County of San Diego v. S.S. CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from an order
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. DF196303
- Trial judge
- James T. Atkins (commissioner)
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed.
- Area
- family
- Panel
- Judith D. McConnell (author), Gilbert Nares, Patricia D. Benke
Analysis
The trial court determined that the father owed child support arrears based on orders from a separate child support action, rejecting his arguments that the Department's termination of services or a marital settlement agreement extinguished the obligation. The Court of Appeal affirmed the order, finding that the father forfeited his arguments by failing to provide record citations and legal analysis, and further concluding that the record did not support his claims.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Order determining father owes child support arrears based on orders issued in the child support action (July 2006 to July 2012).“We review child support orders for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 282.)” | abuse of discretion | correct | agree with court The appellate court correctly applied the abuse of discretion standard to the trial court's calculation of arrears. It properly identified that the trial court's factual findings were supported by the record, specifically noting that the Department's termination of services did not terminate the court-ordered support obligation, which can only be modified by the court. The court also correctly noted the lack of overlap in the time periods for the two separate support orders, refuting the double-payment claim. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764 — Failure to support contentions with record citations and legal analysis results in forfeiture of those arguments on appeal.
- relied: In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269 — Child support orders are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
- relied: In re Marriage of De Guigne (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1353 — Appellate review of child support orders is limited to determining if factual determinations are supported by substantial evidence and if the court acted reasonably.
- relied: In re Marriage of McCann (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 102 — California's interest in protecting children's welfare requires a court to determine when to terminate court-ordered child support; support obligations continue until changed by court action.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the forfeiture doctrine to dismiss the appellant's arguments and substantively addresses the remaining issues with appropriate authorities. The court accurately distinguishes between the termination of agency services and the termination of a court-ordered legal obligation, relying on the specific language in the Department's notice and the initial case advisement.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe trial court, on the Department of Child Support Services' motion, determined that father owed $10,582.16 in child support arrears ($7,532.58 principal for July 2006 to July 2012 plus interest) under orders issued in the Department's 2006 child support action, notwithstanding the Department's 2008 letter ending its services and later support orders in a separate dissolution action. The Court of Appeal held father forfeited his contentions by failing to provide record citations and legal analysis, alternatively found the record did not support them, and affirmed the arrears order.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Arrears accrued under the child support action orders despite the Department's 2008 notice that it was ending its services; the notice did not terminate father's support obligation“Here, the court's orders in the child support action were not contingent upon the Department's continued provision of services.” | abuse of discretion | correct | agree with court Court-ordered support continues until modified by court order; the Department's initial papers told father exactly that, the 2008 letter said the case might remain open for payment processing, and no court order modified the obligation. McCann supports the proposition that only the court determines when support terminates. The reasoning is adequate, though the court could also have cited Family Code section 3651, subdivision (c), which bars retroactive modification of accrued arrears. |
No marital settlement agreement in the record reduced father's child support obligation to zero, and the dissolution orders left prior nonconflicting orders in effect“Similarly, the record does not contain a marital settlement agreement, court approved or otherwise, modifying father's child support obligation.” | mixed | correct | agree with court Appellant bears the burden to furnish an adequate record; absent the agreement, the claim fails. The dissolution court's August 2013 order expressly preserved all nonconflicting prior orders, and the child support action orders through July 2012 did not conflict with dissolution orders effective August 2012. The court's reliance on Family Code section 17404, subdivision (d) for the superseding-order concept is consistent with its conclusion. |
The trial court was not required to reconsider father's parenting timeshare when calculating arrears under prior valid orders“Father has not provided any authority, nor are we aware of any, requiring the court to reconsider his parenting timeshare when calculating arrears under prior valid orders.” | abuse of discretion | correct | agree with court The original orders already accounted for a 42 percent timeshare, and an arrears determination enforces existing orders rather than recalculating guideline support; any change in timeshare would require a prospective modification motion. The conclusion is legally correct even though the opinion does not cite the statutory bar on retroactive modification that squarely supports it. |
