Paul v. Super. Ct. CA4/1
- Area
- family
- Panel
- Joan K. Irion (author), Alex C. McDonald, Judith D. McConnell
Analysis
The trial court ordered that the 30-day statutory stay of a move-away order began running on the date of the oral ruling (August 19, 2015) rather than the date a formal written order was filed. The Court of Appeal granted the petition for writ of mandate, vacating the trial court's order and directing the entry of a formal order to properly trigger the stay period.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Trial court's September 17, 2015 order clarifying that the 30-day stay under Code of Civil Procedure section 917.7 commenced on August 19, 2015.“The family court clearly intended to start the 30-day stay period running on August 19, 2015, and the record suggests both Parminder and Kirsten knew this, but the court never entered an order sufficient to trigger the stay.” | de novo | error | agree with court The appellate court correctly identified that Code of Civil Procedure section 917.7 requires the 'entry' of an order to trigger the 30-day stay. Under California Rules of Court, rule 8.104(c)(2), when a minute order directs that a written order be prepared, the entry date is the date the signed order is filed. Because the August 19 hearing resulted in an oral ruling with a direction to prepare a formal order, and no such order was filed, the stay had not commenced. The trial court erred by treating the oral ruling or the minute entry as the effective 'entry' for purposes of the statutory stay. |
Authorities
- relied: In re Marcus (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1009 — A writing is essential to avoid the uncertainty that can arise when attempting to enforce an oral ruling.
- relied: In re Marriage of Drake (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1139 — A trial court's oral ruling on a motion does not become effective until it is filed in writing with the clerk or entered in the minutes; if the minute order directs that a written order be prepared, only the written order is the effective order.
- relied: In re Marriage of Lasich (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 702 — A postjudgment move-away order is appealable.
- relied: Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171 — Supports the procedural mechanism for issuing a peremptory writ in the first instance.
- relied: Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232 — Establishes the standard for issuing a peremptory writ in the first instance when material facts are not in dispute and the applicable law is settled.
- relied: Jane J. v. Superior Court (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 894 — Supports the issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance in family law contexts.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the specific statutory language of Code of Civil Procedure section 917.7 ('entry of judgment or order') in conjunction with California Rules of Court, rule 8.104(c)(2), which dictates that when a minute order directs the preparation of a written order, the entry date is the filing date of that written order. The court accurately distinguishes between an oral ruling and an effective written order, relying on established precedent (In re Marriage of Drake) to conclude that the stay had not yet commenced.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe San Diego family court orally granted Kirsten Paul's request to move the parties' daughter to Michigan on August 19, 2015, directed counsel to prepare a formal order, and then on September 17, 2015 granted Kirsten's ex parte application and ruled that the 30-day stay under Code of Civil Procedure section 917.7 ran from August 19 so the child had to return to Michigan by September 18. The Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ in the first instance, holding that because the minutes contemplated a written order and none was ever filed, no move-away order had been 'entered' and the statutory stay had not begun, and directed the family court to vacate the September 17 order, deny the ex parte application, and prepare and file a formal order.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
September 17, 2015 order granting ex parte application and ruling that the 30-day stay of Code of Civil Procedure section 917.7 commenced on August 19, 2015, the date of the oral move-away ruling“Where, as here, "the trial court's minute order expressly indicates that a written order will be filed, only the written order is the effective order."” | de novo | error (statutory interpretation) | agree with court Section 917.7 runs the stay from 'entry' of the order; section 1003 defines an order as a written direction; Drake holds an oral ruling is not effective until filed in writing or entered in the minutes and that when the minutes call for a written order only the written order is effective; rule 8.104(c)(2) likewise sets entry at filing of the signed order when a written order is directed. The minutes here expressly contemplated a formal order and none was filed, so the court's reading of 'entry' is supported by the cited authorities, though the opinion does not expressly address whether the written September 17 order could itself have constituted entry of a move-away order. |
Order requiring the minor child to be returned to Kirsten in Michigan no later than September 18, 2015“Because no such order has ever been filed, the 30-day stay of Code of Civil Procedure section 917.7 has not yet commenced.” | de novo | error (law misapplied) | agree with court The return date depended entirely on the premise that the statutory stay began August 19; once that premise fails, the move-away order remains stayed and a return date within the stay period cannot be enforced. The appellate court correctly tied the remedy (vacating the order and requiring a formal written order) to the statutory text of section 917.7. |
Authorities
- relied: In re Marriage of Drake (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1139 — A trial court's oral ruling on a motion is not effective until filed in writing with the clerk or entered in the minutes; where the minute order indicates a written order will be filed, only the written order is the effective order.
