In re Jordan W. CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. CJ1074A-B
- Trial judge
- Laura J. Birkmeyer
- Outcome
- reversed in part — Affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded.
- Area
- dependency
- Panel
- McINTYRE (author), Alex C. McDonald, Judith L. Haller
Analysis
The trial court terminated Margaret C.'s parental rights to her sons Jordan W. and C.N., finding no statutory exceptions applied and that ICWA did not apply to C.N. The Court of Appeal affirmed the termination of parental rights but reversed and remanded the case regarding C.N. solely to correct a procedural error in the notice provided under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Termination of parental rights to Jordan W. and C.N. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, specifically the rejection of the beneficial relationship exception.“Examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment (ibid.), we conclude substantial evidence supports the court's findings.” | substantial evidence | correct | agree with court agree with court |
Finding that ICWA did not apply to C.N. and the sufficiency of the notice sent to the Bureau of Indian Affairs.“In light of the lack of information in the ICWA notice concerning the Blackfeet Tribe... and in light of the Agency's failure to give notice to that tribe, we agree a limited remand is necessary.” | de novo | error (procedure) | agree with court agree with court |
Authorities
- relied: In re Helen W. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 71 — Establishes that if a child is adoptable, parental rights must be terminated unless a statutory exception is proven.
- relied: In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567 — Defines the beneficial relationship exception as requiring that the relationship promotes the child's well-being to a degree that outweighs the benefits of adoption.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion correctly applies the substantial evidence standard to the termination of parental rights, noting that the children had been in stable care for two years and did not view the mother as a primary attachment figure. It also correctly identifies the procedural failure in ICWA notice, as the agency failed to notify the specific tribe indicated in the parental notification form.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe juvenile court terminated Margaret C.'s parental rights to Jordan W. and C.N. after declining to apply the beneficial relationship exception and finding ICWA did not apply to C.N. On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed as to Jordan but, on the Agency's concession, reversed as to C.N. and remanded for proper ICWA notice to the Blackfeet Tribe, with directions to reinstate the judgment if no tribe claims C.N. is an Indian child.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Refusal to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) and termination of parental rights“Examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment (ibid.), we conclude substantial evidence supports the court's findings.” | substantial evidence | correct | agree with court The court correctly placed the burden on the parent (Helen W.) and applied the Autumn H. factors: the boys had been out of Margaret's care nearly two years, C.N. had lived longer with his caregiver than with his mother, Margaret functioned as a peer or friendly visitor rather than a parent, the boys separated easily after visits, and both caregivers were parental figures wishing to adopt. That evidence amply supports a finding that the relationship did not outweigh the benefits of adoption. The opinion applied pure substantial-evidence review without acknowledging the then-existing split over a hybrid standard (abuse of discretion on the detriment weighing), but the result would be the same under either standard. |
Finding that ICWA did not apply in C.N.'s case despite notice omitting the Blackfeet Tribe and no notice sent to that tribe“Margaret contends remand is necessary for proper ICWA notice in C.N.'s case, and the Agency concedes a limited remand is required.” | unclear | error (procedure) | agree with court The father identified possible Blackfeet heritage on his ICWA-020 form, yet the Agency's notice to the Secretary of the Interior and BIA did not mention the Blackfeet Tribe and no notice went to the tribe itself, as 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) and § 224.2 require. The Agency conceded the defect, and the conditional reversal with directions to reinstate the judgment absent a tribal claim is the accepted limited-remand remedy. The court cited no case authority for the ICWA holding, relying only on the Federal Register listing of the tribe, but the conclusion is plainly correct. |
Authorities
- relied: In re Helen W. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 71 — If a dependent child is adoptable, the court must terminate parental rights at the section 366.26 hearing unless the parent proves a statutory exception applies.
- relied: In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567 — The beneficial relationship exception requires that the relationship promote the child's well-being to a degree outweighing the benefits of adoption, assessed by the child's age, time in parental custody, quality of interaction, and particular needs; reviewed for substantial evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion reaches the right result on both issues, applying the correct burden and Autumn H. factors to the exception and ordering the standard limited remand for the conceded ICWA notice defect. It has gaps: the introduction states 'We affirm' although the disposition reverses in part, the ICWA holding cites no statutory or case authority, and the court did not address the then-unsettled standard of review for the exception's detriment prong.
Opinion
Filed 8/7/14 In re Jordan W. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re JORDAN W. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. D065452 SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, (Super. Ct. No. CJ1074A-B) Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MARGARET C., Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Laura J.
Birkmeyer, Judge. Affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded.
Christopher Blake, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County Counsel and Erica R. Cortez, Senior Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Margaret C. appeals the judgment terminating her parental rights to her sons, Jordan W. and C.N. (the boys). Margaret contends the juvenile court erred by declining to apply the beneficial relationship exception (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd.
(c)(1)(B)(i); statutory references are to this code unless otherwise specified) to termination of parental rights and, as to C.N. only, failed to comply with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). We affirm.
