In re Ramiro v. CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. JCM234914
- Trial judge
- Browder A. Willis III
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed.
- Area
- delinquency
- Panel
- Richard D. Huffman, Sr. (author), Gilbert Nares, McINTYRE
Analysis
The juvenile court ordered the minor to pay $681 in restitution for a stolen smartphone, determining this amount was necessary to replace the device and associated service contract obligations. The Court of Appeal affirmed the order, finding the amount was a reasonable calculation of actual economic loss and within the court's broad discretion.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Ordering $681 in restitution for the stolen smartphone“We believe the juvenile court's order was a reasonable calculation of the actual cost of replacement and was well within the court's very broad discretion.” | abuse of discretion | correct | agree with court The appellate court correctly applied the abuse of discretion standard to the restitution amount. Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6, the court must order restitution for all determined economic losses. The record supports the finding that the victim could not reasonably obtain the identical phone (discontinued, identity theft concerns with the only available source) and that the replacement phone was necessary to maintain the service contract for which she remained liable. The $681 figure reflects the actual cost to make the victim whole, not a windfall, as the 'better' phone was the minimum required to utilize the existing service plan. The reliance on In re Alexander A. is appropriate as it supports the principle that restitution methods need only be rational and reasonably calculated to make the victim whole, considering practicalities. |
Authorities
- relied: In re Alexander A. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 847 — Juvenile courts have broad discretion to order restitution using any rational method reasonably calculated to make the victim whole, including allowing victims to choose repair over replacement or other practical solutions to avoid undue burden.
- relied: In re Brittany L. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1381 — Juvenile courts may use any rational method of fixing the amount of restitution, provided it is reasonably calculated to make the victim whole and consistent with the purpose of rehabilitation.
- relied: In re Tommy A. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1580 — Juvenile courts have particularly broad power to order restitution where it advances the goals of the juvenile justice system, such as guidance and rehabilitation.
- relied: People v. Saint-Amans (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1076 — Victims' rights to restitution should be broadly and liberally construed.
- relied: In re Johnny M. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1128 — Victims' rights to restitution should be broadly and liberally construed.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the abuse of discretion standard to the restitution amount and relies on binding precedent (In re Alexander A., In re Brittany L.) to support the conclusion that the court's method was rational and reasonably calculated to make the victim whole. The court adequately addresses the appellant's 'windfall' argument by explaining the necessity of the replacement phone to maintain the service contract and the impracticality of obtaining the identical model.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe juvenile court granted Ramiro V. informal probation under Welfare and Institutions Code section 654 on a section 602 petition for stealing a smart phone and, after a restitution hearing, ordered him to pay the victim $681, the price she paid for a Samsung Galaxy S4 replacement, relying on In re Alexander A. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding the $681 figure was a reasonable calculation of actual replacement cost within the juvenile court's broad discretion because the identical phone was no longer reasonably available, the victim remained bound by her T-Mobile service contract, and full accountability served rehabilitation.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Setting victim restitution at $681 (the price of the replacement Samsung Galaxy S4) rather than approximately $300 (the Amazon price of the identical LG Optimus)“We believe the juvenile court's order was a reasonable calculation of the actual cost of replacement and was well within the court's very broad discretion.” | abuse of discretion | correct | agree with court Section 730.6, subdivision (h)(1) requires restitution sufficient to fully reimburse the victim, and Brittany L. permits any rational method reasonably calculated to make the victim whole. The record showed the identical phone was discontinued and available only through a vendor the victim reasonably avoided, and the service contract obligated her to pay for features requiring a comparable smart phone, so treating the T-Mobile price as the replacement cost of like property was rational. The court did not quote the statutory 'replacement cost of like property' language or explain how a 'somewhat better' phone fits it, and Alexander A. was a repair-versus-replacement case, but the result is defensible under the deferential standard. |
Implied finding crediting the victim's refusal to purchase the identical phone from Amazon because of prior identity theft“The juvenile court impliedly found, and we agree, it would hardly be fair treatment of the victim or giving her respect to require her to risk identity theft in order to reduce the financial burden on the person whose criminal activity caused the loss.” | unclear | correct | agree with court The victim testified at the restitution hearing to a prior identity theft after an Amazon credit card purchase, which is evidence supporting the implied finding that the Amazon option was not a reasonable avenue of replacement. The appellate court did not articulate a substantial evidence standard for this factual finding, but the testimony recited supports it and the court's reliance on the constitutional right to fairness and respect is consistent with Alexander A. |
Finding that requiring the minor to pay the full economic cost of his conduct was important to his rehabilitation“Finally, we observe the trial court reasonably found that requiring Ramiro to bear the full economic cost of his conduct was important to the minor's rehabilitation.” | abuse of discretion | correct | agree with court Section 202, subdivisions (b) and (d), and In re Tommy A. recognize that juvenile restitution serves rehabilitation by holding minors accountable, and Brittany L. requires the method to be consistent with rehabilitation. The finding is consistent with those authorities and the opinion's reasoning tracks the same rehabilitative rationale accepted in Alexander A. |
Authorities
- relied: In re Alexander A. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 847 — Juvenile court may order restitution for cost of repair exceeding replacement value where that choice acknowledges the practicalities facing the victim and serves rehabilitation; victims are entitled to fairness and respect.
