Maas v. Super. Court

California Court of Appeal · D064639 · 2014-12-10 · Published

Proceeding: writ
Trial judge: John M. Thompson
Outcome: writ granted — Let a writ of mandate issue directing respondent superior court to vacate its August 7, 2013, order denying Maas's petition for writ of habeas corpus.
Area: criminal
Panel: McINTYRE (author), Alex C. McDonald, Judith L. Haller

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T06:27Z · confidence high

The trial court denied Maas's petition for writ of habeas corpus without providing him notice of the assigned judge, thereby preventing him from exercising his statutory right to a peremptory challenge under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6. The Court of Appeal granted a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order and reassign the petition to a different judge.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Denial of Maas's petition for writ of habeas corpus by the assigned judge without prior notice of the assignment, precluding a section 170.6 challenge. “Based on the record before us, it is clear that Maas was improperly denied his right to assert a section 170.6 challenge to [TRIAL JUDGE] in the superior court.”	de novo	error (procedure)	agree with court The appellate court correctly identified that the failure to provide notice of the assigned judge deprived the petitioner of the opportunity to exercise a statutory right. By accepting the petitioner's declaration of good faith belief in prejudice and finding that the lack of notice made a subsequent challenge futile, the court properly applied the liberal construction required for section 170.6 challenges. The remedy of vacating the order and reassigning the case is appropriate to cure the procedural defect.

Authorities

relied: Pickett v. Superior Court (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 887 — A good faith belief in prejudice is sufficient for a section 170.6 challenge; proof of actual prejudice is not required.
relied: People v. Villa (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1063 — A petition for writ of habeas corpus is generally regarded as a special proceeding, making section 170.6 applicable.
relied: Stephens v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 54 — Section 170.6 is a remedial statute to be liberally construed in favor of allowing a peremptory challenge.
relied: Yokley v. Superior Court (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 622 — Sets forth limitations on the assertion of section 170.6 challenges in special proceedings.
relied: In re Hillery (1962) 202 Cal.App.2d 293 — It is premature for an appellate court to review the merits of a habeas petition when directing the superior court to issue a new decision.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the statutory text of section 170.6 to habeas corpus proceedings and relies on established case law to support the conclusion that the lack of notice deprived the petitioner of a substantial right. The court appropriately declined to reach the merits of the underlying habeas claims, recognizing that the procedural defect required a new determination by a different judge.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:31Z · confidence medium

The San Diego Superior Court, through a judge whose identity was never disclosed to the petitioner despite his repeated written requests, summarily denied Michael Maas's petition for writ of habeas corpus attacking his two 25-years-to-life sentences. The Court of Appeal held that Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 applies to habeas corpus proceedings assigned to a judge other than the original trial judge, found Maas was improperly deprived of the opportunity to file a peremptory challenge, deemed the habeas petition a petition for writ of mandate, and ordered the superior court to vacate its denial and reassign the petition to a different judge without reaching the merits.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Superior court denied the habeas corpus petition without disclosing the assigned judge, thereby foreclosing any section 170.6 peremptory challenge “Based on the record before us, it is clear that Maas was improperly denied his right to assert a section 170.6 challenge to [TRIAL JUDGE] in the superior court.”	unclear	error (procedure)	agree with court The court's core holding rests on the plain text of section 170.6, subdivision (a)(1), which reaches any 'special proceeding of any kind or character,' and on People v. Villa's characterization of habeas corpus as a special proceeding; the liberal-construction rule from Stephens and the automatic nature of the challenge from Pickett support treating the lost opportunity as a denial of a substantial right. The Attorney General conceded the right existed and raised only form objections, which the court reasonably rejected. The opinion does not, however, address the statute's timing provisions in subdivision (a)(2), does not identify any statutory source for a duty to notify a petitioner of the assigned judge, and does not recite facts showing that the habeas judge was not the original trial judge (the premise of its stated holding and the Yokley limitation it acknowledges). Those gaps make the result defensible but not fully reasoned.
Superior court's denial of the habeas corpus petition on the merits (sentence validity and ineffective assistance of counsel) “Because this opinion directs the superior court to issue a new decision on Maas's habeas petition, it would be premature for this court to review the merits of the petition filed in this court.”	unclear	not reached	agree with court Having vacated the order and directed reassignment, the court sensibly declined to rule on the underlying claims, citing In re Hillery for the proposition that the superior court should decide the petition first. This is consistent with the orderly exhaustion sequence for habeas petitions.

