People v. Chavez CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCS149245SCS167911
- Trial judge
- Kathleen M. Lewis
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- O'Rourke (author), Gilbert Nares, McINTYRE
Analysis
The trial court extended Chavez's civil commitment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO) based on a submission by defense counsel without an explicit on-record waiver of the right to a jury trial. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that defense counsel had the authority to waive the jury trial right and that Chavez failed to demonstrate prejudice.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Failure to advise defendant of right to jury trial and obtain personal waiver“Pending a decision holding otherwise, however, we will adhere to the authorities establishing that Chavez's counsel had the authority to waive the right to trial by jury.” | de novo | error | agree with court The court held that under existing precedent, defense counsel possesses the authority to waive the right to a jury trial in MDO proceedings, even over the defendant's objection, and that Chavez failed to show his counsel was unaware of this right or that the waiver was not knowing. |
Prejudice from alleged waiver error“Chavez has likewise not shown a reasonable probability that he would have achieved a better result if he had had a jury trial.” | de novo | not reached | agree with court The court applied the Watson standard for prejudice, noting that because defense counsel submitted no evidence to contradict the prosecution's medical experts, Chavez could not demonstrate a reasonable probability of a different outcome had a jury trial occurred. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Otis (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1174 — MDO proceedings are civil in nature and the right to a jury trial may be waived by defense counsel.
- relied: People v. Masterson (1994) 8 Cal.4th 965 — Defense counsel may waive the right to a jury trial in civil commitment proceedings.
- relied: People v. Montoya (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 825 — Supports the proposition that counsel may waive jury trial rights in MDO contexts.
- relied: People v. Powell (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1153 — Recognizes that the jury trial right in proceedings to extend civil commitment after an NGRI finding may be waived by defense counsel.
- relied: People v. Epps (2001) 25 Cal.4th 19 — Cites the standard for determining prejudice in the context of jury trial waivers.
- relied: People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 — Establishes the standard that error is prejudicial only if there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been more favorable to the defendant.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the established precedent that counsel may waive jury trial rights in MDO proceedings and properly applies the Watson standard to find no prejudice given the lack of contradictory evidence. It is defensible despite the pending Supreme Court review in People v. Blackburn, as the court explicitly adheres to existing binding authority until otherwise decided.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe San Diego Superior Court extended Juan Daniel Chavez's commitment as a mentally disordered offender for one year after defense counsel submitted on the district attorney's petition and the psychiatric reports, without the court advising Chavez of his right to a jury trial or obtaining his personal waiver. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding under then-existing precedent that counsel could waive the jury trial right, that Chavez failed to show counsel's submission was not a knowing waiver, and that any error was harmless under Watson.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Extension of MDO commitment without the court advising Chavez of his right to a jury trial or obtaining his personal waiver; counsel's submission treated as a valid waiver of jury trial under Penal Code section 2972, subdivision (a).“Pending a decision holding otherwise, however, we will adhere to the authorities establishing that Chavez's counsel had the authority to waive the right to trial by jury.” | unclear | correct | unsure The opinion follows published Court of Appeal authority (Otis, Montoya, Powell) extending Masterson to MDO and NGI recommitments, so the result was defensible when filed. But the court never engages the text of section 2972(a), which directs that the court 'shall advise' the person of the jury trial right, and it acknowledges in a footnote that the exact question was pending in the Supreme Court (Blackburn), which later resolved it against this reading. Masterson itself arose in a competency proceeding where the defendant's capacity was in doubt, a distinction the opinion does not address. I cannot call this a clear error under the law as it stood, but the reasoning is thin. |
Implicit determination that counsel's submission on the petition constituted an effective waiver of jury trial and that any failure to advise or obtain a personal waiver was harmless.“However, as an appellant, Chavez bears the burden of establishing error, i.e., that his attorney was unaware of the right to trial by jury in a civil commitment proceeding and thus did not knowingly waive that right, but has made no such showing.” | unclear | harmless error | unsure The burden allocation is questionable: the claimed error was the court's failure to advise and obtain a personal waiver, not counsel's ignorance, so requiring Chavez to prove counsel did not know of the right reframes his argument. The Watson harmless-error analysis via Epps was a reasonable application of existing law for denial of a statutory jury trial right, and the record shows counsel presented no contrary evidence, so a different outcome before a jury was unlikely. The result is defensible on the record quoted, but the waiver reasoning rests on a presumption rather than any affirmative record of waiver. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Otis (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1174 — An MDO commitment proceeding is civil in nature and defense counsel may waive the right to jury trial, even over the defendant's objection.
