gno.law

State of California v. Superior Court CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D065664 · 2014-10-10 · Unpublished

Proceeding
writ
Trial court
Superior Court of Imperial County · No. ECU07069
Trial judge
Juan Ulloa
Outcome
writ granted — Petition granted.
Area
civil
Panel
McINTYRE (author), Alex C. McDonald, Judith L. Haller

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T06:31Z · confidence high

The trial court denied the defendants' motion to compel the plaintiff to answer deposition questions regarding his methamphetamine use, finding the foundation insufficient and the evidence irrelevant. The Court of Appeal granted a writ of mandate, ruling that the information was relevant to damages and comparative fault and that the plaintiff waived his Fifth Amendment privilege by placing his earning capacity in issue.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Denial of defendants' motion to compel plaintiff's answers to deposition questions regarding methamphetamine use and treatment.
“We conclude the trial court erred in denying Defendants' motion to compel as Rabb's methamphetamine use is relevant to his loss of earning capacity claim and possibly to comparative fault.”
abuse of discretionerroragree with court
The appellate court found the trial court erred because the defendants provided sufficient expert testimony and medical records to establish a minimal showing of relevance to both damages (loss of earning capacity) and comparative fault (impairment affecting driving). The court further held that the plaintiff waived his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by asserting a claim for lost earnings, thereby placing his health and employment status at issue. This aligns with established California law regarding the waiver of privileges when a party places a factual issue in dispute in a civil action.

Authorities

  • relied: Morris Stulsaft Foundation v. Superior Court (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 409 — Discovery statutes must be construed liberally in favor of disclosure; relevance is determined by reason and judicial experience, and information need not be admissible at trial if reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence.
  • relied: Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 554 — A plaintiff waives the privilege against self-incrimination regarding factual issues relevant to the claim when they initiate an action that places those issues in dispute.
  • relied: Hartbrodt v. Burke (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 168 — A plaintiff waives the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when they bring an action that places the existence or content of privileged information in issue.
  • relied: Newson v. City of Oakland (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 1050 — A plaintiff asserting a claim for lost wages waives the privilege against self-incrimination pertaining to tax records by placing their tax status in issue.
  • relied: Wilson v. Superior Court (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 825 — A plaintiff waives the privilege accorded to tax records when they place in issue the existence and content of those returns.
  • relied: City & County of S.F. v. Superior Court (1951) 37 Cal.2d 227 — The physician-patient privilege is waived when a plaintiff places their physical condition in issue by filing a personal injury action.
  • relied: Pulver v. Avco Financial Services (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 622 — Documents not before the trial court must be disregarded as beyond the scope of appellate review.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the liberal standard for discovery relevance and accurately cites binding authority regarding the waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege when a plaintiff places a factual issue (such as earning capacity or physical condition) in issue in a civil suit. The court properly limited its review to the record before the trial court, striking new evidence, and addressed the specific arguments regarding causation and damages.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:31Z · confidence low

