Gonzalez v. Rebollo

California Court of Appeal · D063424 · 2014-05-29 · Published

Proceeding: appeal from an order
Trial court: Superior Court of San Diego County · No. DF202894
Trial judge: Maureen F. Hallahan
Outcome: affirmed — Affirmed.
Area: family
Panel: McINTYRE (author), Judith L. Haller, Judith D. McConnell

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T02:56Z · confidence high

The trial court found that the appellant's primary domicile and residence was in California, thereby establishing that California had subject matter jurisdiction to modify a Mexican child support order under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA). The Court of Appeal affirmed the order, holding that the appellant failed to provide an adequate record on appeal to demonstrate that the trial court's findings were unsupported by substantial evidence.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Trial court's finding that California had subject matter jurisdiction to modify the Mexican child support order based on the appellant's residence in California. “Based on the foregoing, Rebollo has not met his burden of showing error by an adequate record and we reject his claim on appeal.”	substantial evidence	correct	agree with court The appellate court correctly applied the presumption of regularity and the requirement for an adequate record. Because the appellant failed to include the utility receipts and Mexican documents he claimed to have lodged in the trial court record, and provided no reporter's transcript, the appellate court was procedurally barred from reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence. The court correctly relied on the principle that a judgment is presumed correct when the record is silent or incomplete, making the affirmance the only legally supportable outcome regardless of the underlying merits of the residence dispute.

Authorities

relied: In re Marriage of Amezquita v. Archuleta (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1415 — Establishes the distinction between 'residence' and 'domicile' for purposes of UIFSA jurisdiction, noting that residence is a factual question of abode of some permanency.
relied: Bianco v. California Highway Patrol (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1113 — Supports the fundamental principle that an appellant must affirmatively show error by an adequate record and that error is never presumed.
relied: In re Hochberg (1970) 2 Cal.3d 870 — Establishes that an appellate court is limited to considering matters in the record of the trial proceedings and cannot consider matters not presented by the record.
relied: In re Kathy P. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 91 — Supports the proposition that an appellant fails to meet their burden of showing error if they do not provide an adequate record.
relied: Christie v. Kimball (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1407 — Supports the rule that an appellate court cannot presume error from an incomplete record.
relied: Haywood v. Superior Court (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 949 — Supports the rule that an appellate court will decline to find error on a silent record when the record does not contain all relevant documents.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is procedurally sound because it correctly identifies that the appellant's failure to provide a complete record (specifically the utility receipts and transcript) precludes meaningful appellate review of the trial court's factual findings. The court appropriately applied the presumption of regularity and the burden of proof rules to affirm the lower court's order.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