- relied: People v. Masterson (1994) 8 Cal.4th 965 — In a competency proceeding under section 1368, defense counsel may waive jury trial over the defendant's objection because the defendant's competence is itself in question.
- relied: People v. Montoya (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 825 — Counsel may waive the jury trial right in an MDO proceeding without the defendant's personal waiver.
- relied: People v. Powell (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1153 — In a proceeding to extend commitment of a person found not guilty by reason of insanity, counsel may waive the right to jury trial.
- relied: People v. Epps (2001) 25 Cal.4th 19 — Erroneous denial of a statutory (non-constitutional) right to jury trial is reviewed for prejudice under the Watson reasonable-probability standard.
- relied: People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 — State-law error requires reversal only if it is reasonably probable the defendant would have obtained a more favorable result absent the error.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court reached a result supported by the published appellate authority then in force and correctly noted the question was pending before the Supreme Court, but it did not analyze the mandatory advisement language of section 2972(a), did not address why Masterson's competency-hearing rationale should extend to an MDO respondent, and placed on the appellant an odd burden to prove counsel's ignorance of the right. The harmless-error analysis is adequately supported by the uncontradicted expert evidence, so the disposition was defensible when filed even though its premises were later rejected.
Opinion
Filed 11/24/14 P. v. Chavez CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D065960
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. Nos. SCS149245 & SCS167911) JUAN DANIEL CHAVEZ, Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Kathleen M. Lewis, Judge. Affirmed.
Stephen M. Hinkle, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland and Sabrina Y. Lane-Erwin, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Juan Daniel Chavez appeals from a judgment determining him to be a mentally disordered offender (MDO). He contends that the superior court erred in failing to advise him of his right to a jury trial and failing to obtain his personal waiver of that right as required by Penal Code section 2972, subdivision (a).1 We reject Chavez's contentions and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Chavez suffers from schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, antisocial personality disorder and polysubstance dependence. In August 2000, he was incarcerated after pleading guilty to robbery. After being released on formal probation, Chavez was arrested for exhibiting a deadly weapon to resist arrest, pled guilty to the charge and was sentenced to prison.
When Chavez was paroled in April 2006, the Department of Corrections certified him as an MDO and transferred him to the Atascadero State Hospital (Atascadero). The following January, Chavez was sent to Patton State Hospital (Patton), but was later returned to the Department of Corrections after assaulting several Patton patients. He was readmitted to Atascadero in July 2009 and his civil commitment was extended several times thereafter.2 In June 2011, Chavez was administratively transferred to the Metropolitan State Hospital (Metropolitan) and the superior court extended his civil commitment twice 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 more. During this time, Chavez consistently denied having a mental illness and refused to voluntarily take his medications. He was also involved in several physical and verbal assaults toward staff and other patients.
In August 2013, the California Department of Mental Health informed the district attorney that Chavez's civil commitment was set to expire and Metropolitan staff recommended extending his commitment again. The district attorney filed a petition seeking the extension, supported by opinions from two medical experts that Chavez continued to suffer from severe mental illness, did not meet the criteria for release because his illness was not in remission and would pose a substantial risk of harm to others if released into the community.
Chavez was present at the hearing on the petition, wherein the following colloquy occurred:
"[Defense counsel]: Frank Birchak, Alternate Public Defender on behalf of Mr. Chavez[,] who's present before the court in custody. [¶] Your honor, what we would like to do is we're asking that the court recommend a re-evaluation of placement for Mr. Chavez. Currently, he's housed at the Metropolitan State Hospital. He's previously been at Patton and Atascadero and felt he was much more successful in the programs, worked much better from there. He's having some issues with the staff at Metropolitan, so we're asking the court to recommend that the state hospital system re-evaluate where he should be placed.