The Imperial County Superior Court denied the State of California and its employee's motion to compel plaintiff Jerry Rabb to answer deposition questions about his methamphetamine use and treatment, finding an insufficient foundation to show the questions were relevant or reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. The Court of Appeal granted the defendants' writ petition, holding that the methamphetamine evidence was relevant to Rabb's loss of earning capacity claim and (if causation remained open) to comparative fault, that Rabb could not shield the information behind the Fifth Amendment while pursuing his claims, and directed the trial court to grant the motion to compel.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Denial of motion to compel deposition answers about methamphetamine use and treatment as irrelevant to damages (loss of earning capacity)
“By making a loss of earning capacity claim, Rabb placed his future earnings at issue and his methamphetamine usage is relevant to a determination of his damages.”
unclearerror (law misapplied)agree with court
The opinion never states a standard of review for the discovery ruling, but its conclusion is well supported. Under Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2017.010 and 2025.010 and Morris Stulsaft, discovery relevance is construed liberally, and a plaintiff who claims lost future earnings puts his health and employability at issue; a positive methamphetamine test on the day of the accident plus expert declarations tying chronic use to job error rates and unemployment easily meets the 'reasonably calculated' threshold. The trial court appears to have demanded a foundation closer to an admissibility showing, which the discovery statutes do not require.
Denial of motion to compel as to relevance of methamphetamine use to comparative fault/causation
“This evidence was minimally sufficient to show Rabb's methamphetamine use was relevant to the issue of comparative fault.”
unclearerror (law misapplied)agree with court
The appellate ruling here is expressly conditional because the parties disputed whether defendants had admitted full liability, and the opinion did not resolve that dispute. Given the positive urine test indicating use within 24 hours of the collision and expert declarations about impaired driving, the relevancy showing is adequate under the liberal discovery standard if contributory negligence remains open; the conditional framing is a defensible way to handle an unresolved record point, though it leaves the trial court to sort out the liability admission.
Sustaining (by denying the motion to compel) plaintiff's refusal to answer on Fifth Amendment self-incrimination grounds
“Where a plaintiff puts a factual issue in dispute, he either waives his privilege against self-incrimination or must forego the issue in dispute.”
unclearerror (law misapplied)agree with court
The trial court did not expressly rule on the privilege objection, resting instead on relevancy, but the appellate court had to address it because it was an alternative ground for the instruction not to answer. Fremont Indemnity, Hartbrodt, and Newson support the sword-and-shield rule that a civil plaintiff cannot invoke the privilege to withhold facts relevant to his own claims. The opinion does not discuss that these cases typically leave the plaintiff a choice between answering and forgoing the claim (with preclusion or dismissal as the sanction), nor does it distinguish questions about treatment or post-accident use that may carry little incrimination risk, but ordering the motion to compel granted is consistent with the cited authority.

Authorities

  • relied: Morris Stulsaft Foundation v. Superior Court (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 409 — Discovery relevance is determined case by case, discovery statutes are construed liberally in favor of disclosure, inadmissibility is no objection if the information is reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence, and writ of mandate is the proper vehicle to review discovery orders.
  • relied: Hartbrodt v. Burke (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 168 — A civil plaintiff cannot use the privilege against self-incrimination as both sword and shield by pursuing a claim while refusing to disclose evidence relevant to it.
  • relied: Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 554 — An insured suing on a fire policy who invokes the Fifth Amendment as to arson-related facts must either answer or forgo the issue; the privilege cannot be used to prevent the opposing party from discovering facts relevant to the plaintiff's own claim.
  • relied: Newson v. City of Oakland (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 1050 — A plaintiff claiming lost wages places his tax records at issue and cannot invoke the privilege against self-incrimination regarding failure to file returns to block that discovery.
  • relied: Wilson v. Superior Court (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 825 — A plaintiff who places the existence and content of her tax returns at issue waives the tax return privilege.
  • relied: City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court (1951) 37 Cal.2d 227 — A plaintiff waives the physician-patient privilege by placing his physical condition in issue through a personal injury action.
  • relied: Pulver v. Avco Financial Services (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 622 — Documents not before the trial court must generally be disregarded as beyond the scope of appellate review.
  • missed: Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355 — Discovery statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of disclosure, and trial court discovery rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion; the opinion granted writ relief without articulating the deferential standard this foundational case establishes.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court correctly applied the liberal discovery relevance standard and the sword-and-shield line of Fifth Amendment cases to a plaintiff who claimed lost earning capacity after testing positive for methamphetamine on the day of the collision, and it properly refused to consider evidence (the 2011 drug scan and the IME) that was not before the trial court. It did not, however, state the standard of review for the discovery order, left the comparative-fault relevance ruling conditional on an unresolved dispute over the scope of defendants' liability admission, and did not address the usual remedy structure (answer or forgo the claim) or whether every question, such as those about treatment, actually implicated self-incrimination.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

record incomplete

Opinion

Filed 10/10/14 State of California v. Superior Court CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA et al., D065664 Petitioners, (Imperial County Super. Ct. No. ECU07069) v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF IMPERIAL COUNTY,

Respondent;

JERRY RABB et al., Real Parties in Interest.