- relied: In re Marcus (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1009 — An order must be in writing to avoid uncertainty in enforcing oral rulings, and may be set forth in the court's minutes.
- relied: In re Marriage of Lasich (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 702 — A postjudgment move-away order is appealable.
- relied: Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171 — Procedure for issuing a peremptory writ in the first instance after notice to the parties and an opportunity to respond.
- relied: Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232 — A peremptory writ in the first instance is appropriate where the facts are undisputed, the law is settled, petitioner's entitlement to relief is clear, and the matter is urgent.
- relied: Jane J. v. Superior Court (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 894 — Peremptory writ in the first instance is warranted where no useful purpose would be served by plenary consideration.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court answered the dispositive question—when a move-away order is 'entered' for purposes of section 917.7—with the statutory definition of an order, Drake, Marcus, and rule 8.104(c)(2), and the undisputed fact that the minutes called for a written order that was never filed. It did not expressly explain why the written and signed September 17 order could not itself count as entry of the move-away order, nor did it describe or address the arguments in Kirsten's response, leaving a modest gap in otherwise well-supported reasoning.
Opinion
Filed 9/29/15 Paul v. Super. Ct. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
PARMINDER PAUL, D068866
Petitioner, (San Diego County Super. Ct. No. DS543327) v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY,
Respondent;
KIRSTEN PAUL,
Real Party in Interest.
ORIGINAL PRODEEDING in mandate. Paula S. Rosenstein, Judge. Petition granted.
Borchard & Callahan, Janelle M. Dease, Law Offices of Michael Jason Lee, and Michael Jason Lee for petitioner.
No appearance for respondent.
Linda Cianciolo for real party in interest. Petitioner Parminder Paul challenges by petition for writ of mandate respondent's September 17, 2015, order purporting to commence the 30-day stay of an order allowing removal of a minor child from the state (Code Civ. Proc., § 917.7) before the formal order allowing his ex-wife, real party in interest Kirsten Paul, to move their minor daughter to Michigan was signed and filed. We grant the petition.
BACKGROUND
Parminder and Kirsten are divorced and have been unable to agree on the custody of their minor daughter, Jasmine. Respondent Superior Court of San Diego County (the family court) held an evidentiary hearing and, on August 19, 2015, granted Kirsten's request that she be permitted to move Jasmine to Michigan. Kirsten's counsel agreed to prepare the formal order granting the move-away request. The unsigned minutes of the hearing state that "[t]he move away is granted" and, inaccurately, that Parminder would prepare the formal order.
Kirsten's counsel drafted a proposed order stating Jasmine was to be returned to Kirsten in Michigan on September 18, 2015, and sent it to Parminder's counsel for review. Parminder's counsel objected to the proposed order on the basis that the return date conflicted with the 30-day stay of move-away orders provided by Code of Civil Procedure section 917.7, which, counsel contended, would not begin to run until the formal order was filed. Kirsten then filed an ex parte application with the family court on September 16, seeking clarification of the move-away order, specifically as to when the 30-day stay commenced and when Jasmine was to return to Michigan. The court granted the application on September 17, and "to clarify any confusion," ordered that the 30-day 2 stay commenced on August 19 and Jasmine was to return to Michigan no later than September 18.
