Marriage of Phillips CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D064712 · 2014-11-18 · Unpublished

Proceeding: appeal from an order
Trial court: Superior Court of San Diego County · No. DN174329
Trial judge: Kelly C. Dowlan (commissioner)
Outcome: affirmed — Affirmed.
Area: family
Panel: McINTYRE (author), Judith L. Haller, O'Rourke

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T02:55Z · confidence high

The trial court granted Stewart Phillips's motion to quash Luzviminda Phillips's petition for dissolution, determining that a prior Guamanian divorce decree was entitled to full faith and credit and that the marriage no longer existed. The Court of Appeal affirmed the order, rejecting Luzviminda's arguments that the Guamanian judgment was void due to lack of domicile or obtained by fraud.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Granting of Stewart Phillips's motion to quash the dissolution petition based on the validity of the prior Guamanian divorce decree. “Accordingly, the trial court properly concluded that the Guamanian divorce decree was entitled to full faith and credit.”	de novo	correct	agree with court The appellate court correctly applied the Full Faith and Credit Clause and California Family Code sections 2091 and 2093. It properly noted that under Heuer v. Heuer, a party who participates in a proceeding and has the opportunity to litigate jurisdiction cannot later collaterally attack the decree's validity based on domicile, especially when the foreign court complied with its own statutory requirements (19 G.C.A. §§ 8318-8321) and the appellant failed to provide extrinsic evidence challenging the jurisdictional recitals.
Rejection of Luzviminda Phillips's claim that the Guamanian divorce was obtained by fraud. “Based on this conflicting evidence, the trial court could reasonably reject Luzviminda's claim of fraud.”	substantial evidence	correct	agree with court The appellate court correctly applied the substantial evidence standard to the trial court's factual finding regarding fraud. The opinion notes that the evidence was conflicting (Luzviminda claimed the divorce was 'pretend' while Stewart denied this and claimed she held herself out as divorced), and the trial court's resolution of this conflict was within its discretion and supported by the record.

Authorities

relied: Zaragoza v. Superior Court (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 720 — Marriage dissolution is a proceeding in rem where the marriage is the res that is adjudicated.
relied: Heuer v. Heuer (1949) 33 Cal.2d 268 — A divorce decree is binding even if jurisdictional residence requirements were fraudulently asserted, provided the party participated and had full opportunity to litigate the issue.
relied: Estate of Grimble (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 741 — California generally accords full faith and credit to a divorce recognized as valid in the state in which it was originally granted.
relied: Crouch v. Crouch (1946) 28 Cal.2d 243 — In a collateral attack, a court is not bound by the first forum's jurisdictional recitals and may make a de novo determination based on extrinsic evidence.
relied: In re Marriage of Zierenberg (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1436 — If a prior valid divorce exists, the res of the marriage no longer exists and there is nothing to dissolve.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly identifies the applicable legal standards for full faith and credit and collateral attacks on foreign divorce decrees, and it properly applies these standards to the specific facts, noting the lack of extrinsic evidence to challenge the Guamanian court's jurisdictional findings. It also correctly applies the substantial evidence standard to the trial court's rejection of the fraud claim.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:31Z · confidence low

The trial court granted Stewart Phillips's motion to quash Luzviminda Phillips's 2013 California dissolution petition and dismissed it, holding that a 2011 Guam divorce judgment incorporating the parties' notarized marital settlement agreement was entitled to full faith and credit. The Court of Appeal affirmed, rejecting Luzviminda's arguments that the Guam decree was void under Family Code section 2091 because both parties were domiciled in California and that it was procured by fraud.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Determination that the Guam divorce decree was entitled to full faith and credit notwithstanding Family Code section 2091, because section 2093 subordinates the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act to the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the decree complied with Guam law “Accordingly, the trial court properly concluded that the Guamanian divorce decree was entitled to full faith and credit.”	unclear	correct	agree with court The court correctly read section 2093 as limiting section 2091 by the constitutional full faith and credit requirement, correctly treated Guam as a 'state' under section 145 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738, and correctly relied on Heuer for the rule that a party who appeared and had an opportunity to litigate jurisdiction is bound by the decree. It also correctly acknowledged Crouch's rule permitting de novo examination of jurisdictional recitals on collateral attack but found Luzviminda's declaration did not controvert them. The court never articulated an appellate standard of review and did not expressly connect Heuer's appearance-based preclusion to Luzviminda's recited appearance and consent in Guam, nor did it address the section 2092 domicile presumption, but the result follows from the authorities cited.
Rejection of Luzviminda's claim that the Guam decree was procured by Stewart's fraud (that he told her the divorce was 'pretend') “Based on this conflicting evidence, the trial court could reasonably reject Luzviminda's claim of fraud.”	substantial evidence	correct	agree with court The court treated the fraud claim as a factual dispute resolved on conflicting declarations and deferred to the trial court's implied finding, which is the appropriate posture for a credibility contest on declarations. The court did not address whether extrinsic fraud could in any event be a ground for denying recognition in California rather than seeking relief in Guam, or the estoppel doctrine applicable to a party who participated in and later held herself out under the decree, but deference to the trial court's factual resolution is sufficient to sustain the ruling.
Order granting the motion to quash and dismissing the dissolution petition because the marriage had already been dissolved and no res remained “Thus, the trial court properly granted Stewart's motion to quash as the res of the marriage no longer existed and there was nothing to dissolve.”	unclear	correct	agree with court Once the Guam decree is recognized, the marriage no longer exists and a California court has nothing to dissolve; the court's reliance on Zaragoza (dissolution as in rem proceeding) and Zierenberg for this proposition is consistent with those authorities. The disposition follows logically from the first two rulings.

