In re Paige W. CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D066037 · 2015-02-24 · Unpublished

Proceeding: appeal from an order
Trial court: Superior Court of San Diego County · No. J230410
Trial judge: Aaron H. Katz
Outcome: modified — Affirmed as modified and remanded.
Area: delinquency
Panel: Richard D. Huffman, Sr. (author), Alex C. McDonald, Gilbert Nares

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T06:23Z · confidence high

The juvenile court declared the minor a ward and imposed several conditions of probation, including restrictions on travel, substance possession, contact with the victim, school citizenship, and internet use. The Court of Appeal affirmed the order as modified, finding four conditions vague or overbroad and directing their modification or remand, while upholding the internet monitoring condition.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Probation condition prohibiting leaving San Diego County without permission “The People agree that the condition regarding travel outside the county should be modified to the condition which prohibits the Minor from knowingly traveling outside the county without the permission of the probation officer.”	unclear	error	agree with court agree with court
Probation condition prohibiting possession of alcohol, controlled substances, or mind-altering substances “The People also agree the condition relating to possession of substances is vague. It does not contain a knowledge limitation.”	unclear	error	agree with court agree with court
Probation condition prohibiting negative direct or indirect contact with the victim “The People have suggested that the condition be modified as follows: "The minor shall have no negative direct or indirect contact with the victim or her family, which includes not harassing, annoying, molesting, threatening, injuring, intimidating, attacking, battering, assaulting, stalking, destroying the personal property of, unlawfully taking the personal property of, disturbing the peace of, or blocking the movements of the victim or her family."”	unclear	error	agree with court agree with court
Probation condition requiring satisfactory citizenship in school “We agree with the parties that this condition must be remanded to the juvenile court for clarification of the meaning of the terms used.”	unclear	error	agree with court agree with court
Probation condition regarding password-protected internet sites and disclosure of passwords “Certainly the condition is not vague. It is explicit as to what the Minor must and must not do.”	unclear	correct	agree with court agree with court

Authorities

relied: In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875 — Establishes that probation conditions must not be vague or overbroad and that a juvenile does not forfeit a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a probation condition by failing to raise it in the juvenile court.
relied: In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902 — Affirms the juvenile court's broad discretion to impose reasonable conditions of probation for rehabilitation, subject to vagueness and overbreadth limitations.
relied: In re E.O. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1149 — Supports the principle that probation conditions must give fair warning and not abridge constitutional rights beyond what is necessary for rehabilitation.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion correctly applies the established legal standards for probation conditions, citing binding authority to support the conclusion that vague conditions must be modified or remanded. It provides a specific, workable modification for the 'negative contact' condition and logically distinguishes the internet monitoring condition as reasonable and non-vague based on the specific facts of the case.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:31Z · confidence low

