Woodall v. San Diego County Sheriff's Dept. CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. 37-2012-00094422-CU-WM-CTL
- Trial judge
- Joel M. Pressman
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed.
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Judith D. McConnell (author), Cynthia Aaron, Joan K. Irion
Analysis
The trial court dismissed Woodall’s petition for writ of mandate and declaratory relief with prejudice, denying his motions to disqualify the judge and for entry of default due to lack of proof of service. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that the disqualification order was not appealable, the service was defective, and the other claims were not properly before the court or lacked merit.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of motion to disqualify trial judge under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6“An order denying a motion to disqualify a judge is not an appealable order. The exclusive means of obtaining judicial review of such an order is by filing a petition for writ of mandate within 10 days after notice of the order.” | unclear | not reached | agree with court The appellate court correctly identified that an order denying a 170.6 motion is not directly appealable and must be challenged via a petition for writ of mandate. Since Woodall did not file such a petition, the issue was not properly before the court on appeal from the final judgment. |
Denial of request for entry of default“Absent at least colorable compliance with these service requirements, the court had no jurisdiction to grant Woodall's request for entry of default, even if the Department and the County had actual notice of the petition.” | de novo | correct | agree with court The court correctly applied the statutory requirements for service on a public entity, noting that Woodall failed to provide a summons or serve the proper official. Without valid service, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter a default, making the denial of the motion correct. |
Requirement to submit fee waiver application“The Legislature has long required the payment of fee for filing the first paper in a civil action, including a mandamus action. (Gov. Code, § 70611.)” | de novo | correct | agree with court The court correctly distinguished civil mandamus actions from criminal writs, noting that Government Code section 70611 requires filing fees for civil actions. Woodall's reliance on a criminal case was misplaced, so the trial court was correct to require a fee waiver application. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Hull (1991) 1 Cal.4th 266 — An order denying a motion to disqualify a judge is not appealable; review is by writ of mandate.
- relied: Guedalia v. Superior Court (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1156 — The exclusive means of reviewing a denial of a 170.6 motion is a petition for writ of mandate.
- relied: Wagner v. City of South Pasadena (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 943 — A writ petition must be served in the same manner as a summons and complaint, including with a summons if it includes a cause of action for declaratory relief.
- relied: American Express Centurion Bank v. Zara (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 383 — A court lacks jurisdiction to grant a request for entry of default absent at least colorable compliance with service requirements, even if there is actual notice.
- relied: Marler v. Mun. Court (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 155 — Filing a writ petition in a criminal action does not require payment of a filing fee.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the non-appealability rule for 170.6 denials and the jurisdictional requirement for valid service to affirm the dismissal. It also correctly distinguishes civil mandamus fees from criminal writ fees using the appropriate statutory authority.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe trial court denied Woodall's section 170.6 disqualification request, denied his request to transfer the case, denied his request for entry of default against the Sheriff's Department for lack of proof of service, and dismissed his pro se petition for writ of mandate and declaratory relief with prejudice after an order to show cause hearing. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding the disqualification ruling and the thumb-drive release issue were not properly before it, that Woodall had not shown valid service on the County so default could not be entered, and that a filing fee (and hence a fee waiver application) is required for a civil mandamus petition.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of Woodall's Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 motion to disqualify the trial judge (treated as part of his renewed motion to transfer for bias)“An order denying a motion to disqualify a judge is not an appealable order.” | unclear | not reached | agree with court Section 170.3, subdivision (d) makes a petition for writ of mandate filed within 10 days the exclusive means of reviewing a ruling on judicial disqualification, and People v. Hull squarely holds this applies to section 170.6 rulings. The court correctly declined to reach the merits on appeal from the judgment. |
Denial of Woodall's request for entry of default against the Sheriff's Department for lack of proof of service“In this case, the record does not show Woodall obtained a summons or served the” | unclear | correct | agree with court A writ petition joined with declaratory relief must be served with a summons in the manner of a complaint (Wagner), service on a public entity must be on its clerk or head (§ 416.50), and mail service requires a notice and acknowledgment of receipt (§ 415.30). Mailing the petition alone to the County's claims division did not meet these requirements, and without valid service the court lacked jurisdiction to enter default regardless of actual notice (American Express Centurion Bank v. Zara). The court's analysis and authorities support its conclusion. |
Woodall's request that the appellate court declare void the release he signed to obtain copies of his work product from the Department's thumb drive“Accordingly, we conclude Woodall has not established the propriety of the release is properly before us in this appeal.” | unclear | not reached | agree with court The release was not alleged in the petition, arose from separate proceedings after the petition was filed, and by Woodall's own admission played no role in the dismissal. An appellate court reviews the judgment on the record and pleadings before the trial court, so declining to reach this issue was proper. |
Trial court's requirement that Woodall submit a fee waiver application (with a certified copy of his prisoner trust account) to file his writ petition“The Legislature has long required the payment of fee for filing the first paper” | de novo | correct | agree with court Government Code section 70611 imposes a first-paper filing fee in unlimited civil cases, which include civil mandamus petitions. Marler v. Municipal Court concerned a writ petition in a criminal matter and does not establish that civil mandamus petitions are fee-exempt, so the court's distinction is sound. |
Dismissal of the entire action with prejudice following the order to show cause hearing“The court orders the entire action dismissed with prejudice.” | unclear | not reached | unsure The opinion affirms the judgment but never analyzes the statutory basis for dismissing the action with prejudice roughly six months after filing for lack of service; dismissals for failure to serve or prosecute are ordinarily without prejudice. Woodall apparently did not challenge the dismissal itself on this ground, so the court was not obliged to address it, but the record quoted does not permit me to say whether the with-prejudice dismissal was proper. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Hull (1991) 1 Cal.4th 266 — A petition for writ of mandate under section 170.3, subdivision (d) is the exclusive means of reviewing a ruling on a section 170.6 disqualification motion; it is not reviewable on appeal from the judgment.