Petition for writ of mandate from an order of the Superior Court of Imperial County. Juan Ulloa, Judge. Petition granted.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Richard F. Wolfe and Paul T. Hammerness, Deputy Attorneys General, for Petitioners.

No appearance for Respondent.

Terry L. Singleton and Horacio Barraza for Real Parties in Interest. In this personal injury case, Jerry Rabb sued the State of California and Tony Lee Royer, a State of California employee, (together, Defendants) for injuries resulting from a vehicle collision. The writ proceedings arose in response to the trial court's order denying Defendants' request to compel Rabb to answer deposition questions regarding his methamphetamine use and any related treatment. Defendants argued the evidence was relevant to causation and damages. We conclude the trial court erred in denying Defendants' motion to compel as Rabb's methamphetamine use is relevant to his loss of earning capacity claim and possibly to comparative fault. Accordingly, we grant Defendants' petition for writ of mandate and direct the trial court to enter a new order granting Defendants' motion to compel Rabb's answers.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In November 2011, Rabb was driving his motorcycle in El Centro, California.

While driving a vehicle owned by the State of California, Royer collided with Rabb's motorcycle, causing Rabb to suffer serious injuries. Rabb sued Defendants, seeking to recover damages, including amongst other things, loss of earnings. Defendants admitted that Royer, while acting within the course and scope of his employment, was negligent and that his negligence was a cause and contributed to the accident.

At his deposition in November 2013, Rabb testified that at the hospital after the accident, hospital staff informed him that he had tested positive for methamphetamine.

Thereafter, defense counsel asked Rabb if he (1) had an explanation for the positive drug test, (2) had ever used methamphetamine prior to the accident, (3) frequently used methamphetamine prior to the accident, (4) had used methamphetamine since the 2 accident, and (5) had ever obtained treatment for methamphetamine addiction. Rabb's counsel instructed him not to answer these questions, asserting objections based on relevancy and Rabb's Fifth Amendment rights.

Defendants moved to compel answers to the deposition questions regarding Rabb's methamphetamine use and treatment on the basis that the information was relevant to causation and damages. In regard to causation, Defendants argued that although they admitted they were negligent, they did not concede the issue of Rabb's contributory negligence. Thus, Defendants claimed information regarding whether Rabb was impaired by methamphetamine on the day of the accident was relevant to how his driving may have contributed to the accident. In regard to damages, Defendants argued evidence of Rabb's history of methamphetamine use and treatment was necessary to evaluate his loss of earnings claim and health status.

To support their motion, Defendants provided the court with positive methamphetamine results from a urine test performed on the day of the accident.

Defendants also provided Rabb's employment records indicating that between 2004 and 2006, his employer routinely drug tested him after he was convicted of driving under the influence. The results of those drug tests were negative; however, out of the 14 tests, Rabb's employer suspected that on five occasions Rabb hydrated himself prior to the test, which resulted in a diluted specimen.

Lastly, Defendants submitted declarations from two doctors regarding the effects of methamphetamine use. Dr. Smith stated that Rabb's test results on the day of the accident indicated he had taken methamphetamine within 24 hours of the accident.

3 According to Dr. Smith, methamphetamine addicts are prone to exhibit erratic and psychotic behaviors, including hallucinations, paranoia and impulsive violent behavior such as road rage. Further, according to Dr. Smith, "[c]hronic meth[amphetamine] users are unable to successfully follow safety instructions and flaunt safety guidelines, including those pertaining to the safe operation of motor vehicles. Meth[amphetamine]

use by chronic users impairs brain function with spatial distortion and leads to increased error rates on the job. Studies show that [m]eth[amphetamine] addicts who drive sustain twice the accident rates of unimpaired drivers." Similarly, Dr. Strauser stated chronic methamphetamine use has been linked to problems carrying out daily activities and higher unemployment rates. Based on his review of Rabb's medical records, Dr. Strauser also stated that the trauma surgeon who cared for Rabb on the day of the accident had spoken with Rabb's brother and learned Rabb had " 'a situation with methamphetamine.' "

