part of Hiles's plea agreement to justify its continuation.”
de novoerror (statutory interpretation)agree with court
The record showed only that at sentencing the court confirmed the order existed pending a motion to modify; nothing shows the order was a negotiated term of the plea. The form's default three-year expiration is qualified by its own Warnings and Notices provision stating section 136.2 orders are not valid after a state prison commitment, and a Judicial Council form cannot expand statutory jurisdiction in any event. The court's treatment is brief but correct.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378 — Section 136.2 protective orders are limited to the duration of the criminal proceeding and a court lacks authority to issue or continue them beyond pronouncement of judgment.
  • relied: People v. Stone (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 153 — Section 136.2 authorizes orders only by courts with jurisdiction over pending criminal proceedings to protect victims and witnesses during those proceedings; it does not authorize post-judgment orders.
  • relied: People v. Selga (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 113 — A section 136.2 protective order cannot extend beyond the pendency of the criminal case.
  • relied: People v. Hamlin (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1412 — Section 136.2 orders are operative only during the pendency of the criminal action.
  • relied: Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282 — A new statute is presumed to operate prospectively absent an express declaration or clear indication of legislative intent to apply it retroactively.
  • relied: People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314 — Absent clear legislative intent, Civil Code section 3's default rule that no statute is retroactive unless expressly so declared applies.
  • relied: People v. Beckemeyer (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 461 — Distinguished: a postconviction section 136.2, subdivision (i) order could remain in effect where the victim was in a dating relationship with the defendant, a relationship within section 13700's definition of domestic violence.
  • relied: In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 — Cited by way of comparison; statutes reducing punishment are presumed to apply to cases not yet final, an exception to the general rule of prospectivity.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion correctly applies the settled line of authority (Ponce, Stone, Selga, Hamlin) that section 136.2, subdivision (a) orders do not survive a state prison commitment, and correctly holds the Family Code section 6211 amendment to subdivision (i) was not retroactive and did not reach a mother-daughter battery under the section 13700 definition in force at the time of the offense. It does not state a standard of review and spends effort on retroactivity when the amendment was not even effective at the time of the November 2014 ruling, but these are minor gaps that do not affect the result.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

record incomplete

Opinion

Filed 11/9/15 P. v. Hiles CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D067230

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. JCF33154)

BRIANNE HILES,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Imperial County, Donal B.

Donnelly, Judge. Reversed.

Andrea S. Bitar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Seth Friedman and Karl T. Terp, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Defendant Brianne Hiles pleaded guilty to battery with serious bodily injury.

(Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d).)1 The trial court sentenced Hiles to three years in prison and denied her motion to terminate a criminal protective order, prohibiting her from contact with her mother—the victim of the battery—issued under section 136.2. The People contend that Hiles's crime is within the definition of domestic violence (Fam.

Code, § 6211), allowing the court to continue the protective order for up to 10 years. The People further argue that the face of the criminal protective order itself allows the order to remain in effect for three years and the order was part of Hiles's plea agreement. Hiles argues the trial court erred in denying the motion because after she received a sentence to state prison, the trial court lost its jurisdiction to continue and enforce the protective order under section 136.2. We agree, reverse the order, and remand with directions.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 19, 2014, Hiles woke her mother by banging on the bedroom door and demanded money to purchase "spice"—synthetic marijuana. When her mother told Hiles she had no money, Hiles demanded her mother get on the floor to look for spice. She then kicked her mother in the rib cage and leg and, when her mother stood and attempted to walk away, she threw a heavy glass object and hit her mother in the back of the head.

Hiles grabbed an envelope opener and threatened her mother's life. Hiles let her mother go, took a Valium and fell asleep. Later that morning, Hiles again became violent and demanded her mother drive her to buy more spice. While driving, Hiles punched her 1 All subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified. 2 mother repeatedly in the face, breaking her nose and causing vision loss. Her mother finally drove to a convenience store, and went in the store for help. Hiles chased her, demanding her wallet and that she return to the car. Her mother turned over her wallet and Hiles drove away. Her mother sustained a fractured nasal bone, facial contusions, a closed head injury, scalp lacerations, and a subconjunctival hemorrhage to her eye.

