Bellars v. Regents of the University of California CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from an order and judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. 37-2012-00103146-CU-OE-CTL
- Trial judge
- Randa Trapp
- Outcome
- reversed — Reversed and remanded with directions.
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Patricia D. Benke (author), O'Rourke, McINTYRE
Analysis
The trial court granted the defendants' anti-SLAPP motion, awarded them attorneys' fees, and entered judgment. The appellate court reversed the judgment and fee order based on the parties' stipulation to vacate due to settlement, directing the trial court to enter a dismissal with prejudice.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Grant of anti-SLAPP motion, attorneys' fees award, and entry of judgment“The order and judgment at issue are the result of the granting of an anti-SLAPP motion, not an adjudication on the merits.” | unclear | not reached | agree with court The court did not review the merits of the trial court's rulings because the parties stipulated to vacate the judgment due to settlement. The appellate court's review was limited to the statutory requirements for accepting a stipulation to vacate under Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(8), specifically finding that no nonparties or the public would be adversely affected and that the reasons for reversal outweighed the erosion of public trust. |
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is procedurally sound as it correctly applies the statutory test for stipulated vacatur under Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(8). It appropriately notes that the underlying judgment was not an adjudication on the merits, which supports the finding that public trust is not significantly eroded by the reversal.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe superior court granted Respondents' anti-SLAPP motion (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16) against Dr. Bellars's invasion-of-privacy complaint, awarded Respondents $90,194 in attorneys' fees, and entered judgment. After Bellars appealed the fee order and the judgment, the parties settled and jointly moved under section 128, subdivision (a)(8) for a stipulated reversal; the Court of Appeal accepted the stipulation, reversed the fee order and judgment, and remanded with directions to dismiss the entire case with prejudice.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Order granting Respondents' anti-SLAPP motion under section 425.16 and resulting judgment“The order and judgment at issue are the result of the granting of an anti-SLAPP motion, not an adjudication on the merits.” | unclear | not reached | unsure The appellate court did not evaluate whether the anti-SLAPP ruling was correct; it reversed solely on the parties' stipulation under section 128(a)(8). The merits are therefore unreviewed and no view on correctness can be formed from this opinion. |
Order awarding Respondents $90,194 in attorneys' fees“In November, the court granted Respondents' motion for $90,194 in attorneys' fees.” | unclear | not reached | unsure The fee order was reversed by stipulation as part of the settlement, not because the appellate court found error. The opinion contains no analysis of the fee award's propriety or amount. |
Joint motion to vacate judgment on stipulation of the parties under section 128, subdivision (a)(8)“Our independent review of the record leads us to conclude we should accept the stipulation.” | de novo | correct | agree with court The court quoted the two statutory findings required by section 128(a)(8) and made an independent review. Its stated reasons (no merits adjudication, non-confidential settlement, continued employment, public medical license records) support the first finding that nonparties and the public are not adversely affected, but the court did not expressly address the second finding that the parties' reasons outweigh erosion of public trust and the reduced incentive for pretrial settlement. The result is defensible given the non-merits posture, but the second-prong analysis is implicit at best. |
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court correctly identified section 128, subdivision (a)(8) as governing a stipulated reversal and gave record-based reasons why nonparties and the public would not be harmed. It did not, however, expressly make the second required finding that the parties' reasons for reversal outweigh the erosion of public trust and the settlement-incentive concern, and it cited no case authority applying the statute.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual disposition record incompleteOpinion
Filed 5/16/14 Bellars v. Regents of the University of California CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
RICHARD BELLARS, D065129, D065455
Plaintiff and Appellant, v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2012-00103146- CU-OE-CTL) REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA et al., Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from an order and judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Randa Trapp, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Appellant Richard Bellars, M.D., an anesthesiologist and University of California faculty member, sued the Regents of the University of California and Shannon Chavez, M.D. (together, Respondents), alleging invasion of privacy. Respondents filed an anti- SLAPP motion (Code Civ. Proc.,1 § 425.16) arguing that their challenged actions were part of peer review proceedings. Bellars opposed the motion, arguing that the actions 1 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. were outside of those proceedings. In April 2013, the superior court granted Respondents' anti-SLAPP motion. In November, the court granted Respondents' motion for $90,194 in attorneys' fees. In January 2014, the court entered judgment.
In December 2013, Bellars filed a notice of appeal of the November fee award (D065129). In February 2014, he filed a notice of appeal of the January judgment (D065455). After Bellars filed his notices of appeal, the parties reached a settlement. In April, the parties filed the instant joint motion to vacate judgment due to settlement.
(§ 128, subd. (a)(8).) They stipulate to the reversal of the attorneys' fees order and dismissal with prejudice of the entire case.
"An appellate court shall not reverse or vacate a duly entered judgment upon an agreement or stipulation of the parties unless the court finds both of the following: (A)
There is no reasonable possibility that the interests of nonparties or the public will be adversely affected by the reversal. (B) The reasons of the parties for requesting reversal outweigh the erosion of public trust that may result from the nullification of a judgment and the risk that the availability of stipulated reversal will reduce the incentive for pretrial settlement." (§ 128, subd. (a)(8).)
Our independent review of the record leads us to conclude we should accept the stipulation. The order and judgment at issue are the result of the granting of an anti- SLAPP motion, not an adjudication on the merits. The parties' settlement agreement is not confidential. Bellars remains employed by the University of California. The status of his medical license is a matter of public record.
2 DISPOSITION
The attorneys' fee order and the judgment are reversed. The case is remanded to the superior court so that it may enter a dismissal with prejudice of the entire case. Each party shall bear their own costs on appeal.
BENKE, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
McINTYRE, J.
O'ROURKE, J.