Taylor v. Mr. T. CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D065559 · 2015-03-23 · Unpublished

Proceeding: appeal from a judgment
Trial court: Superior Court of San Diego County · No. D545233
Trial judge: Cindy D. Davis
Outcome: affirmed — Affirmed.
Area: family
Panel: Patricia D. Benke (author), Alex C. McDonald, Joan K. Irion

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T02:55Z · confidence high

The trial court dismissed Taylor's 2013 paternity petition and denied his request for DNA testing, ruling that the claims were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel based on a final 2009 judgment in a prior case. The Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal, holding that the prior judgment, which determined Mr. T. was not the father, was binding on Taylor because he was a party to that action and no grounds for setting it aside were asserted.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Dismissal of paternity petition and denial of DNA testing request based on res judicata and collateral estoppel “Taylor's action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata and its corollary, collateral estoppel. The judgment in D472096 determined the paternity issue Taylor now raises against him on the merits.”	unclear	correct	agree with court The appellate court correctly applied the doctrine of res judicata, noting that the prior judgment was final, on the merits, and involved the same parties (or parties in privity). The court verified that Taylor was a party to the prior action and that the issue of paternity was actually litigated and determined, satisfying the elements for preclusion.
Effect of Taylor's minority on the binding nature of the prior judgment “Although Taylor was a minor at the time the judgment in D472096 was entered, his minority did not deprive that judgment of its res judicata or collateral estoppel effect.”	unclear	correct	agree with court The court correctly noted that Taylor was made a party to the prior action and represented by a guardian ad litem as required by Family Code section 7635. Therefore, the judgment was binding on him, and his minority did not invalidate the preclusive effect of the final judgment.

Authorities

relied: City of Simi Valley v. Superior Court (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1077 — Defines the elements of res judicata.
relied: Groves v. Peterson (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 659 — Defines the elements of collateral estoppel.
relied: City and County of San Francisco v. Cartagena (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1061 — Supports the principle that a final judgment is binding unless set aside.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies established preclusion doctrines to the facts, verifying that the prior judgment was final, on the merits, and binding on the appellant who was a party to the prior action. The court addresses the appellant's implicit argument regarding his minority by citing the procedural protections (guardian ad litem) that were in place during the prior proceeding.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:31Z · confidence low

The San Diego Superior Court granted Mr. T.'s motion to quash Taylor's 2013 paternity petition, denied his request for DNA testing, and dismissed the action on the ground that a final 2009 judgment in a prior paternity action (D472096) had already determined Mr. T. is not Taylor's father. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding the 2009 judgment, to which Taylor was a party, is res judicata and collaterally estops his new claim unless and until it is set aside, which Taylor never sought.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Granting Mr. T.'s motion to quash and dismissing Taylor's paternity petition as barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel based on the final 2009 judgment in D472096 “Taylor's action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata and its corollary, collateral estoppel.”	unclear	correct	agree with court The prior judgment was on the merits (summary judgment on uncontroverted HLA/DNA evidence), was final with no appeal taken, involved the identical paternity issue, and expressly bound Taylor as a claimant. The elements of claim and issue preclusion as stated in Simi Valley and Groves are satisfied on the face of the record quoted. The opinion does not state a standard of review, though preclusion on undisputed facts is ordinarily reviewed de novo.
Denial of Taylor's request for further DNA/paternity testing “Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order dismissing Taylor's petition and quashing his request for further testing.”	unclear	correct	agree with court Because the paternity issue was conclusively determined against Taylor in a binding final judgment, there was no live issue for which testing could be ordered; denial follows directly from the preclusion ruling.
Determination that Taylor's status (described as a minor) and his removal as a claimant in D472096 did not prevent the 2009 judgment from binding him “Although Taylor was a minor at the time the judgment in D472096 was entered, his minority did not deprive that judgment of its res judicata or collateral estoppel effect.”	unclear	correct	agree with court The result is correct: Taylor was joined as a party under Family Code section 7635, the trial court expressly made its paternity determination binding on him when granting his request to be removed, and under Cartagena a judgment remains binding until set aside, which Taylor never sought. However, the opinion contains an internal inconsistency: Taylor was born May 25, 1988, so he was 20 years old when judgment was entered on January 12, 2009, not a minor. It also does not expressly confirm that a guardian ad litem was appointed or analyze whether his removal as a claimant affected party status. These gaps do not change the outcome, since an adult party who declined to oppose summary judgment and did not appeal is plainly bound.