The trial court denied Defendants' motion to compel, concluding they had "laid an insufficient foundation for [their] argument that [Rabb] ha[d] a methamphetamine addiction problem" and the evidence was insufficient "to support a determination that further questioning on the topic would lead to admissible evidence that was actually relevant to the subject matter of the case."

Defendants filed a petition for writ of mandate in this court seeking a writ directing the court to vacate its order denying their motion to compel Rabb's deposition answers. On March 27, 2014, we stayed all further proceedings in the case and directed Rabb to file an informal response. Thereafter, we issued an order to the superior court to 4 show cause as to why this court should not grant the relief Defendants seek in their petition.

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Strike Rabb filed a motion to strike a portion of the exhibits submitted by Defendants in support of their writ petition. Specifically, Rabb requested that we strike results from a drug scan conducted at the University of California, San Diego Health System in January 2011, several months before the accident, showing he tested positive for methamphetamine. Rabb contends this court should not consider that document because it was not presented to the trial court. Defendants argue the document was not available to them before the court denied their request to compel deposition answers and the information is relevant to show they would be prejudiced as a result of the trial court's ruling.

California Rules of Court, rule 8.486(b)(1) provides that a petition seeking review of a trial court ruling must be accompanied by "[a]ll documents and exhibits submitted to the trial court supporting and opposing the petitioner's position" and "[a]ny other documents or portions of documents submitted to the trial court that are necessary for a complete understanding of the case and the ruling under review." (Italics added.) The rule does not allow for the petitioner to include new evidence not considered by the trial court. Moreover, "[a]s a general rule, documents not before the trial court . . . must be disregarded as beyond the scope of appellate review." (Pulver v. Avco Financial Services 5 (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 622, 632.) Accordingly, we grant Rabb's motion to strike and do not consider documents not presented to the trial court in our review.

II. Motion to Compel Deposition Answers Defendants contend the trial court erred in denying their motion to compel Rabb's answers to deposition questions concerning his methamphetamine use and treatment because that information was relevant to damages and his contributory negligence in the accident. They also assert Rabb cannot seek civil relief yet to refuse to testify on matters relevant to his recovery based on the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

"[A]ny party may obtain discovery [through the deposition of a party] regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action." (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2017.010, 2025.010.) " ' "No precise or universal test of relevancy is furnished by the law. The question must be determined in each case according to the teachings of reason and judicial experience." ' " (Morris Stulsaft Foundation v. Superior Court (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 409, 416 (Morris).) "In determining whether questions asked at a deposition pertain to matters 'relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action' [citation] we heed the caveat that the discovery statutes 'must be construed liberally in favor of disclosure unless the request is clearly improper by virtue of well-established causes for denial.' [Citations.] . . . [I]t is not a ground for objection that the information sought to be elicited is not admissible at trial if it 'appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.' "

(Id. at p. 417.)

6 "It is settled that the writ of mandate is the proper remedy for reviewing discovery procedures and that the writ may issue not only to enforce a proper discovery right but to prevent improper discovery." (Morris, supra, 245 Cal.App.2d at p. 415.) With the foregoing principles in mind, we consider Defendants' arguments.

As a preliminary matter, we note that Defendants devote a significant portion of their petition to matters outside the scope of our review. Specifically, Defendants discuss at length an independent medical examination (IME) of Rabb in March 2014. During that IME, Rabb allegedly refused to discuss the issues of his methamphetamine use, addiction or treatment and provide blood and urine samples for testing. The IME took place after the trial court's ruling denying Defendants' motion to compel Rabb's deposition answers. Based on the record before us, it is unclear as to whether the IME was ever considered by the trial court. As it is not a part of the court's order subject to Defendants' petition, we do not consider any issues concerning the IME.