- relied: In re Brittany L. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1381 — Juvenile courts may use any rational method of fixing restitution provided it is reasonably calculated to make the victim whole and consistent with rehabilitation.
- relied: In re Tommy A. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1580 — Juvenile courts have particularly broad power to order restitution to advance the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile justice system.
- relied: People v. Saint-Amans (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1076 — Victims' constitutional right to restitution is to be broadly and liberally construed.
- relied: In re Johnny M. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1128 — Restitution statutes in juvenile cases are construed broadly and liberally in favor of the victim.
- missed: People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644 — Restitution orders are reviewed for abuse of discretion; the court must employ a rational method that could reasonably be said to make the victim whole, and the standard of review should be articulated when assessing the amount.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion answers the minor's windfall and misapplication arguments with the governing constitutional and statutory provisions and the correct line of juvenile restitution cases, and the result is defensible on the recited record. It never expressly states or cites authority for the standard of review, does not engage the 'replacement cost of like property' language of section 730.6, subdivision (h)(1) when upholding payment for a concededly better phone, and relies on Alexander A. without acknowledging that it addressed repair rather than replacement cost.
Opinion
Filed 4/30/15 In re Ramiro V. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re RAMIRO V., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. D066646 THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. JCM234914)
v. RAMIRO V., Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Browder A. Willis, III, Judge. Affirmed.
Robert H. Rexrode, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Barry Carlton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. A petition was filed in the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 602 alleging that Ramiro V. (Ramiro) had stolen a smart phone. The court granted Ramiro informal probation pursuant to section 654, on the condition he pay the victim court ordered restitution in the amount of $681.
Ramiro appeals contending the court erred in setting the amount of restitution at $681, because it was possible to replace the stolen phone for $300, and the new phone was somewhat better than the one which was stolen. We will reject Ramiro's contention because his arguments fail to take into account the fact that the victim was obliged to pay the contract service fee and the victim found it necessary to purchase the somewhat better phone in order to continue to utilize the services for which she was required to pay. We believe the juvenile court's order was a reasonable calculation of the actual cost of replacement and was well within the court's very broad discretion.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts discussed here are from the transcript of the restitution hearing conducted by the juvenile court.
The phone stolen by Ramiro was a LG Optimus smart phone the victim purchased at Wal-Mart on sale for $237. She had to purchase an upgraded contract for service from T-Mobile in order to utilize the phone. Because the phone was stolen six months into the contract, the victim was not eligible for the discounted replacement cost, but still remained obligated to pay the service fees on the contract.
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified. 2 The victim was not able to purchase the identical phone at Wal-Mart or T-Mobile as it was no longer offered. Her on line search found the same phone on Amazon for approximately $300. However, the victim had previously suffered identity theft after a credit card purchase from Amazon and was not willing to make another purchase there.
In an effort to get a phone that matched the features of her service contract, the victim returned to T-Mobile. There she had choices between phones with fewer features than her contract provided, or she could purchase the Samsung Galaxy S4, which is somewhat better than the phone which was stolen. The victim paid $681 for the new smart phone.
DISCUSSION
At the completion of the restitution hearing, the juvenile court found the proper restitution to the victim under the circumstances of this case to be $681. The court found that amount was necessary to actually replace the smart phone that had been stolen. The court also found that ordering the minor to make the victim whole was important to the minor's rehabilitation. The court expressly relied on the opinion of this court in In re Alexander A. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 847 (Alexander), to support his exercise of discretion. Ramiro contends the court misapplied our decision. We disagree, and will find the court properly determined the amount of economic damages actually incurred by the victim of Ramiro's conduct.