Authorities

relied: City of Simi Valley v. Superior Court (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1077 — Elements of res judicata: a final judgment on the merits precludes relitigation of the same cause of action between the same parties or their privies.
relied: Groves v. Peterson (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 659 — Collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue actually litigated and necessarily decided in a prior proceeding against a party to that proceeding.
relied: City and County of San Francisco v. Cartagena (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1061 — A final paternity judgment remains binding and preclusive unless and until it is set aside through proper procedures.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court reaches a clearly defensible result with appropriate preclusion authorities, since Taylor was a party to a final, unappealed merits judgment that expressly bound him and he asserted no ground to set it aside. The opinion nonetheless misstates that Taylor was a minor when the 2009 judgment was entered (he was 20 by the birth date the opinion itself recites), does not confirm a guardian ad litem was appointed, states no standard of review, and does not separately analyze whether his removal as a claimant affected his party status.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

record incomplete

Opinion

Filed 3/23/15 Taylor v. Mr. T. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

ALEXANDER E. TAYLOR, D065559 Plaintiff and Appellant, v. (Super. Ct. No. D545233)

MR. T., Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Cindy D.

Davis, Judge. Affirmed.

Alexander E. Taylor, in pro. per, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Phillips Lerner, Marc Oren Lerner and Autumn Miley-Boland for Defendant and Respondent.

In 2009, a judgment, which is now final, was entered and, by its terms, it determined that defendant and respondent Mr. T. is not the father of plaintiff and appellant Alexander E. Taylor. That judgment bars Taylor's current petition to establish a parent-child relationship between Mr. T. and Taylor. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order dismissing Taylor's petition and quashing his request for further testing.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Taylor was born on May 25, 1988 in Chicago, Illinois. Taylor's mother, Vanessa Taylor, was not married.

A. Illinois Proceedings In 1989, Vanessa commenced a paternity action in Illinois against Mr. T. alleging that he was Taylor's father. In 1990, the court in which the paternity action was pending ordered that Taylor, Vanessa and Mr. T. submit to blood tests. The laboratory that conducted the tests reported it was not possible that Mr. T. was Taylor's father.

Thereafter, in March 1992, Vanessa stipulated to dismissal of her paternity action without prejudice.

In May 1992, a state's attorney in Illinois filed a complaint alleging that Mr. T.

was Taylor's father. The state shortly thereafter voluntarily dismissed the complaint.

A third Illinois paternity complaint, alleging Mr. T. was Taylor's father and also the father of Taylor's younger brother, Nathaniel, was dismissed in 1993.

B. Prior California Proceedings In 1998, the San Diego County District Attorney filed a child support action against Mr T. in which it alleged he was Taylor and Nathaniel's father. Shortly after filing the action, the district attorney dismissed it without prejudice.

In 2002, Vanessa filed a paternity petition in San Diego against Mr. T., in which she again alleged he was Taylor's father. Taylor was joined as a claimant in the action.

