gno.law

In re Frances G. CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D065301 · 2014-09-29 · Unpublished

Proceeding
appeal from a judgment
Trial court
Superior Court of San Diego County · No. J234154
Trial judge
Richard R. Monroy
Outcome
affirmed — Affirmed.
Area
delinquency
Panel
Gilbert Nares (author), Alex C. McDonald, Judith D. McConnell

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T06:32Z · confidence high

The juvenile court declared Frances G. a ward of the court and ordered her placed with her adult sister after she contested the charges and did not request deferred entry of judgment, despite receiving notice of her eligibility. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the trial court was excused from its mandatory duty to hold a deferred entry of judgment hearing because Frances rejected consideration by insisting on a contested jurisdictional hearing.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Failure to hold a hearing on deferred entry of judgment (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 790) or summarily grant it.
“The juvenile court is excused from its mandatory duty to hold a hearing if, after receiving notice of eligibility for [deferred entry of judgment], the minor nonetheless rejects [deferred entry of judgment] consideration by contesting the charges.”
de novocorrectagree with court
The appellate court correctly applied the established exception to the mandatory hearing requirement. Under In re D.L. and In re Kenneth J., a juvenile court is not required to hold a deferred entry of judgment hearing if the minor, after receiving proper notice of eligibility, chooses to contest the charges rather than accept the deferred judgment process. Frances received notice, appeared with counsel, and requested a denial and trial, thereby rejecting the expedited mechanism. The court's reliance on In re Kenneth J. is appropriate as the facts are analogous (notice given, minor insisted on contesting charges).

Authorities

  • relied: In re D.L. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1240 — The juvenile court has a mandatory duty to either grant deferred entry of judgment summarily or hold a hearing, but is excused from this duty if the minor rejects consideration by contesting the charges after receiving notice.
  • relied: In re Kenneth J. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 973 — A minor who is advised of deferred entry of judgment eligibility but insists on a jurisdictional hearing to contest the charges has rejected consideration, excusing the court from holding a separate hearing.
  • relied: In re Usef S. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 276 — Supports the proposition that the court is excused from the mandatory hearing duty if the minor rejects deferred entry of judgment consideration by contesting the charges.
  • relied: In re Luis B. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1117 — Distinguished on the grounds that in Luis B., the prosecutor failed to give the required notice of eligibility, whereas in the present case, notice was properly given.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly identifies the legal standard for when a juvenile court is excused from holding a deferred entry of judgment hearing and accurately applies the facts of the case to that standard. The court properly distinguishes cases where notice was not given or where the court made a summary finding of unsuitability, relying instead on In re Kenneth J. which directly addresses the scenario where a minor contests charges after receiving notice.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:31Z · confidence medium

The juvenile court made a true finding that Frances G. received stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)), declared her a ward, and placed her with her adult sister under probation supervision, without ever holding a deferred entry of judgment (DEJ) suitability hearing after the prosecutor gave statutory notice of eligibility and Frances denied the petition and went to trial. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that a minor who receives DEJ eligibility notice and then rejects DEJ consideration by contesting the charges excuses the juvenile court from its otherwise mandatory duty to hold a DEJ hearing or summarily grant DEJ.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Juvenile court's failure to hold a Welfare and Institutions Code section 790 DEJ suitability hearing or to summarily grant DEJ after the prosecutor gave notice of eligibility and the minor denied the petition and proceeded to a contested jurisdictional hearing.
“Here, Frances "reject[ed] [deferred entry of judgment] consideration by contesting the charges."”
unclearcorrectagree with court
The opinion does not state a standard of review, but the question whether the court's mandatory DEJ duty was excused is legal. The record shows the petition contained the section 790 notice, counsel confirmed receiving and reviewing it with Frances, counsel entered a denial, requested trial dates, and never sought DEJ; Frances conceded notice was adequate. Under In re Kenneth J., In re Usef S., and In re D.L., a minor who is advised of eligibility and insists on contesting the charges forfeits the hearing requirement, and the opinion correctly distinguishes In re Luis B. (no notice) and In re D.L. (summary unsuitability finding before denial). The result follows the published authority.

Authorities

  • relied: In re D.L. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1240 — Juvenile court has a mandatory duty to summarily grant DEJ or hold a suitability hearing, but is excused from that duty when a minor who has received eligibility notice rejects DEJ consideration by contesting the charges.
  • relied: In re Kenneth J. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 973 — A minor advised of DEJ eligibility who does not admit the charges, shows no interest in DEJ, and insists on a contested jurisdictional hearing cannot fault the juvenile court on appeal for failing to hold a DEJ hearing.
  • relied: In re Usef S. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 276 — A minor who receives notice of DEJ eligibility and nonetheless contests the charges waives consideration of DEJ.
  • relied: In re Luis B. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1117 — Where the prosecutor fails to give the required DEJ eligibility notice, the juvenile court's failure to consider DEJ is error; distinguished here because notice was given.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion answers the sole appellate contention with the controlling published authorities, correctly applies the forfeiture-by-contesting-charges rule from Kenneth J., Usef S., and D.L., and persuasively distinguishes Luis B. and D.L. on their facts. It does not articulate a standard of review or address the due process framing separately, but the result is compelled by the cited cases given the minor's concession that notice was adequate.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 9/29/14 In re Frances G. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re FRANCES G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. D065301 THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. J234154)

v. FRANCES G., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Richard R.

