gno.law

In re Diego R. CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D067075 · 2015-10-16 · Unpublished

Proceeding
appeal from a judgment
Trial court
Superior Court of San Diego County · No. J231551
Trial judges
Browder A. Willis III; Louis R. Hanoian
Outcome
affirmed — Affirmed.
Area
delinquency
Panel
Richard D. Huffman, Sr. (author), Alex C. McDonald, Cynthia Aaron

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T06:07Z · confidence high

The juvenile court made true findings on allegations that the minor aided and abetted a robbery and grand theft for the benefit of a criminal street gang, and denied a motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding substantial evidence supported the findings and the denial of the motion.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
True findings on aiding and abetting robbery and grand theft
“Our task is to determine whether there is sufficient substantial evidence from which the trial court could find the elements of the offense had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
substantial evidenceerroragree with court
The appellate court correctly applied the substantial evidence standard, deferring to the trial court's credibility determinations and finding that the minor's participation in gang chants and signs, combined with the group's intimidation and flight, supported an inference of intent to facilitate the robbery.
Denial of motion to dismiss under Welfare and Institutions Code section 701.1
“The standard for reviewing the denial of such motion is the same as cases where the court reviews a claim of insufficiency of the evidence to support a true finding, i.e., the substantial evidence standard of review.”
substantial evidencenot reachedagree with court
The court correctly identified that the standard for reviewing a denial of a motion to dismiss is the same as for sufficiency of the evidence, and concluded that the prosecution's case-in-chief contained sufficient evidence to support the findings.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557 — Establishes the substantial evidence standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence challenges.
  • relied: People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1 — Reaffirms the substantial evidence standard of review.
  • relied: People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764 — Confirms that the substantial evidence standard applies even when the prosecution's case is based on circumstantial evidence.
  • relied: People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547 — Defines the elements required to prove aiding and abetting, specifically knowledge of the criminal purpose and intent to facilitate the offense.
  • relied: People v. Swanson-Birabent (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 733 — Clarifies that knowledge and intent to assist in a crime can be acquired as the action is unfolding, not just in advance.
  • relied: People v. Mitchell (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 325 — Supports the proposition that intent to aid and abet can be formed during the commission of the crime.
  • relied: People v. Campbell (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402 — Establishes that participating in the asportation (carrying away) of property completes the robbery.
  • relied: In re Man J. (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 475 — Sets the standard of review for the denial of a motion to dismiss in juvenile court cases as the substantial evidence standard.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the well-established substantial evidence standard to both the sufficiency of the evidence and the denial of the motion to dismiss. It properly relies on binding California authority to define the elements of aiding and abetting and to support the inference that the minor's conduct facilitated the robbery.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:30Z · confidence low

The juvenile court made true findings that the Minor aided and abetted a robbery and grand theft from the person, with gang enhancements, after denying his Welfare and Institutions Code section 701.1 motion to dismiss at the close of the prosecution's case, and committed him to a three-week short term offender program. The Court of Appeal applied the substantial evidence standard to both the true findings and the denial of the motion to dismiss and affirmed.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
True findings that the Minor aided and abetted the robbery (Pen. Code § 211) and grand theft from the person (§ 487, subd. (c)), challenged for insufficiency of the evidence
“It is certainly clear the evidence showed that the Minor and Parks joined the gang members in surrounding, and thereby intimidating the victims.”
substantial evidencecorrectagree with court
Under deferential review, the Minor's joining the group that surrounded the victims, chanting the gang's name and flashing its sign during the intimidation, the gang detective's testimony that robbery is a primary gang activity, and his flight with the robber support inferences of knowledge and intent to encourage the taking; flight together during asportation also supports liability under Campbell. The court's inference from 'intent to aid the gang' to intent to aid the robbery is somewhat loose, but the combined circumstances (presence, companionship, conduct before and after) satisfy the standard.
Denial of the Minor's motion to dismiss under Welfare and Institutions Code section 701.1 at the close of the prosecution's case
“Plainly the evidence we have already found sufficient to support the true findings existed before the defense case.”
substantial evidencecorrectagree with court
In re Man J. supplies the correct standard, and the court correctly noted that the defense case added only denials, so the prosecution's evidence found sufficient for the true findings was all before the court when the motion was denied; the analysis follows logically from the first ruling.
True findings on the criminal street gang enhancement (Pen. Code § 186.22, subd. (b)) as to both counts
“There is abundant evidence to support the finding of a robbery committed for the benefit of a street gang.”
substantial evidencecorrectagree with court
The Minor did not seriously contest the enhancement, and the evidence of group gang chanting, gang signs, gang territory, and detective testimony on primary activities supports the finding; the court addressed it only in a footnote, which is adequate given the lack of a developed challenge.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557 — Substantial evidence standard: review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment for evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value.
  • relied: People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1 — Reviewing court does not reweigh evidence or make credibility determinations on substantial evidence review.
  • relied: People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764 — The same substantial evidence standard applies when the prosecution's case rests on circumstantial evidence.
  • relied: People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547 — Aider and abettor must act with knowledge of the perpetrator's criminal purpose and with intent to commit, encourage, or facilitate the offense.
  • relied: People v. Swanson-Birabent (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 733 — Advance knowledge of the perpetrator's purpose is not required; knowledge and intent to aid may be formed as the crime unfolds.
  • relied: People v. Mitchell (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 325 — Aider's knowledge and intent may arise during commission of the offense.
  • relied: People v. Campbell (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402 — Robbery continues through asportation, and one who joins in the flight with the stolen property with the requisite intent may be liable as an aider and abettor.
  • relied: In re Man J. (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 475 — Denial of a Welfare and Institutions Code section 701.1 motion to dismiss is reviewed under the substantial evidence standard.
  • missed: People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158 — For aider and abettor liability, robbery's commission continues through asportation until the loot reaches a place of temporary safety, so one who forms intent to aid during asportation is liable; the controlling Supreme Court authority for the asportation theory the court drew from Campbell.
  • missed: People v. Durham (1969) 70 Cal.2d 171 — Mere presence at the scene and failure to prevent a crime are not alone sufficient for aiding and abetting, though presence, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense may be considered; the standard framing the Minor's 'mere presence' argument.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court applied the correct deferential standard and the correct Beeman definition of aiding and abetting, and the evidence of surrounding the victims, gang chanting and signs, and flight with the robber supports the result, with Campbell supplying an asportation theory. It did not, however, squarely address the Minor's mere-presence argument through Durham or similar authority, relied on an intermediate appellate case rather than Cooper for the asportation point, and moved somewhat loosely from intent to aid the gang to intent to aid the robbery.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 10/16/15 In re Diego R. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re DIEGO R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. D067075 THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. J231551)