A. Legal Principles Under the California Constitution, trial courts have broad discretion to impose restitution orders for economic losses caused by criminal conduct. (Cal. Const., art. I, 3 § 28, subd. (b), par. (13)(A).) Victims' rights to restitution should be broadly and liberally construed. (People v. Saint-Amans (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1084; In re Johnny M. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1132.)
Juvenile courts are vested with particularly broad power to order restitution where it advances the goals of the juvenile justice system. Such goals include guidance and rehabilitation which can be advanced by holding minors accountable for the results of their conduct. (In re Tommy A. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1580, 1587-1588; § 202, subds.
(b) & (d).)
Section 730.6, subdivision (h)(1) requires courts to order restitution "of a dollar amount sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for all determined economic losses incurred as the result of the minor's conduct." In order to carry out the statutory mandate, juvenile courts "may use any rational method of fixing the amount of restitution, provided it is reasonably calculated to make the victim whole, and provided it is consistent with the purpose of rehabilitation." (In re Brittany L. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1391-1392.)
In Alexander, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th 847, the juvenile court dealt with a minor who had vandalized a car. After a restitution hearing the court ordered the minor to pay the cost of repair even though it was substantially higher than the cost of replacement.
The court found it was reasonable to allow the victim to choose to fix the car rather than requiring the person to spend the time to try to purchase a comparable vehicle. The juvenile court also found that requiring the minor to pay the costs of making the victim whole was a necessary part of the minor's rehabilitation.
4 On appeal, this court upheld the juvenile court's choice of restitution method. We said: "Choosing repair over replacement is not intended to reimburse the victim for noneconomic injury but acknowledges the practicalities involved in cleaning up after a crime spree. The victim is entitled to a resolution." (Alexander, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 857.) The court further observed that victims have a right to be treated with fairness and respect for their privacy and dignity.
B. Analysis Ramiro contends the juvenile court erred in its application of our opinion in Alexander, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th 847. He argues that this is not a cost of repair case and that the evidence showed an identical replacement phone could have been purchased for $300. He further argues the replacement, which was purchased at $681, was a better phone, thus the victim received a windfall. That would probably be a surprise to the victim in this case. We disagree with Ramiro's contentions.
Here the identical phone was not regularly available since it was apparently off the market. It was theoretically possible to get the same model through Amazon. However, the victim was reluctant to purchase from Amazon. She had previously used her credit card with Amazon and became a victim of identity theft. The juvenile court impliedly found, and we agree, it would hardly be fair treatment of the victim or giving her respect to require her to risk identity theft in order to reduce the financial burden on the person whose criminal activity caused the loss.
5 Since we find the juvenile court was not unreasonable in crediting the victim's concerns about another purchase on Amazon, we must consider the claim that she obtained a "windfall." She did not do so.
The loss of a smart phone, as in this case, is not just a loss of a specific item of personal property. This piece of equipment only works with a service contract such as the one provided by T-Mobile. Whether the phone is lost or not, the obligation under the contract continues. Apparently the phone was stolen early into a two-year contract, which limited the victim's ability to get a discounted replacement. Additionally, the contract costs were calculated on certain features that can only be used with smart phones with specific capabilities. If the victim could not reasonably replace the exact, out of date model she lost, she had to get the next best choice that allowed her to use the services for which she was obligated to pay.
The record shows the victim made reasonable efforts to replace the stolen item with like merchandise. However, she could not reasonably get the identical item. The evidence demonstrates she got the nearest quality level to what she had lost. Thus, if we examine the loss to the victim under all of the circumstances, including the service contract, the reasonable unavailability of the identical phone and the efforts of the victim to simply get the service for which she was obligated to pay, the restitution set by the court was reasonable and proper.
Finally, we observe the trial court reasonably found that requiring Ramiro to bear the full economic cost of his conduct was important to the minor's rehabilitation. He should know there are consequences to theft that can go beyond the minimum value of 6 the thing that was stolen. Holding the minor accountable for the full economic impact of his behavior comports with the goals of juvenile justice.
DISPOSITION
The order of the juvenile court setting restitution is affirmed.
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
NARES, J.
McINTYRE, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Alexander A. No. D056674 · 2011-02-10
- People v. Tommy A. D045115 · 2005-07-25
- People v. Saint-Amans A105413 · 2005-07-18
- People v. Johnny M. B154810 · 2002-08-05
- People v. Brittany L. B154167 · 2002-07-10