In re J.A. CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D065892 · 2014-10-14 · Unpublished

Proceeding: appeal from an order
Trial court: Superior Court of San Diego County · No. J515303A-B
Trial judge: Laura Birkmeyer
Outcome: affirmed — Affirmed.
Area: dependency
Panel: Patricia D. Benke (author), Gilbert Nares, McINTYRE

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T06:31Z · confidence high

The juvenile court terminated Jose A.'s reunification services, finding that reasonable services had been offered or provided and that return of the children would be detrimental. The Court of Appeal affirmed the order, holding that substantial evidence supported the finding that reasonable services were offered despite Jose's location in Mexico and his limited participation.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Termination of reunification services based on the finding that reasonable services were offered or provided. “Substantial evidence supports the finding Jose was offered reasonable services.”	substantial evidence	correct	agree with court The appellate court correctly applied the substantial evidence standard to the record. The opinion details that the Agency made referrals through an international liaison, confirmed requests with the consulate, and repeatedly instructed Jose to contact the Mexican social services agency, while Jose failed to maintain contact or participate in available services. This supports the conclusion that the services offered were reasonable under the circumstances, particularly given the parent's voluntary nature of participation and his own statements that he did not need services or preferred the children remain in San Diego.

Authorities

relied: Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758 — The role of the appellate court is to decide whether the record discloses substantial evidence which supports the juvenile court's finding that reasonable services were provided or offered.
relied: In re Misako R (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538 — The standard is not that the best possible services were provided, but that reasonable services were provided under the circumstances.
relied: In re Jonathan R. (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1214 — Reunification services are voluntary, and cannot be forced on an unwilling or indifferent parent.
relied: In re Geoffrey G. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 412 — The appellant bears the burden to show the evidence is insufficient to support the court's findings.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the substantial evidence standard and relies on established California authority regarding the voluntary nature of reunification services and the definition of 'reasonable' services. It addresses the specific arguments regarding parenting classes, drug testing, counseling referrals, and visitation by pointing to the record evidence of the Agency's efforts and the parent's lack of engagement.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:31Z · confidence low

At the 12-month review hearing the juvenile court terminated Jose A.'s reunification services as to his daughters J.A. and J.B.A., finding reasonable services had been offered or provided, that return would be detrimental, and that there was no substantial probability of return by the 18-month date. On appeal Jose challenged only the reasonable services finding, and the Court of Appeal affirmed, holding substantial evidence supported the finding as to parenting education, drug testing, counseling referrals, and visitation.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Finding at the 12-month hearing that reasonable reunification services were offered or provided to Jose (parenting classes, drug testing, counseling referrals) “Substantial evidence supports the finding Jose was offered reasonable services.”	substantial evidence	correct	agree with court The opinion recites evidence that the Agency made a referral through an international liaison in November 2012, confirmed with the consulate in January 2013 that services and therapy had been requested, told Jose repeatedly to stay in contact with the Mexican agency because of a waiting list, arranged private parenting classes he said he could not afford, and that Jose failed to return the social worker's calls. Under Angela S. and Misako R. the question is whether reasonable, not ideal, services were offered, and Jonathan R. supports the point that services cannot be forced on an indifferent parent. The opinion does not, however, acknowledge that the juvenile court's reasonable services finding at a 12-month hearing must be made by clear and convincing evidence, nor does it directly answer Jose's argument that a Mexican agency could not refer him to an 'Agency approved' therapist, so the analysis is thinner than ideal though the result is defensible on the facts recited.
Finding that Jose was provided reasonable visitation as part of his reunification plan “Jose's argument he was not provided reasonable visitation is also unsupported.”	substantial evidence	correct	agree with court The record as recited shows the children visited Jose in Tijuana several times, had frequent telephone contact, that consulate visits were arranged in February 2014 and Jose declined them, and that Jose himself said telephone and internet contact would suffice. A parent who declines offered visits and expresses satisfaction with remote contact cannot readily show visitation was unreasonable. The conclusion follows from the facts stated, though the opinion is brief and does not discuss how the visitation order was framed or whether the Agency's later request for unsupervised consulate drop-offs was implemented.
Juvenile court's treatment of the absence of drug testing as not undermining the reasonable services finding “The court stated it was not concerned that drug tests had not been ordered. If Jose was worried about not drug testing, his counsel could have asked for him to be tested.”	substantial evidence	correct	agree with court The case plan left drug testing to the social worker's discretion, so the absence of testing was not a failure to provide a required service. The appellate court's additional remark that counsel could have asked for testing is a somewhat informal rationale, but the core point—that discretionary testing not requested by the social worker does not render the overall plan unreasonable—is consistent with the Misako R. standard that services need only be reasonable under the circumstances.

