United States v. Mario Haro

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 14-50562 · 2015-09-25 · Unpublished

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Mario HARO, Defendant-Appellant

Area: other
Panel: Stephen R. Reinhardt (author), Marsha S. Berzon, Edward Leavy

Analysis

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Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 25 2015 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 14-50562 Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 3:08-cr-00649-BTM v. MEMORANDUM* MARIO HARO, Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Barry T. Moskowitz, Chief Judge, Presiding Submitted September 21, 2015** Before: REINHARDT, LEAVY, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.

Mario Haro appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the two-year term of supervised release and a special condition of supervised release imposed upon revocation of supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Haro contends that the district court erred by imposing a term of supervised release based on the allegedly erroneous determination that it would contribute to his rehabilitation. In light of Haro’s history and circumstances, the district court did not err in determining that supervised release was warranted. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(c); U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1 & cmt. n.3.

Haro next challenges the special condition of supervised release which requires him to obtain prior approval from his probation officer for any residence or change in residence. The district court did not abuse its discretion. See United States v. Daniels, 541 F.3d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 2008). In light of Haro’s circumstances and criminal history, the challenged condition is reasonably related to deterrence and protection of the public, and it does not involve a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2);

Daniels, 541 F.3d at 924 (“[W]e give considerable deference to a district court's determination of the appropriate supervised release conditions.” (internal quotations omitted)).

AFFIRMED.

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