"The Court: Anything from the People?
"[Prosecutor]: Submitted.
"The Court: All right. I'm going to request the state hospital system re- evaluate the defendant's placement and then we'll continue this.
2 Chavez was restrained and secluded at Atascadero as a result of threatening and sexually inappropriate behavior.
3 "[Defense counsel]: I think given that, we would submit on the current MDO petition and extend his commitment date one year.
"The Court: I take it the People also submit?
"[Prosecutor]: Yes, your honor.
"The Court: Based on the forensic psychiatry reports then, the petition is extended for one year. . . ."
Chavez filed a notice of appeal and obtained a certificate of probable cause.
DISCUSSION
The MDO law (§ 2960 et seq.) provides for the involuntary commitment and continuing treatment by the State Department of Mental Health as a condition of parole for a defendant who has been convicted of one or more specified offenses, has a severe mental disorder and is not in remission or cannot be kept in remission without treatment and meets certain other criteria. (§ 2962, subds. (a)-(e).) Prior to the expiration of the involuntary commitment period, the district attorney may file a new petition to recommit the defendant for another year. (§ 2972, subd. (e).) The court must extend the involuntary commitment if the jury, or the court sitting as a trier of fact, finds that (a) the defendant has a severe mental disorder for which he has received continuous treatment, (b) the disorder is not in remission or cannot be kept in remission without continued treatment, and (c) because of the disorder, the defendant represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others. (§§ 2970, 2972, subd. (c).)
A proceeding to have a defendant committed as an MDO or to extend an existing commitment is a civil proceeding. (People v. Otis (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1176.)
4 In such a proceeding, the defendant has a state constitutional and statutory right to a jury trial on the allegations of the petition (§ 2966, subd. (b) [providing that "trial shall be by jury unless waived by both the person and the district attorney"]); however, in accordance with existing precedent, that right may be waived by defense counsel, even over the defendant's objection. (Otis, at p. 1176; People v. Masterson (1994) 8 Cal.4th 965, 972;
see also People v. Montoya (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 825, 828-832; People v. Powell (2004)
114 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1157-1159 [recognizing that the jury trial right of a defendant in a proceeding to extend his civil commitment after having been found not guilty by reason of insanity may be waived by defense counsel].)
Here, Chavez argues that the trial court prejudicially erred in failing to advise him of his right to a jury trial and in failing to obtain his personal waiver of that right. This issue is currently before the California Supreme Court.3 Pending a decision holding otherwise, however, we will adhere to the authorities establishing that Chavez's counsel had the authority to waive the right to trial by jury.
Chavez further contends that because defense counsel did not state on the record that he was waiving the jury trial right, his submission on the district attorney's evidence and agreement to a one-year extension of the commitment period cannot be construed as such a waiver. However, as an appellant, Chavez bears the burden of establishing error, i.e., that his attorney was unaware of the right to trial by jury in a civil commitment proceeding and thus did not knowingly waive that right, but has made no such showing.
3 People v. Blackburn, review granted August 14, 2013, S211078.
5 Moreover, as trial counsel submitted no evidence to contradict the district attorney's medical experts' opinions in support of the recommitment petition, Chavez has likewise not shown a reasonable probability that he would have achieved a better result if he had had a jury trial. (See People v. Epps (2001) 25 Cal.4th 19, 29, citing People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment extending Chavez's commitment as an MDO is affirmed.
O'ROURKE, J.
WE CONCUR:
NARES, Acting P. J.
MCINTYRE, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Powell B168083 · 2004-01-08
- People v. Epps S082110 · 2001-03-05
- People v. Montoya E027229 · 2001-01-30
- People v. Otis No. B123471 · 1999-03-25
- People v. Masterson S039341 · 1994-12-01
- People v. Watson Crim. 5813 · 1956-07-03