In re Gage J. CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D065363 · 2014-09-23 · Unpublished

Proceeding: appeal from an order
Trial court: Superior Court of San Diego County · No. JCM233464
Trial judge: Aaron H. Katz
Outcome: affirmed — Affirmed.
Area: delinquency
Panel: Richard D. Huffman, Sr. (author), O'Rourke, Joan K. Irion

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T06:32Z · confidence high

The juvenile court denied Gage's motion to withdraw his admission of possessing a knife on school grounds, ruling that the failure to orally advise him of the maximum confinement term was not a valid ground for withdrawal. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that Gage failed to demonstrate prejudice because the record showed he was aware of the one-year maximum term.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Denial of motion to withdraw admission “The court denied the motion without prejudice "to be renewed for appropriate grounds."”	abuse of discretion	correct	agree with court The appellate court correctly applied the abuse of discretion standard to the trial court's denial of the withdrawal motion. It further correctly applied the prejudice requirement from People v. Walker, finding that the record evidence (signed minute order and Gage's statements) negated any claim that he was unaware of the consequences of his plea.

Authorities

relied: People v. Cruz (1974) 12 Cal.3d 562 — Establishes the 'good cause' standard for withdrawing a guilty plea, requiring a showing of mistake, ignorance, fraud, duress, or other factors overcoming free judgment.
relied: People v. Superior Court (Giron) (1974) 11 Cal.3d 793 — Establishes that the grant or denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is within the trial court's sound discretion and must be upheld unless an abuse is clearly demonstrated.
relied: Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592 — Requires a record demonstrating the trial court advised the defendant of the direct consequences of the conviction, including the permissible range of punishment.
relied: In re Carabes (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 927 — Interprets 'possible range of punishment' to mean an advisement of the maximum and minimum prison terms.
relied: People v. Walker (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1013 — Holds that a defendant is entitled to relief for failure to advise of the maximum term only if they establish prejudice, defined as a reasonable probability they would not have pleaded guilty.
relied: In re Moser (1993) 6 Cal.4th 342 — Reaffirms the prejudice requirement for relief based on failure to advise of the maximum term of confinement.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly identifies the applicable legal standards for plea withdrawal and the specific prejudice requirement under People v. Walker. It effectively uses the record evidence, specifically the signed minute order and the minor's own statements, to demonstrate that the minor was aware of the maximum term, thereby negating the claim of prejudice.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:31Z · confidence low

The juvenile court accepted Gage J.'s admission to possessing a knife on school grounds without orally advising him of the one-year maximum confinement term, later denied without prejudice his motion to withdraw the admission (which was based on the revocation of informal supervision), and placed him on formal probation. On appeal, raised for the first time, Gage argued the missing advisement entitled him to withdraw his admission; the Court of Appeal found the advisement omission was error but harmless because Gage could not show prejudice under People v. Walker, and affirmed.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Acceptance of the minor's admission without an oral advisement of the one-year maximum term of confinement “Although the juvenile court failed to orally advise Gage he could be subject to confinement in juvenile court for up to one year, we conclude on this record that the court's failure to do so was harmless.”	mixed	harmless error (procedure)	unsure The court correctly identified the Bunnell duty to advise of direct consequences and the Walker/Moser requirement that the defendant show a reasonable probability he would not have pleaded absent the error. Placing the burden on Gage and noting the absence of any record evidence beyond his appellate brief's assertion is a defensible basis for finding no prejudice. However, two of the three facts the court relied on are weak: the minute order advisement was signed after the admission was entered, so it does not show pre-plea awareness, and Gage's complaint about being 'on probation for a year' concerns probation, not confinement, and does not clearly show knowledge of the maximum confinement term. The court also did not address juvenile-specific authority such as In re Ronald E., which applies a prejudice requirement to defective consequence advisements in juvenile admissions and would have strengthened the analysis. The result is defensible on burden-of-proof grounds, but the inferences drawn are thin.
Denial without prejudice of the minor's motion to withdraw his admission “The court denied the motion without prejudice "to be renewed for appropriate grounds."”	abuse of discretion	correct	agree with court The motion actually made below challenged the revocation of informal supervision, not the admission's validity, and the juvenile court correctly treated that as a separate issue with no bearing on whether the admission was knowing and voluntary. Gage never renewed the motion on the advisement ground despite two further hearings, so there was no evidentiary showing of good cause by clear and convincing evidence under Cruz. Under the deferential Giron standard, no abuse of discretion appears, and the appellate court's affirmance of the denial follows from its no-prejudice finding.