inconsistent with cited authority

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:31Z · confidence medium

The San Diego family court, after a de novo hearing following a commissioner's ruling, found that Rebollo's primary domicile and residence was in Calexico, California, that the children resided in Chula Vista, and that it therefore had subject matter jurisdiction under the UIFSA to modify a Mexican child support order. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that Mexico would retain continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under Family Code section 4909 if Rebollo kept a 'residence' (not merely domicile) there, but that Rebollo's appellate record—lacking his lodged utility receipts, license, voting card, and any reporter's transcript—was inadequate to show the implied finding of no Mexican residence was unsupported.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Determination that California had subject matter jurisdiction under the UIFSA (Fam. Code, §§ 4909, 4962) to modify the Mexican child support order, which depends on whether Mexico lost continuing, exclusive jurisdiction because no relevant person retained a 'residence' there. “After considering the statute in context of the UIFSA, we conclude it could not if Rebollo retained "residence" in Mexico.”	de novo	correct	agree with court The court's reading of the statutory scheme is faithful to the text and official comments: section 4909(a)(1) keys retention of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to 'residence' of the obligor, obligee, or child, section 4962 permits a new state to assume jurisdiction only when the issuing state has lost it, and the comments expressly distinguish residence from domicile, consistent with Amezquita's definition of residence as a factual abode of some permanency. Mexico's status as a reciprocating 'state' under section 4901(s)(2) is adequately supported. One unaddressed wrinkle is the trial court's reliance on the federal Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, whose definition of 'State' does not reach Mexico, but the UIFSA analysis independently supports the framework.
Finding that Rebollo's primary domicile and residence was in Calexico, California, and the implied finding that he had no 'residence' in Mexicali, Mexico, at the time the modification request was filed. “Without a complete record, we are unable to determine whether substantial evidence supported the implied findings underlying the trial court's order.”	substantial evidence	correct	agree with court Applying the presumption of correctness and the appellant's burden to furnish an adequate record (Bianco, Kathy P., Christie, Haywood), the court properly declined to find error where the documents Rebollo relied on below and the reporter's transcript were absent. The trial court could also credit Gonzalez's evidence (tax returns, marriage license, prenuptial agreement and restraining order filings listing a Calexico address; minimal electricity use at the Mexicali property in the wife's name) over Rebollo's declarations. The result is defensible, though the trial court's phrasing 'primary domicile and residence' tracks a domicile test rather than the residence test the Court of Appeal identified as controlling, and the appellate court's inference of a no-Mexican-residence finding from the jurisdictional conclusion is thin given the opinion acknowledges a person may have more than one residence.

Authorities

relied: In re Marriage of Amezquita & Archuleta (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1415 — UIFSA aims to ensure only one valid support order is effective at a time; 'residence' connotes a factual place of abode of some permanency, more than a temporary sojourn, and a person may have multiple residences but only one domicile.
relied: Bianco v. California Highway Patrol (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1113 — An appellant must affirmatively show error by an adequate record; a judgment or order is presumed correct and all intendments are indulged to support it where the record is silent.
relied: In re Marriage of Lusby (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 459 — Error is never presumed; the appellant bears the burden of providing an adequate record demonstrating error.
relied: In re Hochberg (1970) 2 Cal.3d 870 — An appellate court is limited to matters in the trial record and cannot consider matters outside it on the suggestion of the parties in their briefs.
relied: In re Kathy P. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 91 — An appellant who fails to provide an adequate record has not met her burden of showing error.
relied: Christie v. Kimball (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1407 — A reviewing court cannot presume error from an incomplete record.
relied: Haywood v. Superior Court (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 949 — Where the record does not contain all the documents considered below, the appellate court declines to find error on a silent record.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion correctly frames the UIFSA question as one of 'residence' rather than 'domicile' under section 4909 and its official comments, and properly applies the inadequate-record rule to a pro se appellant who omitted the very documents and transcript needed to challenge the factual finding. It skips over the trial court's 'primary domicile and residence' phrasing, which suggests a domicile analysis inconsistent with the test the court articulates, and it does not address the trial court's reliance on the federal Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, which does not apply to Mexican orders.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

record incomplete

Opinion

Filed 4/29/14; pub. order 5/29/14 (see end of opn.)

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

ROSA ISELA MARTINEZ GONZALEZ, D063424

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. DF202894)

MIGUEL ANGEL GARCIA REBOLLO,

Defendant and Appellant,

SAN DIEGO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES,

Intervener and Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Maureen F. Hallahan, Judge. Affirmed.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Miguel Angel Gargia Rebolla, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Julie Weng-Gutierrez, Assistant Attorney General, Linda M. Gonzalez and Marina L. Soto, Deputy Attorneys General, for Intervener and Respondent. Miguel Angel Garcia Rebollo appeals an order finding the court had subject matter jurisdiction to modify his child support order, which was issued in Mexico.

He contends the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) (Fam. Code, § 4900 et seq.) because his domicile and residence is in Mexicali, Mexico, and there was insufficient evidence to support the court's finding that his domicile and residence was in Calexico, California.

(Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.) We affirm the order because the record Rebollo provided is inadequate for us to fully assess his arguments on appeal.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Rebollo and Rosa Isela Martinez Gonzalez were married in Mexico in 1990.