Authorities

relied: Pickett v. Superior Court (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 887 — A timely and properly formed section 170.6 challenge is automatic; a good faith belief in prejudice alone suffices and the judge has no discretion to refuse it.
relied: People v. Villa (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1063 — A petition for writ of habeas corpus is generally regarded as a special proceeding.
relied: Stephens v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 54 — The section 170.6 peremptory challenge is a substantial right; the statute is remedial and liberally construed in favor of allowing a challenge, which is denied only if the statute absolutely forbids it.
relied: Yokley v. Superior Court (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 622 — Cited for limitations on use of section 170.6 in habeas proceedings, i.e., a petitioner cannot use it to disqualify the judge who presided over the original trial.
relied: In re Hillery (1962) 202 Cal.App.2d 293 — An appellate court should ordinarily require a habeas petitioner to first seek relief in the superior court before the reviewing court addresses the merits.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court correctly applied the broad text of section 170.6 and the liberal-construction and automatic-challenge principles from Villa, Stephens, and Pickett to a conceded right, and the Attorney General's form-based objections were weak given that Maas never learned the judge's identity until the ruling issued. The opinion skips the statute's timing rules, never cites a source for a court's duty to disclose the assigned judge before a summary habeas ruling, and does not lay out the factual premise that the habeas judge differed from the trial judge, which its own holding and the Yokley limitation require.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

record incomplete

Opinion

Filed 12/10/14

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL EUGENE MAAS, D064639

Petitioner, (San Diego County Super. Ct. Nos. SCE185960, v. SCE188460)

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY,

Respondent;

THE PEOPLE,

Real Party in Interest.

PROCEEDING in mandate following the superior court's denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Petition granted to address a peremptory challenge issue.

John M. Thompson, Judge.

Russell S. Babcock, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Peter Quon, Jr. and Susan E. Miller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Real Party in Interest.

In this case, we hold that where petitioner collaterally attacks his criminal convictions and sentences by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus and the matter is assigned to a judge other than the original trial judge, petitioner may assert a peremptory challenge under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 (section 170.6)

to the judge assigned to the petition.

Petitioner Michael Eugene Maas petitions for writ of habeas corpus, raising issues regarding the validity of his sentence and ineffective assistance from his counsel. He also contends the superior court denied him his statutory right under section 170.6 to challenge the judge assigned to his habeas corpus petition in that court. We construe his section 170.6 argument as seeking a writ of mandate and grant relief on that ground. We decline to address the remaining issues set forth in Maas's petition for writ of habeas corpus as they are premature.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 1998, Maas was convicted of grand theft of an automobile and unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle. He was sentenced to 25 years to life in prison. In a subsequent case, he was convicted of burglary and forgery of a fictitious check and sentenced to a consecutive term of 25 years to life. We affirmed the judgments of 2 conviction on appeal. (People v. Thomas et al. (Jan. 11, 2001, D031288 [nonpub.

opn.]; People v. Maas (May 16, 2000, D032176) [nonpub. opn.].)

In July 2013, Maas petitioned for writ of habeas corpus in the superior court.

(Undesignated date references are to the year 2013.) On July 19, Maas wrote a letter to the clerk of the superior court requesting his case number, the date of filing, and the name of the judge assigned to his petition. On July 29, Maas received a photocopy of the cover page of his petition, which was file stamped by the superior court on July 17. The cover page indicated the case number, but did not identify the judge assigned to the matter. Thus, on August 4, Maas again wrote to the superior court requesting the name of the judge. On August 7, the superior court, through the Honorable John M. Thompson, denied Maas's petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Maas petitioned this court for a writ of habeas corpus, raising many of the same issues he asserted in the superior court concerning the validity of his sentence and ineffective assistance from his counsel. He also argues that if he had been informed of the judge assigned to his superior court petition, he would have asserted a challenge under section 170.6 because Judge Thompson was biased against him.

He submitted a declaration in this court stating that if he had been advised Judge Thompson was assigned to review his petition in the superior court, he would have requested another judge.

We requested an informal response from the Attorney General addressing Maas's contention that he was denied the right to file a peremptory challenge under section 170.6. After receiving that response, we issued an order to show cause and 3 appointed counsel for Maas. Maas's appointed counsel submitted a supplemental petition for writ of habeas corpus.

DISCUSSION

"Section 170.6 permits a party to an action to disqualify summarily an assigned judge based on a sworn statement of the party's belief that the judge is prejudiced against that party or the party's attorneys. Provided the statement is timely and in proper form, the judge has no discretion to refuse the challenge.

