People v. Hill CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. PLAF4374
- Trial judge
- Desiree A. Bruce-Lyle
- Outcome
- dismissed — Dismissed.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Alex C. McDonald (author), O'Rourke, Gilbert Nares
Analysis
The trial court (Board of Parole Hearings) imposed parole conditions requiring the defendant to stay away from places where children congregate and wear a GPS device, which the defendant challenged on appeal. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits, ruling that the defendant failed to exhaust available administrative remedies.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Dismissal of appeal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies“Hill neither challenged his parole conditions by an administrative review nor requested reconsideration by an administrative appeal. Instead, Hill sought to circumvent available administrative remedies by appealing to this court. The appeal is unauthorized and we therefore must dismiss the appeal without proceeding to the merits.” | unclear | error | agree with court The court correctly applied the well-settled doctrine that inmates and parolees must exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of parole conditions. The opinion cites specific regulations and statutes (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §§ 3084.1-3084.3; Pen. Code, §§ 3000, 5075.1, 5077) that provide the necessary administrative avenues for challenging parole conditions, which the defendant ignored. The dismissal is procedurally correct because the appellate court lacks jurisdiction to review the merits when the prerequisite administrative steps have not been taken. |
Authorities
- relied: In re Hudson (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1 — Inmates must exhaust available administrative remedies before filing a petition for habeas corpus in the courts.
- relied: In re Muszalski (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 500 — Supports the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies.
- relied: Ogo Associates v. City of Torrance (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 830 — The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies contains exceptions, such as when the subject matter is outside the agency's jurisdiction or when the agency cannot grant an adequate remedy.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is procedurally sound as it correctly identifies that the defendant bypassed the mandatory administrative review process for parole conditions. It relies on established case law and specific statutory/regulatory provisions to support the dismissal, without needing to address the constitutional merits of the conditions.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe San Diego Superior Court revoked Richard Hill's parole after he waived a hearing, admitted violating parole by absconding and possessing drug paraphernalia, and agreed to serve 135 days in custody; Hill then appealed, attacking as vague and overbroad the parole conditions requiring him to stay away from places where children congregate and to wear a GPS device. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits, holding that Hill had to exhaust administrative remedies (inmate/parolee grievance review and reconsideration by the Board of Parole Hearings) before challenging his parole conditions in court.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Parole revocation order entered on Hill's admission of parole violations (135 days custody), appealed on the ground that the underlying parole conditions (stay-away from children, GPS monitoring) are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and unrelated to his commitment offense“Hill neither challenged his parole conditions by an administrative review nor requested reconsideration by an administrative appeal. Instead, Hill sought to circumvent available administrative remedies by appealing to this court.” | unclear | not reached | unsure The conditions Hill attacks were imposed administratively by CDCR/the parole authority, not by the superior court, so a direct appeal from the revocation order is a poor vehicle for reviewing them and the exhaustion rationale drawn from In re Hudson and In re Muszalski is defensible. However, those authorities arose in habeas, not on direct appeal, and the court does not explain why an appeal from a post-realignment parole revocation order is itself 'unauthorized' rather than simply presenting a non-cognizable claim; nor does it address the effect of Hill's admission of the violations or whether the Sheena K. rule allowing facial constitutional challenges without objection has any application. The result appears correct but the reasoning is thin. |
Authorities
- relied: In re Hudson (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1 — Inmates must exhaust available administrative remedies before seeking habeas relief in the courts; the exhaustion doctrine admits recognized exceptions.
- relied: In re Muszalski (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 500 — Exhaustion of administrative remedies is required before an inmate may petition for habeas corpus.
- relied: Ogo Associates v. City of Torrance (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 830 — The exhaustion doctrine contains exceptions, including where the agency lacks jurisdiction, pursuit of the remedy would cause irreparable harm, the agency cannot grant adequate relief, or the agency's decision is a foregone conclusion.
- missed: In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875 — A facial constitutional challenge to a probation condition as vague or overbroad presents a pure question of law that may be raised on appeal despite the absence of an objection below; the court did not discuss whether any comparable principle bears on Hill's facial vagueness/overbreadth claim or distinguish court-imposed probation conditions from administratively imposed parole conditions.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The dismissal rests on a defensible premise that administratively imposed parole conditions must first be challenged through the CDCR grievance process and Board of Parole Hearings reconsideration, and the court cites proper exhaustion authority. But the opinion imports a habeas exhaustion rule onto a direct appeal without addressing appealability of the revocation order under Penal Code section 1237, the effect of Hill's admission of the violations, or the Sheena K. principle that facial constitutional challenges may be heard without prior objection.
