gno.law

Shelly v. Superior Court CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D065580 · 2015-02-10 · Unpublished

Proceeding
appeal from an order
Trial court
Superior Court of San Diego County · No. 37-2013-00076212-CU-PT-CTL
Trial judge
Lisa Schall
Outcome
reversed — Reversed and remanded with directions.
Area
civil
Panel
O'Rourke (author), Richard D. Huffman, Sr., Cynthia Aaron

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T06:23Z · confidence high

The trial court denied Shelley's petition to change his name without providing any reasons or holding a hearing. The Court of Appeal reversed the order, finding that the denial was an abuse of discretion because it was arbitrary and capricious in light of the common law right to change one's name and the absence of any statutory exceptions or objections.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Denial of petition for change of name
“We conclude the court abused its discretion by denying Shelley's petition without stating any reason for doing so. (See In Re Ross, supra, 8 Cal.2d at p. 610.) The court's action was arbitrary and capricious.”
abuse of discretionerroragree with court
The appellate court correctly applied the abuse of discretion standard, which requires that the trial court's action be supported by a reasonable basis. Given the strong common law presumption in favor of name changes and the lack of any statutory exceptions, objections, or stated reasons in the record, the trial court's unexplained denial was indeed arbitrary and capricious. The authorities cited (In re Ross, In re Useldinger) directly support the conclusion that an unexplained denial in the absence of fraud or public policy concerns is an abuse of discretion.

Authorities

  • relied: In re Ross (1937) 8 Cal.2d 608 — A court abuses its discretion in denying a name change petition if there is no substantial reason for the denial.
  • relied: In re Useldinger (1939) 35 Cal.App.2d 723 — Courts should encourage the filing of name change petitions to ensure they are a matter of public record, and denials are improper absent fraud, invasion of rights, or unfair competition.
  • relied: In re Marriage of Banks (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 631 — The burden of proof rests on the person who would deny the name change, not the person seeking it.
  • relied: Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747 — Judicial discretion must be exercised within the confines of applicable legal principles and is not a whimsical, uncontrolled power.
  • relied: People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367 — A reviewing court must consider the legal principles and policies that should have guided the trial court's actions to determine if it abused its discretion.
  • relied: Lee v. Superior Court (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 510 — A court may properly deny a name change petition if the name was adopted to defraud, intentionally confuse, intrude into privacy, or violate public policy.
  • relied: In re Ritchie (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 1070 — Denial of a name change petition is proper if the proposed name is confusing and not a legitimate name.
  • relied: City of Sacramento v. Drew (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1287 — The legal principles governing discretionary action are derived from the common law or statutes under which discretion is conferred.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly identifies the applicable standard of review and applies the well-established common law presumption in favor of name changes. It logically concludes that an unexplained denial in the absence of statutory exceptions or objections constitutes an abuse of discretion.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:31Z · confidence medium

The San Diego Superior Court denied Daniel Shelley's unopposed petition to change his name to Daniel Hector MacKinnon by minute order, without holding the noticed hearing and while expressly declining to disclose its reasons. The Court of Appeal held the unexplained denial was an abuse of discretion inconsistent with the common law right to change one's name, reversed, and remanded with directions to either grant the petition or deny it with stated reasons.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Denial of petition for change of name without a hearing and without stating any reason for the denial
“We conclude the court abused its discretion by denying Shelley's petition without stating any reason for doing so.”
abuse of discretionerror (discretion)agree with court
The petition met the facial requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 1276, no objections were filed, none of the statutory exceptions in section 1279.5 appeared in the record, and nothing suggested fraud, confusion, or a public policy violation. Under In re Ross, In re Useldinger, and In re Marriage of Banks, the burden lies on the party opposing a name change and petitions should be readily granted; a denial for undisclosed reasons leaves no reviewable basis and is arbitrary. The appellate court's reasoning and authorities support its conclusion.

Authorities

  • relied: In re Ross (1937) 8 Cal.2d 608 — Denial of a name change petition is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and denial without a substantial reason is an abuse; the statutory procedure merely provides a public record and does not abrogate the common law right to change one's name.
  • relied: Lee v. Superior Court (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 510 — A court may properly deny a name change petition where the name is adopted to defraud, intentionally confuse, invade privacy, or violate recognized public policy, such as a racial epithet.
  • relied: In re Ritchie (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 1070 — Denial of a name change was proper where the proposed name ('III') was confusing and not a legitimate name.
  • relied: Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747 — Judicial discretion must be exercised within the confines of the applicable legal principles.
  • relied: City of Sacramento v. Drew (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1287 — The legal principles governing discretionary action vary with context and derive from the common law or statutes conferring the discretion.
  • relied: People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367 — A reviewing court considers the legal principles and policies that should have guided the trial court to determine whether discretion was abused.
  • relied: In re Useldinger (1939) 35 Cal.App.2d 723 — Courts should encourage the filing of name change petitions so changes become a matter of public record; denial is reversible where opposition is not substantial and there is no showing of fraud, invasion of legal rights, or unfair competition.
  • relied: In re Marriage of Banks (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 631 — In a name change proceeding the burden of proof rests on the person who would deny the change, not the person seeking it.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion correctly identifies the abuse of discretion standard, grounds it in the statutory scheme (sections 1276 and 1279.5) and the long-standing common law presumption favoring name changes, and applies those principles to a record showing no objection and no recognized ground for denial. The remedy of remand for a reasoned order rather than outright direction to grant is measured and consistent with the trial court's residual discretion recognized in Lee and Ritchie.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 2/10/15 Shelly v. Superior Court CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL PATRICK SHELLEY, D065580

Plaintiff and Appellant, v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2013-00076212- CU-PT-CTL) THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY, Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Lisa Schall, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.

