People v. Saunders CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D065479 · 2015-04-22 · Unpublished

Proceeding: appeal from a judgment
Trial court: Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCD184170, SCD179948
Trial judge: David J. Danielsen
Outcome: affirmed — Affirmed.
Area: criminal
Panel: Richard D. Huffman, Sr. (author), Judith L. Haller, O'Rourke

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T06:18Z · confidence high

The trial court denied Saunders's petition to modify his third-strike sentence under Proposition 36, finding him ineligible because his prior convictions for vehicular manslaughter were disqualifying offenses. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the statute explicitly excludes inmates with prior homicide convictions, including vehicular manslaughter, from resentencing eligibility.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Denial of petition to modify third-strike sentence under Proposition 36 (Pen. Code, § 1170.126) “The trial court correctly denied the petition.”	de novo	correct	agree with court The appellate court applied de novo review to the statutory interpretation question, concluding that the plain language of Section 1170.126, subdivision (e)(3) renders inmates with prior homicide convictions, including vehicular manslaughter, ineligible for resentencing. The court also noted that Saunders had previously admitted the priors were qualifying strikes and failed to challenge their nature in his prior appeal, supporting the denial.

Authorities

relied: People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136 — When interpreting a statute, courts first examine its language.
relied: People v. Leal (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999 — The words used in a statute are usually the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.
relied: Garcia v. McCutchen (1997) 16 Cal.4th 469 — Courts must try, where possible, to give effect to every word and phrase in the statute.
relied: People v. Bow (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1551 — A defendant who admitted prior convictions as qualifying strikes and did not challenge their nature in a prior appeal should not be heard to contend they did not qualify later.
relied: People v. Yearwood (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 161 — Proposition 36 created a resentencing mechanism for those previously sentenced to life terms under the previous version of the three strikes law.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the plain language of the statute to determine that vehicular manslaughter is a disqualifying prior offense for resentencing under Proposition 36. It also appropriately addresses the procedural history, noting that Saunders admitted the priors were qualifying strikes and did not challenge them in his prior appeal.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:31Z · confidence low

The San Diego Superior Court denied Mark Saunders's Proposition 36 petition to recall his two consecutive 25-years-to-life third-strike sentences, finding him ineligible under Penal Code section 1170.126, subdivision (e)(3) because his three 1987 vehicular manslaughter strike priors (former § 192, subd. (c)(4), now § 191.5, subd. (b)) are homicide offenses listed in section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv)(IV). The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding the statutory text plainly disqualifies inmates with section 191.5 priors, alternatively holding Saunders could not now dispute the serious/violent character of priors he admitted as strikes in 2005, and declining to reach his ineffective assistance claim.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Denial of section 1170.126 resentencing petition on the ground that prior vehicular manslaughter (former § 192(c)(4) / § 191.5(b)) convictions are disqualifying homicide offenses under § 1170.126(e)(3) and § 667(e)(2)(C)(iv)(IV). “The language of section 1170.126 subdivision (e)(3) is absolutely clear, inmates convicted of a homicide offense, including section 191.5, are not eligible for resentencing under the act.”	de novo	correct	agree with court Section 667(e)(2)(C)(iv)(IV) expressly lists any homicide offense defined in sections 187 to 191.5, and section 1170.126(e)(3) incorporates that list as a disqualifier; the renumbered § 191.5(b) falls squarely within the range. Saunders's argument that the clause also requires the prior be 'serious and/or violent' has textual footing, and the court did not fully engage it, but the point is answered in practice because he admitted the three priors as qualifying strikes in 2005, satisfying that prong. The result follows from the plain text read together with the admission.
Alternative holding that Saunders, having admitted the vehicular manslaughter priors as strikes in 2005 and not having challenged them on direct appeal, cannot now contend they were neither serious nor violent. “We agree with the People, Saunders should not be heard now to contend the prior convictions did not qualify as either serious or violent.”	de novo	correct	unsure The court relied on People v. Bow for the proposition that a defendant who admits a prior-conviction allegation is bound by that admission and cannot later dispute that the prior qualifies. The opinion does not explain why that direct-appeal forfeiture principle transfers to a collateral Proposition 36 eligibility determination, which is a distinct statutory proceeding, so the analysis is thin. Because the primary textual holding independently supports the result, I lean toward agreement but cannot be certain the forfeiture rationale is fully correct in this context.
Claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue in the trial court that the vehicular manslaughter priors were not serious or violent felonies. “We will address the merits of Saunders's arguments about the nature of his prior convictions. Thus, we find it unnecessary to address the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel.”	unclear	not reached	agree with court Because the court resolved the underlying eligibility question against Saunders on the merits, any failure by counsel to raise it could not have been prejudicial, so declining to reach the ineffective assistance claim was appropriate and consistent with the Strickland prejudice framework.