In 2000, they entered into an agreement for divorce in Mexico. The agreement provided that Rebollo would pay child support in the amount of 1,000 Mexican pesos per month for each of their two children. Mexico entered a judgment of divorce in March 2000.

In 2003, Gonzalez and her two children moved to San Diego County. The San Diego County Department of Child Support Services (the Department) provided services to Gonzalez and her children. In 2008, the Department registered the Mexicali judgment in California.

In February 2012, the Department moved to modify the child support obligation in the Mexicali agreement. Rebollo requested that the trial court dismiss the Department's petition because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify child 2 support as the original support order was issued in Mexicali and he still lived and worked there. To support his request, Rebollo filed an income and expense declaration in which he stated that he had worked full time in Mexico since 1995, lost his home to foreclosure in 2008, had to move to Mexico in order to make ends meet, and filed for bankruptcy in 2009. Rebollo also apparently lodged with the trial court utility receipts for electricity, gas, water and telephone services and copies of his Mexican driver's license and voting card. These documents are not in the record before us.

Gonzalez responded to Rebollo's request for dismissal by providing the family court with evidence to support her position that Rebollo resided in California.

Gonzalez submitted copies of a title search, deed of trust, grant deed, and quitclaim deed for a property in Calexico. The documents showed that the property was owned by Concepcion I. Garcia, Rebollo's current wife. Lastly, Gonzalez included a document which purportedly showed minimal electricity usage at Rebollo's residence in Mexicali from June 2011 through April 2012. She also pointed out that Rebollo used a Calexico address in prior court filings.

Rebollo claimed that his mother-in-law bought the Calexico property for his wife so that she could apply for United States citizenship after three years. According to Rebollo, his wife and son lived in Calexico while he lived and worked in Mexicali.

He further asserted that he had no claim to the Calexico property, his prenuptial agreement with his wife stated that their income, property and debt were separate, and they filed separate income tax returns.

3 In June 2012, a commissioner held a hearing on the matter. The court found there was "insufficient evidence to find that California has subject matter jurisdiction to modify the original Mexican order."

Gonzalez moved for reconsideration of the commissioner's findings. Gonzalez claimed that at the June 2012 hearing, she was unable to provide the trial court with all the evidence it needed to establish Rebollo's residence in California. Subsequent to the hearing, Gonzalez obtained Rebollo's 2009, 2010, and 2011 United States income tax returns, marriage certificate, and request for a restraining order. She pointed out that Rebollo listed his address as being in Calexico on all of those documents. Rebollo opposed reconsideration by stating that he lived and worked in Mexico, he sought the restraining order to protect himself and his wife in Calexico, he used a postal mailbox address in Calexico for the restraining order, his United States tax returns show his income is from Mexico, and he is required to file tax returns in the United States because he is a citizen.

In August 2012, the commissioner denied Gonzalez's petition for reconsideration on the basis that the new evidence presented was available at the time of the original hearing. However, at the same time, the commissioner considered the new evidence and granted Gonzalez's new request to modify child support. The court stated:

"Based upon the evidence before the court, the Court finds [Rebollo] lives in California with his new wife and child. [Rebollo] has filed his federal taxes in United States for the last three years and notes his address is in Calexico, California. [Rebollo's] marriage license indicates his address is in Calexico 4 and he has signed a prenuptial agreement with a California address. [Rebollo] filed for a temporary restraining order in Calexico, California and indicated on the forms his residence is in Calexico, California.

"The court finds based upon the enumerated evidence, [Rebollo's] primary domicile and residence is in Calexico, California. [Gonzalez] and the children's primary domicile and residence is in Chula Vista, California. Therefore, under the Federal Full Faith and [C]redit for Child Support Act and . . . section 4909, Mexico no longer has continuing exclusive jurisdiction. As such this court has subject matter jurisdiction to modify or issue . . . child support for this family."