Authorities

relied: Heuer v. Heuer (1949) 33 Cal.2d 268 — A sister-state divorce decree is entitled to full faith and credit where the party participated and had full opportunity to litigate jurisdiction, even if relitigation might show the domiciliary claim was fraudulent; jurisdiction need not have been actively litigated.
relied: Crouch v. Crouch (1946) 28 Cal.2d 243 — On collateral attack of another forum's divorce judgment, a California court is not bound by jurisdictional recitals and may determine jurisdictional facts de novo on extrinsic evidence.
relied: Zaragoza v. Superior Court (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 720 — Marriage dissolution is an in rem proceeding in which the marriage is the res adjudicated.
relied: Estate of Grimble (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 741 — California generally accords full faith and credit to a divorce recognized as valid in the state where it was granted.
relied: In re Marriage of Zierenberg (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1436 — Where the marriage has already been dissolved by a valid judgment, there is no res left for a California court to dissolve.
missed: Rediker v. Rediker (1950) 35 Cal.2d 796 — A spouse who procures, participates in, or accepts the benefits of a foreign divorce decree may be estopped from later attacking its validity in California; directly relevant to the fraud and section 2091 arguments but not discussed.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court reached a defensible result with the right core authorities (sections 2091-2093, Heuer, Crouch, Grimble) and properly deferred to the trial court on the conflicting fraud declarations. It did not state a standard of review, did not address the section 2092 presumption of California domicile, did not expressly tie Heuer's preclusion rule to Luzviminda's appearance and consent in Guam, and did not discuss the estoppel doctrine of Rediker that would have squarely answered her participation-based attack.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 11/18/14 Marriage of Phillips CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re the Marriage of LUZVIMINDA B. and STEWART H. PHILLIPS. D064712 LUZVIMINDA B. PHILLIPS, Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. DN174329)

v. STEWART H. PHILLIPS, Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Kelly C. Dowlan, Commissioner. Affirmed.

William C. Halsey for Appellant.

Sara R. Neumann for Respondent.

In 2013, Luzviminda Phillips filed a petition to dissolve her marriage to Stewart H. Phillips. Stewart moved to quash the petition on the ground a court in Guam entered a final judgment of divorce in 2011, Luzviminda never challenged the validity of the judgment in Guam and the judgment was entitled to full faith and credit. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the dissolution petition. Luzviminda appeals, contending the Guamanian divorce (1) is void because both parties were domiciled in California and (2) was obtained by fraud. We reject her contentions and affirm the order.

DISCUSSION

Luzviminda notes that when the parties signed a marital settlement agreement in 2011 that was later incorporated into the Guamanian judgment of divorce, both parties listed California as their address. Accordingly, Luzviminda asserts both parties were domiciled in California and the Guamanian judgment of divorce is void under Family Code section 2091. (Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.) We disagree.

Marriage dissolution is a proceeding in rem where the marriage is the res that is adjudicated. (Zaragoza v. Superior Court (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 720, 724-725.)

" 'The res which is the subject of adjudication is an intangible. Jurisdiction is exercised not by taking custody of a tangible article, but by serving process [] upon the other spouse.' " (Id. at p. 725.) Section 2091 is part of the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act. (§ 2090 et seq.) Section 2091 provides the following: "A divorce obtained in another jurisdiction shall be of no force or effect in this state if both parties to the marriage were domiciled in this state at the time the proceeding for the divorce was commenced." The seemingly broad language of section 2091, however, is tempered by section 2093, which provides that "[t]he application of this chapter [which includes 2 section 2091] is limited by the requirement of the Constitution of the United States that full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state." (See also, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738 ["[J]udicial proceedings . . . shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken."].)