The juvenile court sustained misdemeanor battery and fighting-in-public allegations against Paige W., declared her a ward, and placed her on probation with conditions including county travel limits, a substance prohibition, a no-negative-contact order, a 'satisfactory citizenship' school requirement, and an Internet/password disclosure condition. On appeal the Court of Appeal, largely by stipulation of the parties, modified the travel and substance conditions to add knowledge requirements, modified the negative-contact condition to define prohibited conduct, remanded the 'satisfactory citizenship' condition for clarification or striking, and affirmed the Internet/password condition against vagueness and overbreadth challenges.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Probation condition barring the Minor from leaving San Diego County without the probation officer's permission, challenged as vague/overbroad for lacking a knowledge requirement “The travel condition must likewise be modified to provide that the Minor must not knowingly travel outside of San Diego County without the probation officer's permission.”	unclear	error (law misapplied)	agree with court The opinion does not articulate a standard, though facial vagueness challenges to probation conditions are reviewed de novo under In re Sheena K. The People conceded the modification, and inserting an express scienter term was consistent with the then-prevailing appellate practice (Sheena K.; In re Victor L.). The modification is harmless and within the court's power under Sheena K. at p. 892.
Probation condition prohibiting use or possession of alcohol, controlled substances, or mind-altering substances, challenged as vague for lacking a knowledge requirement “We therefore order that the condition of probation regarding possession of substances be modified to provide that the Minor may not knowingly possess the items described.”	unclear	error (law misapplied)	agree with court The People conceded vagueness because the possession clause lacked a knowledge limitation. Adding an express scienter requirement follows Sheena K. and Victor L., both cited, and was standard practice in 2015. The appellate court's authority to modify on appeal is correctly drawn from Sheena K. at p. 892.
Probation condition that the Minor have 'no negative direct or indirect contact' with the victim or her family, challenged as vague “The Minor contends, and the People agree, the condition is vague as to what constitutes "negative direct or indirect contact." We agree.”	unclear	error (law misapplied)	agree with court The undefined term 'negative contact' gives insufficient notice of what is forbidden, satisfying the Sheena K. vagueness standard. The court's adopted definition (harassing, threatening, battering, etc.) tracks language used in standard protective orders, and the court sensibly noted a distance requirement was impractical because the Minor lives next door to the victim. Result is supported by the cited authorities.
Probation condition requiring the Minor to maintain 'satisfactory citizenship' in school, challenged as vague “We agree with the parties that this condition must be remanded to the juvenile court for clarification of the meaning of the terms used.”	unclear	error (law misapplied)	agree with court Both parties agreed the term was undefined. Rather than craft a definition, the court remanded for the juvenile court to clarify or strike, which is a defensible exercise given that school-conduct expectations are better defined by the trial court with input from probation. Consistent with Sheena K.'s notice requirement.
Probation condition restricting use of password-protected Internet sites/functions and requiring disclosure of passwords to the probation officer, challenged as internally inconsistent, vague, and overbroad under the First Amendment “Certainly the condition is not vague. It is explicit as to what the Minor must and must not do.”	unclear	correct	unsure The court's conclusion that monitoring was justified is reasonable given defense counsel's acknowledgment that the Minor posted images of substance use online and affirmatively requested monitored Internet access. However, the opinion never quotes the actual condition, its own paraphrase ('she may not use password protected functions on any file or computer' yet 'does not prevent her from otherwise using passwords') appears self-contradictory, and the overbreadth analysis cites no authority and does not apply Sheena K.'s 'closely tailored' test. Without the condition's text I cannot confirm the result.

Authorities

relied: In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875 — Facial constitutional challenges to probation conditions for vagueness or overbreadth are not forfeited by failure to object below; conditions must give fair notice and be closely tailored to rehabilitation; appellate courts may modify conditions.
relied: In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902 — Juvenile courts have broad discretion to impose rehabilitative probation conditions under Welfare and Institutions Code section 730, but conditions may not be so vague the probationer cannot tell what is prohibited.
relied: In re E.O. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1149 — A probation condition is overbroad when it burdens constitutional rights beyond what is necessary to serve the state's rehabilitative interest.
missed: People v. Ebertowski (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1170 — A probation condition requiring disclosure of social media and electronic device passwords to probation is not unconstitutionally overbroad where it is tailored to the probationer's demonstrated online conduct and rehabilitative needs.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — Four of the five rulings rest on party concessions and correctly apply Sheena K., Victor L., and E.O., producing defensible modifications and a remand. The affirmance of the Internet/password condition, however, is conclusory: the condition is never quoted, the court's description of it seems internally inconsistent, and the First Amendment overbreadth analysis cites no authority such as People v. Ebertowski, which had already addressed password-disclosure conditions.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

record incomplete

Opinion

Filed 2/24/15 In re Paige W. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re PAIGE W., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. D066037 THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. J230410)

v. PAIGE W., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Aaron H.

Katz, Judge. Affirmed as modified and remanded.

Michelle C. Zehner, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Peter Quon and Stacy Tyler, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. The juvenile court found true allegations that Paige W. (the Minor) committed two misdemeanor offenses: unlawful use of force (Pen. Code,1 § 242) and fighting in a public place (§ 415, subd. (1)). The Minor was declared a ward of the court and placed on probation.

The Minor appeals challenging only several of the conditions of her probation.

Although the Minor did not object to any of the challenged conditions in the juvenile court, she now argues that five of the conditions are either overbroad or unconstitutionally vague.

The People agree that four conditions should be modified and the parties agree on the proposed modifications. The parties also agree that one of the conditions must be remanded to the juvenile court for clarification. As to one of the conditions the People contend the condition is neither vague or overbroad.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Since the Minor does not challenge the admissibility or the sufficiency of the evidence to support the true findings we will simply adopt the very brief summary of facts from the respondent's brief.

In a dispute with a neighbor in Spring Valley, the Minor pushed a woman to the ground. The woman struck her head on a rock and suffered a bleeding laceration to the back of her head. Appellant fled.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified. 2 The Minor later admitted to an investigating officer that she pushed the woman because the Minor was "upset."