Opinion
Filed 3/20/15 P. v. Hill CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D066033
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. PLAF4374)
RICHARD M. HILL, Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Desiree A.
Bruce-Lyle, Judge. Dismissed.
Patrick Morgan Ford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton and Christopher P.
Beesley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
As a juvenile, Richard Hill committed a lewd and lascivious act on a child. Years later, Hill was convicted of a narcotics offense and sentenced to prison. He was eventually released on parole and, because of his criminal history, his parole conditions included requirements that he stay away from places children congregate and wear a Global Positioning System (GPS) monitoring device.
In January 2014, Hill violated his parole by removing his GPS monitoring device and absconding from supervision. On his arrest, Hill was found to be in possession of drug paraphernalia. Hill now appeals, claiming the parole conditions requiring that he stay away from children and wear a GPS device are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and have nothing to do with the narcotics offense for which he was originally sentenced to prison or to future criminality. The People claim the matter is not properly raised in this court, or any court, until Hill exhausts available administrative remedies.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2004, the juvenile court made a true finding that Hill committed a lewd and lascivious act on his eight-year-old stepsister. In 2010, Hill was convicted of possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)) and sentenced to state prison for a term of two years. He was released on parole in September 2011. His parole conditions required him to stay away from places children congregate and wear a GPS monitoring device.
In April 2013, Hill absconded from parole supervision. The Board of Parole Hearings issued a warrant for his arrest. In September, police contacted Hill in connection with a domestic dispute and arrested him on learning of the arrest warrant.
Hill's parole agent petitioned for revocation of parole. Hill re-acknowledged his parole conditions, which required him to stay away from places children congregate and wear a GPS monitoring device at all times, and was again released on parole.
2 In November 2013, Hill tampered with and subsequently removed his GPS monitoring device, once again absconding from parole supervision. The superior court suspended Hill's parole and issued an arrest warrant. In December, police arrested Hill, and his parole agent again petitioned for revocation of parole. Hill admitted his parole violation and agreed to serve additional time in custody as part of the revocation.
In January 2014, Hill was released from custody. He was arrested in April 2014, when he again failed to report to his parole agent, and was found to be in possession of drug paraphernalia. Hill's parole agent recommended revocation of parole based on his propensity to abscond from supervision and his possession of drug paraphernalia.
In May 2014, Hill waived a parole revocation hearing, admitted his parole violations, and agreed to serve 135 days in custody. Hill then filed a notice of appeal, contesting the "parole evidentiary hearing on violation."
I
DISCUSSION
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies "It is well settled that inmates must exhaust available administrative remedies before filing a petition for habeas corpus in the courts." (In re Hudson (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1, 7, citing In re Muszalski (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 500, 508.)1 A parolee, 1 Although the " 'doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies' " is not entirely inflexible, Hill does not assert and we do not find that any of the usual exceptions apply in this case. (In re Hudson, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 7; Ogo Associates v. City of Torrance (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 830, 834 ["It contains its own exceptions, as when the subject matter of the controversy lies outside the administrative agency's jurisdiction [citation], when pursuit of an administrative remedy would result in irreparable harm [citations], when the administrative agency cannot grant an adequate remedy [citations], 3 dissatisfied with his parole conditions, can challenge those conditions by an administrative review. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §§ 3084.1-3084.3, 3084.8-3084.9 [describing appeal process for inmates and parolees with grievances].) He can also request reconsideration of the length or conditions of his parole by an administrative appeal. (Pen. Code, § 3000, subd. (b)(5), (7) [inmates have the right to reconsideration by the Board of Parole Hearings, also known as the parole authority]; Pen. Code, §§ 5075.1, 5077 [Board of Parole Hearings shall review prisoner requests for setting of parole length or conditions and have authority to modify previous decisions of the Department of Corrections on these matters].)
Hill neither challenged his parole conditions by an administrative review nor requested reconsideration by an administrative appeal. Instead, Hill sought to circumvent available administrative remedies by appealing to this court. The appeal is unauthorized and we therefore must dismiss the appeal without proceeding to the merits.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
McDONALD, J. WE CONCUR:
NARES, Acting P. J.
O'ROURKE, J.
and when the aggrieved party can positively state what the administrative agency's decision in his particular case would be."].) 4
Cites, in this corpus
- In Re Hudson A112494 · 2006-09-20
- In Re Muszalski Crim. 7329 · 1975-10-27
- Ogo Associates v. City of Torrance Civ. 42060 · 1974-03-11