gno.law

People v. McFadden CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D065416 · 2014-06-25 · Unpublished

Proceeding
appeal from a judgment
Trial court
Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCD249941
Trial judge
Eugenia Eyherabide
Outcome
affirmed — Affirmed.
Area
criminal
Panel
Patricia D. Benke (author), Alex C. McDonald, Gilbert Nares

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T06:39Z · confidence high

The trial court accepted McFadden's guilty plea to criminal threats and corporal injury, sentencing him to two years and eight months in state prison. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, finding no reasonably arguable issues regarding the voluntariness of the plea or ineffective assistance of counsel.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Voluntariness and knowing nature of the guilty plea and stipulated sentence
“We independently conclude on this record that McFadden knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily consented to the sentence of two years eight months.”
de novocorrectagree with court
The court correctly applied the de novo standard for reviewing the voluntariness of a plea waiver. The record cited in the opinion, including the signed plea agreement and the transcript of the plea colloquy where the defendant confirmed understanding of the specific sentence, provides sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the plea was knowing and voluntary. The court's reliance on the objective evidence of the defendant's initials and verbal confirmations is legally sound.
Ineffective assistance of counsel claim
“we independently conclude McFadden's guilty plea was not the result of ineffective assistance of counsel.”
de novocorrectagree with court
The court correctly applied the Strickland standard, noting that on direct appeal, a defendant must show deficient performance based on the four corners of the record. The opinion cites the defendant's initials on the plea form acknowledging counsel's advice and his statement during the plea hearing that he had no further questions. Given the lack of evidence in the record suggesting counsel failed to explain the consequences or that the defendant was unaware of the stipulated sentence, the court's rejection of the claim is supported by the authorities cited.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 — Establishes the procedure for appointed appellate counsel to review the record for reasonably arguable issues when a defendant is represented by counsel on appeal.
  • relied: Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 — Requires appointed counsel to file a brief identifying any potentially meritorious issues and to request leave to withdraw if none are found.
  • relied: People v. D'Arcy (2010) 48 Cal.4th 257 — Waivers of constitutional rights must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of relevant circumstances and likely consequences.
  • relied: People v. Pannizon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68 — The voluntariness of a waiver of constitutional rights is a question of law reviewed de novo by appellate courts.
  • relied: People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69 — To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show both deficient performance and prejudice.
  • relied: People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926 — A defendant raising ineffective assistance on appeal must establish deficient performance based upon the four corners of the record.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is procedurally sound as it follows the Wende/Anders protocol for reviewing the record for reasonably arguable issues. It correctly applies the de novo standard to the plea voluntariness and the four-corners-of-the-record limitation to the ineffective assistance claim, relying on the specific facts of the plea agreement and colloquy to support its affirmance.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:31Z · confidence low

The trial court accepted McFadden's guilty plea to making a criminal threat (Pen. Code, § 422) and corporal injury to a cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)) and imposed the stipulated sentence of two years eight months in state prison, later granting a certificate of probable cause. On appeal, appointed counsel filed a Wende brief, the Court of Appeal independently reviewed the record, found no arguable issues as to the voluntariness of the plea or ineffective assistance of counsel, and affirmed.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Acceptance of the guilty plea and imposition of the stipulated two-year-eight-month sentence as a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of constitutional rights
“We independently conclude on this record that McFadden knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily consented to the sentence of two years eight months.”
de novocorrectagree with court
The court applied the correct de novo standard from Panizzon and relied on specific record facts: the written plea form stating a stipulated 2-year-8-month sentence, McFadden's initials next to the maximum-punishment and voluntariness advisements, counsel's signature, and the oral colloquy in which McFadden confirmed he understood the stipulated and maximum terms. Nothing in the record supported a promise of a one-year term, so the conclusion follows from the authorities cited.
Implicit determination that the guilty plea was not the product of ineffective assistance of counsel
“Here, McFadden has not satisfied his burden to show his counsel's performance was deficient.”
de novocorrectagree with court
The court correctly stated the Strickland-based two-prong test via Benavides and the rule from Cunningham that deficient performance on direct appeal must appear in the four corners of the record. The record showed McFadden initialed that counsel advised him of all consequences and confirmed in open court that counsel reviewed the forms with him, and he accepted a term well below the 4-year-8-month maximum. No deficiency appears on this record, though the opinion did not expressly label the standard of review and simply stated it 'independently' concluded.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 — When appointed appellate counsel finds no arguable issues, the Court of Appeal must independently review the entire record to determine whether any arguable issue exists.
  • relied: Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 — Appointed counsel who finds an appeal frivolous may file a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal, after which the court independently reviews the record.
  • relied: People v. D'Arcy (2010) 48 Cal.4th 257 — Waivers of constitutional rights must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent acts made with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.
  • relied: People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68 — Waivers may be oral or written, and the voluntariness of a waiver is a question of law reviewed de novo; a challenge to a negotiated sentence is a challenge to the plea's validity requiring a certificate of probable cause.
  • relied: People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69 — To establish ineffective assistance, a defendant must show both deficient performance below an objective standard of reasonableness and resulting prejudice.
  • relied: People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926 — A defendant raising ineffective assistance on direct appeal must establish deficient performance from the four corners of the record.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion follows the Wende/Anders procedure, states the governing standards with correct Supreme Court authority, and ties its conclusions to specific record facts from the plea form and plea colloquy. It addresses both issues counsel flagged and McFadden's own contention about a one-year term, leaving no apparent gap.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 6/25/14 P. v. McFadden CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APEA, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D065416

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD249941)

ALEJANDRO RAY MCFADDEN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Eugenia Eyherabide, Judge. Affirmed.

