People v. Jacquett CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCD246226
- Trial judge
- Laura W. Halgren
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- O'Rourke (author), Richard D. Huffman, Sr., Patricia D. Benke
Analysis
The trial court denied the defendant's motion to withdraw his negotiated guilty plea and sentenced him to a stipulated 10-year term. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the defendant did not clearly request the discharge of his retained counsel and a Marsden hearing was inappropriate for retained counsel.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of motion to withdraw guilty plea“The court declined to continue the case or set aside the plea, noting that counsel had not stated there was legal cause to do so.” | abuse of discretion | correct | agree with court The appellate court found no error because the defendant failed to provide a clear indication that he wanted a substitute attorney, which is a prerequisite for the trial court to be required to conduct a Marsden inquiry or appoint conflict counsel. Since the procedural prerequisites for a Marsden hearing or appointment of substitute counsel were not met, the trial court's decision to proceed with sentencing based on the lack of legal cause stated by retained counsel was within its discretion. |
Refusal to appoint conflict/substitute counsel to investigate plea withdrawal“It is also improper to appoint ' "conflict" or "substitute" counsel to investigate or evaluate the defendant's proposed new trial or plea withdrawal motion.'” | de novo | correct | agree with court The court correctly applied the rule from People v. Sanchez that appointing conflict counsel to investigate a plea withdrawal motion is improper procedure. The trial court was not required to appoint new counsel to evaluate the merits of the withdrawal request when the retained counsel had already advised against it and the defendant had not clearly requested discharge of that counsel. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Hernandez (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 101 — A Marsden hearing is an inappropriate vehicle to consider complaints against retained counsel.
- relied: People v. Sanchez (2011) 53 Cal.4th 80 — It is improper to appoint conflict or substitute counsel to investigate or evaluate a defendant's proposed new trial or plea withdrawal motion.
- relied: People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130 — A defendant must give a clear indication that he wants a substitute attorney to trigger the court's duty to inquire into the desire to change counsel.
- relied: People v. Ortiz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 975 — The right to discharge retained counsel is not absolute and may be denied if it results in significant prejudice or disruption of the orderly processes of justice.
- relied: People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 — Establishes the procedure for a hearing to determine if a defendant has a good faith basis for requesting a change of counsel.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly identifies that the procedural mechanisms for changing counsel (Marsden hearing or appointment of conflict counsel) do not apply in the manner the defendant requested for retained counsel. It relies on binding Supreme Court authority (Sanchez, Mendoza) to support the conclusion that the trial court was not required to appoint new counsel or conduct a Marsden inquiry absent a clear request for discharge.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe trial court, at sentencing on a negotiated plea to assault with a firearm with gang and firearm enhancements, declined to hold a Marsden-type hearing or appoint substitute counsel to investigate a plea withdrawal after retained counsel said he saw no basis for the motion, and imposed the stipulated 10-year term. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding Marsden procedures do not apply to retained counsel, appointment of conflict counsel to evaluate a plea withdrawal is improper, and Jacquett never asked to discharge counsel or clearly indicated he wanted a substitute attorney.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Refusal to treat Jacquett's letter as a request to discharge retained counsel (no Ortiz inquiry conducted)“did not request discharge of his retained counsel” | abuse of discretion | correct | agree with court Under Ortiz a defendant may discharge retained counsel subject to timeliness and prejudice limits, but the right must be invoked. The letter complained of pressure and misunderstanding and asked to return to the preliminary hearing; it did not ask for new counsel, so the court reasonably found no clear request under Mendoza. The reading is defensible though the letter's 'manipulated' language and reference to a second legal opinion arguably put the court on notice of dissatisfaction with counsel. |
Refusal to conduct a Marsden-type inquiry into Jacquett's complaints about retained counsel“The court noted that a "quasi-Marsden hearing"” | abuse of discretion | correct | agree with court Hernandez holds Marsden is an inappropriate vehicle for complaints against retained counsel because a defendant with retained counsel may simply discharge him under Ortiz. The trial court did ask counsel whether the plea withdrawal rested on incompetence of counsel and counsel said no. The appellate court's application of Hernandez is consistent with that authority. |
Refusal to appoint conflict or substitute counsel to investigate a motion to withdraw the plea“nor was it "the proper procedure" to appoint "conflict or substitute counsel to investigate or evaluate the . . . plea withdrawal motion."” | abuse of discretion | correct | agree with court Sanchez expressly disapproved the practice of appointing substitute counsel solely to evaluate a proposed plea withdrawal motion; the remedy, if any, is substitution of counsel after a proper showing. The trial court's refusal tracks Sanchez, and the appellate court correctly relied on it. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 — A defendant seeking to substitute appointed counsel for inadequate representation must be allowed to state the reasons for the request.
- relied: People v. Hernandez (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 101 — A Marsden hearing is an inappropriate vehicle for complaints against retained counsel.
- relied: People v. Sanchez (2011) 53 Cal.4th 80 — Trial courts should not appoint conflict or substitute counsel to investigate or evaluate a defendant's proposed new trial or plea withdrawal motion.
- relied: People v. Ortiz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 975 — A defendant's right to discharge retained counsel is not absolute and may be denied where discharge would cause significant prejudice or is untimely and disruptive.