v. DIEGO R., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Louis R.

Hanoian and Browder A. Willis III, Judges. Affirmed.

Laura R. Sheppard, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland and Scott C.

Taylor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. In August 2014, a petition was filed with the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, alleging that Diego R. (the Minor) had committed robbery (Pen. Code,1 § 211) and grand theft from a person (§ 487, subd. (c)). It was further alleged that the Minor committed the offenses for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)).

After a trial the court made true findings on all of the allegations, finding that the Minor was an aider and abettor. The Minor was committed to the short term offender program for three weeks in juvenile hall.

The Minor appeals contending the evidence is insufficient to support the true findings and that the court should have dismissed the case at the conclusion of the prosecution's case. Applying the proper standard of review we will find there is sufficient substantial evidence to support the true findings and that there was sufficient evidence at the close of the prosecution's case to support the denial of the motion to dismiss.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Late in the evening of August 15, 2014, the Minor and a member of the Diablos street gang, Lance Parks, were walking on Fig Street in Escondido. They observed four men, who appeared to be Diablos gang members arguing with two other men, Raphael M. (Raphael), and Russell May. The Minor and Parks joined the group and the six of them surrounded Raphael and May.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified. 2 During the encounter with the six men surrounding Raphael and May, the Minor joined in the group "rapping" the Diablos chant and the Minor made the gang sign (the small case letter d) with his hands.

The encounter with the gang members lasted somewhere around 30-45 seconds according to May. During that time the group surrounded May and Raphael who were afraid they would get "jumped" or that the gang members may have weapons. At the end of the encounter one of the group, described as a man with a goatee, grabbed May's hat off of his head and said, "This hat is mine now, homie." The robber and the rest of the group, including the Minor and Parks, ran away together.

After the robbery Raphael and May went to a nearby 7-Eleven. About 10 to 20 minutes after the encounter, Raphael and May saw the Minor and Parks walking their way. Raphael called police and Parks and the Minor were arrested. Parks and the Minor were identified by the victims at a curbside lineup.

A gang detective testified the area where the robbery took place was Diablos territory. The detective testified that one of the primary activities of the gang was robbery, either street robberies or armed robberies.

Defense The Minor testified he was 16 at the time of the events. He had been detained by police earlier in the evening. He was worried about being out after curfew. He encountered his friend Parks, who was 21. He asked Parks to escort him home so he would not have a curfew problem.

3 While walking home they saw a group of four men arguing with two other men.

They approached the group because Parks wanted to ask for a cigarette. The Minor denied knowing anyone in the group. He did not do anything except stand there. He felt he had to stay as long as Parks did to avoid a curfew problem. He denied any membership in the Diablos gang and denied knowing anyone who was a member. The Minor denied knowing that Parks was a member of the Diablos.

