People v. Thammavongsa CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCE339677
- Trial judge
- Evan P. Kirvin
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- O'Rourke (author), Richard D. Huffman, Sr., Patricia D. Benke
Analysis
The trial court sentenced the defendant to two years in local prison pursuant to a plea agreement, declining to impose a split sentence after reviewing a probation report recommending against it. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that the defendant forfeited his claim of sentencing error by failing to object at the time of sentencing and that his counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a meritless objection.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of split sentence under Penal Code section 1170 without detailed on-record reasons“Thammavongsa waived his right to appeal by failing to object at the time of sentencing. (People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 594-595; People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 852-853.)” | unclear | error | agree with court The appellate court correctly applied the forfeiture rule established in People v. McCullough and People v. Smith, which requires defendants to object to sentencing errors at the time they occur to preserve them for appeal. Because the defendant did not object to the lack of detailed reasons for the split sentence denial, the claim is forfeited. The court also correctly noted that the plea agreement context further supports affirmance, as defendants who accept a bargained sentence are generally estopped from challenging it on appeal unless fundamental jurisdiction is lacking. |
Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request detailed statement of reasons“Furthermore, defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance by declining to object that the trial court did not explain further its reasons for the sentence imposed. (People v. Bradley (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 64, 90 ["Failure to raise a meritless objection is not ineffective assistance of counsel."])” | unclear | not reached | agree with court The court correctly applied the principle from People v. Bradley that counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise a meritless objection. Since the underlying claim of sentencing error was forfeited and/or meritless due to the plea agreement, the failure to object to the lack of detailed reasons was not a strategic error or a violation of the duty of effective assistance. The reasoning is consistent with established California law regarding ineffective assistance claims in the context of forfeited or meritless issues. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589 — Defendants must object to sentencing errors at the time of sentencing to preserve them for appeal; failure to do so results in forfeiture.
- relied: People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849 — Failure to object to a sentencing error at the time it occurs waives the right to raise it on appeal.
- relied: People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331 — A defendant cannot complain for the first time on appeal about the trial court's failure to state reasons for discretionary sentencing choices.
- relied: People v. Nguyen (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 114 — Appellate courts are not inclined to find error in a bargained-for sentence unless the court lacked fundamental jurisdiction, as defendants should not 'trifle with the courts' to better their bargain.
- relied: People v. Couch (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1053 — A defendant who agrees to accept a sentence is estopped from challenging it on appeal because they waived alleged errors.
- relied: People v. Bradley (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 64 — Failure to raise a meritless objection is not ineffective assistance of counsel.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the well-established forfeiture rule for sentencing errors and the principle that counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise meritless objections. The reliance on People v. McCullough, People v. Smith, and People v. Bradley provides sufficient legal support for the conclusion that the claims were forfeited and the counsel's performance was not deficient.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe trial court accepted Thammavongsa's stipulated guilty plea to burglary (Pen. Code, § 459) and, after considering and rejecting a split sentence, imposed the bargained-for two years in local custody with no mandatory supervision. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding the challenge to the denial of a split sentence and the adequacy of the court's statement of reasons was forfeited by failure to object (and barred by estoppel given the stipulated term), and that counsel was not ineffective for failing to make a meritless objection.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of a split sentence under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (h) and imposition of the full two-year term without a detailed statement of reasons“Although a court is generally required to state its reasons for its discretionary sentencing choices on the record, a defendant cannot complain for the first time on appeal about the court's failure to do so.” | unclear | not reached | agree with court The court did not reach the merits of the abuse-of-discretion claim; it held the claim forfeited under People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331 because no objection was made at sentencing to the court's discretionary choice or its statement of reasons. Scott squarely holds that complaints about the manner in which the court exercises sentencing discretion and articulates reasons are forfeited absent a contemporaneous objection, and the record shows the court announced the sentence and gave a brief reason without objection. The alternative estoppel ground from Nguyen and Couch fits less cleanly, because the plea fixed only the two-year term and the court itself told the defendant a split remained possible, but the Scott forfeiture ground is sufficient on its own. |
Claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request a more detailed statement of reasons for denying a split sentence“Furthermore, defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance by declining to object that the trial court did not explain further its reasons for the sentence imposed.” | unclear | correct | agree with court The court rejected the ineffective assistance claim on the ground that an objection would have been meritless, citing People v. Bradley (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 64. The trial court had reviewed a probation report documenting repeated supervision violations and a prior mandatory supervision term, and expressly stated it considered and rejected a split; on this record a request for further reasons would not have changed the outcome, so neither deficient performance nor prejudice is shown. The court did not articulate a standard of review or walk through the Strickland elements, but the result is supported. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331 — Claims that the trial court failed to state reasons for, or otherwise erred in, its discretionary sentencing choices are forfeited unless raised by objection at sentencing.