- relied: People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130 — A trial court's duty to inquire arises only when the defendant gives a clear indication that he wants a substitute attorney.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion correctly applies Hernandez, Sanchez, Mendoza and Ortiz to hold that Marsden procedures and appointment of investigating counsel were not available and that no discharge request was made. It does not grapple with whether the letter's statements that counsel 'manipulated' him and that his family sought a second legal opinion were enough to trigger at least a brief direct inquiry of the defendant about his wishes, nor does it address the denial of a continuance to allow Jacquett to pursue his own withdrawal motion.
Opinion
Filed 7/1/14 P. v. Jacquett CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D064479
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD246226)
TYREECE RICHARD JACQUETT,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Laura W.
Halgren, Judge. Affirmed.
Donna L. Harris, under appointment by the Court of Appeal for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Michael Pulos, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Tyreece Richard Jacquett entered a negotiated guilty plea to assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2)) with personal firearm use (Pen. Code, § 12022.5, subd.
(a)) for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). After denying Jacquett's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the court sentenced him to a stipulated 10-year prison term: the two-year lower term for assault with a firearm, the three-year lower term for personal firearm use and five years for the gang enhancement.
Jacquett appeals, contending the court abused its discretion by failing to (1) recognize Jacquett's right to discharge his retained counsel, (2) conduct an adequate inquiry into Jacquett's allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and (3) appoint counsel for Jacquett. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On February 13, 2013, at the outset of this case, the court appointed counsel for Jacquett. On May 31, retained counsel began representing Jacquett.
At the change of plea hearing on June 19, 2013, Jacquett testified that he understood the plea agreement; he had read it carefully, or had it read and explained so he understood it. After consulting with counsel off the record, Jacquett testified that he did not have any questions for the court about the proceedings. Jacquett also testified he was entering the plea freely and voluntarily and because he believed it was in his best interest.
While the court was questioning Jacquett about the factual basis for the plea, Jacquett said, "I just wanted to note that it is not really [¶] . . . [¶] there was no assault. . . ." After 2 a discussion off the record, Jacquett agreed to the following factual basis: On February 8, Jacquett assaulted the victim with a firearm, for the benefit of a criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote criminal conduct by gang members, and in so doing, personally used a firearm.
At the sentencing hearing on August 6, 2013, Jacquett's attorney told the court that Jacquett wished to withdraw his plea. Jacquett's attorney requested that counsel be appointed to look into the matter and ascertain whether there were grounds to withdraw the plea. Counsel stated, "[S]ince I was the one who did the plea, it would be a conflict for me to be the one to review it." The court noted that a "quasi-Marsden hearing"
(People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118) was not appropriate when counsel was retained rather than appointed, nor was it "the proper procedure" to appoint "conflict or substitute counsel to investigate or evaluate the . . . plea withdrawal motion." The court asked retained counsel "if the basis for the desire to withdraw the plea has anything to do with allegations of incompetency of counsel." Counsel responded, "Not that he's inquired of me, your honor." The court responded, "So if you think there is a good faith basis to file a motion, I would continue this for purposes of you to file a motion. And if you don't think there is, then there's no legal cause, and we should proceed." Counsel replied, "I don't believe there is a basis for a plea withdrawal, your honor."
After a discussion of other matters, the court asked whether there was any legal cause why sentencing should not proceed. Jacquett and his counsel conferred. The court 3 again asked whether there was any legal cause why sentencing should not proceed.
Counsel announced that Jacquett had a letter he wished to present to the court. The court read the letter, which stated: "I am very disturbed, uncomfortable, and I feel pressured and forced into taking a deal that I ultimately don't want and never intended to take. I wasn't aware of, and fully didn't understand the stipulations of the deal I was signing. I was persuaded into thinking that my lawyer understood my case, but instead I was manipulated into taking a deal I truly didn't understand until my family got a second opinion from legal counsel. I have a right to face my accusers and I would like to advance my case to my preliminary hearing." The court declined to continue the case or set aside the plea, noting that counsel had not stated there was legal cause to do so.
DISCUSSION
A Marsden hearing is an " 'inappropriate vehicle in which to consider appellant's complaints against his retained counsel.' " (People v. Hernandez (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 101, 108.) It is also improper to appoint " ' "conflict" or "substitute" counsel to investigate or evaluate the defendant's proposed new trial or plea withdrawal motion.' "
(People v. Sanchez (2011) 53 Cal.4th 80, 89.) Moreover, Jacquett did not request discharge of his retained counsel,1 either in his letter or by other means, and he did not 1 In any case, when counsel is retained, the "defendant's right to discharge . . . counsel . . . is not absolute. The trial court, in its discretion, may deny such a motion if discharge will result in 'significant prejudice' to the defendant [citation], or if it is not timely, i.e., if it will result in 'disruption of the orderly processes of justice' [citations]." (People v. Ortiz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 975, 983.)
4 give a " 'clear indication . . . that he want[ed] a substitute attorney.' " (People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 157.) There was no error.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
O'ROURKE, J.
WE CONCUR:
BENKE, Acting P. J.
HUFFMAN, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Sanchez S188453 · 2011-12-05
- People v. Hernandez B183053 · 2006-05-05
- People v. Mendoza S008621 · 2000-08-24
- People v. Ortiz S010853 · 1990-11-26
- People v. Marsden Crim. 14119 · 1970-02-26