gno.law

People v. Cesmat CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D063796 · 2014-04-28 · Unpublished

Proceeding
appeal from a judgment
Trial court
Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCN312558
Trial judge
Aaron H. Katz
Outcome
affirmed — Affirmed.
Area
criminal
Panel
Joan K. Irion (author), Gilbert Nares, Cynthia Aaron

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T06:42Z · confidence high

The trial court accepted Cesmat's guilty plea to assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury after a brief inquiry where he confirmed the facts stated in his plea form. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in establishing a factual basis and that any error was harmless given the probation report in the record.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Trial court's acceptance of the guilty plea without a more extensive factual inquiry
“We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in establishing a factual basis for the guilty plea, and we accordingly affirm the judgment.”
abuse of discretionnot reachedagree with court
The appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the crime was simple and self-explanatory, and the direct inquiry of the defendant was sufficient under controlling precedent.
Harmlessness of any potential error in the factual basis inquiry
“Accordingly, any error by the trial court in establishing the factual basis for Cesmat's guilty plea was harmless.”
de novonot reachedagree with court
The appellate court held that even if the initial inquiry was insufficient, the error was harmless because the probation report in the appellate record contained sufficient details to support a finding of a factual basis.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36 — The purpose of the factual basis requirement is to protect against situations where a defendant does not recognize that their acts constitute the charged offense.
  • relied: People v. Palmer (2013) 58 Cal.4th 110 — Claims that the trial court failed to establish a factual basis for a plea are cognizable on appeal, and acceptance of the plea is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
  • relied: People v. Holmes (2004) 32 Cal.4th 432 — A trial court possesses wide discretion in determining whether a sufficient factual basis exists, and a brief inquiry asking the defendant if they did what was described in the complaint is sufficient.
  • relied: People v. Watts (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 173 — A trial court is not required to interrogate a defendant personally in an element-by-element manner about the factual basis for a guilty plea.
  • relied: People v. Calderon (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 930 — A defendant's statement that they intentionally tried to kill someone constituted an adequate factual basis for attempted murder.
  • relied: People v. Coulter (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1117 — Failure to find a factual basis at the time of the initial entry of a negotiated plea is harmless where the contents of the record support a finding of a factual basis.
  • relied: People v. Wilkerson (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1571 — If the trial court fails to make an on-the-record inquiry, the appellate court may review the record to determine if the error is harmless.
  • relied: People v. Mickens (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1557 — A probation report containing details of the crime can establish a factual basis for a guilty plea, rendering any error in the initial inquiry harmless.
  • relied: People v. Trujillo (2006) 40 Cal.4th 165 — The appellate court may review the probation report to see if it establishes a factual basis for the plea when challenged by appellate counsel.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the abuse of discretion standard from People v. Palmer and People v. Holmes to the specific facts, noting that the crime was simple and the inquiry was direct. It also correctly applies the harmless error doctrine from People v. Trujillo and People v. Mickens, relying on the probation report in the record to cure any potential deficiency in the initial inquiry.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:31Z · confidence low