DISCUSSION

The juvenile court has broad discretion to impose reasonable conditions of probation for the purpose of rehabilitating a juvenile offender. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730, subd. (b); In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 910.) However, a court may not impose conditions that are so vague that it is unclear what the probationer is supposed to do, or avoid doing. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889-890; In re Victor L., supra, at p. 910.)

Similarly, the juvenile court may not impose conditions that are so overbroad as to fail to give the probationer fair warning of the requirements, or where the condition abridges constitutional rights beyond that which is necessary for rehabilitation. (In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890; In re E.O. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1153.)

The juvenile does not forfeit a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a probation condition by failing to raise the issue in the juvenile court. (In re Sheena K., supra, at pp. 884-888.)

The first two challenged conditions require: "The minor shall not leave the County of San Diego without permission of the Probation Officer" and "the minor shall not use or possess alcohol, a controlled substance, or any substance the minor knows or reasonably should know is a mind altering substance without a valid prescription." The Minor contends the conditions are vague and overbroad. The People agree that the 3 condition regarding travel outside the county should be modified to the condition which prohibits the Minor from knowingly traveling outside the county without the permission of the probation officer.

The People also agree the condition relating to possession of substances is vague.

It does not contain a knowledge limitation. We are empowered to modify conditions of probation on appeal. (In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 892.) We therefore order that the condition of probation regarding possession of substances be modified to provide that the Minor may not knowingly possess the items described. The travel condition must likewise be modified to provide that the Minor must not knowingly travel outside of San Diego County without the probation officer's permission.

The next challenged condition provided that the Minor "shall have no negative direct or indirect contact" with the victim or her family. The Minor contends, and the People agree, the condition is vague as to what constitutes "negative direct or indirect contact." We agree.

The People have suggested that the condition be modified as follows: "The minor shall have no negative direct or indirect contact with the victim or her family, which includes not harassing, annoying, molesting, threatening, injuring, intimidating, attacking, battering, assaulting, stalking, destroying the personal property of, unlawfully taking the personal property of, disturbing the peace of, or blocking the movements of the victim or her family."

4 The modified condition is consistent with other stay away orders which courts have used. Since the Minor lives next to the victim she cannot reasonably be required to stay certain distances from the victim. The proposed modification provides the Minor with an adequate definition of negative contact. The condition is necessary to aid the Minor in avoiding contact with the victim that might lead to probation violation. We direct the juvenile court to modify the condition of probation dealing with "negative contact" in the fashion we have set forth above.

The next challenged condition requires the Minor to maintain "satisfactory citizenship" in school. Once again the parties agree the condition is vague. There is no definition as to what would or would not constitute such citizenship. We agree with the parties that this condition must be remanded to the juvenile court for clarification of the meaning of the terms used.

The last challenged condition relates to the use of password protected Internet sites and directs the Minor to provide any passwords to the probation officer. The Minor argues the condition is internally inconsistent and vague. We disagree.

There was a sound basis for the court's concern about the use of the Internet. Even defense counsel recognized the Minor had placed pictures of herself using alcohol and other substances on social media sites. The court agreed with the Minor's request to continue to use the Internet, but recognized her rehabilitation required access by the 5 probation officer to her computer practices. She does not challenge the reasonableness of the condition.

We start with the claim the condition is internally inconsistent because it forbids the use of password protected sites, but also requires disclosure of passwords. These are two different thoughts. First, she may not use password protected functions on any file or computer. The condition does not prevent her from otherwise using passwords on her computer, it simply requires her to disclose the passwords so she can be monitored.

Certainly the condition is not vague. It is explicit as to what the Minor must and must not do.

In the alternative, the Minor argues the condition is overbroad and infringes on her First Amendment rights. We again disagree. All she is required to do is to use the Internet in a fashion that will allow appropriate monitoring. Here, the defense agreed her past computer use to display substance abuse was a problem, but successfully argued for monitored use of computers. The condition does not improperly intrude on any protected right.

DISPOSITION

The case is remanded to the juvenile court to modify the conditions of probation as set forth in this opinion. The court is directed to conduct further proceedings to clarify 6 the meaning of "satisfactory citizenship" or to strike the condition as the court finds appropriate. In all other respects the order of the juvenile court is affirmed.

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

NARES, J.

McDONALD, J.

Cites, in this corpus

People v. E.O. No. H035462 · 2010-09-29
People v. Victor L. A123649 · 2010-03-09