People v. Vargas CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCS263094
- Trial judge
- Garry G. Haehnle
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- McINTYRE (author), Patricia D. Benke
Analysis
The trial court initially accepted the defendant's admission of a prior strike without advising him of his constitutional rights, but later corrected this error at a sentencing hearing by providing the required advisements and obtaining a valid waiver. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that the subsequent advisements and the defendant's affirmative response established a voluntary and intelligent admission.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Validity of the defendant's admission of a prior strike conviction“Because the record reveals that Vargas was informed of his trial rights, that he waived those rights and admitted his prior strike conviction, we reject Vargas's arguments to the contrary.” | unclear | correct | agree with court The appellate court correctly applied the standard from People v. Mosby, which requires the trial court to advise the defendant of specific rights before accepting an admission of a prior conviction. The court found that although the initial admission was defective, the trial court cured the error by providing the necessary advisements and obtaining a clear, affirmative waiver at the sentencing hearing. The record supports the conclusion that the defendant voluntarily and intelligently waived his rights and admitted the prior conviction. |
Authorities
- relied: In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857 — Before accepting a criminal defendant's admission of a prior conviction, the trial court must advise the defendant and obtain waivers of the right to a trial, the right to remain silent, and the right to confront adverse witnesses.
- relied: People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353 — Proper advisement and waivers of the rights identified in In re Yurko in the record establish a defendant's voluntary and intelligent admission of the prior conviction.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly identifies the legal standard for admitting prior convictions and applies it to the specific facts of the record, noting that the trial court cured its initial error by providing the required advisements later. The court's analysis is concise and directly addresses the appellant's argument regarding the clarity of the waiver.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe trial court accepted Vargas's admission of a prior strike conviction, belatedly advised him at sentencing of his Boykin/Tahl rights after neglecting to do so at the original admission, obtained an affirmative response to a combined waiver-and-admission question, and imposed a doubled six-year sentence. The Court of Appeal rejected Vargas's claim that the record was unclear whether he waived his rights or admitted the prior, and affirmed the judgment.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Validity of the defendant's admission of the prior strike conviction and waiver of trial rights (Yurko advisements)“Because the record reveals that Vargas was informed of his trial rights, that he waived those rights and admitted his prior strike conviction, we reject Vargas's arguments to the contrary.” | unclear | correct | agree with court Under People v. Mosby, the question is whether the record affirmatively shows the admission was voluntary and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances. Here the court expressly advised Vargas of each right at sentencing, confirmed he understood them, asked whether he gave up those rights in order to admit the strike, received 'Yes,' confirmed he understood the sentence-doubling consequence, and defense counsel did not object. A combined waiver/admission question is not ideal, but the record as quoted supports the finding of a knowing, voluntary waiver and admission. The opinion does not articulate a standard of review, which is a minor gap. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353 — Before accepting an admission of a prior conviction the trial court must advise of and obtain waivers of the rights to trial, to remain silent, and to confront witnesses; proper advisements and waivers in the record establish a voluntary and intelligent admission, and the inquiry looks to the totality of the circumstances.
- relied: In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857 — A defendant admitting a prior conviction allegation must be advised of and waive the Boykin/Tahl rights to jury trial, confrontation, and silence.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court correctly identified the Yurko/Mosby framework and applied it to a record showing express advisement, confirmation of understanding, an affirmative waiver and admission, and advisement of the penal consequence. It did not state a standard of review or expressly invoke Mosby's totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, but the result is well supported by the quoted colloquy.
Opinion
Filed 5/12/14 P. v. Vargas CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D064148
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCS263094)
DANIEL VARGAS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Garry G. Haehnle, Judge. Affirmed.
Wayne C. Tobin for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton and James H.
Flaherty III, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury found Daniel Vargas guilty of being an inmate in possession of a weapon.
He later admitted suffering a strike prior. At a sentencing hearing the following month, the trial court noted that when Vargas admitted suffering the strike prior, it had neglected to inform him that he had constitutional rights to a jury trial on the strike allegation, to have the prosecution prove the allegation, to confront witnesses, present a defense and remain silent. When the court asked Vargas if he wanted to give up those rights, Vargas responded, "I've already done that." After the court clarified that it was referring to a charge that the prosecution needed to prove, it again asked Vargas if he understood his rights.
When Vargas responded affirmatively, the court asked, "Do you give up those rights in order to admit that you do have a strike prior?" Vargas responded, "Uh-huh.
Yes." The court then confirmed that Vargas understood that his admission could double his sentence. The court found that Vargas understood the nature of the plea and that he "voluntarily and freely [gave] up his constitutional trial rights, and freely and voluntarily admitted the prior strike offense." Vargas, who was represented by counsel, did not object. The court then imposed the three-year mid-term, doubled for the strike prior for a total term of six years in prison.
DISCUSSION
Vargas appeals, contending that his admission was invalid and should be reversed because the record is unclear whether he waived his rights or whether he also admitted the prior conviction. We disagree.
"[B]efore accepting a criminal defendant's admission of a prior conviction, the trial court must advise the defendant and obtain waivers of (1) the right to a trial to determine the fact of the prior conviction, (2) the right to remain silent, and (3) the right to confront adverse witnesses. [In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857, 863] Proper 2 advisement and waivers of these rights in the record establish a defendant's voluntary and intelligent admission of the prior conviction. [Citations.]" (People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 356.)
Here, the trial court failed to inform Vargas of his constitutional rights when it initially accepted the admission. The court, however, recognized the error and corrected it at the sentencing hearing. The court properly informed Vargas of his constitutional rights and confirmed that Vargas understood those rights. The court then asked a combined question, whether Vargas "g[a]ve up those rights" and "admit[ted] that [he had]
a strike prior." Vargas responded affirmatively. Because the record reveals that Vargas was informed of his trial rights, that he waived those rights and admitted his prior strike conviction, we reject Vargas's arguments to the contrary.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
MCINTYRE, J.
WE CONCUR:
BENKE, Acting P. J.
MCDONALD, J
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Mosby S104862 · 2004-07-08
- In Re Yurko Crim. 16368 · 1974-03-07