John Michael Viola for Plaintiff and Appellant.

No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.

BACKGROUND

On November 19, 2013, Daniel Patrick Shelley petitioned the superior court to change his name to "Daniel Hector MacKinnon," asserting his great-great-grandfather was named Hector MacKinnon and he likes that name more than his own. The superior court set a hearing for January 10, 2014, directing all persons objecting to the name change to file written objections and appear on that date. On the day set for the hearing, the court did not conduct a hearing, but issued a minute order denying Shelley's petition, stating the court "is not at liberty to disclose the reasons for the denial. The Court advises petitioner that he may wish to speak to an attorney." No written objections appear in the record. Shelley appeals, contending the court abused its discretion by denying his petition without stating its reasons. We agree.

DISCUSSION

The standard governing our review of a court's denial of a name change petition is abuse of discretion. (In re Ross (1937) 8 Cal.2d 608, 610 [concluding the court abused its discretion in denying petition for name change because there was no substantial reason for the denial].)

The court is not required to approve every petition for name change that comes before it. (See Lee v. Superior Court (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 510, 515 [noting a court may properly deny petition if name was adopted to defraud, intentionally confuse, intrude into someone's privacy, or violate recognized public policy, and noting denial was proper where proposed name was a racial epithet, which has no First Amendment protection]; In re Ritchie (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 1070, 1072 [noting denial was proper because proposed name ("III") was confusing and not a legitimate name].)

But the court's discretion "must be exercised within the confines of the applicable legal principles." (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012)

55 Cal.4th 747, 773.) Judicial discretion "is not a whimsical, uncontrolled power, but a legal discretion, which is subject to the limitations of legal principles governing the 2 subject of its action, and to reversal on appeal where no reasonable basis for the action is shown." (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Appeal, § 364, p. 420.) "The legal principles that govern the subject of discretionary action vary greatly with context.

[Citation.] They are derived from the common law or statutes under which discretion is conferred." (City of Sacramento v. Drew (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1287, 1297-1298.)

The reviewing court must consider the legal principles and policies that should have guided the trial court's actions to determine if it abused its discretion. (See People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377.)

Code of Civil Procedure1 section 1275 et seq. sets forth the procedure to petition a name change: "The petition or pleading shall specify the place of birth and residence of the person, his or her present name, the name proposed, and the reason for the change of name." (§ 1276, subd. (a).) California's statutory procedures for recording a name change do not abrogate the common law right to change one's name. (§ 1279.5, subd.

(a); In re Ross, supra, 8 Cal.2d at p. 610 [noting the statutory procedure for a name change exists merely to provide a legal record].)

With limited statutory exceptions that do not appear in the record before us, filing a legal name change should be readily granted. (See In re Useldinger (1939) 35 Cal.App.2d 723,727.) Exceptions to the right to a name change apply to persons under the jurisdiction of the director of corrections and rehabilitation and persons required to register as sex offenders under Penal Code section 290. (§ 1279.5, subds. (c) & (d).)

1 Statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated. 3 Though a legal record of the name change is not required for a person to change his or her name, at common law, "the courts should encourage rather than discourage the filing of petitions for change of name [citation] to the end that such changes may be a matter of public record." (In re Useldinger, supra, 35 Cal.App.2d at p. 727 [reversing denial of petition to change name because opposition was not substantial and there was no showing of fraud, an invasion of any legal rights, or any elements of unfair competition].) "In effect the burden of proof rests on the person who would deny the change, not the person seeking the change." (In re Marriage of Banks (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 631, 638.)

The record does not indicate anyone opposed Shelley's petition for a name change.

Moreover, the record shows Shelley requested the name change because it was used by a family member and he liked it more than his own. Thus, Shelley appears to have met the statutory requirements under section 1275 et seq. Nothing in the record indicates Shelley's petition implicated fraud, invasion of any legal rights, unfair competition, or violated public policy. (See In re Useldinger, supra, 35 Cal.App.2d at p. 727.) In the minute order, the court acknowledged it was declining to provide a reason for denying the petition. On this record, the court's denial is inconsistent with the common law right to change one's name. We conclude the court abused its discretion by denying Shelley's petition without stating any reason for doing so. (See In Re Ross, supra, 8 Cal.2d at p.

610.) The court's action was arbitrary and capricious. We therefore reverse the order.

4 DISPOSITION

The order denying Daniel Patrick Shelley's petition is reversed. The superior court is directed on remand to prepare an order either granting the petition or denying it and stating the reasons for its denial.

O'ROURKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

AARON, J.

Cites, in this corpus