Rebollo objected to the commissioner's findings. Thus, in November 2012, a judge held a de novo hearing on the matter. Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, the trial court found (1) Rebollo's primary domicile and residence was in Calexico, (2) the children's primary domicile and residence was in Chula Vista, and (3) the court had jurisdiction over the issue of child support. Accordingly, the court confirmed the commissioner's August 2012 ruling.

DISCUSSION

I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Rebollo argues the family court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to modify the Mexican child support order because his domicile and residence is in Mexicali, Mexico. This issue turns on whether California could assume "continuing, exclusive jurisdiction" over the parties' child support order under section 4962. After considering the statute in context of the UIFSA, we conclude it could not if Rebollo retained "residence" in Mexico.

5 In California, enforcement and modification of out-of-state child support orders is governed by the UIFSA (§ 4900 et seq.). The goal of the UIFSA is to ensure that " 'only one valid support order may be effective at any one time' [citation], even though the parties and their children may move from state to state." (In re Marriage of Amezquita v. Archuleta (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1420 (Amezquita).) The term "state" for purposes of the UIFSA includes "[a] foreign jurisdiction that has enacted a law or established procedures for issuance and enforcement of support orders which are substantially similar to the procedures under [the UIFSA], the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, or the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act." (§ 4901, subd. (s)(2).) Mexico is a reciprocating state for purposes of the UIFSA. (U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, Admin. for Children & Families, Office of Child Support Enforcement, Intergovernmental Reference Guide, § C1, https://extranet.acf.hhs.gov/irg/profile.html?selection=STA&stateGeoBox=06 [as of April 28, 2014].) Accordingly, the UIFSA applies in this case.

The cornerstone of the UIFSA is that "the tribunal issuing a support order retains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify that order" (UIFSA Com., 29F p. 2 West's Ann. Fam. Code (2013 ed.) foll. § 4909, p. 45) if "[a]t the time of filing the request for modification, [the issuing] state is the residence of the obligor, the individual obligee, or the child for whose benefit the support order is issued." (§ 4909, subd. (a)(1), italics added.) "Just as Subsection (a) defines the retention of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, by clear implication the subsection also indentifies how jurisdiction to modify may be lost. That is, if all the relevant persons—the obligor, the 6 individual obligee, and the child—have permanently left the issuing State, the issuing State no longer has an appropriate nexus with the parties or child to justify the exercise of jurisdiction to modify its child-support order." (UIFSA Com., 29F p. 2 West's Ann.

Fam. Code, supra, foll. § 4909 at p. 46.) The official comments to section 4909 provide that "residence is a fact question for the trial court, keeping in mind that the question is residence, not domicile." (Ibid.)

Under the UIFSA, a California court can assume jurisdiction to modify a child support order of another state "[i]f all of the parties who are individuals reside in this state and the child does not reside in the issuing state." (§ 4962, subd. (a).) "[Section 4962] deal[s] with the possibility that the parties and the child subject to a child support order no longer reside in the issuing State and that the individual parties have moved to the same new State. This section makes it clear that, when the issuing State no longer has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify its order, a tribunal of the State of mutual residence of the individual parties has jurisdiction to modify the child- support order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction." (UIFSA Com., 29F p. 2 West's Ann. Fam. Code, supra, foll. § 4962 at p. 176, italics added.)

Here, California could not assume jurisdiction to modify Mexico's child support order under section 4962 unless "[Mexico] no longer ha[d] continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify its order." (UIFSA Com., 29F p. 2 West's Ann. Fam. Code, supra, foll. § 4962 at p. 176, italics added.) Thus, the threshold question is whether Mexico retained continuing, exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of section 4909. It did so if Rebollo had a "residence" in Mexico at the time of filing the 7 request for modification. (§ 4909, subd. (a)(1).) Based on the official comments to that section, it is clear that the drafters distinguished between "residence" and "domicile" and concluded that for purposes of "continuing, exclusive jurisdiction," the question is whether the obligor's, obligee's or child's "residence" is in the issuing state.

