People v. Taylor CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D066865 · 2015-03-23 · Unpublished

Proceeding: appeal from a judgment
Trial court: Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCD248418
Trial judge: Timothy R. Walsh
Outcome: affirmed — Affirmed.
Area: criminal
Panel: Cynthia Aaron (author), Richard D. Huffman, Sr., Joan K. Irion

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T06:20Z · confidence high

The trial court denied Taylor's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, finding he failed to demonstrate that the plea was involuntary or coerced. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment after an independent review of the record found no reasonably arguable issues of error.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Denial of motion to withdraw guilty plea “The trial court found that Taylor did not meet his burden to show that the plea was obtained through coercion, terror, inducement or threat, and that there was no indication that his guilty plea was involuntary or violated due process.”	abuse of discretion	not reached	agree with court The appellate court did not explicitly apply a standard of review to the trial court's ruling because it concluded, pursuant to its Wende/Anders obligations, that the issue was not reasonably arguable. The court noted that Taylor did not claim other coercive factors existed or that the trial court failed to make an adequate inquiry, effectively accepting the trial court's factual findings as unchallenged on appeal.

Authorities

relied: People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 — Requires appointed appellate counsel to file a brief identifying potential issues and invites the court to independently review the record for error when no arguable issues are presented.
relied: Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 — Establishes the procedure for appointed counsel to withdraw from representation in an appeal where no arguable issues exist, requiring a brief identifying potential issues and court review.
relied: People v. Alexander (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 313 — Defines 'good cause' for withdrawing a plea as mistake, ignorance, fraud, duress, or any other factor that overcame the defendant's exercise of free judgment.
relied: Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 — Holds that guilty pleas obtained through coercion, terror, inducement, or threat are involuntary and violate due process.
relied: In re Ibarra (1983) 34 Cal.3d 277 — Establishes that a 'package deal' plea bargain is not intrinsically coercive and outlines the totality of the circumstances test for voluntariness.
relied: People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353 — Cited to note that In re Ibarra was abrogated on other grounds, but the specific proposition regarding package deals remains valid.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is procedurally sound as it correctly follows the Wende/Anders protocol for reviewing a record when appointed counsel finds no arguable issues. It correctly identifies that the appellant's claim of a 'package deal' does not constitute intrinsic coercion under established California law.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:31Z · confidence low

The trial court accepted Taylor's negotiated guilty plea to robbery with firearm and gang enhancements, later denied his motion to withdraw the plea on the ground that a 'package deal' with his codefendant pressured him, and sentenced him to the stipulated 15 years. On appeal, appointed counsel filed a Wende brief, Taylor filed a supplemental brief renewing the coercion argument, and the Court of Appeal independently reviewed the record, found no arguable issue, and affirmed.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Denial of Taylor's Penal Code section 1018 motion to withdraw his guilty plea for lack of good cause “The trial court found that Taylor did not meet his burden to show that the plea was obtained through coercion, terror, inducement or threat, and that there was no indication that his guilty plea was involuntary or violated due process.”	abuse of discretion	correct	agree with court Section 1018 gives the trial court discretion to permit withdrawal on a showing of good cause by clear and convincing evidence, and good cause requires a factor that overcame free judgment. Taylor's only claimed pressure was concern for his codefendant friend; he had signed a plea form, been advised in open court, and denied any threats or inducement. On that record a finding of no coercion is well within discretion, and the appellate court correctly so concluded.
Finding that the plea was knowing, intelligent and voluntary despite being a 'package deal' with the codefendant “A "package deal" plea bargain is not intrinsically coercive.”	substantial evidence	correct	agree with court In re Ibarra holds that package-deal pleas are not per se coercive and that the trial court must assess voluntariness under the totality of the circumstances. The trial court asked each defendant separately about understanding, rights and threats, and Taylor did not claim any additional coercive factor or an inadequate inquiry. The appellate court applied the correct rule and the record supports the voluntariness finding.

Authorities

relied: People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 — When appointed counsel finds no arguable issues, the appellate court must independently review the entire record for error.
relied: Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 — Appointed counsel who finds an appeal frivolous must so advise the court and identify anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.
relied: People v. Alexander (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 313 — Good cause to withdraw a plea under section 1018 means mistake, ignorance, fraud, duress, or another factor overcoming the defendant's free judgment.
relied: Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 — A guilty plea obtained through coercion, terror, inducement or threat is involuntary and violates due process.
relied: In re Ibarra (1983) 34 Cal.3d 277 — Package-deal plea bargains are not intrinsically coercive; the trial court must evaluate voluntariness under the totality of the circumstances.
relied: People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353 — Cited only to note that Ibarra was abrogated on other grounds regarding advisement of rights.
missed: People v. Johnson (2009) 47 Cal.4th 668 — An appeal challenging the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea attacks the validity of the plea and requires a certificate of probable cause under section 1237.5; the opinion does not state whether a certificate was obtained before reaching the plea-withdrawal issue.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court correctly stated the section 1018 good-cause standard and the Ibarra rule that package deals are not inherently coercive, and the record of a written plea form, in-court advisements, and Taylor's denial of threats supports affirmance. The opinion is brief and does not mention whether a certificate of probable cause was obtained, which is a prerequisite to reviewing the denial of a plea-withdrawal motion, and it addresses Taylor's supplemental brief only summarily.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

record incomplete

Opinion

Filed 3/23/15 P. v. Taylor CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D066865

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD248418)

SAI KIYOSHI TAYLOR,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Timothy R. Walsh, Judge. Affirmed.