Authorities

relied: People v. Yearwood (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 161 — Proposition 36 both prospectively narrowed the felonies qualifying for a third-strike life sentence and created a separate resentencing mechanism for inmates already serving such terms.
relied: People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136 — Statutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute.
relied: People v. Leal (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999 — The words of a statute are generally the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.
relied: Garcia v. McCutchen (1997) 16 Cal.4th 469 — Courts should give effect to every word and phrase in a statute where possible.
relied: People v. Bow (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1551 — A defendant who admits a prior serious felony conviction allegation is bound by that admission and may not later contend the prior did not qualify.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court correctly read sections 1170.126(e)(3) and 667(e)(2)(C)(iv)(IV) to disqualify inmates with section 191.5 homicide priors, and the 2005 admission of the priors as strikes answers the 'serious and/or violent' prong Saunders pressed. The opinion, however, declares the text 'absolutely clear' without directly confronting the argument that clause (iv) requires the prior also be serious or violent, and it does not explain why direct-appeal forfeiture principles from People v. Bow govern a collateral Proposition 36 eligibility proceeding.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 4/22/15 P. v. Saunders CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D065479

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD184170, SCD179948) MARK MCLEAN SAUNDERS, Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, David J.

Danielsen, Judge. Affirmed.

Marianne Harguindeguy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson, Kristine A. Gutierrez and Warren Williams, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Mark McLean Saunders appeals from the denial of his petition to modify his third strike sentence pursuant to Proposition 36 (Pen. Code,1 § 1170.126). He contends the 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified. trial court erred in finding he was ineligible for resentencing because of the nature of his prior convictions. We disagree and affirm.

In 1987, Saunders was convicted of three counts of vehicular manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (c)(4)). In 2005, Saunders was convicted of driving under the influence with a prior vehicular manslaughter conviction (Veh. Code, §§ 23152, subd. (a); 23626; 23540)

and failing to appear while on bail (§ 1320.5). He admitted three prior serious/violent felony (strike) convictions (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)). In 2005, Saunders was sentenced to two consecutive terms of 25 years to life.

In February 2014, the trial court denied Saunders's petition to modify his sentence because the nature of his strike priors rendered him ineligible under section 1170.126, subdivision (e)(3).

Saunders has filed a timely notice of appeal.

Saunders contends his prior convictions for vehicular manslaughter were neither "serious" nor "violent" and thus he was eligible for resentencing under section 1170.126.

He also claims his counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue in the trial court.

We will address the merits of Saunders's arguments about the nature of his prior convictions. Thus, we find it unnecessary to address the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel.

This appeal presents only a narrow question of law, therefore we will omit discussion of the facts of the "current offenses" as well as the facts underlying the three strike priors.

2 DISCUSSION

A. Background In November 2012 the voters enacted the Three Strikes Reform Act (Proposition 36) to limit the types of felonies that will prospectively qualify a person for imposition of the indeterminate life sentence required for a "third strike" conviction. In addition, the measure created a resentencing mechanism for those previously sentenced to life terms under the previous version of the three strikes law. (People v. Yearwood (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 161, 167.) Thus, the statute redefines which crimes qualify in the future, separately from the resentencing process it established.