The distinction is that a person may have more than one "residence" but only one "domicile," the place where he is most settled, has a permanent connection and intends to remain. (Amezquita, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 1419.) Accordingly, we next consider whether the evidence established that Rebollo had a "residence" in Mexico.

II. Evidence of "Residence" in Mexico The trial court found that Rebollo's primary domicile and residence was in Calexico, California. Although the court did not explicitly state that Rebollo did not have a "residence" in Mexico, we can infer this finding because the trial court found Mexico no longer had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under section 4909. Rebollo argues there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's findings regarding his "residence." Based on the record before us, we reject this argument.

" 'A fundamental principle of appellate practice is that an appellant " 'must affirmatively show error by an adequate record. . . . Error is never presumed. . . .

"A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent. . . ." ' " ' [Citation.]" (Bianco v. California Highway Patrol (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1125; accord, In re Marriage of Lusby (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 459, 470.) The appellate court is limited to considering matters in the record of the trial 8 proceedings; matters not presented by the record cannot be considered on the suggestion of the parties in their briefs. (In Re Hochberg (1970) 2 Cal.3d 870, 875.)

" '[R]esidence' connotes any factual place of abode of some permanency, more than a mere temporary sojourn." (Amezquita, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 1419.)

Here, Gonzalez provided the trial court with evidence that Rebollo did not maintain a "residence" in Mexico. For example, she included a document which purportedly showed minimal electricity usage at Rebollo's residence in Mexicali from June 2011 through April 2012. Additionally, the electricity statement was in Rebollo's wife's name. Rebollo, however, claimed his wife lived in Calexico.

To support his claim that he had a "residence" in Mexico, Rebollo apparently lodged with the trial court utility receipts for electricity, gas, water and telephone services and copies of his Mexican driver's license and voting card. These documents are not in the record before us. Additionally, there is no reporter's transcript in the record on appeal. Other than statements in Rebollo's own declarations, there is nothing in the record establishing he had a "residence" in Mexico.

Without a complete record, we are unable to determine whether substantial evidence supported the implied findings underlying the trial court's order. (In re Kathy P. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 91, 102 ["appellant . . . has not met her burden of showing error by an adequate record"]; Christie v. Kimball (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1412 ["[w]e cannot presume error from an incomplete record"]; Haywood v. Superior Court (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 949, 955 [because "the record does not contain all the 9 documents . . . we decline to find error on a silent record"].) Based on the foregoing, Rebollo has not met his burden of showing error by an adequate record and we reject his claim on appeal.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. Respondent is entitled to costs on appeal.

MCINTYRE, J.

WE CONCUR:

MCCONNELL, P. J.

HALLER, J.

10 Filed 5/29/14

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

ROSA ISELA MARTINEZ GONZALEZ, D063424

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. DF202894)

MIGUEL ANGEL GARCIA REBOLLO, ORDER CERTIFYING OPINION FOR PUBLICATION Defendant and Appellant,

SAN DIEGO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES,

Intervener and Respondent.

THE COURT:

The opinion filed April 29, 2014, is ordered certified for publication.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent. Miguel Angel Gargia Rebolla, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Julie Weng-Gutierrez, Assistant Attorney General, Linda M. Gonzalez and Marina L. Soto, Deputy Attorneys General, for Intervener and Respondent.

MCINTYRE, Acting P. J. Copies to: All parties

Cites, in this corpus

Christie v. Kimball No. B230286 · 2012-01-26
Amezquita v. Archuleta No. C038927 · 2002-09-13
Haywood v. Superior Court B135613 · 2000-01-25
In Re Marriage of Lusby D024029 · 1998-06-02
Bianco v. California Highway Patrol D019372 · 1994-05-03
People v. Kathy P. L.A. 30981 · 1979-08-30
In Re Hochberg Crim. 14323 · 1970-07-10