People v. Henderson CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCD243546
- Trial judge
- Joan P. Weber
- Outcome
- modified — Affirmed as modified with directions.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Gilbert Nares (author), McINTYRE, Joan K. Irion
Analysis
The trial court sentenced the defendant to 75 years to life plus 10 years, including a concurrent 25 years to life for assault and a $400 domestic violence fee. On appeal, the court modified the judgment to stay the assault sentence under Penal Code section 654 and strike the fee, then affirmed the judgment as modified.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Imposition of a concurrent 25 years to life sentence for assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (count 4) alongside the sentence for forcible sodomy (count 2).“the physical assault was absolutely part and parcel of the sexual assault. I believe that they happened simultaneously.” | de novo | error (statutory interpretation) | agree with court agree with court |
Imposition of a $400 domestic violence fee under Penal Code section 1203.097.“The domestic violence fee applies only when the defendant is granted probation. (§ 1203.097, subd. (a).)” | de novo | error (statutory interpretation) | agree with court agree with court |
Authorities
- relied: Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11 — Section 654 bars double punishment for a course of conduct constituting one indivisible transaction with one criminal objective.
- relied: People v. Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203 — Section 654 bars double punishment for a course of conduct constituting one indivisible transaction with one criminal objective.
- relied: People v. Lee (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 774 — Section 654 bars double punishment for a course of conduct constituting one indivisible transaction with one criminal objective.
The appellate opinion: sound — The court correctly applied the single-transaction rule of section 654 to stay the concurrent assault sentence based on the trial court's own admission that the acts were simultaneous. It also correctly identified that the domestic violence fee is statutorily limited to probation cases, which did not apply here.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe trial court sentenced Henderson to 75 years to life plus 10 years after a jury convicted him of forcible sodomy and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury, imposing a concurrent 25-years-to-life term on the assault count and a $400 domestic violence fee under Penal Code section 1203.097. On appeal, with the Attorney General conceding both points, the Court of Appeal modified the judgment to stay the assault sentence under section 654 and strike the domestic violence fee, and otherwise affirmed.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Imposition of a concurrent 25-years-to-life sentence on count 4 (assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury) rather than staying it under Penal Code section 654“the physical assault was absolutely part and parcel of the sexual assault. I believe that they happened simultaneously.” | unclear | error (law misapplied) | agree with court The trial court itself found that the assault and the sodomy were part and parcel of one simultaneous course of conduct, which under Neal and Latimer means a single indivisible transaction with one criminal objective. Section 654 bars multiple punishment, including concurrent terms, for such conduct, so the proper remedy was to impose and stay the count 4 sentence. The court's own stay of the section 12022.7 enhancement under section 654 confirmed its view; the concurrent term was inconsistent with that finding. The Attorney General's concession and the court's reliance on controlling Supreme Court authority support the result. |
Imposition of a $400 domestic violence fee under Penal Code section 1203.097 on a defendant sentenced to state prison“The domestic violence fee applies only when the defendant is granted probation.” | unclear | error (statutory interpretation) | agree with court Section 1203.097, subdivision (a) by its terms applies when a defendant is granted probation for a crime against a victim described in Family Code section 6211. Henderson was sentenced to prison, not probation, so the fee had no statutory basis and was an unauthorized sentence correctable on appeal. The Attorney General conceded the point and the opinion's plain reading of the statute is correct. |
Authorities
- relied: Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11 — Section 654 bars multiple punishment for a course of conduct that constitutes an indivisible transaction pursued with a single criminal objective.
- relied: People v. Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203 — Reaffirming the Neal intent-and-objective test for determining whether section 654 bars multiple punishment for an indivisible course of conduct.