Theresa Osterman Stevenson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Alejandro Ray McFadden pleaded guilty to one count of making a criminal threat (Pen. Code, § 422) and one count of corporal injury to a spouse/roommate (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced McFadden to two years eight months in state prison.

McFadden timely appealed from the judgment. Appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), setting forth the facts of the case and requesting that we review the entire record. Pursuant to Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders), appointed counsel suggested we consider two issues: (1)

whether McFadden's waiver of his constitutional rights and entry of his plea were voluntarily and knowingly made with an understanding of the consequences; and (2)

whether his guilty plea was a result of ineffective assistance of counsel. McFadden was granted 30 days to file a brief on his own behalf and has not done so.

We have independently reviewed the entire record and have found no reasonably arguable issues. (See Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 438.) We therefore affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

In August 2013, McFadden visited Shelly Payne, his girlfriend and the mother of his daughter. The two got into an argument, and McFadden refused to let Payne leave the apartment. During the argument, McFadden brandished a gun and threatened to kill Payne. The next day, McFadden returned to Payne's residence and attacked her. Payne fled to the bathroom, but McFadden knocked her to the ground before she could lock the door.

1 The parties stipulated that the preliminary hearing transcript and court records provided a factual basis for the plea. 2 Payne eventually escaped and called the police. She reported that McFadden stomped on her head, punched her in the back and pulled out her hair.

McFadden fled the scene into the alleyway, where the police later found him in a laundry room. After McFadden's arrest, the police searched the laundry room and found a small revolver inside a black glove. The police also found a matching black glove on McFadden.

Initially, McFadden pleaded not guilty. He subsequently changed his plea to guilty for a stipulated sentence of two years eight months. After sentencing, McFadden appealed, claiming his sentence should run concurrently and equate to a total term of confinement of one year. The trial court granted his request for a certificate of probable cause.

DISCUSSION

I

"'Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.' [Citations.]" (People v. D'Arcy (2010) 48 Cal.4th 257, 284.) "Waivers may be manifested either orally or in writing. [Citation.] The voluntariness of a waiver is a question of law which appellate courts review de novo. [Citation.]" (People v. Pannizon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 80.)

Here, the record clearly shows McFadden manifested his consent to the stipulated sentence. McFadden's plea agreement states that he was promised a "stipulated 2 years 8 3 months state prison [sentence] concurrent with any parole or PRCS violation." The plea agreement makes no reference to a sentence any less than two years eight months. In fact, McFadden placed his initials next to the paragraph that reads, "I understand that I may receive this maximum punishment as a result of my plea: 4 y[ea]rs 8 months . . . ."

McFadden also placed his initials next the sentence that reads, "I am entering my plea freely and voluntarily, without fear or threat to me or anyone closely related to me."

Additionally, McFadden's attorney signed the plea stating that he had reviewed the entire plea agreement with McFadden and explained each of the terms, including the stipulated sentence.

Moreover, when taking the plea, the record shows the trial court asked McFadden if he understood his stipulated sentence to be "two years and eight months in the state prison," and McFadden stated he did. The trial court also advised McFadden that "[t]he maximum penalty could be four years and eight months in the state prison . . . ."

McFadden stated he understood.

We independently conclude on this record that McFadden knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily consented to the sentence of two years eight months.

Indeed, from our own review of the record we have found no evidence whatsoever to support his contention that he was promised, or reasonably could have expected, a sentence of less than this term, including one year as he alleges in his brief.

4 II "To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. [Citations.] Counsel's performance was deficient if the representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. [Citation.] Prejudice exists where there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

[Citation.]" (People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 92-93.) "A defendant who raises the issue on appeal must establish deficient performance based upon the four corners of the record." (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1003.)

Here, McFadden has not satisfied his burden to show his counsel's performance was deficient. On the plea form, McFadden placed his initials next to the paragraph stating that his attorney had advised him of all possible consequences of his plea. During the taking of the plea, the trial court asked McFadden if his attorney went over the plea forms with him. McFadden stated that he did and that he had no further questions. In light of the foregoing, and given that McFadden was facing possible confinement of four years eight months for the offenses, we independently conclude McFadden's guilty plea was not the result of ineffective assistance of counsel.

5 DISPOSITION

The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

BENKE, Acting P. J. WE CONCUR:

NARES, J.

McDONALD, J.

Cites, in this corpus