[Citations.] The right to disqualify a judge under section 170.6 ' "is 'automatic' in the sense that a good faith belief in prejudice is alone sufficient, proof of facts showing actual prejudice not being required." ' " (Pickett v. Superior Court (2012)

203 Cal.App.4th 887, 892.)

By its terms, section 170.6 applies in any "civil or criminal action or special proceeding of any kind or character." (§ 170.6, subd. (a)(1), italics added.) A petition for writ of habeas corpus "is generally regarded as a special proceeding."

(People v. Villa (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1063, 1069.) Thus, subject to the limitations set forth in section 170.6 and case authority (see, e.g., Yokley v. Superior Court (1980)

108 Cal.App.3d 622), a petitioner seeking a writ of habeas corpus may assert a challenge to the judge assigned to the petition.

"The right to exercise a peremptory challenge under . . . section 170.6 is a substantial right and an important part of California's system of due process that promotes fair and impartial trials and confidence in the judiciary. [Citation.] As a remedial statute, section 170.6 is to be liberally construed in favor of allowing a 4 peremptory challenge, and a challenge should be denied only if the statute absolutely forbids it. [Citation.]" (Stephens v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 54, 60, 61-62.)

Here, the Attorney General does not contend that Maas did not have a right to assert a section 170.6 challenge to Judge Thompson. Instead, the Attorney General asserts arguments based on procedure and form. Specifically, the Attorney General argues Maas's section 170.6 claim lacks merit because he raised it within an ineffective assistance of counsel argument and the claim is not supported with proper documentation. We find these arguments unavailing.

First, although Maas did not separately indentify his section 170.6 argument as a ground for relief, he clearly set forth the argument and supporting facts. The argument is encompassed within a claim related to ineffective assistance from counsel, but it is clear that he is complaining regarding the superior court's failure to provide notice of the assigned judge and his resulting inability to assert a section 170.6 challenge to Judge Thompson.

Second, the Attorney General's argument that Maas did not support his section 170.6 challenge with proper documentation ignores the fact that Maas did not have an opportunity to challenge Judge Thompson's assignment because Maas was not provided with advance notice of the judge assigned to review the petition.

According to Maas, he sent the superior court multiple requests for the identity of the judge assigned to his petition, but the superior court did not provide the information. Instead, the first time Maas learned that Judge Thompson would 5 review his petition was upon receiving Judge Thompson's decision. The Attorney General has not proffered evidence suggesting Maas had advance notice of Judge Thompson's assignment. Without advance notice of the assignment, Maas did not have an opportunity to file a section 170.6 challenge in the superior court.

Based on the record before us, it is clear that Maas was improperly denied his right to assert a section 170.6 challenge to Judge Thompson in the superior court. At this point, however, it would serve no useful purpose and would result in a waste of judicial resources to require Maas to file a section 170.6 challenge to Judge Thompson in the superior court. Based on Maas's arguments and declaration in this court, we accept as true his claim that had he been provided notice of Judge Thompson's assignment, he would have asserted a section 170.6 challenge because he believed Judge Thompson was biased against him. Maas's good faith belief that Judge Thompson was prejudiced against him was sufficient to require Judge Thompson's disqualification. (Pickett v. Superior Court, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 892.)

We deem Maas's petition herein as seeking a writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its August 7, 2013, order denying Maas's petition for writ of habeas corpus and grant that relief. We also direct the superior court to reassign Maas's petition to a judge other than Judge Thompson for decision. Because this opinion directs the superior court to issue a new decision on Maas's habeas petition, it would be premature for this court to review the merits of the petition filed in this court. (See In re Hillery (1962) 202 Cal.App.2d 293, 294.)

6 DISPOSITION

Let a writ of mandate issue directing respondent superior court to vacate its August 7, 2013, order denying Maas's petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Thereafter, the superior court shall reassign Maas's petition for writ of habeas corpus for decision by a judge other than Judge Thompson.

MCINTYRE, J.

WE CONCUR:

HALLER, Acting P. J.

MCDONALD, J.

Cites, in this corpus

Pickett v. Superior Court No. B238175 · 2012-02-22
People v. Villa S151561 · 2009-03-16
Stephens v. Superior Court D038328 · 2002-02-08
Yokley v. Superior Court Civ. 48359 · 1980-07-28
In Re Hillery Crim. 40 · 1962-04-10