Authorities

relied: Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758 — Appellate review of a reasonable services finding asks whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that reasonable services were provided or offered.
relied: In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538 — The standard is not whether the best possible services were provided but whether reasonable services were provided under the circumstances.
relied: In re Jonathan R. (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1214 — Reunification services are voluntary and cannot be forced on an unwilling or indifferent parent.
relied: In re Geoffrey G. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 412 — The appellant bears the burden of showing the evidence is insufficient to support the juvenile court's findings.
missed: In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403 — To support a reasonable services finding the record should show the agency identified the problems leading to loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parent, and made reasonable efforts to assist when compliance proved difficult.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion correctly identifies the substantial evidence standard and marshals facts showing the Agency made referrals, maintained contact efforts, and that Jose declined or failed to pursue offered services and visits, so the affirmance is defensible. It omits the clear and convincing evidence standard the juvenile court must apply at a 12-month hearing, does not frame the Riva M. elements of a reasonable services analysis, and only glancingly addresses Jose's argument that the Mexican agency could not refer him to an Agency-approved therapist.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

record incomplete

Opinion

Filed 10/14/14 In re J.A. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re J.A. et al, Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. D065892 SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, (Super. Ct. No. J515303A-B) Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOSE A., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Laura Birkmeyer, Judge. Affirmed.

Terence M. Chucas under appointment by the Court of Appeal for Defendant and Appellant.

Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Erica R. Cortez, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Lisa Storing under appointment by the Court of Appeal for Minors. Jose A. appeals a juvenile court order terminating his reunification services concerning his daughters, J.A. and J.B.A. He contends the court erred by finding he had been provided reasonable services. We affirm the order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In January 2004, the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) petitioned on behalf of then five-year-old J.A. and one-year-old J.B.A. (the children) under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g), based on domestic violence and drug use by the children's mother, A.S., and Jose. The petitions further alleged the parents were incarcerated and unable to arrange appropriate care. The court found the allegations under section 300, subdivision (b), to be true and ordered reunification services for A.S. It did not order services for Jose because he was scheduled to be incarcerated for longer than the statutory reunification time and then deported to Mexico. A.S. initially did not participate in services, but then began working toward regaining custody of the children. Her services were terminated in September 2005, but in September 2006, the court granted her section 388 petition, returned the children to her care and ordered visitation for Jose. In September 2007, it terminated jurisdiction, granted A.S. sole custody and provided supervised visitation for Jose, who was living in Mexico.

In October 2012, when J.A. was 14 and J.B.A. was 10, law enforcement officers went to the family home because A.S. was brandishing a knife. A.S. drove away with the 1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 2 children's infant sister, L.S., and was later arrested for driving under the influence of a controlled substance and child endangerment.2 The Agency filed section 300 petitions on behalf of all three children, alleging L.S. had been exposed to serious risk of physical harm, and J.A. and J.B.A. were also at risk from A.S.'s drug use and from domestic violence between L.S.'s father, Gregorio S., and A.S. The court sustained the petitions, ordered J.A. and J.B.A. placed in relative care, and ordered reunification services.

Jose said he telephoned J.A. and J.B.A. frequently. He agreed they should be placed in San Diego with their maternal aunt, Leticia V. His case plan included general counseling with an Agency approved counselor or psychologist, a parenting class, random drug testing and visitation. Jose said he did not think he needed services, but would participate if he needed to do so to obtain custody.

Jose reported he inquired about parenting classes in Tijuana, but could not go at the times classes were scheduled. He had not started counseling or drug testing. These services had been requested for him, but there was a waiting list for services in his area.

Jose was told several times that he needed to contact the social services agency in Tijuana to begin services. The children visited him in Tijuana a few times and they had frequent telephone visits. A study of his home was positive, but Jose said he believed J.A. and J.B.A. were better off living with Leticia and going to school in San Diego than starting a new life with him in Tijuana.

