gno.law

People v. George CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D066001 · 2015-02-19 · Unpublished

Proceeding
appeal from a judgment
Trial court
Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCN320305
Trial judge
Carlos O. Armour
Outcome
affirmed — Affirmed.
Area
criminal
Panel
Patricia D. Benke (author), O'Rourke, Cynthia Aaron

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T06:23Z · confidence low

The trial court accepted the defendant's guilty plea to two counts of robbery and denied his motion to strike prior serious felony convictions under the Three Strikes law, sentencing him to 25 years to life. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, finding no reasonably arguable issues on appeal after an independent review of the record.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Denial of motion to strike prior serious felony convictions (Romero motion)
“The court concluded that it "would not be a reasonable exercise by this Court to grant" the defense motion to strike the prior strikes and sentenced defendant to 25 years to life plus six years.”
abuse of discretionnot reachedunsure
The appellate court did not explicitly analyze the trial court's denial of the Romero motion under the abuse of discretion standard. Instead, the court relied on its independent review of the entire record under People v. Wende to find no reasonably arguable issues, thereby affirming the judgment without a specific ruling on the merits of the trial court's discretion.
Acceptance of guilty plea and waiver of constitutional rights
“The court then accepted the plea of guilty by finding that defendant had made a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights and that there was a factual basis for the admission.”
unclearnot reachedunsure
The appellate court did not apply a specific standard of review to the trial court's acceptance of the plea. It noted that the record showed the defendant was advised of the consequences and waived rights, but ultimately affirmed based on the Wende review finding no arguable issues rather than a specific legal analysis of the plea's validity.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 — Establishes the procedure for appointed counsel to file a brief when no arguable issues exist, requiring the court to independently review the record.
  • relied: Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 — Requires appointed counsel to file a brief identifying any arguable issues, even if counsel believes the appeal is frivolous.
  • relied: People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 — Establishes that trial courts have discretion to strike prior serious felony convictions under the Three Strikes law.
  • relied: People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148 — Clarifies the factors and standards for exercising discretion to strike prior convictions under the Three Strikes law.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion is procedurally sound as it correctly follows the Wende/Anders protocol for reviewing an appeal where counsel finds no arguable issues. However, it is a 'sound with gaps' opinion because it fails to explicitly address the specific legal arguments raised in the defendant's own brief regarding pressure from counsel and sentencing miscalculations, relying instead on a general statement that no reasonably arguable issues were found.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:31Z · confidence low

The trial court accepted Alexander George's guilty plea to two robbery counts with a deadly-weapon enhancement and prior-conviction admissions, denied his Romero motion to strike his four prior strikes, and sentenced him to 25 years to life plus six years. On a Wende appeal with a certificate of probable cause, the Court of Appeal independently reviewed the record, considered defendant's pro se claims that counsel pressured him and promised a maximum of 18 years, found no arguable issues, and affirmed.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Acceptance of guilty plea as knowing, voluntary and intelligent after advisement of constitutional rights and consequences (including 62-years-to-life maximum and absence of any plea agreement)
“The court then accepted the plea of guilty by finding that defendant had made a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights and that there was a factual basis for the admission.”
unclearcorrectagree with court
The opinion recites a detailed colloquy in which defendant affirmed he understood the charges, consequences, that there was no agreement with the People, and that he could receive 62 years to life; this record supports the finding of a valid plea and undercuts the pro se claim of an 18-year promise. The court did not articulate a standard of review, which is typical of Wende dispositions.
Denial of Romero motion to strike prior strike convictions and imposition of 25-years-to-life third-strike sentence
“The court concluded that it "would not be a reasonable exercise by this Court to grant" the defense motion.”
abuse of discretioncorrectagree with court
The trial court stated it had reviewed the probation report, statements in aggravation and mitigation, and applicable case law, and expressly weighed the current and past offenses, background, character and prospects, which are the Williams factors; given four prior armed robberies of Taco Bell restaurants and a repeat of the same conduct, a refusal to strike is well within discretion. The appellate court cited Romero and Williams but did not cite People v. Carmony, the controlling statement of the abuse-of-discretion standard, though the result is not affected.
Rejection of defendant's pro se contentions that retained counsel pressured him to plead and told him he would receive at most 18 years
“In light of this record, we find no basis upon which to relieve defendant from his plea or the sentence imposed by the trial court.”
unclearcorrectagree with court
The plea colloquy, in which defendant acknowledged there was no agreement and that he could receive 62 years to life, contradicts the claimed 18-year promise, so the record supports the court's conclusion. However, the claim rests on family declarations outside the appellate record and sounds in ineffective assistance; the court should have noted that such a claim is properly pursued by habeas corpus rather than disposing of it with a single sentence.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 — When appointed counsel finds no arguable issues, the Court of Appeal must independently review the entire record to determine whether any arguable issue exists.
  • relied: Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 — Appointed counsel who finds an appeal frivolous may so advise the court and identify anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.
  • relied: People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 — Trial courts have discretion under Penal Code section 1385 to strike prior strike convictions in the interest of justice, and must state reasons on the record.
  • relied: People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148 — In deciding whether to strike a prior strike, the court considers the nature of the present and prior offenses and the defendant's background, character and prospects to determine whether he falls outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law.
  • missed: People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367 — A trial court's refusal to strike a prior strike is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and only extraordinary circumstances justify finding a career criminal falls outside the Three Strikes scheme.
  • missed: People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106 — In a Wende appeal where the defendant files a supplemental brief, the Court of Appeal's opinion must set out the contentions raised and explain why they fail.
  • missed: People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264 — Ineffective assistance claims that depend on facts outside the appellate record should be raised by petition for writ of habeas corpus rather than on direct appeal.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court independently reviewed the record under Wende, correctly cited Romero and Williams for the strike-dismissal analysis, and the detailed plea colloquy it recounts refutes defendant's claim of an 18-year promise. It omitted Carmony on the standard of review and did not explain, as Kelly contemplates, why the pro se claims about counsel's pressure and misadvice fail or that such extra-record claims belong in a habeas petition.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 2/19/15 P. v. George CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D066001

