In re Jonathan A. CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. J518967
- Trial judge
- Michael J. Martindill (referee)
- Outcome
- reversed in part — Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
- Area
- dependency
- Panel
- Patricia D. Benke (author), Judith L. Haller, O'Rourke
Analysis
The trial court denied the father's request for presumed father status and a hearing on that issue, relying on a prior referee's preliminary finding that the questionnaire evidence was insufficient. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for a hearing, finding the trial court erred in denying the hearing based on a mistaken belief that the issue had already been fully adjudicated.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of request for presumed father status and hearing on that issue“The court effectively denied Jose's request for presumed father status as well as his request for a hearing on that issue. We reverse and remand for a hearing.” | abuse of discretion | error | agree with court The appellate court found the trial court abused its discretion by denying the hearing based on a misreading of the prior minute order, which had deferred ruling rather than denying the request. The court noted the Agency did not oppose the request, making the denial of a hearing on the merits unjustified. |
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion correctly identifies that the prior referee had deferred ruling rather than denying the request, and that the trial court's reliance on the prior minute order was a factual/legal error. The reversal is supported by the lack of opposition from the Agency and the due process implications of denying a hearing on a status determination.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe juvenile court sustained a dependency petition for one-year-old Jonathan, removed him from his mother, placed him with a relative, and declined to find Jose N. a presumed father or to hold a hearing on that request, with the referee reading a prior minute order as having already resolved the issue. The Court of Appeal affirmed the jurisdictional findings and dispositional order but reversed the denial of presumed father status and of a hearing, remanding for a hearing on Jose's request under Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d).
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of Jose's request for presumed father status under Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d), and refusal to hold a hearing on that request, based on the referee's belief that a prior judge had already denied the request“The court effectively denied Jose's request for presumed father status as well as his request for a hearing on that issue. We reverse and remand for a hearing.” | unclear | error (procedure) | agree with court The record quoted in the opinion shows the first judge expressly deferred ruling on presumed father status pending DNA testing and directed the social worker to reassess, including interviewing Jose's proposed witnesses; the second referee then treated the deferral as a denial without taking evidence. Jose had presented conflicting questionnaire claims about the period Jonathan lived with him and asked for witnesses to be heard, so refusing any hearing on a disputed factual question affecting his parental status was procedurally improper. The Agency did not oppose relief, and the appellate court's conclusion follows from the record even though it cites no case authority and does not articulate a standard of review. |
Jurisdictional true finding on the petition and dispositional order declaring Jonathan a dependent, removing him from Judy's custody, and placing him with a relative“The jurisdictional findings and dispositional order are affirmed.” | unclear | correct | agree with court Jose did not challenge the jurisdictional findings or the dispositional order on appeal; his sole contention concerned presumed father status and the denial of a hearing. The appellate court therefore left those orders undisturbed, which is consistent with the limited scope of the appeal as described in the opinion. |
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The result is defensible on the record quoted: the first judge deferred the presumed father ruling and ordered a reassessment, the referee then denied the request without a hearing on a mistaken reading of the minute order, and the Agency conceded error. The opinion, however, cites no case authority, states no standard of review, and offers only a one-sentence analysis, leaving the legal basis for reversal (due process, abuse of discretion, or statutory entitlement to a hearing) unexplained.
Opinion
Filed 11/20/14 In re Jonathan A. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re JONATHAN A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. D066345 SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, (Super. Ct. No. J518967) Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOSE N., Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Michael J.
Martindill, Referee. Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
Gorman Law Office and Seth F. Gorman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County Counsel and Erica R. Cortez, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Jose N. appeals following the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing in the juvenile dependency case of minor Jonathan A. Jose contends the court erred by denying a hearing on his request for presumed father status (Fam. Code, § 7611, subd. (d)). We agree.
BACKGROUND
In April 2014 the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) filed a dependency petition for one-year-old Jonathan. The petition alleged methamphetamine use by his mother, Judy A. The petition also alleged Jose had a long history of drug-related arrests and was incarcerated on charges of possessing controlled substances. Jonathan was detained with a relative.
In May 2014 Jose's counsel requested paternity testing. Counsel also requested presumed father status for Jose (§ 7611, subd. (d)) based on the parentage questionnaires Jose and Judy had completed. Jose's questionnaire claimed Jonathan had lived with him from June 2013 to December 2013 or January 2014. Judy's questionnaire claimed Jonathan had lived with Jose for one month in March 2013. The court (Judge Riggs)
stated, "I believe the amount of time that the child was exposed to [Jose] was at the most one month, according to the questionnaire. And the court finds that that's not sufficient to determine that he is a presumed father at this point, especially in light of the remaining questions on the questionnaire and the responses thereto." After Jose objected to the finding and asked to be heard further, the court deferred ruling on the presumed father request. The court granted Jose's request for paternity testing and said, "So he'll remain an alleged father until after the DNA testing. As I said, I find that based on the 2 allegations in the questionnaire, it's insufficient to go under . . . [section] 7611." After the court ordered the petition amended by adding the name of another alleged father, Jose said, "[Judy] stayed with me for approximately six months at [my grandmother's] house."
Jose asked that his grandmother, his brother and "people that live at the house" be interviewed and their testimony and statements be obtained. The court responded, "The social worker will have it reassessed in the assessment." Jose added, "That's my son, no matter what" and "I love my son." The court set a hearing for June 19.
On June 18, 2014, the Agency received the paternity test results: a 99.99 percent probability that Jose was the father. On June 19 the court (Referee Martindill) found that Jose was Jonathan's biological father and made a true finding on the petition. Jose's counsel renewed the request for presumed father status. Counsel for the Agency, Jonathan and Judy submitted on the issue. Quoting the May minute order, the court stated, " 'The request for presumed status for father under [section 7611, subdivision (d)], the Court is not finding father presumed at this time. Father remains alleged until DNA testing is done.' That would lead me to believe that at that hearing there was not sufficient factual basis for it finding [section 7611, subdivision (d)]." The court declared Jonathan a dependent, removed him from Judy's custody, found it would be detrimental to Jonathan to be placed with Jose and ordered Jonathan placed with a relative. The court ordered services for both Judy and Jose.
DISCUSSION
Jose contends Referee Martindill abused his discretion by denying a hearing on the request for presumed father status in the mistaken belief that Judge Riggs had denied the 3 request. Jose argues the denial of a hearing contravened his due process rights, noting the Agency had not provided an assessment of his witnesses as Judge Riggs had directed.
The Agency has filed a letter brief stating that it does not oppose Jose's request for a hearing on presumed father status or his request for presumed father status.
The court effectively denied Jose's request for presumed father status as well as his request for a hearing on that issue. We reverse and remand for a hearing.
DISPOSITION
The jurisdictional findings and dispositional order are affirmed. The order denying Jose's request for presumed father status and denying his request for a hearing on that issue is reversed. The case is remanded to the juvenile court for a hearing on Jose's request for presumed father status.
BENKE, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
HALLER, J.
O'ROURKE, J.