People v. Baker CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. MH110020
- Trial judge
- Joseph P. Brannigan
- Outcome
- dismissed — Appeal dismissed.
- Area
- other
- Panel
- Joan K. Irion (author), Alex C. McDonald, O'Rourke
Analysis
The trial court found the defendant incompetent to stand trial based on a single psychiatric evaluation and ordered his commitment. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot because the defendant was subsequently found competent to stand trial, rendering any reversal without practical effect.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Trial court's finding of mental incompetency to stand trial and order of commitment“We conclude that Baker's appeal is moot because he has subsequently been found mentally competent to stand trial, and we accordingly dismiss the appeal.” | mixed | not reached | agree with court The court applied the mootness doctrine, determining that because the defendant's competency was restored, a reversal of the incompetency finding would provide no meaningful relief. The court relied on People v. Lindsey to support the conclusion that temporary disability findings do not carry disadvantageous collateral consequences that require appellate correction once the disability is resolved. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Lindsey (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 742 — An appeal of a mental incompetency finding is moot if the defendant is subsequently found competent, as there are no disadvantageous collateral consequences to be relieved by reversal.
- relied: People v. Delong (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 482 — An action based on a justiciable controversy cannot be maintained on appeal if all questions have become moot by subsequent acts or events.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the established mootness doctrine from People v. Lindsey to the specific facts where the defendant's competency was restored. It appropriately addresses the conflicting unpublished authority (People v. De La Rosa) by noting it was decertified and thus not good authority, while acknowledging the statutory amendments since Lindsey but finding the analysis still valid.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe trial court found Baker incompetent to stand trial under Penal Code section 1369 on the basis of a single psychiatric evaluation and committed him to Patton State Hospital; Baker appealed, arguing his own statements at the hearing triggered the statutory requirement of two evaluators. While the appeal was pending the trial court found his competency restored, and the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot under People v. Lindsey without reaching the merits.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Finding of mental incompetency to stand trial and commitment order under Penal Code sections 1369 and 1370, challenged on the ground that the court appointed only one evaluator rather than the two required by section 1369, subdivision (a) when the defendant informs the court he is not seeking an incompetency finding“Baker's appeal of the April 18, 2014 mental incompetency finding has been rendered moot by the subsequent August 20, 2014 finding that Baker is once again competent to stand trial.” | unclear | not reached | unsure The court applied the general rule that an appeal is dismissed when subsequent events leave no effective relief, following Lindsey's holding that a later competency finding moots an appeal from an earlier incompetency finding because no disadvantageous collateral consequences flow from a temporary commitment. The reasoning is consistent with the cited authority and the depublished De La Rosa opinion was properly disregarded under rule 8.1115. The court did not, however, discuss whether to exercise its discretion to reach a recurring statutory question under the public-interest exception to mootness, nor did it analyze whether any present-day collateral consequences of a section 1370 commitment exist, instead adopting Lindsey's 1971 assessment wholesale. Because no specific legal error can be identified, but the mootness analysis is thin, I am unsure rather than in disagreement. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Lindsey (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 742 — An appeal from a finding of mental incompetency to stand trial becomes moot when the defendant is subsequently found competent, because the temporary commitment carries no disadvantageous collateral consequences that appellate reversal could cure.
- relied: People v. Delong (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 482 — An action based on a justiciable controversy cannot be maintained on appeal if all questions have become moot by subsequent events, because reversal would be without practical effect.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The dismissal follows directly from Lindsey and the general mootness rule in Delong, and the court correctly declined to rely on the depublished De La Rosa opinion. The opinion does not address the court's discretion to decide a moot but recurring statutory question of public importance, and it accepts Lindsey's 1971 conclusion about the absence of collateral consequences without examining whether that remains true under the current competency statutes.
Opinion
Filed 2/13/15 P. v. Baker CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D065886
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. MH110020)
ZACH FUCHSER BAKER,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Joseph P.
Brannigan, Judge. Appeal dismissed.
Michele Anne Cella for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Peter Quon, Marilyn George and Parag Agrawal, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Zach Fuchser Baker appeals from the trial court's April 18, 2014 judgment finding Baker to be incompetent to stand trial (Pen. Code, § 1369.)1 We conclude that Baker's appeal is moot because he has subsequently been found mentally competent to stand trial, and we accordingly dismiss the appeal.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Baker was charged on December 12, 2013, with two counts of stalking with a court order in effect (§ 646.9, subd. (b)), and two counts of disobeying a court order (§ 166, subd. (a)(4)). According to evidence at the preliminary hearing, Baker sent numerous unwanted and threatening e-mails to a female acquaintance (the victim). The e-mails included suicidal statements as well as statements that could be interpreted as threats to kill the victim. Baker continued to send threatening e-mails after the victim obtained a restraining order.
At a March 18, 2014 hearing, defense counsel raised questions about Baker's mental competency, and the trial court ordered a psychiatric evaluation pursuant to section 1369, subdivision (a) to determine whether Baker was competent to stand trial.