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN320305)

ALEXANDER S. GEORGE , Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Carlos O.

Armour, Judge. Affirmed.

Ava R. Stralla, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant and Appellant Alexander S. George pled guilty to two counts of robbery growing out of a single incident in 2013 in which he flashed a shiny object at an employee of a Taco Bell restaurant and demanded money from a cash register and then flashed the object at a second employee in an attempt to get her to open the restaurant's safe. (Pen. Code,1 § 211.) Defendant also admitted that he personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon. (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).) Defendant was sentenced to 25 years to life on count 1; the court also imposed a consecutive five-year term for a prior serious felony plus a one-year term for the personal use of a dangerous weapon. The court ordered the same sentence on the second robbery conviction in count 2, to be served concurrently, and struck a one-year prison prior. The court ordered defendant to pay various fines and fees, and awarded actual credits and section 2933.1 conduct credits.

Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment, and the trial court granted his request for a certificate of probable cause. Appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), setting forth the facts of the case and requesting that we review the entire record. Pursuant to Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders), appointed counsel suggested the following as possible, but not arguable, issues on appeal: (1) Was defendant properly advised of the consequences of pleading guilty? (2) Was defendant advised of his constitutional rights, and did he waive them before he pleaded guilty? (3) Did the court abuse its discretion by declining to strike any of defendant's four strike priors? (4) Did the court give proper reasons for declining to exercise its discretion. (See People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 531-532; People v Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.)

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 We granted defendant leave to file a brief on his own behalf, and he has done so.

In his brief, supported by declarations from his mother, father and sister, he complains that he felt pressured by his retained counsel to change his plea and that his counsel suggested he would be sentenced to a maximum of 18 years.

We have independently reviewed the entire record and have found no reasonably arguable issues. (See People v Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 438.) We therefore affirm.

DISCUSSION

The record shows that on February 25, 2014, at the change of plea hearing, defendant indicated that he would be pleading guilty; that he understood the nature of the charges against him, the possible defenses and the consequences of his pleading guilty;

that he had not taken any drugs, alcohol or other medication in the last 24 hours; and that he had enough time to go over his case with his attorney. The court reviewed the specifics of the change of plea form with defendant and added: "Do you understand that there is no agreement between you and the People for your plea and admission to those priors?" Defendant replied, "Yes."

The court also asked defendant if he understood the following: (1) the maximum consequence of his plea is 62 years to life; (2) he was subject to a $10,000 fine; (3) he was subject to parole for at least 10 years or for life; (4) that the offenses he was admitting to constituted two additional strikes; (5) he would be deported if he was not a citizen; (5) at sentencing, his attorney would present a motion for the court to consider striking some of the prior strikes—but the sentence would be up to the court's discretion and defendant "could very well be sentenced to 62-years-to-life"; (7) his future period of incarceration would count as a prison prior; his maximum credits would be 15 percent;

3 and, if he were to be sentenced to the full extent, it would be a life sentence. Defendant answered "yes" to all of the trial court's questions.

Defendant then admitted that on or about June 17, 2013, he committed two counts of robbery and personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon as to both counts; he also admitted all prior allegations. Defendant stipulated to the facts of the two current offenses as contained in the preliminary hearing transcript—as did defense counsel and the prosecutor. Defense counsel indicated that he concurred with defendant's entry of plea and waiver of constitutional rights. The court then accepted the plea of guilty by finding that defendant had made a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights and that there was a factual basis for the admission.

At the April 21, 2014 sentencing hearing, the court indicated it had read and considered the probation officer's report, the prosecution's statement in aggravation, the defense statement in mitigation, including support letters, and the defense Romero motion. The probation report indicated that defendant's criminal record included four armed robberies at Taco Bell restaurants for which he was convicted in 2007. The court said it had reviewed case law "as to when the Court should exercise [its] discretion to striking strikes," and added, "[a]nd for me to do so, I think, would fall short of what a reasonable judge would do under these circumstances." The court said it had reviewed all factors, which included "the current and past offenses, his background, character and prospect in the future," and determined those factors do "not support a finding that relief under the three strikes law is warranted." The court concluded that it "would not be a reasonable exercise by this Court to grant" the defense motion. The court then denied the 4 defense motion to strike the prior strikes and sentenced defendant to 25 years to life plus six years.

In light of this record, we find no basis upon which to relieve defendant from his plea or the sentence imposed by the trial court. Defendant has been competently represented by counsel on this appeal.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

BENKE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

O'ROURKE, J.

AARON, J.

Cites, in this corpus