Monroy, Judge. Affirmed.

Robert Booher, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, and Charles C. Ragland and Stacy Tyler, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. The juvenile delinquency court made a true finding that Frances G. had received stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)), a felony. The court declared her a ward and ordered her placed with her adult sister, under the supervision of the probation officer.

Frances appeals, contending the court violated her due process rights by not holding a hearing to consider her suitability for deferred entry of judgment (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 790) or summarily granting deferred entry of judgment. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

In April 2013, a teacher at Lincoln High School discovered that 21 iPads had been stolen from a locked cart in a classroom. The theft was reported to the police. In July, police officers executed a search warrant at the home where Frances lived. They found one of the iPads in a bedroom she shared with her boyfriend. Frances said the iPad was hers and her boyfriend had stolen it from a school. She gave her password to a police officer, who then unlocked the iPad and found "Frances's iPad" in the settings. On the back of the iPad was the San Diego Unified School District logo.

In September 2013, the district attorney filed a delinquency petition alleging one count of receiving stolen property. The petition contained a "NOTICE PURSUANT TO WELFARE AND INSTITUTIONS CODE SECTION 790" stating "The District Attorney has determined that [Frances] is eligible to be considered by the juvenile court for a deferred entry of judgment . . . ." The petition explained in detail the procedures for deferred entry of judgment. There was a statement at the end of the petition "that . . . [t]he above matter has been set for hearing on Oct[ober 7] . . . ."

2 On October 7, 2013, at readiness hearing, Frances appeared with appointed counsel. Counsel said she had received the petition and reviewed it with Frances.

Counsel asked that a denial be entered. At counsel's request, the court set dates for a settlement conference and trial. At the settlement conference, the court confirmed the trial date. Trial took place in early November and the dispositional hearing took place later that month. Neither Frances nor her trial counsel ever requested deferred entry of judgment.

DISCUSSION

The court has a mandatory duty "to either grant [deferred entry of judgment]

summarily or examine the record, conduct a hearing, and determine whether the minor is suitable for [deferred entry of judgment] . . . ." (In re D.L. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1240, 1243.) "The juvenile court is excused from its mandatory duty to hold a hearing if, after receiving notice of eligibility for [deferred entry of judgment], the minor nonetheless rejects [deferred entry of judgment] consideration by contesting the charges." (Id. at p. 1244, citing In re Kenneth J. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 973, 979-980 & In re Usef S.

(2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 276, 285.) Here, Frances "reject[ed] [deferred entry of judgment] consideration by contesting the charges." (In re D.L., supra, at p. 1244.)

Frances correctly concedes "[t]he prosecutor fulfilled its duty to inform the court and [Frances] that [Frances] was eligible for a deferred entry of judgment . . . ." In re Luis B. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1117, on which Frances relies, is therefore distinguishable; in that case, the prosecutor did not give the required notice. (Id. at p. 1123.) In re D.L., supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at page 1240, is also distinguishable. There, 3 the probation department filed a report stating D.L. was eligible but not suitable for deferred entry of judgment. (Id. at p. 1242.) The court summarily found the minor was not suitable and the minor then entered a denial to the allegations of the petition. (Id. at pp. 1242-1243, 1245.)

In re Kenneth J., supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at page 973, on the other hand, is apposite. There, the prosecutor gave the requisite notice. (Id. at p. 977.) A hearing on deferred entry of judgment was set, but never held. (Id. at p. 978.) Before the date set for the hearing on deferred entry of judgment, the minor requested a contested jurisdictional hearing. (Id. at pp. 977-979.) The reviewing court rejected his contention that the juvenile court had erred by failing to hold a hearing on deferred entry of judgment. (Id.

at p. 976.) The fact that a hearing was set in In re Kenneth J. does not distinguish it from Frances's case, and the words of the reviewing court there are apt here. "It is perhaps true the [deferred entry of judgment] statutes make no express provision for a minor in Kenneth's position, one who is advised of his [deferred entry of judgment] eligibility, who does not admit the charges in the petition or waive a jurisdictional hearing, and who does not show the least interest in probation, but who insists on a jurisdictional hearing in order to contest the charges. But the [deferred entry of judgment] is clearly intended to provide an expedited mechanism for channeling certain first-time offenders away from the full panoply of a contested delinquency proceeding. That goal could not co-exist with a minor who insists on exercising every procedural protection offered, and who then on appeal faults the juvenile court for not intervening and short circuiting those very protections." (Id. at pp. 979-980.)

4 DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NARES, J.

WE CONCUR:

MCCONNELL, P. J.

MCDONALD, J.

Cites, in this corpus