On the issue of causation, the parties disagree as to whether Defendants admitted complete liability in this case. Rabb contends causation is not a factor in this case because Defendants admitted full liability whereas Defendants claim they have not conceded the issue of contributory negligence. If causation is an open factor in this case, we conclude Defendants made a minimal showing of relevancy in regard to comparative fault. They presented evidence from two doctors regarding how methamphetamine may have impacted Rabb's driving on the day of the collision. Specifically, the doctors made statements that methamphetamine use can cause erratic and impulsive violent behavior and deficits in cognitive functions. Further, Dr. Smith explained how chronic 7 methamphetamine users are unable to follow safety guidelines pertaining to the operation of a motor vehicle and sustain twice the accident rates of unimpaired drivers. This evidence was minimally sufficient to show Rabb's methamphetamine use was relevant to the issue of comparative fault.

We also conclude Defendants showed relevancy as to damages. Dr. Smith opined that methamphetamine users have increased error rates on the job and Dr. Strauser stated they have higher unemployment rates. Both doctors stated it was critically important to question Rabb about his drug usage in order to properly evaluate his health status and loss of earnings claim. By making a loss of earning capacity claim, Rabb placed his future earnings at issue and his methamphetamine usage is relevant to a determination of his damages.

Having found relevancy, we must consider whether Rabb could properly rely on his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to refuse to answer questions about his methamphetamine usage and any related treatment.

Our review of relevant authority leads us to the conclusion that under these circumstances, Rabb cannot be permitted to insist on "having his cake and eating it too"

by asserting a claim for negligence and seeking damages for a purportedly large loss of future earnings while denying Defendants crucial information to evaluate and refute his claims. (Hartbrodt v. Burke (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 168, 175 (Hartbrodt); Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 554, 560 (Fremont).) Where a plaintiff puts a factual issue in dispute, he either waives his privilege against self- incrimination or must forego the issue in dispute. (Fremont, at p. 560 [where plaintiff 8 initiated an action to recover under his fire insurance policy, he waived his privilege against self-incrimination as to factual issues relevant to policy's arson exclusion];

Hartbrodt, at pp. 174-175 [where plaintiff brought action stemming from oral agreement and had recording of alleged oral agreement but refused to disclose it based on Fifth Amendment privilege, court forced disclosure of the recording finding that plaintiff waived privilege against self-incrimination]; Newson v. City of Oakland (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 1050, 1055 [where plaintiff asserted a claim for lost wages and placed his tax records at issue, the court rejected plaintiff's assertion of the privilege against self- incrimination pertaining to his failure to file tax returns].) Courts have enforced similar waivers of other privileges. For example, in Wilson v. Superior Court (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 825, 830, the court held that where "plaintiff has placed in issue the existence and the content of her tax returns and the tax consequences of the computations thereon,"

plaintiff waived the privilege accorded to tax records. Similarly, in City & County of S.F.

v. Superior Court (1951) 37 Cal.2d 227, 231, the court stated a physician-patient privilege is waived when plaintiff places his physical condition in issue by filing an action for personal injuries.

Based on the foregoing discussion, we conclude under the circumstances of this case, Rabb's methamphetamine use and treatment is relevant to his loss of earning capacity claim and to comparative fault if it is an open issue in the case. Rabb cannot continue to assert the privilege against self-incrimination to prevent disclosure of this relevant evidence. Accordingly, Rabb must answer deposition questions related to his methamphetamine use and treatment.

9 DISPOSITION

Let a writ of mandate issue directing the superior court to vacate its January 24, 2014, order denying the motion to compel answers to deposition questions and enter an order granting the motion. The stay issued on March 27, 2014, is vacated. Defendants are entitled to costs in the writ proceeding.

MCINTYRE, J.

WE CONCUR:

HALLER, Acting P. J.

MCDONALD, J.

Cites, in this corpus