Authorities

relied: People v. Cruz (1974) 12 Cal.3d 562 — Good cause to withdraw a plea requires clear and convincing evidence of mistake, ignorance, fraud, duress, or another factor overcoming free judgment.
relied: People v. Superior Court (Giron) (1974) 11 Cal.3d 793 — Grant or denial of a motion to withdraw a plea rests in the trial court's sound discretion and is upheld absent a clear showing of abuse.
relied: Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592 — The record must show the defendant was advised of the direct consequences of the plea, including the permissible range of punishment.
relied: In re Carabes (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 927 — The 'possible range of punishment' advisement means the maximum and minimum terms that may be imposed on conviction.
relied: People v. Walker (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1013 — A defendant is entitled to relief for failure to advise of plea consequences only on a showing that it is reasonably probable he would not have pleaded guilty absent the error.
relied: In re Moser (1993) 6 Cal.4th 342 — Advisement errors regarding direct consequences of a plea are not reversible per se and require a showing of prejudice.
missed: In re Ronald E. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 315 — In juvenile proceedings, a court's failure to advise a minor of the consequences of an admission does not require reversal absent a showing that the minor would not have admitted the allegation had he been properly advised.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion applies the correct Bunnell/Walker/Moser framework and reaches a defensible result because Gage bore the burden of showing prejudice and offered nothing beyond an unsupported assertion in his brief. It has gaps, however: it relies on adult criminal authority and Penal Code section 1018 without addressing juvenile-specific precedent such as In re Ronald E., and two of its factual inferences (a post-admission minute order signature and a comment about a year of probation) do not clearly establish pre-plea awareness of the maximum confinement term.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 9/23/14 In re Gage J. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re GAGE J., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. D065363 THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. JCM233464)

v. GAGE J., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Aaron H.

Katz, Judge. Affirmed.

Jared G. Coleman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton and Christopher P. Beesley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Minor Gage J. (Gage) admitted to possessing a knife on school grounds, as alleged in a petition filed in the juvenile court. (Pen. Code, § 626.10, subd. (a)(1).) During a later hearing, Gage moved to withdraw his admission. The court denied his request without prejudice and placed him on formal probation.

Gage appeals, contending he is entitled to withdraw his admission because the juvenile court failed to orally advise him of the one-year maximum period of confinement as a direct consequence of his plea. We disagree and affirm the order of the juvenile court denying his request to withdraw his admission.

BACKGROUND

A petition filed with the juvenile court alleged Gage possessed a knife on school grounds (count 1) and violated curfew (count 2). (Pen. Code, § 626.10, subd. (a)(1); San Diego Mun. Code, § 58.0102, subd. (a).) The court initially placed Gage on informal supervision, but reinstated the petition a few months later because Gage was expelled from school and continued to demonstrate behavioral problems at home.

Immediately after the court reinstated the petition, counsel explained Gage was willing to admit count 1 in exchange for the People's dismissal of count 2. Gage was advised of and waived his constitutional rights, then admitted the knife allegation.

Before Gage entered his admission, however, the court did not orally advise him of the maximum term of confinement, which was one year. Although the court did not orally advise Gage of the potential term of confinement, both Gage and the court signed the minute order the same day, which stated: "The minor is advised the maximum term for 2 Count 1 is 1 year," and "[t]he minor is advised the overall maximum term of confinement is 1 year."

At the next hearing Gage moved to withdraw his admission, challenging the court's decision to revoke his informal supervision. The court rejected this argument, noting its decision to revoke informal supervision was a separate issue having no effect on the validity of Gage's admission. The court denied the motion without prejudice "to be renewed for appropriate grounds."