At the close of the evidence and argument the juvenile court made the following findings:

"I am also satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that this is a gang crime. There has to be, basically, a finding that the Diablos are a criminal street gang under California law, and I'm satisfied that that has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Diablos were a criminal street gang, and that this particular crime was -- was done to -- was done at -- for the benefit of, at the direction of or in association with a criminal street gang with the specific intent to promote, further assist in criminal conduct by gang members, within the meaning of Penal Code section 186.22(b)(1). I find that beyond a reasonable doubt both for count 1 and for count 2.

"The real issue in this case is whether or not this young man Diego, Diego Rodriguez, is to be found a ward of the court and a true finding being made as to his participation as either -- well, he's not the perpetrator. He's an aider and abettor, if he's anything, in connection with this case.

"And based upon the testimony of both Russell and Ralph that Diego was both announcing Diablos gang and flashing the gang sign, the small "d," while this crime was taking place -- whether he was a member of the gang or not, he was encouraging both the conduct of the taking of the -- of the hat and, therefore, as an aider and abettor, he is responsible for the robbery, Penal Code section 211. I make a true finding as to count 1.

"I make a true finding as to count 2, that he was aiding and abetting the taking of a hat as a theft from the person, Penal Code section 4 487(c), and inasmuch as it was being done at a time when he was flashing and claiming gang association or gang affiliation, that it was done for the benefit of the criminal street gang, pursuant to Penal Code section 186.22(b)(1) as to counts 1 and 2, and I make a true finding as to all -- all allegations in the petition."

DISCUSSION

The Minor makes two arguments that are basically the same, but are directed to two different procedural points. First he contends there was not sufficient evidence to support the finding that he aided and abetted the robbery. The Minor concedes there was a robbery. He disputes the sufficiency of the evidence to show he aided and abetted that crime. Separately, the Minor contends the court should have dismissed the case at the conclusion of the prosecution's case for insufficient evidence.2 We disagree on both arguments and will affirm the trial court's finding.

A. Legal Principles When we review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence we apply the familiar substantial evidence standard of review. Under that standard we review the entire record, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the trial court's decision. We do not reweigh the evidence or make credibility decisions. Our task is to determine whether there is sufficient substantial evidence from which the trial court could find the elements of the offense had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Johnson 2 The Minor does not seriously challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the true finding on the gang enhancement, given the evidence clearly shows the Minor joining the group "Diablos" chanting and flashing gang signs. There is abundant evidence to support the finding of a robbery committed for the benefit of a street gang. The only real issue is whether the evidence shows the Minor aided or abetted the commission of the robbery. 5 (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578; People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 32.) We apply the same standard where the prosecution's case is based on circumstantial evidence. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 792.)

In order to prove a person has aided and abetted a crime the prosecution must show the person "act[ed] with knowledge of the criminal purpose of the perpetrator and with the intent or purpose either of committing, or of encouraging or facilitating commission of, the offense." (People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560; italics omitted.) The prosecution does not have to show the person had advance knowledge of the perpetrator's purpose. Knowledge and intent to assist can be acquired as the action is unfolding. (People v. Swanson-Birabent (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 733, 742; People v. Mitchell (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 325, 330.)

B. Analysis Dealing first with the claim of insufficiency of the evidence. The Minor agrees there was a robbery and the evidence could show he aided the "harassment of the victims." He argues there is no evidence he had knowledge of, or aided the robbery. We disagree. It is certainly clear the evidence showed that the Minor and Parks joined the gang members in surrounding, and thereby intimidating the victims. The Minor's participation in the gang chant and throwing gang signs shows his intent to aid the gang.

He participated in blocking the victims' movements leading up to the taking of the hat by one of the group. The question remains whether the evidence supports a finding he aided the robbery.

6 Although the Minor claimed he knew nothing about the gang, the facts show the group the Minor joined were apparently all gang members. His friend was a gang member, and the Minor demonstrated knowledge of and support for the gang by way of his acts and statements. The gang detective's testimony indicated an important activity of the gang was robbery, either street robbery or armed robbery. The Minor's conduct supports an inference he was supporting the gang's efforts.

Last, the Minor and Parks all ran away with the person who took the hat and thus participated in the asportation of the hat, completing the robbery. (People v. Campbell (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402, 409-410.)

Finally, we turn to the contention that the court should have granted the motion to dismiss the petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 701.1. The standard for reviewing the denial of such motion is the same as cases where the court reviews a claim of insufficiency of the evidence to support a true finding, i.e., the substantial evidence standard of review. (In re Man J. (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 475, 482.)

As we have already discussed the evidence supports a finding of knowledge and support for the actions of the gang members. Although the motion to dismiss took place before the Minor presented his defense, the prosecution's case was essentially the same.

All the Minor's testimony added to the evidence was his denial of all knowledge of gang membership and activities as well as a denial of any of the actions testified to by the victims. Plainly the evidence we have already found sufficient to support the true findings existed before the defense case. Thus our analysis of the evidence leads us to conclude the juvenile court properly denied the motion to dismiss.

7 DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

McDONALD, J.

AARON, J.

Cites, in this corpus