People v. Roberts CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCE323459
- Trial judges
- Patricia K. Cookson; John M. Thompson
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed and remanded.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Richard D. Huffman, Sr. (author), Judith L. Haller, Gilbert Nares
Analysis
The trial court denied Roberts's motion to suppress evidence, finding that the police encounter was consensual and that he was not seized until after officers discovered his probation condition waiving Fourth Amendment rights. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, agreeing that the encounter was consensual and the subsequent search was valid.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of motion to suppress evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5“It is clear from this record that the trial court properly found the encounter between Roberts and the officer was consensual and that Roberts was not seized until after police learned about the waiver of Fourth Amendment rights.” | mixed | correct | agree with court The appellate court applied the correct two-step standard of review: substantial evidence for historical facts and independent review for legal conclusions. The factual finding that the encounter was consensual was supported by the officer's testimony and Roberts's cooperation, and the legal conclusion that no seizure occurred until the discovery of the probation waiver was consistent with established Fourth Amendment jurisprudence regarding consensual encounters. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225 — Establishes the two-step standard of review for motions to suppress: substantial evidence for facts and independent review for law.
- relied: People v. Leyba (1981) 29 Cal.3d 591 — Supports the standard of review for suppression motions.
- relied: People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327 — Defines a seizure as a restraint of liberty by physical force or show of authority, using an objective standard.
- relied: People v. Bouser (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1280 — Holds that an encounter where police ask to talk and check records is consensual until a warrant or other basis for detention is discovered.
- relied: Florida v. Bostick (1991) 501 U.S. 429 — Establishes that a seizure is determined by whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline requests or terminate the encounter.
- relied: California v. Hodari D. (1991) 499 U.S. 621 — Supports the objective standard for determining if a seizure has occurred.
- relied: U.S. v. Mendenhall (1980) 446 U.S. 544 — Supports the objective standard for determining if a seizure has occurred.
The appellate opinion: sound — sound
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe trial court denied Gary Wayne Roberts's Penal Code section 1538.5 motion to suppress, crediting the officer's testimony and finding the street encounter consensual until police learned Roberts was on probation with a Fourth Amendment waiver; Roberts then pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine for sale and received a 16-month term stayed pending appeal. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that under the objective Mendenhall/Bostick test Roberts was not seized before the waiver was discovered, declined to reach the People's alternative exclusionary-rule argument, and remanded for execution of the stayed sentence.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of motion to suppress under Penal Code section 1538.5: finding that the officer was credible, the encounter was consensual, and Roberts was not detained until after police learned of his Fourth Amendment waiver, so the ensuing probation search was lawful.“It is clear from this record that the trial court properly found the encounter between Roberts and the officer was consensual and that Roberts was not seized until after police learned about the waiver of Fourth Amendment rights.” | mixed | correct | agree with court The court correctly applied the two-step Ayala/Leyba framework, deferring to the credibility finding that the officer made no commands, used no spotlight or emergency lights, and did not block or restrain Roberts, and then independently applied the objective Mendenhall/Bostick/Zamudio test. People v. Bouser is closely analogous and supports treating a consensual conversation, voluntary production of identification, and a records check as a non-seizure. The result is defensible, but the opinion does not squarely confront the strongest contrary factor: the officer retained Roberts's driver's license and asked him to sit on the curb while the check ran, which some published authority (People v. Castaneda) treats as converting a consensual encounter into a detention. The court also gratuitously relies on Roberts's apparent subjective belief that he was not on probation, which is irrelevant to the objective reasonable-person inquiry, though this does not affect the outcome. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225 — On review of a suppression ruling, the trial court's factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence and the application of law to those facts is reviewed independently.
- relied: People v. Leyba (1981) 29 Cal.3d 591 — Two-step standard of review for motions to suppress: deferential review of historical facts, independent review of the legal question of reasonableness.
- relied: People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327 — A Fourth Amendment seizure occurs when an officer restrains liberty by physical force or show of authority, judged objectively by whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave or terminate the encounter.
- relied: People v. Bouser (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1280 — A street encounter in which officers ask to talk, request identification, and run a records check can remain consensual, so that discovery of a warrant during the check is not the product of an unlawful detention.
- relied: Florida v. Bostick (1991) 501 U.S. 429 — Courts must consider all circumstances to determine whether police conduct would communicate to a reasonable person that he was not free to decline requests or terminate the encounter.
- relied: California v. Hodari D. (1991) 499 U.S. 621 — A seizure requires either physical force or submission to a show of authority.
- relied: United States v. Mendenhall (1980) 446 U.S. 544 — A person is seized only if, in view of all the circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave; examples include display of weapons, physical touching, or commanding language.
- missed: People v. Castaneda (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1222 — An officer's retention of a person's identification while running a warrant check can convert a consensual encounter into a detention, because a reasonable person would not feel free to leave without his identification; such a detention must be supported by reasonable suspicion.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion applies the correct standard of review and the governing objective seizure test, and Bouser is directly on point for the result it reaches. It skips the most difficult feature of the record—the officer's retention of the driver's license combined with asking Roberts to sit on the curb—and does not address published authority such as Castaneda treating retention of identification during a records check as a detention, while also leaning on Roberts's irrelevant subjective belief about his probation status.