Parminder promptly petitioned this court for a writ of mandate and requested an immediate stay. He argued Jasmine could not be required to return to Michigan on September 18, 2015, because the 30-day stay of Code of Civil Procedure section 917.7 did not begin to run on August 19 and would not do so until the formal order, which Kirsten's counsel agreed to prepare, was signed and filed. We stayed the family court's orders to the extent they purported to require Jasmine to return to Michigan by September 18, obtained a response from Kirsten, and advised the parties we were considering issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance. (See Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 180.)
DISCUSSION
The family court clearly intended to start the 30-day stay period running on August 19, 2015, and the record suggests both Parminder and Kirsten knew this, but the court never entered an order sufficient to trigger the stay. A postjudgment order allowing removal of a minor child from the state is stayed "for a period of 30 calendar days from the entry of judgment or order." (Code Civ. Proc., § 917.7, italics added.) None of the family court's rulings constituted the required "entry" of a move-away "order."
The move-away ruling made orally at the August 19, 2015 custody hearing did not constitute entry of an order, because an "order" is a "direction of a court or judge, made in writing." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1003, italics added; see In re Marcus (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1016 ["a writing is essential to avoid the uncertainty that can arise 3 when attempting to enforce an oral ruling"].) "A trial court's oral ruling on a motion does not become effective until it is filed in writing with the clerk or entered in the minutes."
(In re Marriage of Drake (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1170.) The minutes of the August 19 hearing do state that "[t]he move away is granted," and ordinarily "[t]he entry date of an appealable order that is entered in the minutes is the date it is entered in the permanent minutes." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(c)(2); see In re Marcus, supra, at p. 1016 [order "may be set forth in detail in the court's minutes"]; In re Marriage of Lasich (2002)
99 Cal.App.4th 702, 705, fn. 1 [postjudgment move-away order is appealable].) "But if the minute order directs that a written order be prepared, the entry date is the date the signed order is filed . . . ." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(c)(2), italics added.) At the end of the August 19 hearing, Kirsten's counsel agreed to prepare a formal move-away order, and the family court's minutes state an order was to be prepared (although they incorrectly identify Parminder as the preparer). Where, as here, "the trial court's minute order expressly indicates that a written order will be filed, only the written order is the effective order." (In re Marriage of Drake, supra, at p. 1170, italics added.) Because no such order has ever been filed, the 30-day stay of Code of Civil Procedure section 917.7 has not yet commenced.
To correct the family court's error in ruling the stay began to run on August 19, 2015, issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance is appropriate. The material facts are not in dispute, the applicable law is settled, Parminder is clearly entitled to relief, the need for final resolution of Jasmine's custody is urgent, and no useful purpose would be served by plenary consideration of the issue. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1088; Lewis v. 4 Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1240-1241; Jane J. v. Superior Court (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 894, 909-910.)
DISPOSITION
Let a writ issue commanding respondent, immediately upon receipt of the writ, to:
(1) vacate its September 17, 2015 order granting real party in interest's ex parte application and purporting to clarify the August 19 move-away order; (2) enter a new order denying that application; and (3) prepare, sign, file, and serve a formal order memorializing the move-away and other orders made at the August 19 hearing. The temporary stay issued by this court on September 18 is dissolved. In the interests of justice, this opinion shall be final as to this court upon filing, and the parties shall bear their own costs. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.490(b)(2)(A), 8.493(a)(1)(B).)
IRION, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
MCDONALD, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- Jane J. v. Superior Court G051603 · 2015-06-16
- In Re Marcus H028866 · 2006-04-18
- Lasich v. Lasich No. C039957 · 2002-06-24
- Lewis v. Superior Court S061240 · 1999-02-08
- In Re Marriage of Drake B099548 · 1997-03-27
- Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. L.A. No. 31725 · 1984-06-07