Under section 1170.126, subdivision (a), a person who was sentenced to a life term for a "current offense" for which the person would not be eligible for such sentence under the new statute, may petition the court for resentencing. The trial court first determines eligibility and then if the inmate is eligible for resentencing, it should conduct a hearing to determine whether resentencing is appropriate under all the provisions of the statute. (§ 1170.126, subds. (a), (b).)

Subdivision (e) of section 1170.126 also defines several classes of offenders who are not eligible for resentencing. Before we discuss that section we address the nature of Saunders's strike priors.

3 The 1987 convictions were for three counts of vehicular manslaughter under section 192, subdivision (c)(4). The parties agree that since 1987, the Legislature renumbered section 192, subdivision (c)(4) as section 191.5, subdivision (b).2 Returning to the statutory definition of which persons are ineligible for resentencing, section 1170.126, subdivision (e) provides in part: "An inmate is eligible for resentencing if: [¶] . . . [¶] (3) The inmate has no prior convictions for any of the offenses appearing in clause (iv) of paragraph (C) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of section 667 or clause (iv) of paragraph (2) of section 1170.12."

Section 667, subdivision (e)(2(C) provides in part:

"If a defendant has two or more prior serious and/or violent felony convictions as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 or subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7 that have been pled and proved, and the current offense is not a serious or violent felony as defined in subdivision (d), the defendant shall be sentenced pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (e) unless the prosecutor pleads and proves any of the following: [¶] . . . [¶] (iv) The defendant suffered a prior serious and/or violent felony conviction, as defined in subdivision (d) of the section, for any of the following felonies: [¶] . . . [¶] (IV) Any homicide offense, including any attempted homicide, defined in sections 187 to 191.5, inclusive."

Saunders acknowledges this section but argues essentially that we should ignore it because of his various arguments that vehicular manslaughter is neither "serious" nor 2 Section 191.5, subdivision (b) provides: "Vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice aforethought, in the driving of a vehicle, where the driving was in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153 of the Vehicle Code, and the killing was either the proximate result of the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, but without gross negligence, or the proximate result of the commission of a lawful act that might produce death, in an unlawful manner, but without gross negligence." 4 "violent" because the underlying conduct leading to the unlawful killing does not amount to a felony.

B. Analysis When we interpret a statute we first examine its language. (People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 142.) The words used are usually the most reliable indicator of the legislative intent in the drafting of the statute. (People v. Leal (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1007.) We must try, where possible, to give effect to every word and phrase in the statute. (Garcia v. McCutchen (1997) 16 Cal.4th 469, 476.)

Saunders parses the various sections cited in the statute to support his claim that vehicular manslaughter is not violent under section 667.5, subdivision (c) and not serious under section 1192.7, subdivision (c), because the underlying conduct of criminal activity supporting vehicular manslaughter is behavior "not amounting to a felony."

As we have noted, Proposition 36 has both a prospective and retrospective feature.

The statute with regard to resentencing has undertaken to define various types of inmates who, notwithstanding their current offense, are not eligible for relief under the act. The language of section 1170.126 subdivision (e)(3) is absolutely clear, inmates convicted of a homicide offense, including section 191.5, are not eligible for resentencing under the act. Further, when Saunders was convicted of the current offense he admitted that the three vehicular manslaughter convictions were qualifying strikes under section 667, subdivisions (b) through (i). He did not challenge the nature of his strike priors in the appeal from his 2005 convictions and sentence (People v. Saunders (Feb. 27, 2007, D047541) [nonpub. opn.]). We agree with the People, Saunders should not be heard now 5 to contend the prior convictions did not qualify as either serious or violent. (People v. Bow (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1551, 1558.)

In any event, the statute plainly establishes that prior convictions for violation of section 191.5 (previously § 192) are disqualifying for purposes of resentencing under Proposition 36.

The trial court correctly denied the petition.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

HALLER, J.

O'ROURKE, J.

Cites, in this corpus

People v. Yearwood No. F063712 · 2013-01-29
People v. Leal S114399 · 2004-08-05
People v. Murphy S075263 · 2001-03-29
Garcia v. McCutchen No. S052920 · 1997-08-14
People v. Bow B065807 · 1993-03-03