Opinion
Filed 5/15/14 P. v. Roberts CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D064542
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE323459)
GARY WAYNE ROBERTS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, John M.
Thompson and Patricia K. Cookson, Judges. Affirmed and remanded.
John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbanski and Alastair J.
Agcaoili, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5, Gary Wayne Roberts entered a guilty plea to one count of possession of a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378). The court sentenced Roberts to a determinate term of 16 months in prison. The court stayed the execution of the sentence pending appeal. Roberts filed a timely notice of appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Since this appeal challenges only the denial of the motion to suppress evidence, we will summarize the facts from the transcript of the hearing on that motion.
At approximately 10:19 p.m. on August 24, 2012, an El Cajon police officer observed Roberts walking eastbound on Main Street in the City of El Cajon. The officer, who was in uniform and driving a marked patrol car, made a u-turn so that he could contact Roberts. The officer parked his car about 30 to 50 feet from Roberts, who continued to walk toward the officer. The officer did not use the car's spotlight or emergency lights.
As Roberts walked toward the officer's position, the officer got out of his car.
When Roberts was about 5 to 10 feet from the officer, the officer said, "What is up man?"
and "Do you mind talking to me." Roberts responded, "Sure what is going on." The officer responded, "Nothing much, just doing my job out here. Just talking to people."
He then asked Roberts, "Do you mind if I check your identification out?" Roberts said, "Sure" and handed his driver's license to the officer. The officer testified that this conversation was calm, and that he did not make any commands or block or restrain Roberts in any fashion.
2 The officer wanted to conduct a record check on Roberts and asked Roberts if he "wouldn't mind having a seat on the curb" while he conducted the record check. Roberts sat on the curb while the record check was conducted.
The record check revealed that Roberts was on probation and subject to a Fourth Amendment waiver. When Roberts was informed of the results of the record check he became nervous and angry and denied he was the subject of a "Fourth waiver." Police reconfirmed the waiver information with the dispatcher three or four times. Thereafter Roberts was searched and a quantity of drugs and counterfeit bills were found on his person.
Roberts testified at the suppression hearing. He said the officer rushed up to him and in a stern voice asked to speak to him and asked for his identification. Roberts said the officer shined the patrol car spotlight on him as he approached and that the officer used a flashlight during the encounter.
At the close of the hearing the court determined the officer's testimony was truthful, that the encounter was consensual and that although the officer did use his flashlight during the encounter, Roberts was not detained until after the police learned of his Fourth waiver.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review When we review a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress evidence we follow an established two-step process. First we review the historical facts found by the trial court under the substantial evidence standard of review. Once we have determined 3 the trial court's factual findings are supported in the record, we independently determine if, in light of those facts, the trial court properly applied the law to the facts. (People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 255; People v. Leyba (1981) 29 Cal.3d 591, 596-597.)
B. Analysis The question presented in this case is when was Roberts seized by police. If he was seized upon the officer's initial encounter then arguably the later discovery of his "Fourth waiver" would be the product of an unlawful detention. Thus we must determine the point at which Roberts was first seized.
A seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs when a law enforcement officer restrains a person's liberty by means of physical force or a show of authority. (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 341.) We examine the officer's action under an objective standard to determine whether a reasonable person, under the circumstances, would feel free to leave or to discontinue the contact with police. (Ibid.)
Not all encounters with police amount to seizures, some may be described as consensual, that is, the person contacted has not yet been restrained in his or her liberty.
In People v. Bouser (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1282, police encountered the defendant.
Much like this case, the officers said, "Hey, how are you doing? You mind if we talk?"
The defendant stopped and talked with police for several minutes. Police asked for identification and did a record check which, in turn, revealed an outstanding arrest warrant. The court affirmed the trial court's decision denying a motion to suppress, finding the encounter was consensual up to the point that police discovered the outstanding warrant. (Id. at pp. 1287-1288.)
4 In Florida v. Bostick (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 439, the court said, "[I]n order to determine whether a particular encounter constitutes a seizure, a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter." (California v. Hodari D.
(1991) 499 U.S. 621, 628; U.S. v. Mendenhall (1980) 446 U.S. 544, 554.)
The undisputed evidence at the suppression hearing was that the officer did not block Roberts's movements, make any commands or in any way physically restrain him.
The trial court credited the officer's testimony about the calm, low key nature of the encounter and the fact that Roberts agreed to cooperate with the officer, including sitting down while the officer did a record check. Given Roberts's reaction to the finding of the probation condition, it would appear Roberts thought he was not on probation, had no concerns about a record check, and was willing to participate in the process.
It is clear from this record that the trial court properly found the encounter between Roberts and the officer was consensual and that Roberts was not seized until after police learned about the waiver of Fourth Amendment rights. Roberts does not challenge the validity of that probation condition. Thus, the search that followed the discovery of the condition was valid and not the product of an unlawful seizure.
Given our conclusion that the police conduct in this case was objectively reasonable, we decline to consider the People's contention that the exclusionary rule should not be applicable to this case even if police erred in the initial contact with Roberts.
5 DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The case is remanded to the trial court to execute the sentence which was stayed pending appeal.
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
NARES, J.
HALLER, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Zamudio S074414 · 2008-04-21
- People v. Ayala S009108 · 2000-06-08
- People v. Bouser G013837 · 1994-07-20
- People v. Leyba Crim. 21650 · 1981-06-25