- relied: People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589 — A defendant who fails to object at sentencing forfeits appellate challenges to sentencing determinations that turn on the trial court's discretion or factual findings.
- relied: People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849 — General forfeiture principles apply to sentencing claims not raised in the trial court, subject to the unauthorized-sentence exception.
- relied: People v. Nguyen (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 114 — A defendant who pleads guilty in exchange for a specified sentence is estopped from challenging that sentence on appeal absent a lack of fundamental jurisdiction.
- relied: People v. Couch (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1053 — A defendant who agreed to accept a sentence as part of a plea bargain is estopped from challenging it and waives the alleged errors in its imposition.
- relied: People v. Bradley (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 64 — Failure to raise a meritless objection is not ineffective assistance of counsel.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The forfeiture holding rests squarely on Scott and resolves the appeal, and the ineffective assistance claim is properly rejected because a further objection would have been futile on this record. The opinion is thin in two respects: it does not acknowledge that the plea left the split-or-straight choice open, which weakens the Nguyen/Couch estoppel strand, and it does not address whether the court's brief statement that a split 'would not be appropriate' was itself an adequate statement of reasons.
Opinion
Filed 6/16/15 P. v. Thammavongsa CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D066197
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE339677)
THAVONE THAMMAVONGSA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Evan P.
Kirvin, Judge. Affirmed.
Richard Schwartzberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Scott C. Taylor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Defendant Thavone Thammavongsa stipulated to plead guilty to a burglary charge (Pen. Code,1 § 459) in exchange for the People dismissing a forgery charge (§ 470, subd.
(d)), and on condition he be sentenced to two years in local prison. On appeal, Thammavongsa contends the court abused its discretion by declining to impose a split sentence under section 1170, and failing to state reasons for its ruling. He alternatively contends his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to request a detailed statement of the court's reasons for the sentence imposed.
We conclude that Thammavongsa has forfeited any claim of sentencing error.
Further, Thammavongsa's counsel was not ineffective for failing to request additional explanations for the sentence imposed. We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The factual basis for Thammavongsa's plea was that in November 2013, he had entered the "Sycuan Casino building with the intent to commit theft therein." Before taking the plea, the court told Thammavongsa: "So it's possible that you could do the full two years in custody. It's also possible the court could split it up such that you did one year in custody and one year mandatory supervision. Do you understand that?"
Thammavongsa replied in the affirmative.
The probation department declined to recommend a split sentence, stating in a report: "[Thammavongsa] has been given every opportunity to take advantage of services while on supervision both as a juvenile and as an adult. He has an established 1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 pattern of criminal behavior and of supervision revocations. He has been on terms of supervision with probation, parole and mandatory supervision. The defendant's multiple convictions, supervision violations, and the fact he has previously been sentenced to mandatory supervision are an indications [sic] that he is not amendable [sic] or suitable for another mandatory supervision term."
After reviewing the probation report, the court sentenced Thammavongsa to two years in custody, stating, "In this matter the court will sentence the defendant according to the stipulation of the parties. [¶] I have considered whether or not to split the sentence, and find that doing so would not be appropriate in this case."
DISCUSSION
Thammavongsa contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying him a split sentence without stating reasons for its decision.
Thammavongsa waived his right to appeal by failing to object at the time of sentencing. (People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 594-595; People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 852-853.) Although a court is generally required to state its reasons for its discretionary sentencing choices on the record, a defendant cannot complain for the first time on appeal about the court's failure to do so. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 349-351, 353.) "Where defendants have pleaded guilty in return for a specified sentence, appellate courts are not inclined to find error even though the trial court acts in excess of jurisdiction in reaching that figure, as long as the court does not lack fundamental jurisdiction. [Citations.] The rationale behind this policy is that defendants who have received the benefit of their bargain should not be allowed to 'trifle 3 with the courts' by attempting to better the bargain through the appellate process."
(People v. Nguyen (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 114, 122-123, italics added; accord, People v. Couch (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1053, 1058 ["[D]efendant must be estopped from challenging his sentence because he agreed to accept it and thereby waived the alleged errors which he now claims occurred."].) Furthermore, defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance by declining to object that the trial court did not explain further its reasons for the sentence imposed. (People v. Bradley (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 64, 90 ["Failure to raise a meritless objection is not ineffective assistance of counsel."].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
O'ROURKE, J.
WE CONCUR:
BENKE, Acting P. J.
HUFFMAN, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. McCullough S192513 · 2013-04-22
- People v. Bradley No. B175564 · 2012-08-01
- People v. Smith S088387 · 2001-01-11
- People v. Couch Docket Nos. H013659, H014452 · 1996-08-19
- People v. Scott No. S037757 · 1994-12-30
- People v. Thang Van Nguyen G011288 · 1993-02-11