To be entitled to full faith and credit, the issue of jurisdiction need not have been actively litigated in the court rendering the divorce decree. (Heuer v. Heuer (1949) 33 Cal.2d 268, 271.) Where a party participated in the proceedings and had full opportunity to litigate the issue, the divorce "decree is binding even though a relitigation of the question of jurisdictional residence requirements in another state might result in a finding that the domiciliary claim was fraudulently asserted for the purpose of obtaining a decree which as a matter of policy could not be procured in the state of actual domicile." (Ibid.)

California generally accords full faith and credit to a divorce recognized as valid in the state in which it was originally granted. (Estate of Grimble (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 741, 748-749.) Under the Family Code, " '[s]tate' means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, or a commonwealth, territory, or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." (§ 145.) Guam is an unincorporated territory of the United States (48 U.S.C.A. § 1421a); thus, Guam is a state within the meaning of the Family Code. Accordingly, the judicial proceedings of Guam are entitled to full faith and credit if the Guamanian court properly adjudicated 3 the divorce. To determine whether Guam properly adjudicated the parties' divorce, we must examine the Guamanian statutes.

In Guam, a court may grant an uncontested divorce if both parties agree to the terms of the divorce and at least one spouse has resided in Guam for a minimum of seven days immediately preceding the filing of the complaint. (19 G.C.A. § 8318, subd. (b).) If the consent to a divorce is signed in the United States, it must be verified before a notary public. (19 G.C.A. § 8319, subd. (b).) The Guamanian court may grant an uncontested divorce based upon the verified complaint if it appears to be in the interests of justice. (19 G.C.A. § 8320.) If the Guamanian court dissolves the marriage, it enters an interlocutory judgment (19 G.C.A. § 8321), followed by a final divorce decree (19 G.C.A. § 8320).

In 2011, the parties filled out and signed a marital settlement agreement form in California agreeing to settle all matters regarding their marital affairs and intending that the marital settlement agreement be incorporated into any subsequent divorce decree. The marital settlement agreement was notarized. The following month, a Guamanian court entered an interlocutory judgment of divorce and a final divorce decree. The interlocutory judgment stated that the matter was uncontested, the court acquired jurisdiction based on Stewart's residency in Guam for seven days, Luzviminda entered her appearance and consented that the cause be heard as a default matter. The court approved the marital settlement agreement and ordered the parties to perform the terms of the agreement. The final divorce decree reaffirmed the terms of the interlocutory judgment.

4 The recitations within the interlocutory judgment and final divorce decree show the Guamanian court complied with Guamanian statutes governing dissolution of marriage. Nonetheless, where a court decides a collateral attack on the validity of another forum's dissolution judgment, the court is not bound by the first forum's jurisdictional recitals and may make a de novo determination based on extrinsic evidence. (Crouch v. Crouch (1946) 28 Cal.2d 243, 249-250.) Here, however, nothing in Luzviminda's sworn declaration challenged the recitations within the interlocutory judgment and final divorce decree. In contrast, Stewart's declaration states he went to Guam in July 2011 to file the divorce action. Accordingly, the trial court properly concluded that the Guamanian divorce decree was entitled to full faith and credit.

Luzviminda next argues she is entitled to relief from the Guamanian divorce decree because Stewart procured it by fraud. She claims Stewart repeatedly told her the divorce was " 'pretend.' " Stewart, however, denied telling Luzviminda the divorce was " 'pretend' " and claimed Luzviminda willingly participated in the divorce and later held herself out as divorced. Based on this conflicting evidence, the trial court could reasonably reject Luzviminda's claim of fraud.

In summary, because the parties' Guamanian divorce was valid in Guam, it is entitled to full faith and credit here. Thus, the trial court properly granted Stewart's motion to quash as the res of the marriage no longer existed and there was nothing to dissolve. (In re Marriage of Zierenberg (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1436, 1445.)

5 DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

MCINTYRE, J.

WE CONCUR:

HALLER, Acting P. J.

O'ROURKE, J.

Cites, in this corpus

Zaragoza v. Superior Court B102410 · 1996-09-24
In Re Marriage of Zierenberg B062448 · 1992-09-29
Kellogg v. Gregoire Civ. No. 44383 · 1974-10-28
Heuer v. Heuer Sac. 5828 · 1949-01-11
Crouch v. Crouch L. A. 18870 · 1946-05-24