Sheila Quinlan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Sai Kiyoshi Taylor pled guilty to robbery, a felony, under Penal Code section 211,1 and admitted to a gang allegation and to using a handgun in the commission of the 1 Unless otherwise specified, all subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code. robbery (§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1), 12022.53, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced Taylor to 15 years in prison, and ordered him to pay fines, fees and victim restitution.

Appointed appellate counsel filed a brief presenting no argument for reversal, but inviting this court to review the record for error in accordance with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). Taylor filed a supplemental brief on his own behalf.

After having independently reviewed the entire record for error, as required by Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders) and Wende, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 27, 2013, Taylor and his friend, Malcolm Hune, entered a medical marijuana dispensary. Taylor had a revolver in his possession. Hune had a semi- automatic handgun. Taylor and Hune each pointed their respective weapons at an employee of the dispensary. When another employee opened a door, Hune pointed the semi-automatic handgun at him. Taylor and Hune took more than three pounds of marijuana, valued at $10,000, and $220 in cash. Both Taylor and Hune were documented members of a criminal street gang.

Taylor was charged with two counts of robbery, assault with a firearm, burglary with a weapon, and gang enhancement on each count. If convicted, Taylor faced a prison sentence of up to 25 years.

On April 30, 2014, Taylor pled guilty to one count of robbery, admitted the firearm and gang enhancements, and stipulated to a 15-year prison sentence. Taylor's codefendant Hune accepted the same plea deal. Taylor filed a written guilty plea form acknowledging that he had been advised of his constitutional rights and the consequences 2 of his guilty plea. The court advised Taylor of his rights and the consequences of his guilty plea. The court accepted Taylor's and Hune's guilty pleas at the same time, asking each defendant in turn whether he understood his rights and the nature and consequences of his guilty plea, and whether anyone had threatened or convinced him to take the plea.

Taylor indicated that he understood his rights and the nature and consequences of pleading guilty, and that no one had threatened or convinced him to take the plea. The court found that Taylor knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights when he accepted the plea agreement.

On May 14, 2014, at Taylor's request, the court relieved his counsel and appointed a different attorney to represent him. Taylor informed the court that he was filing a motion to withdraw his plea.

The motion to withdraw the plea was heard on October 15, 2014. In a declaration in support of the motion, Taylor stated that he felt pressured to plead guilty because it was a "package deal" involving his codefendant, who was a close friend of his. He did not want his friend to lose his deal. In addition, his attorney did not present him with any option other than pleading guilty.

The trial court found that Taylor did not meet his burden to show that the plea was obtained through coercion, terror, inducement or threat, and that there was no indication that his guilty plea was involuntary or violated due process. The court denied the motion to withdraw the plea and sentenced Taylor to 15 years in prison.

3 DISCUSSION

Appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief summarizing the facts and proceedings in the trial court. Counsel has presented no argument for reversal, and invited this court to review the record for error in accordance with Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436. Pursuant to Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738, counsel identified the following as possible, but not arguable, issues:

"A. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion to withdraw his plea?

"B. Did the nature of the negotiation in this case as a "package deal" make this plea inherently coercive?"

In his supplemental brief, Taylor states that under Penal Code section 1018, he has the right to withdraw his plea prior to the entry of judgment. When a defendant was represented by counsel at the time of the plea, the trial court may, but is not required to, grant the request to withdraw the plea on a sufficient showing of good cause. (Ibid.)

"Good cause" means mistake, ignorance, fraud, duress, or any other factor that overcame the defendant's exercise of free judgment. (People v. Alexander (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 313, 318; see Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 243 [guilty pleas obtained through coercion, terror, inducement, or threat are involuntary and violate due process].) A "package deal" plea bargain is not intrinsically coercive. (In re Ibarra (1983) 34 Cal.3rd 277, 283-284, abrogated on other grounds as stated in People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 360.)

4 In Taylor's declaration and supplemental briefing, Taylor claims that he was motivated to plead guilty out of concern for his codefendant, who was potentially exposed to a longer sentence if he and Taylor did not jointly accept the plea offer. Taylor does not claim that there were other coercive factors that led to his decision to plead guilty, or that the trial court failed to make an adequate inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea under the totality of the circumstances at the hearing to withdraw the plea.

(In re Ibarra, supra, at pp. 288-290.)

A review of the record pursuant to Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, and Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738, including the issues suggested by counsel, has disclosed no reasonably arguable appellate issue. Taylor has been represented by competent counsel on this appeal.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

AARON, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

IRION, J.

Cites, in this corpus

People v. Alexander B256482 · 2015-01-16
People v. Mosby S104862 · 2004-07-08
People v. Wende Crim. 20851 · 1979-10-12