The trial court accepted Jesse Cesmat's guilty plea to assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)) after asking him to confirm his plea-form statement that he 'committed an assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury on another,' and sentenced him to three years of formal probation. The Court of Appeal held the factual-basis inquiry under Penal Code section 1192.5 was not an abuse of discretion and, alternatively, that any error was harmless because the probation report in the record established a factual basis; it affirmed.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Acceptance of the guilty plea after a factual-basis inquiry under Penal Code section 1192.5 consisting of the defendant confirming a plea-form statement that tracked the statutory language of the offense
“We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in establishing a factual basis for the guilty plea.”
abuse of discretioncorrectunsure
Holmes approves having the defendant describe the conduct or confirm a 'detailed factual basis' in the complaint or plea agreement, and warns that a bare conclusion is inadequate. Here the plea form and the court's question merely recited the elements of section 245(a)(4), with no description of conduct; the court's answer that the offense is 'self-explanatory' is a defensible but thin reading of Holmes, and the court did not address People v. Willard, which found a statutory-language recitation insufficient. The result is nonetheless sustainable, so I cannot point to a clear legal error.
Alternative holding that any deficiency in the factual-basis inquiry was harmless because the probation report in the appellate record described the assault (accelerating a car at the victim and throwing him into the air)
“Accordingly, any error by the trial court in establishing the factual basis for Cesmat's guilty plea was harmless.”
de novoharmless erroragree with court
Coulter, Wilkerson, Mickens and Trujillo support reviewing the probation report to determine whether the record contains a factual basis, and the facts recited (driving a vehicle into a person) plainly support assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury. The harmlessness analysis is well grounded and independently sustains the affirmance.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36 — The factual-basis requirement protects against a defendant pleading guilty to an offense his acts do not actually constitute and ensures he committed a crime at least as serious as the one pleaded to.
  • relied: People v. Palmer (2013) 58 Cal.4th 110 — A claim that the trial court failed to establish a factual basis under section 1192.5 is cognizable on appeal, and acceptance of the plea after a factual-basis inquiry is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
  • relied: People v. Holmes (2004) 32 Cal.4th 432 — Trial courts have wide discretion in determining a factual basis; the court may have the defendant describe the conduct or question him about a detailed factual basis in the complaint or plea form, but a bare statement that a factual basis exists is inadequate.
  • relied: People v. Watts (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 173 — The trial court need not interrogate the defendant element by element about the factual basis for the plea.
  • relied: People v. Calderon (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 930 — A defendant's brief statement that he intentionally tried to kill someone was an adequate factual basis for an attempted murder plea.
  • relied: People v. Coulter (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1117 — Failure to find a factual basis at the plea is harmless where the record supports a finding of a factual basis.
  • relied: People v. Wilkerson (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1571 — An appellate court may review the record to determine whether a factual-basis error is harmless.
  • relied: People v. Mickens (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1557 — A probation report in the appellate record describing the crime can establish a factual basis and render the trial court's error harmless.
  • relied: People v. Trujillo (2006) 40 Cal.4th 165 — When appellate counsel claims the plea lacks an adequate factual basis, the appellate court may review the probation report to see if it establishes a factual basis.
  • missed: People v. Willard (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1329 — A factual-basis inquiry that rests only on a recitation of the statutory elements of the offense, without any description of the underlying conduct, is inadequate under Holmes, though the error may be harmless if the record otherwise supplies a factual basis. Although a Court of Appeal decision is not binding on another appellate panel, it addressed the exact argument Cesmat raised and the court did not engage with it.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court applied the correct standard and authorities (Palmer, Holmes, French) and its alternative harmless-error analysis under Coulter, Mickens and Trujillo is firmly supported by the probation report describing the vehicular assault. It did not, however, grapple with the fact that the plea-form statement merely parroted the statutory elements rather than describing conduct, which Holmes's 'detailed factual basis' language and People v. Willard suggest is insufficient, so the primary holding is thinner than the opinion acknowledges.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 4/28/14 P. v. Cesmat CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D063796

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN312558)

JESSE CESMAT,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Aaron H.

Katz, Judge. Affirmed.

Jan B. Norman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland and Teresa Torreblanca, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Jesse Cesmat appeals from a judgment following his guilty plea to one count of assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4).)

Cesmat contends that the trial court improperly accepted his guilty plea without conducting an adequate factual inquiry. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in establishing a factual basis for the guilty plea, and we accordingly affirm the judgment.

I

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

An information charged Cesmat with assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)), resisting an officer (id., § 148, subd. (a)(1)), and two counts of hit and run driving (Veh. Code, § 20002, subd. (a)).

Cesmat reached a deal to plead guilty to one count of assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)). The factual basis for the plea was set forth in the guilty plea form that Cesmat filled out and signed. On the portion of the form asking Cesmat to describe the facts as to each charge (par. 15)

Cesmat stated, "I committed an assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury on another." At the hearing on the guilty plea, the trial court referred to Cesmat's statement on the guilty plea form. The trial court asked, "Sir, says [in] paragraph 15 the reason you are pleading guilty today is because you committed assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury on another. Is that what you did?" Cesmat answered, "Yes." Cesmat was represented by counsel, who stated that he joined in the plea and believed that 2 Cesmat was making a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights. Further, Cesmat confirmed that he had carefully reviewed the guilty plea form with his attorney.

The trial court accepted Cesmat's guilty plea and sentenced him to three years of formal probation.

The probation officer's report, filed after Cesmat's guilty plea and before sentencing, describes the events leading to the criminal charges. Based on information in the police report, the probation officer stated that Cesmat was involved in a minor traffic collision but did not stop to exchange information with the other driver. The other driver followed Cesmat into a parking lot where the two men had a confrontation. When Cesmat tried to move his car, the other driver stood in front of Cesmat's vehicle, and Cesmat accelerated toward him, causing the man to be thrown into the air.

Following sentencing, Cesmat obtained a certification of probable cause and filed this appeal, contending that the trial court improperly accepted his guilty plea without establishing a factual basis.

II

DISCUSSION

The sole issue is whether there is merit to Cesmat's contention that the trial court prejudicially erred by accepting Cesmat's guilty plea without conducting an adequate factual inquiry.

3 A. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Establishing the Factual Basis for the Guilty Plea Penal Code section 1192.5 provides that upon accepting a conditional guilty plea, "[t]he court shall . . . cause an inquiry to be made of the defendant to satisfy itself that the plea is freely and voluntarily made, and that there is a factual basis for the plea." (Ibid.)

" 'The purpose of the requirement is to protect against the situation where the defendant, although he realizes what he has done, is not sufficiently skilled in law to recognize that his acts do not constitute the offense with which he is charged. [Citation.] Inquiry into the factual basis for the plea ensures that the defendant actually committed a crime at least as serious as the one to which he is willing to plead.' " (People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 50-51 (French).)