Two days after the incident, Hiles was charged with assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a) (1)), second degree robbery (§ 211), kidnapping by force or fear (§ 207, subd. (a)), torture (§ 206), making criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a)), and battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)). On May 27, 2014, the People requested a criminal protective order under section 136.2, naming Hiles's mother as the protected person. Hiles pleaded guilty to battery with serious bodily injury and agreed to a three- year prison term, in exchange for dismissal of all other counts. At the sentencing hearing on July 10, the trial court asked the parties to "verify there is currently a criminal protective order [and] [i]t will remain in effect pending a motion to modify?" Both parties acknowledged its existence and the trial court proceeded to impose the three-year prison sentence. There is no record that the criminal protective order was part of the original plea agreement.

On October 9, 2014, Hiles filed a notice of motion and motion to terminate the criminal protective order based on lack of jurisdiction after sentencing. The order stated:

"2. This order expires on (date):_______[.] If no date is listed, this order expires three years from the date of issuance." No date was listed. On the reverse in "Warnings and Notices," section six states "[o]rders under Penal Code section 136.2 are valid as long as 3 the court has jurisdiction over the case. They are not valid after imposition of a state prison commitment." Hiles's mother attended the hearing and supported vacating the order so she could visit her daughter in prison. The trial court instructed Hiles's mother to obtain a request to withdraw the order, with a declaration outlining her reasons, and to file it with the court.

On November 4, 2014, Hiles filed a second motion to terminate. The People filed opposition, contending the court properly asserted jurisdiction under section 136.2, subdivision (i), because the crime was one of domestic violence. Hiles responded and argued section 136.2, subdivision (i), was not applicable because her crime was not within section 13700's definition of domestic violence. The trial court heard argument and denied the motion to terminate the protective order. At the hearing, the parties agreed a court reporter was not necessary so there is no record to substantiate the trial court's reasoning. Hiles timely appealed.

On appeal, Hiles urges this court to vacate the protective order. She argues that section 136.2, subdivision (i), is inapplicable because her crime is not within section 13700's definition of domestic violence. The People argue that section 136.2, subdivision (i), does apply because the crime is within the section 136.2, subdivision (i), reference to Family Code section 6211. The People also argue the order is valid based on it being a part of Hiles's plea agreement and because the face of the order contained no end date.

Because section 136.2 allows an order to remain in effect only prior to imposition of a state prison commitment and section 136.2, subdivision (i), did not contain a reference to 4 Family Code section 6211 at the time of Hiles's crime, we reverse the trial court's order maintaining the criminal protective order.

DISCUSSION

Section 136.2, subdivision (a), authorizes a court "with jurisdiction over a criminal matter" to issue protective orders based upon a "good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of, a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur." Under this statute, a trial court has jurisdiction to issue protective orders that apply during the pendency of a criminal matter, but has no authority to issue a protective order extending beyond the pronouncement of judgment. (People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378, 382-386; People v. Hamlin (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1478; People v. Selga (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 113, 118-119; People v. Stone (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 153, 159-160.)

Because of this preconviction limitation, in 2011 the Legislature enacted an exemption for domestic violence cases. Effective January 1, 2012, a trial court could impose a postconviction protective order for up to 10 years for domestic violence crimes specified in section 136.2, subdivision (i). The statute defined domestic violence as that set forth in section 13700, which states: " 'Domestic violence' means abuse committed against an adult or a minor who is a spouse, former spouse, cohabitant [and] [f]or purposes of this subdivision, 'cohabitant' means two unrelated adult persons living together for a substantial period of time . . . ." In 2014, the Legislature amended section 136.2, subdivision (i), to include crimes of domestic violence as defined by Family Code 6211. Family Code 6211 defines domestic violence similarly, but—at issue here— 5 includes abuse perpetrated against "[a]ny other person related by consanguinity or affinity within the second degree." The amendment took effect January 1, 2015.