Gage did not renew his request to withdraw his admission at either of the two continued disposition hearings that followed. At the final disposition hearing, Gage again expressed his dissatisfaction with the court's decision to revoke informal supervision, stating, "I have not broken informal probation . . . and I don't see why the court is pushing me to be on probation for a year . . . ."

DISCUSSION

Gage for the first time on appeal contends he should be able to withdraw his admission based on the juvenile court's failure to orally advise him of the direct consequences of his plea.1 He contends he would not have admitted the knife allegation had the juvenile court orally admonished him of the one-year maximum term of confinement. Because the record shows Gage was aware of the one-year maximum term, we conclude he fails to establish the prejudice necessary to warrant a withdrawal of his admission.

1 Although the People argue Gage forfeited this claim by failing to raise this objection in the juvenile court, we nevertheless dispose of it on the merits. 3 A. Legal Principles Generally, a defendant may move the trial court to set aside a guilty plea for good cause at any time before the entry of judgment. (Pen. Code, § 1018.) "Good cause"

requires a showing by clear and convincing evidence of mistake, ignorance, fraud, duress or any other factor that overcomes the exercise of free judgment. (People v. Cruz (1974)

12 Cal.3d 562, 566.) The grant or denial of such a withdrawal motion is "within the sound discretion of the trial court and must be upheld unless an abuse thereof is clearly demonstrated." (People v. Superior Court (Giron) (1974) 11 Cal.3d 793, 796.)

The validity of a guilty plea requires a record demonstrating the trial court advised the defendant of the direct consequences of the conviction, including the permissible range of punishment provided by statute. (Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592, 605.) The phrase, "possible range of punishment," has been interpreted to mean an advisement of the maximum and minimum prison terms that may be imposed upon conviction. (In re Carabes (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 927, 932-933.) Thus, the trial court errs when it fails to advise a defendant of the maximum term of punishment as a consequence of his or her plea. (Bunnell, supra, at p. 605.)

However, as the California Supreme Court explained in People v. Walker (1991)

54 Cal.3d 1013, 1022-1023, a defendant is entitled to relief based on the trial court's failure to advise of the maximum term of confinement only if the defendant establishes that he or she was prejudiced by the error. (In re Moser (1993) 6 Cal.4th 342, 352.) To establish prejudice, a defendant must demonstrate it is "reasonably probable" that he or she would not have pleaded guilty if not for the error. (Walker, supra, at p. 1023.)

4 B. Analysis Although the juvenile court failed to orally advise Gage he could be subject to confinement in juvenile court for up to one year, we conclude on this record that the court's failure to do so was harmless. Gage was represented by counsel (and Gage indicated to counsel that he was willing to admit the knife allegation). Immediately after Gage entered his admission, the record shows he signed the minute order, which clearly advised the maximum term of confinement for possessing a knife on school grounds was one year.

Moreover, Gage was given several opportunities to move to withdraw his admission based on the court's failure to advise him of the direct consequences of his plea. The record also shows, however, Gage made no effort to do so, suggesting he did not consider the court's failure significant in his decision to admit the knife allegation.

In addition, Gage's statement at the final disposition hearing that he did not "see why the court [was] pushing [him] to be on probation for a year" shows he was in fact aware of the maximum term of punishment for possessing a knife on school grounds.

Gage's assertion in his brief that, but for the court's failure to advise him he would not have made his admission, without any evidentiary support from the record, is insufficient to establish prejudice. As such, we are satisfied on this record that Gage had full recognition of the consequences of his admission, including the potential term of confinement in juvenile hall for up to one year. Because Gage was aware of the potential term of confinement, he cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the juvenile court's failure to confirm his awareness and is not entitled to withdraw his plea.

5 DISPOSITION

We affirm the order of the juvenile court denying Gage's request to withdraw his admission of possessing a knife on school grounds.

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

O'ROURKE, J.

IRION, J.

Cites, in this corpus

In Re Moser S026837 · 1993-12-02
People v. Walker S017854 · 1991-12-05
In Re Carabes Civ. 7591 · 1983-07-13
Bunnell v. Superior Court S.F. 23128 · 1975-02-27
People v. Cruz Crim. 17561 · 1974-09-20
People v. Superior Court (Giron) S. F. 23084 · 1974-06-25