- relied: People v. Lee (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 774 — Section 654 prohibits double punishment for one indivisible transaction, and the bar extends to concurrent sentences, which must be stayed rather than imposed concurrently.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion correctly applies section 654's single-objective rule to the trial court's own finding that the assault and sexual assault were simultaneous and part of one transaction, and correctly reads section 1203.097 as limited to probationers; both points were conceded. It is brief and does not state standards of review or cite authority on unauthorized sentences, but nothing of substance was skipped given the concessions and the straightforward statutory text.
Opinion
Filed 1/8/15 P. v. Henderson CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D065238
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD243546)
THOMAS HENDERSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Joan P.
Weber, Judge. Affirmed as modified with directions.
Patricia L. Brisbois, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Peter Quon, Jr., and Anthony DaSilva, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
On the night of September 24, 2012, Catherine G. drove her van to a liquor store where she met her friend, Thomas Henderson. They bought alcohol, then Ms. G. drove Henderson to a church parking lot. When she told him she did not want to hang out with him and get drunk, he became upset, took her keys and her phone and left. About 10 or 15 minutes later, Henderson returned. He hit Ms. G. in the head, threw her into the back of the van and drove to a park. He stripped off her dress; beat her face, stomach and chest with his fists; threatened to kill her; and tried to force her to perform sexual acts.
He put his penis into her mouth momentarily and into her anus. Around 2:00 a.m. on September 25, a patrolling police officer approached the van. Ms. G. stuck her head out the window, said that she was being raped and needed help, jumped out of the van and ran to the officer. Henderson stuck his head out of the van and said, "I didn't rape her.
We were having sex." Ms. G.'s right eye was bruised and swollen, her left eye was swollen shut, her nose was swollen, her neck and face were bruised and several of her teeth were chipped. There were lacerations on her right ear and left shoulder and an oozing laceration below her left eye. She suffered injuries to her arms and left leg, eight rib fractures and a punctured lung.
A jury found Henderson guilty of forcible sodomy (Pen. Code,1 § 286, subd.
(c)(2)(A); count 2) and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count 4). As to both counts, the court found Henderson had personally inflicted great bodily injury (§§ 12022.5, 12022.7, 12022.8, 667.61, subds. (a), (c), (d)).
Henderson waived trial and in a bifurcated proceeding admitted two serious felony prior convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)) and two strikes (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)). The court 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 sentenced Henderson to 75 years to life plus 10 years in prison: on count 2, 75 years to life; on count 4, a concurrent sentence of 25 years to life and three years for the section 12022.7 enhancement; and five years for each serious felony prior. Henderson appeals, contending the sentence on count 4 must be stayed (§ 654) in light of the court's comments at sentencing and the domestic violence fee (§ 1203.097) must be stricken as unauthorized.
Section 654 bars double punishment, including concurrent sentences, for a course of conduct constituting one indivisible transaction with one criminal objective. (Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 19; People v. Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203;
People v. Lee (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 774, 785.) Here, at sentencing, the court denied Henderson's motion to dismiss the strikes, stating, "the probation department was recommending that the court do consecutive sentencing on count four. And to me, the physical assault was absolutely part and parcel of the sexual assault. I believe that they happened simultaneously." Later, the court stated: "As to count four, the court is imposing 25 to life concurrent and three years consecutively for the [section] 12022.7 [enhancement] per . . . section 654."2 Henderson contends that in light of the court's first statement, the sentence on count 4 must be stayed pursuant to section 654. Respondent properly concedes the point.
2 The abstract of judgment lists a stayed three-year sentence (§ 654) for the enhancement 3 Henderson contends the domestic violence fee (§ 1203.097) must be stricken as unauthorized. Respondent properly concedes the point. The domestic violence fee applies only when the defendant is granted probation. (§ 1203.097, subd. (a).)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified by staying the sentence for assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count 4) and striking the $400 domestic violence fee (§ 1203.097). As so modified, the judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and to forward it to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
NARES, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
McINTYRE, J.
IRION, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Latimer S027839 · 1993-10-04
- People v. Lee Crim. 11509 · 1980-09-30
- Neal v. State of California Sac. 7090 · 1960-12-13