(§ 136.2, as amended by Stats. 2014, ch. 673, § 1.3.)

"It is well settled that a new statute is presumed to operate prospectively absent an express declaration of retrospectvity or a clear indication that the electorate, or the Legislature, intended otherwise." (Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 287, citing People v. Hayes (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1260, 1274; Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1206-1209; Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1947) 30 Cal.2d 388, 393; Jones v. Union Oil Co. (1933) 218 Cal. 775, 777; cf. In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 746.) When the Legislature has not made its intent clear, the Legislature's generally applicable declaration, " '[n]o part . . . is retroactive, unless expressly so declared,' " is applied. (People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 319; Civ.

Code, § 3.)

Here, Hiles committed a crime of domestic violence against her mother on May 19, 2014. However, at the time of her crime, section 136.2, subdivision (i), defined domestic violence with reference only to section 13700—not that of Family Code section 6211—on which the People rely. Section 13700 subdivision (b), does not encompass a crime of domestic violence between a mother and daughter because "cohabitant" is defined as "two unrelated adult persons." (§ 13700, subd. (b).) The People rely heavily on People v. Beckemeyer (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 461 for the proposition that in 2011, the Legislature recognized the broad definition of "victim" within section 136.2 and did not intend to enact any provision that would narrow the scope of a postconviction 6 protective order. This reliance is misplaced. In Beckemeyer, the court had to determine whether a postconviction protective order could remain after the victim's ex-boyfriend went to prison. The court relied on the definition of domestic violence based on section 13700—not Family Code section 6211. (Beckemeyer, at pp. 465-466.) Section 13700 applied because the abuse committed was against an adult "with whom the suspect . . .

has had a dating or engagement relationship." (§ 13700, subd. (b).)

We have no record of the termination hearing to indicate whether the trial court extended the protective order under the domestic violence exception in section 136.2, subdivision (i). In our review of the 2014 legislative history, we find no indication that the Legislature intended the new reference to Family Code 6211 to apply retroactively.

As stated, it is a time-honored principle that absent such express intent a statute only applies prospectively. If the trial court extended the order under this subdivision, it did so without authority. At the time of Hiles's offense, the exception in section 136.2, subdivision (i), did not encompass domestic violence as defined in Family Code section 6211, and the definition set forth in section 13700 did not apply.

The court also did not have jurisdiction to impose the order beyond sentencing under section 136.2, subdivision (a). The record contains no reference to the criminal protective order as a part of Hiles's plea agreement to justify its continuation.

Furthermore, the trial court lost jurisdiction after sentencing Hiles to serve three years in state prison because the court instituted the order under section 136.2. Outside of subdivision (i), the statute "authorizes injunctions only by courts with jurisdiction over criminal proceedings and is aimed at protecting only 'victim[s] or witness[es],' an 7 indication of its limited nature and focus on preserving the integrity of the administration of criminal court proceedings and protecting those participating in them." (People v. Stone, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 159.) Absent any specified time during a proceeding, section six of the "Warnings and Notices" provisions within the criminal protective order clearly states that "Orders under Penal Code section 136.2 . . . are not valid after imposition of a state prison commitment." (Judicial Council Forms, Form CR-160.) We conclude the trial court did not have jurisdiction to extend Hiles's criminal protective order under section 136.2.

DISPOSITION

The order is reversed and this matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to terminate the criminal protective order issued under section 136.2 barring Hiles from any contact with her mother. The court shall prepare an amended abstract of the judgment reflecting the termination and forward the amended abstract to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

McDONALD, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

O'ROURKE, J.

AARON, J.

Cites, in this corpus