2 L.S. is not a part of this appeal. 3 At the six-month review hearing in June 2013, the court found reasonable reunification services had been provided and ordered six more months of services.

The social worker reported he had called Jose numerous times, but was not able to reach him, and Jose never returned his calls. He confirmed Jose knew it was his responsibility to contact the Mexican social services agency to locate services that would fit into his schedule. J.A. and J.B.A. spoke with him frequently and visited him in Tijuana. In November 2013, because Leticia was no longer willing to care for J.A., J.A.

was placed with a non-related extended family member. J.B.A.'s placement was changed to the home of maternal aunt, Lidia E. Subsequently, J.A. and J.B.A. began attending conjoint therapy with A.S. J.A. said she wanted to return to A.S.'s care.

In February 2014, arrangements were made for Jose to visit J.A. and J.B.A. at the Mexican-American consulate, but Jose declined to have visits at the consulate offices.

The social worker then requested arrangements be made to allow the girls be dropped off at the consulate offices for unsupervised visits with Jose. Jose said he understood it was difficult for J.A. and J.B.A. to come to Tijuana to visit him. He said he wanted to see them, but it would be alright for them not to come if he could continue to contact them by telephone and the internet.

At the 12-month hearing in March 2014, after considering the documentary evidence and argument by counsel, the court terminated Jose's reunification services, finding reasonable services had been offered or provided, but it would be detrimental to return J.A. and J.B.A. to his custody and there was no substantial probability of return by the 18-month date.

4 DISCUSSION

Jose contends the court erred by finding he had been provided reasonable services.

He argues in order to show he had mastered parenting skills he needed to have the children in his care; he was not asked to drug test; no referrals were made for counseling, and the Mexican social services agency could not have referred him to an Agency approved therapist; and he was denied reasonable visitation.

In determining the sufficiency of reunification services the role of the appellate court is to decide "whether the record discloses substantial evidence which supports the juvenile court's finding that reasonable services were provided or offered." (Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 762.) The standard is not that the best possible services were provided, but that reasonable services were provided under the circumstances. (In re Misako R (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.) "Reunification services are voluntary, and cannot be forced on an unwilling or indifferent parent." (In re Jonathan R. (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d. 1214, 1220.) The appellant bears the burden to show the evidence is insufficient to support the court's findings. (In re Geoffrey G.

(1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 412, 420.)

Substantial evidence supports the finding Jose was offered reasonable services.

Problems in the family included parental neglect, domestic violence and drug use.

Although Jose was not named as an offending parent in the 2012 petition, he had a history of domestic violence and substance abuse and he was aware A.S. was physically and emotionally abusing the children, but did not intervene.

5 As to his argument regarding parenting education, he declined to attend parenting classes, saying he did not need the classes and he could not go at times they were offered.

When private classes were arranged for him, he said he could not afford them. As for drug testing, his case plan indicated it was up to the discretion of the social worker to ask him to drug test. The court stated it was not concerned that drug tests had not been ordered. If Jose was worried about not drug testing, his counsel could have asked for him to be tested.

His argument regarding the inadequacy of counseling referrals is without merit. In November 2012, the Agency submitted a referral through an international liaison requesting Jose receive services in Tijuana, including drug testing, parenting classes, a home evaluation and visitation at the border. In January 2013, the Agency confirmed with a representative at the Mexican-American consulate that the "aforementioned services and therapy" had been requested for Jose. The social worker emphasized with Jose that he needed to maintain contact with the Mexican social services agency because he was on a waiting list for services as there was a shortage of services in his area.

However, the evidence shows he did not keep in contact with the social worker or the Mexican social services agency.

Jose's argument he was not provided reasonable visitation is also unsupported.

Jose declined to visit at the consulate. He had visitation when relatives brought J.A. and J.B.A. to visit him, and he said he understood it was burdensome to bring them to Tijuana. He did not object to their living arrangements, but throughout the dependency 6 period said he agreed they should live and go to school in San Diego as long as he was able to continue to have contact with them through telephone calls and the internet.

Jose has not shown he was not offered reasonable reunification services.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

BENKE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

NARES, J.

McINTYRE, J.

Cites, in this corpus

Angela S. v. Superior Court A069677 · 1995-07-11
In Re Misako R. D013604 · 1991-12-09
Mervin v. Gustave G. Civ. 4772 · 1979-11-02