On April 1, 2014, Dr. Michael M. Takamura performed a psychiatric examination based on the referral from the trial court. Dr. Takamura concluded that Baker was not competent to stand trial, primarily because he was not capable of rationally cooperating with his attorney. Dr. Takamura also recommended the involuntary administration of 1 Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 antipsychotic medication to Baker and opined that those medications would likely render Baker competent to stand trial.
On April 18, 2014, relying on Dr. Takamura's report, the trial court found that Baker was incompetent to stand trial and entered a judgment of mental incompetency and an order of commitment to Patton State Hospital. (§§ 1369, 1370.) Baker filed a notice of appeal on April 24, 2014, challenging the finding of incompetency.
On August 20, 2014, while this appeal was pending, the trial court found that Baker's mental competency had been restored. According to the respondent's brief, Baker's trial was scheduled to take place on December 1, 2014.
II
DISCUSSION
Baker argues that the trial court was required to appoint two different psychiatrists or psychologists to evaluate his mental competency instead of only one. According to Baker, a second examination was required by section 1369, subdivision (a), which states that "[i]n any case where the defendant or the defendant's counsel informs the court that the defendant is not seeking a finding of mental incompetence, the court shall appoint two psychiatrists, licensed psychologists, or a combination thereof." (Ibid.) Baker contends that although defense counsel did not take issue with the finding of mental incompetency in Dr. Takamura's report, Baker himself made statements during the 3 hearing indicating that he objected to being found mentally incompetent.2 Baker argues that his statements at the hearing amounted to "the defendant . . . inform[ing] the court that the defendant is not seeking a finding of mental incompetence," triggering the requirement that two different mental health professionals examine him. (§ 1369, subd. (a).)
The People argue that the appeal should be dismissed because it is moot in light of the subsequent finding that Baker is mentally competent to stand trial. As we will explain, we agree.
" ' "[A]n action that originally was based on a justiciable controversy cannot be maintained on appeal if all the questions have become moot by subsequent acts or events.
A reversal in such a case would be without practical effect, and the appeal will therefore be dismissed." ' " (People v. Delong (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 482, 486.) As established in People v. Lindsey (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 742 (Lindsey), when a defendant is found to be mentally competent after he appeals an earlier finding of mental incompetency, a successful appeal of the earlier mental incompetency finding will no longer afford any 2 At the mental competency hearing after the trial court found Baker to be mentally incompetent, but before the trial court made a final decision on committing Baker to Patton State Hospital, Baker stated, "I don't know what your finding is now going to be, but . . . well I'm wondering what the basis is for me being found incompetent to stand trial?" Baker added, "Well, well, I'm obviously, I'm disagreeing with this, with what's going on. [¶] . . . [¶] I understand perfectly, my criminal case." Because we dismiss the appeal as moot, we do not resolve the dispute on the merits between Baker and the People as to whether Baker's statements, made near the end of the hearing, were sufficient to trigger the requirement that the trial court appoint two mental health professionals to evaluate Baker.
4 meaningful relief, and the appeal accordingly becomes moot. As Lindsey explained, "[t]he law imposes no disadvantageous collateral consequences upon one whose trial has had to be postponed by reason of such a temporary disability. In the event defendant is convicted, the fact that he had been so disabled . . . should not affect the kind of sentence imposed by the trial court. If defendant's mental state is considered in future proceedings, the issue will turn upon what that state is found to be as of the relevant time, and not the fact that an order was made [regarding his mental incompetency in the past].
If any social opprobrium is thought to attach by reason of the commitment, that is nothing which is likely to be relieved by an appellate decision. The temporary commitment is nothing from which defendant needs to 'clear his name.' " (Id. at pp. 744-745.)3 We agree with Lindsey's analysis and follow it here.4 Baker's appeal of the April 18, 2014 mental incompetency finding has been rendered moot by the subsequent 3 Although the statute governing court proceedings to determine whether a defendant is mentally competent to stand trial has been amended since Lindsey was decided in 1971 (§ 1367 et seq.), Lindsey's analysis on the issue of mootness is equally valid under the current version of the statute.
4 We note that the parties' appellate briefs discuss a case, decertified for publication by our Supreme Court after the briefing of this appeal was complete, which disapproved of Lindsey and concluded that an appeal of a mental incompetency finding is not rendered moot when the defendant is subsequently found to have had his mental competency restored. (People v. De La Rosa (Sept. 8, 2014, C073061) review denied and opinion ordered nonpub. Dec. 10, 2014, No. S222215.) We do not consider De La Rosa in our analysis, as it is no longer good authority. Further, independent of De La Rosa, Baker has identified no persuasive ground for us to reject Lindsey's analysis. As in Lindsey, we perceive no disadvantageous collateral consequences from the trial court's now- superseded finding of Baker's mental incompetency to stand trial and commitment of Baker to Patton State Hospital that could be cured by an appellate court's reversal of the trial court's finding.
5 August 20, 2014 finding that Baker is once again competent to stand trial. We accordingly dismiss the appeal as moot.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed as moot.
IRION, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCDONALD, Acting P. J.
O'ROURKE, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Delong B152019 · 2002-08-22
- People v. Lindsey Crim. 20553 · 1971-10-21