BACKGROUND
In April 2012, the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) filed dependency petitions for nine-year-old Jordan and one-year-old C.N. The petitions alleged the boys were exposed to violent confrontations between Margaret and C.N.'s father, Martin N. The boys were detained in Polinsky Children's Center. Less than two weeks later, Jordan was moved to the home of his paternal grandmother and C.N. was moved to the home of a nonrelative extended family member. The boys remained in these homes for the remainder of the case.
In May 2012, the court entered true findings on the petitions, ordered Jordan placed with a relative and C.N. placed with a nonrelative extended family member and ordered reunification services. At the 12-month hearing in July 2013, the court 2 terminated services and set a section 366.26 hearing. The section 366.26 hearing took place in January and February 2014.
ICWA
According to the detention report, Martin said he might have Native American heritage with the Blackfeet Tribe, but he was not a registered member of the tribe. On the day of the detention hearing, Martin filed an ICWA-020 form (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(2) [Parental Notification of Indian Status]) declaring that he might have Indian ancestry through the Blackfeet Tribe and he and C.N. might be eligible for membership. The court deferred making an ICWA finding.
In May 2012, the Agency mailed ICWA notice to the United States Secretary of the Interior and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The notice did not mention the Blackfeet Tribe and no notice was sent to that tribe. In December, the court found ICWA did not apply in C.N.'s case.
Margaret contends remand is necessary for proper ICWA notice in C.N.'s case, and the Agency concedes a limited remand is required. In light of the lack of information in the ICWA notice concerning the Blackfeet Tribe (Blackfeet Tribe of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation of Montana), 79 Fed. Reg. 4748-02 (Jan. 29, 2014), and in light of the Agency's failure to give notice to that tribe, we agree a limited remand is necessary.
THE BENEFICIAL RELATIONSHIP EXCEPTION
Margaret does not contest the finding the boys are adoptable. If a dependent child is adoptable, the court must terminate parental rights at the section 366.26 hearing unless the parent proves the existence of a statutory exception. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1); In re 3 Helen W. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 71, 80-81.) An exception exists if "[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) A beneficial relationship "promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents." (In re Autumn H.
(1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.) If terminating parental rights "would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome . . . ." (Ibid.) The existence of a beneficial relationship is determined by considering "[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child's life spent in the parent's custody, the 'positive' or 'negative' effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child's particular needs . . . ." (Id. at p. 576.)
Examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment (ibid.), we conclude substantial evidence supports the court's findings. The court found that Margaret had maintained regular visitation and contact during the period since the referral hearing, although she had not done so earlier in the case. The court also found that Margaret had not shown that the boys "would benefit continuing the relationship to such a degree that terminating parental rights would be detrimental to the [boys] . . . ."
By the conclusion of the section 366.26 hearing, 11-year-old Jordan and four-year- old C.N. had been out of Margaret's care for almost two years. For virtually all of that time, the boys had lived with their respective caregivers. C.N. had lived with his caregiver longer than he had lived with Margaret. The nonrelative extended family member wished to adopt C.N. and Jordan's paternal grandmother wished to adopt him.
4 Margaret and the boys showed affection for each other during their supervised visits. Visits were positive and Margaret was appropriate, often performing parental duties such as bringing snacks and clothes making sure the boys were comfortable and engaged. The boys enjoyed visits, but separated from Margaret easily when visits ended.
Margaret related to Jordan as a sibling or peer rather than a parent. He called her "mom," but did not trust her or look to her to meet his needs. Jordan had a loving and trusting relationship with his paternal grandmother, who had cared for him periodically in the past. He viewed her as a parental figure and was happy and secure in her care.
Jordan said he wanted his paternal grandmother to adopt him but wanted to continue having a relationship with Margaret.
Margaret's relationship with C.N. was that of a friendly visitor. C.N. called both Margaret and his caregiver "mommy." C.N. was affectionate with his caregiver and was happy, safe, and thriving in her home.
In Margaret's care, the boys were exposed to chaos, violence, and marijuana use.
When the boys were detained, after a long history of child welfare referrals, C.N. had breathing difficulties and Jordan had untreated tooth infections. Jordan suffered from depression and anxiety. With therapy and the support of his paternal grandmother, Jordan's mood and self esteem improved, despite Margaret's "drama," false promises and deliberate withholding of Jordan's belongings. The boys' caregivers provided them loving, nurturing, stable homes and the boys needed the permanency, stability, and consistency of adoption.
5 DISPOSITION
In Jordan's case, the judgment is affirmed. In C.N.'s case, the judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the juvenile court with directions to order the Agency to give proper ICWA notice and file all required documentation with the court. If a tribe then claims C.N. is an Indian child, the court shall proceed in conformity with ICWA; if no tribe makes such a claim, the court shall reinstate its judgment in C.N.'s case.
McINTYRE, J.
WE CONCUR:
HALLER, Acting P. J.
McDONALD, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- Orange County Social Services Agency v. Jamie W. G037374 · 2007-04-23
- In Re Autumn H. D020708 · 1994-08-08