The trial court dismissed the petition (San Diego County Super. Ct. No. D472096;

hereafter D472096) on the grounds that it was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. On 2 appeal, we reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

On remand, in D472096, Mr. T. moved for summary judgment on the grounds DNA testing he submitted showed he was not Taylor's father. Neither Vanessa nor Taylor responded to the motion for summary judgment on the merits; however, Taylor moved to be removed as a claimant. The trial court granted Mr. T.'s motion for summary judgment. With respect to the motion for summary judgment the trial court found:

"There is no triable issue of fact regarding whether Respondent is the father of Claimant because the uncontroverted evidence of Dr. Daniel B. Garner and Dr. Howard M. Gebel establishes that, after drawing blood from Petitioner, Respondent, and Claimant in conformity with the then existing requirements of the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity (Evidence Code, Section 890-897), HLA and DNA paternity tests were conducted by CellMark and HLA Labs, both of which concluded that Respondent is not the father of [Taylor]."

With respect to Taylor's request that he be removed as a claimant in the action, the court stated: "[Taylor's] Order to Show Cause to remove himself as a Claimant in this action is GRANTED, provided however, that the Court's determination of the non- existence of a Parent-Child Relationship between Respondent and Claimant is binding on Claimant." Thus, the trial court relieved Taylor of the obligation to further participate in the case but made its decision on the merits binding on him.

Judgment in D472096 was entered on January 12, 2009 and no appeal from it was taken by Vanessa or Taylor.

C. These Proceedings In 2013, Taylor filed the instant paternity petition and request for DNA testing.

3 Mr. T. moved to quash the service of a summons on him as well as the petition on the grounds they were barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel; the trial court granted the motion and denied Taylor's request for DNA testing; on its own motion the trial court dismissed the action. Taylor, acting in propria persona, filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

Taylor's action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata and its corollary, collateral estoppel. The judgment in D472096 determined the paternity issue Taylor now raises against him on the merits. It is binding on him here and forecloses the paternity claims he now asserts. (City of Simi Valley v. Superior Court (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1082 [res judicata]; Groves v. Peterson (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 659, 667 [collateral estoppel].)

Although Taylor was a minor at the time the judgment in D472096 was entered, his minority did not deprive that judgment of its res judicata or collateral estoppel effect.

In this regard, we note that Family Code section 76351 required that he be made a party 1 Family Code section 7635 states: "(a) The child may, if under the age of 12 years, and shall, if 12 years of age or older, be made a party to the action. If the child is a minor and a party to the action, the child shall be represented by a guardian ad litem appointed by the court. The guardian ad litem need not be represented by counsel if the guardian ad litem is a relative of the child. "(b) The natural parent, each person presumed to be a parent under Section 7611, and each man alleged to be the natural father, may be made parties and shall be given notice of the action in the manner prescribed in Section 7666 and an opportunity to be heard. Appointment of a guardian ad litem shall not be required for a minor who is a parent of the child who is the subject of the petition to establish parental relationship, unless the minor parent is unable to understand the nature of the proceedings or to assist counsel in preparing the case. "(c) The court may align the parties. 4 to the action in D472096 and that a guardian ad litem be appointed to act on his behalf in that action. That portion of the record in D472096, which is part of the record on appeal here, indicates that, consistent with Family Code section 7635, Taylor was made a party to the action and that the trial court intended its resolution of paternity be binding on Taylor as well as Vanessa. Hence, unless the judgment in D472096 is set aside, it is binding on Taylor and bars his current claim. (See City and County of San Francisco v. Cartagena (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1061, 1066.) Taylor has not asserted any grounds for setting aside the judgment in D472096.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Mr. T. to recover his costs on appeal.

BENKE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

McDONALD, J.

IRION, J.

"(d) In any initial or subsequent proceeding under this chapter where custody of, or visitation with, a minor child is in issue, the court may, if it determines it would be in the best interest of the minor child, appoint private counsel to represent the interests of the minor child pursuant to Chapter 10 (commencing with Section 3150) of Part 2 of Division 8." 5

Cites, in this corpus

City of Simi Valley v. Superior Court B166917 · 2003-09-03
Groves v. Peterson No. B152404 · 2002-07-26
City and County of San Francisco v. Cartagena A065055 · 1995-06-14