As Cesmat challenges the procedures the trial court used in establishing a factual basis for his guilty plea, "the claim the trial court failed to establish a factual basis for defendant's plea under [Penal Code] section 1192.5 is cognizable on appeal." (People v. Palmer (2013) 58 Cal.4th 110, 115.) " 'The trial court's acceptance of the guilty plea, after pursuing an inquiry to satisfy itself that there is a factual basis for the plea, will be reversed only for abuse of discretion.' " (Id. at p. 119.)

"[A] trial court possesses wide discretion in determining whether a sufficient factual basis exists for a guilty plea." (People v. Holmes (2004) 32 Cal.4th 432, 443 (Holmes).) Among other approaches, "the court may develop the factual basis for the plea on the record through its own examination by having the defendant describe the 4 conduct that gave rise to the charge, or question the defendant regarding the detailed factual basis described in the complaint or written plea agreement." (Id. at p. 444.)

Here, the trial court followed this procedure by directly inquiring of Cesmat as to the factual basis for his plea. Specifically, the trial court asked Cesmat to confirm that he took the actions stated in paragraph 15 of the guilty plea form, namely that he committed an assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury on another.

Cesmat does not take issue with the trial court's approach of making a direct inquiry of the defendant to establish the factual basis for the plea. Instead, Cesmat complains that the inquiry was not thorough enough. He contends that "the trial court simply recited the statutory language," and "[t]he actions that constitute sufficient 'force' and the meaning of 'great bodily injury' are not self-explanatory." We disagree.

The crime of assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury is a simple and self-explanatory crime that a layperson is able to understand merely from the everyday words describing the crime. The trial court is not required "to interrogate a defendant personally in an element by element manner about the factual basis for his guilty plea." (People v. Watts (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 173, 180.) Our Supreme Court has approved similarly brief inquiries of a defendant. In Holmes it was sufficient that "[t]he trial court asked defendant if he received a copy of the complaint, asked him if he did what was described in the complaint, and then concluded that a factual basis existed for the conditional plea[,]" even though "[t]he trial court did not conduct an extensive inquiry with defendant to develop the factual basis on the record . . . ." (Holmes, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 443.) In the course of its discussion in Holmes, at page 443, our Supreme 5 Court also approved the trial court's truncated approach in People v. Calderon (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 930, 935 (Calderon), in which the defendant's "statement he intentionally tried to kill someone constituted an adequate factual basis for attempted murder."

(Calderon, at p. 935).1 Accordingly, although "a bare statement by the judge that a factual basis exists . . .

is inadequate" (Holmes, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 436), that is not what happened here. The trial court specifically asked Cesmat to establish the factual basis for his guilty plea by having him confirm the truth of the statement in paragraph 15 of the guilty plea form that Cesmat committed assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury on another.

Although the inquiry was brief, the crime was not complex. The trial court's questioning of Cesmat was accordingly adequate to insure that this was not a situation where " 'although he realizes what he has done' " the defendant " 'is not sufficiently skilled in law to recognize that his acts do not constitute the offense with which he is charged.' "

(French, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 50-51.) We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in establishing a factual basis for the guilty plea.

B. Any Error Was Harmless Although we conclude that the trial court did not err in its inquiry into the factual basis for the guilty plea, if any such error occurred, it would be harmless.

1 In Calderon, "[t]he entire factual basis, under the court's inquiry, was as follows: 'That on March 14, 1989 in Orange County you attempted to kill Hiep Bui with a firearm and that you shot Felix Angel, inflicting great bodily injuries while attempting to shoot Mr. Bui? Is that true?' " (Calderon, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at p. 935, fn. 1.)

6 "Failure to find a factual basis at the time of the initial entry of the negotiated plea is '. . . harmless where the contents of the record support a finding of a factual basis for the conditional plea.' " (People v. Coulter (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1122.) "If the trial court fails to make an on-the-record inquiry as to the factual basis for the plea, the appellate court is free to review the record and determine whether the error is harmless, i.e., whether the record contains sufficient information to ensure the defendant committed the acts to which the plea was entered." (People v. Wilkerson (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1571, 1576.)

Thus, for instance, in People v. Mickens (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1557, 1559, 1564- 1565, the trial court's error in failing to establish the factual basis for a plea was harmless because a probation report, which referred to the details of the defendant's crime in a police report, was contained in the appellate record and established a factual basis for the guilty plea. Our Supreme Court has favorably cited Mickens, explaining that when "appellate counsel claims the plea lacks an adequate factual basis, the appellate court may review the probation report to see if it establishes a factual basis for the plea." (People v. Trujillo (2006) 40 Cal.4th 165, 185.)

Here, the probation report is in the appellate record, and it extensively details the facts of the assault committed by Cesmat as described in a police report, supporting a finding that Cesmat committed assault with a force likely to cause great bodily injury by accelerating his vehicle at another person and throwing him into the air. Accordingly, any error by the trial court in establishing the factual basis for Cesmat's guilty plea was harmless.

7 DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

IRION, J.

WE CONCUR:

NARES, Acting P. J.

AARON, J.

Cites, in this corpus