The arrears calculated under the child support action (July 2006–July 2012) did not overlap with arrears calculated under the dissolution action (effective August 2012), so father was not double-charged“Thus, there was no overlap in the court's calculations of arrears in the two actions and father has not established any abuse of discretion by the court.” | substantial evidence | correct | agree with court The two arrears determinations covered mutually exclusive periods as described in the opinion, so the factual finding of no overlap is supported by the record as recounted. Father offered no record citations showing otherwise. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764 — Contentions unsupported by record citations or legal argument may be treated as forfeited
- relied: In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269 — Child support orders are reviewed for abuse of discretion
- relied: In re Marriage of De Guigne (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1353 — Review of support orders is confined to whether factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether any judge could reasonably have made the order
- relied: In re Marriage of McCann (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 102 — The state's interest in protecting children's welfare requires a court, not the parties or an agency, to determine when court-ordered child support terminates
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion answers each of father's five contentions with record facts and appropriate authority on forfeiture, standard of review, and the rule that only a court can terminate or modify support, and the result is plainly correct. It is thin, however, in not citing Family Code section 3651, subdivision (c), the statutory bar on retroactive modification of accrued arrears, which directly disposes of the timeshare and agency-closure arguments, and it frames a largely arithmetical arrears determination under an abuse-of-discretion standard without much analysis.
Opinion
Filed 6/19/15 County of San Diego v. S.S. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, D065852
Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. DF196303)
S.S., Appellant;
A.S., Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, James T.
Atkins, Commissioner. Affirmed.
S.S., in pro per., for Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Julie Weng-Gutierrez, Assistant Attorney General, Linda M. Gonzalez and Marina L. Soto, for Respondent County of San Diego. INTRODUCTION Father challenges a trial court order determining he owes child support arrears based on orders issued in a child support action filed by the San Diego County Department of Child Support Services (Department) (child support action). He contends:
(1) he does not owe arrears because the Department sent him a letter in 2008 closing the child support action; (2) there were no subsequent orders reinitiating his child support obligation; (3) he and mother entered into a marital settlement agreement in a separate dissolution action setting his child support obligation to zero; (4) the trial court failed to review his parenting timeshare and the Department's 2008 letter before reaching its decision; and (5) the Department's accounting confused his child support obligation in the child support action with his child support obligation in the dissolution action, burdening him with double payments.
We conclude father has forfeited these contentions by failing to support them with record citations and legal analysis. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.) Even if he had not forfeited these contentions, the record does not support them. We, therefore, affirm the order.
BACKGROUND
Child Support Action In September 2006 the Department filed a paternity and child support action against father. The Department's initial papers included the following advisement, "If a support order is entered and, at a later date, you believe a change of circumstances may require a modification of your order, you should be aware that: [¶] . . . [¶]your liability 2 for support as ordered will continue to run until it is changed by court action. Only the court can change your obligation."
Father admitted paternity and the court ordered him to pay monthly child support of $300 effective July 2006. The court based the amount of child support in part on father having a 42 percent parenting timeshare.
At a later hearing, the court reduced father's monthly child support obligation to $118 effective January 2007 and ordered him to pay an additional $40 per month toward arrearages effective February 2007. Again, the court based the amount of child support in part on father having a 42 percent parenting timeshare.
In September 2008 the Department notified father it was ending its services in the child support action. The Department also notified him the "case may remain open with the State of California for payment processing only."1 Dissolution Action In November 2012 in a separate dissolution action, the court ordered father to pay mother monthly child support of $340 effective August 2012. The court also found father owed mother $1,360 in child support arrears as of November 8, 2012, and ordered him to pay $25 a month toward the arrears beginning December 1, 2012.
