People v. Baker CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCD244547
- Trial judge
- Eugenia A. Eyherabide
- Outcome
- modified — Affirmed as modified.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Judith D. McConnell (author), Judith L. Haller, Gilbert Nares
Analysis
The trial court imposed a three-year probation sentence on a defendant who pleaded guilty to possessing oxycodone, including a condition to take psychotropic medications if prescribed and an order to report for a determination of ability to pay attorney fees. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment as modified by striking the vague probation condition, while dismissing the attorney fee challenge as not ripe.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Probation condition requiring defendant to 'Take psychotropic medications if prescribed / ordered by doctor'“We agree the condition is invalid because, inter alia, it does not require that Baker be aware of the prescription or order, does not define "psychotropic medications," and is not reasonably related to Baker's crime or future criminality.” | de novo | error | agree with court The court correctly applied the standard from People v. Carbajal and People v. Balestra, which hold that probation conditions must be reasonably related to the crime and not vague. The condition failed because it did not define the medication or require the defendant's knowledge, making it overbroad and vague. |
Order requiring defendant to report to Revenue and Recovery for determination of ability to pay attorney fees“In light of this further statement, Baker's contention is not ripe. (Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158, 170-171.)” | unclear | not reached | agree with court The court determined the issue was not ripe because the probation order explicitly preserved the defendant's right to a hearing before the court if he disagreed with the Revenue and Recovery determination. Since the final determination had not yet occurred, the due process challenge was premature. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114 — Probation conditions must be reasonably related to the crime and not vague or overbroad.
- relied: People v. Balestra (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 57 — A probation condition requiring the taking of medication is invalid if it does not require the defendant's awareness of the prescription or define the medication.
- relied: Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158 — A claim is not ripe for review if the administrative or judicial process has not yet been exhausted or a final determination has not been made.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies established California law regarding the vagueness of probation conditions and the ripeness doctrine. It relies on appropriate authorities to support both the invalidation of the medication condition and the dismissal of the fee challenge.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe trial court accepted Baker's negotiated guilty plea to possessing oxycodone, placed him on three years' probation with a condition requiring him to take psychotropic medications if prescribed, and fixed the value of appointed-counsel services at $570 subject to a later ability-to-pay determination. The Court of Appeal held the attorney-fee challenge unripe, struck the psychotropic-medication condition as vague, overbroad, and unrelated to the offense, and affirmed the judgment as modified.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Fixing the face value of appointed-counsel services at $570 and referring the ability-to-pay determination to Revenue and Recovery under Penal Code section 987.8“In light of this further statement, Baker's contention is not ripe. (Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158, 170-171.)” | unclear | not reached | agree with court The order expressly deferred the ability-to-pay determination and preserved Baker's right to a court hearing before any judgment, so no final fee order had issued and the due process challenge was premature. The ripeness conclusion follows from the quoted order and Pacific Legal Foundation. |
Imposing probation condition 7a requiring Baker to take psychotropic medications if prescribed or ordered by a doctor“We agree the condition is invalid because, inter alia, it does not require that Baker be aware of the prescription or order, does not define "psychotropic medications," and is not reasonably related to Baker's crime or future criminality.” | unclear | error (discretion) | agree with court The condition lacked a knowledge requirement, was undefined, and bore no relationship to a drug-possession offense or future criminality under the Lent/Carbajal test; the Attorney General conceded as much. Striking the condition is consistent with Carbajal and Balestra. |
Authorities
- relied: Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158 — A claim is not ripe for judicial review until the controversy has sufficiently matured into a concrete dispute
- relied: People v. Balestra (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 57 — Probation conditions are reviewed for reasonableness under the Lent test as restated in Carbajal
- relied: People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114 — A probation condition is invalid if it has no relationship to the crime, relates to conduct not itself criminal, and is not reasonably related to future criminality
- missed: In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875 — Facial vagueness and overbreadth challenges to probation conditions present pure questions of law reviewable de novo and are not forfeited by failure to object below
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court correctly resolved both issues: the fee claim was premature because a hearing was still available, and the medication condition was facially defective and unrelated to the offense. The opinion is very brief, does not state its standards of review, and rests the probation ruling largely on the People's concession without discussing Sheena K. or forfeiture.
Opinion
Filed 4/30/14 P. v. Baker CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D063816
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD244547)
CLARENCE T. BAKER, Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Eugenia A.
Eyherabide, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Russell S. Babcock, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland and Stacy Tyler, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. In November 2012, police officers found Clarence T. Baker in possession of Percocet without a prescription. Baker entered a negotiated guilty plea to possessing oxycodone (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)). The court imposed a stipulated sentence of three years' probation. Baker appeals, raising two contentions: First, the court violated his due process rights by fixing the amount of reimbursable attorney fees at $570 without sufficient evidence, notice or a hearing. Second, the probation condition requiring that he "[t]ake psychotropic medications if prescribed / ordered by doctor" is invalid on its face because it is vague, overbroad and impermissibly infringes on his right to due process, liberty interest and fundamental privacy right. We agree with the second contention.
ATTORNEY FEES
The court found the face value of the services of Baker's appointed attorney was $570. The court ordered Baker to report to Revenue and Recovery within 20 days "for a determination of your present ability to pay the cost of your court appointed attorney [Pen. Code, §] 987.8." The probation order further stated: "If it is determined that you have the present ability to pay all or any part of the costs incurred, the county will request that a judgment be issued against you for this amount. If you do not agree with this determination, you have the right to a hearing before the court for a decision on your present ability. Failure to report within the 20 days will be deemed a waiver of your right to such a hearing, and a civil judgment will be entered against you for the amount of costs incurred. Payment of any costs so determined shall be to Revenue and Recovery.
Payment is not a condition of probation but any judgment obtained may be enforced in 2 the manner of any civil judgment." In light of this further statement, Baker's contention is not ripe. (Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158, 170-171.) Even if Revenue and Recovery determines that Baker has the ability to pay "all or any part of the costs," he still has the right to a court hearing at which he can present evidence of an inability to pay any or all of the $570.
PROBATION CONDITION
Respondent concedes the probation condition requiring Baker to "[t]ake psychotropic medications if prescribed / ordered by doctor" "appears to be overbroad and vague and its nexus to [Baker]'s reformation and rehabilitation appears tenuous." We agree the condition is invalid because, inter alia, it does not require that Baker be aware of the prescription or order, does not define "psychotropic medications," and is not reasonably related to Baker's crime or future criminality. (People v. Balestra (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 57, 65, citing People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1121.) In light of our conclusion, we need not consider Baker's remaining challenges to the probation condition.
3 DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified by deleting probation condition number 7a. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed.
MCCONNELL, P. J. WE CONCUR:
NARES, J.
HALLER, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Balestra D031953 · 1999-11-04
- People v. Carbajal S036146 · 1995-08-14
- Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Commission L.A. 31564 · 1982-12-20