In August 2013 the trial court entered an order in the dissolution action increasing father's monthly child support obligation to $407, effective June 1, 2013. The order 1 The record does not indicate why the Department terminated its services. 3 provided, "All other orders not in conflict with this Order shall remain in full force and effect."
Arrears Based on Orders in Dissolution Action In September 2013 the Department resumed its services. The same month, the Department filed a motion for a judicial determination of arrears. The motion was based on the child support orders issued in the dissolution action and included a declaration from mother stating father's support history from August 2012 to September 2013. The court subsequently determined father owed arrears of $1,531 in principal and $58.86 in interest for the period of August 1, 2012 through August 31, 2013.
Arrears Based on Orders in Child Support Action In November 2013 the Department filed a second motion for a judicial determination of arrears. This motion was based on the child support orders issued in the child support action and included a declaration from mother stating father's support history from October 2006 through August 2013. The Department also filed a motion to modify father's child support obligation. At a hearing in January 2014, the court reduced father's monthly child support obligation to $314 effective December 2013 and reserved jurisdiction over the issue of arrears. At a subsequent hearing in March 2014, the trial court found father owed mother child support arrears of $10,582.16, consisting of $7,532.58 in principal (from July 2006 to July 2012) and $3,049.58 in interest (from July 2006 to December 2013).
4 DISCUSSION
Father contends the trial court erroneously found he owed arrears based on the orders issued in the child support action because the Department terminated its services in the child support action, he entered into a marital settlement agreement setting his child support obligation to zero, the trial court failed to take these facts and his parenting timeshare into consideration when it established the amount of arrears, and the trial court's calculations of arrears from the orders issued in the dissolution action and the orders issued in the child support action overlapped.
As previously stated, father has forfeited these contentions by failing to provide record citations and legal analysis. (People v. Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 793.)
Moreover, the record simply does not support them.
We review child support orders for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 282.) "Our review is limited to determining whether the court's factual determinations are supported by substantial evidence and whether the court acted reasonably in exercising its discretion. [Citation.] We do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court, but confine ourselves to determining whether any judge could have reasonably made the challenged order." (In re Marriage of De Guigne (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1360.)
Here, the court's orders in the child support action were not contingent upon the Department's continued provision of services. In addition, nothing in the Department's notification to father indicated the Department's termination of its services also terminated father's child support obligation. To the contrary, the notification indicated 5 the case may be left open for payment processing purposes. Moreover, the initial papers filed by the Department in the child support action expressly informed father any child support orders issued in the action could only be modified by the court. (See In re Marriage of McCann (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [California's interest in protecting children's welfare requires a court to determine when to terminate court-ordered child support].) The record does not contain any court order modifying father's child support obligation due to the Department's termination of its services.
Similarly, the record does not contain a marital settlement agreement, court approved or otherwise, modifying father's child support obligation. Although the court issued a superseding child support order in the dissolution action (Fam. Code, § 17404, subd. (d)), the court expressly left all prior nonconflicting orders in place, which included the orders issued in the child support action through July 2012.
Furthermore, the record shows the court considered father's parenting timeshare when it entered the orders in the child support action. Father has not provided any authority, nor are we aware of any, requiring the court to reconsider his parenting timeshare when calculating arrears under prior valid orders.
Finally, the record does not show the court confused arrears owed from orders issued in the dissolution action with arrears owed from orders in the child support action.
Rather, the record shows the court calculated the arrears for the child support action based on orders in effect from July 2006 through July 2012. The orders for child support in the dissolution action did not become effective until August 2012. Thus, there was no 6 overlap in the court's calculations of arrears in the two actions and father has not established any abuse of discretion by the court.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. The Department is entitled to its appeal costs.
MCCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
BENKE, J.
NARES, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- Guigne v. Guigne No. A091882 · 2002-04-30
- Cheriton v. Fraser No. H019424 · 2001-09-14
- People v. Stanley S004605. Crim. No. 23532 · 1995-07-06
- In Re Marriage of McCann A062856 · 1994-07-11