- relied: Guedalia v. Superior Court (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1156 — Review of an order denying judicial disqualification must be sought by writ petition within 10 days of notice of the order.
- relied: Wagner v. City of South Pasadena (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 943 — A writ petition must be served in the same manner as a summons and complaint, and a petition joined with a declaratory relief cause of action must be served with a summons.
- relied: American Express Centurion Bank v. Zara (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 383 — Without at least substantial compliance with statutory service requirements, a court lacks jurisdiction to enter default, even if the defendant had actual notice of the action.
- relied: Marler v. Municipal Court (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 155 — Distinguished by the court: concerned a writ petition filed in a criminal action and so does not show civil mandamus petitions are exempt from the first-paper filing fee.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion correctly disposes of each argument Woodall raised, applying the right authorities on non-appealability of disqualification rulings, the service prerequisites for default, and the civil filing-fee requirement. It does not, however, examine the basis for the trial court's dismissal of the action with prejudice, which it affirms without discussion, leaving a gap in the analysis of the judgment itself.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
record incompleteOpinion
Filed 3/12/14 Woodall v. San Diego County Sheriff’s Dept. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SHAWN JAMES ALLEN WOODALL, D063157
Plaintiff and Appellant, v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2012-00094422- CU-WM-CTL) SAN DIEGO COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Joel M.
Pressman, Judge. Affirmed.
Shawn James Allen Woodall, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Shawn James Allen Woodall appeals from a judgment dismissing his petition for writ of mandate and declaratory relief (petition) against the San Diego County Sheriff's Department (Department). He contends we must reverse the judgment because the trial court erroneously denied his motion to disqualify the assigned trial judge and refused to enter a default against the Department after mistakenly determining Woodall had not supplied proof of service. Woodall further claims the Department wrongfully required him to sign a release in order to obtain copies of documents he created, which were contained on a USB flash drive (thumb drive) the Department provided him while he was representing himself in a criminal case. Finally, he contends the court erroneously required him to submit a fee waiver application.
We conclude these contentions are either not properly before us or they lack merit.
We therefore affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
Woodall was apparently incarcerated at the time he filed the underlying petition.
The petition generally alleged the Department violated its constitutional obligation to ensure he, as an indigent, had meaningful access to the courts by providing him with adequate services and supplies. Among the relief requested in the petition, Woodall sought a writ of mandate commanding the Department to provide him with pen and paper to draft legal documents; copies of the documents for the courts, himself, and opposing counsel; postage to mail documents to the courts and opposing counsel; a minimum of four hours a week of access to the law library and computer legal research services; and regular use of a computer to generate legal documents. He also requested an award of $1,000 for the Department's purported failure to follow Woodall v. Kolender et al.
2 (Nov. 10, 2009, D054152) [nonpub. opn.], a case in which we also affirmed a judgment of dismissal in favor of the Department.
Approximately a month after filing the petition, Woodall filed a declaration stating he mailed the petition to a supervisor in the claims division of the County of San Diego's Office of County Counsel (County). After receiving the petition, a deputy county counsel sent Woodall a letter informing him the claims division did not have the authority to accept service of process on behalf of any County-related defendant or respondent and Woodall's act of mailing the petition to the claims division was not effective service. The letter also informed Woodall the Department was part of the County and was not a separate, or suable, public entity. Neither the County nor the Department ever responded to the petition.
Approximately six months after Woodall filed the petition, the court issued an order to show cause why the case should not be dismissed. Woodall filed a motion requesting the court order the Department to produce him in person or telephonically for the order to show cause hearing. The court issued an order allowing Woodall to appear telephonically and provided him with a toll-free number to call.
Meanwhile, Woodall requested the court enter a default against the Department and, based on this request, he expected the court to take the order to show cause hearing off calendar. When the court did not take the hearing off calendar, Woodall filed a renewed motion requesting the court order the Department to produce him telephonically for the hearing. Alternatively, he requested the court transfer the case for disposition because the court was biased against him (renewed motion).
3 Approximately two weeks later, after conducting a hearing in which Woodall telephonically appeared, the court issued the following order: "The court den[ies]
[Woodall's Code of Civil Procedure section]1 170.6 request. [¶] . . . [¶] [Woodall's]
request to transfer the case is denied. [¶] [Woodall's] request for default is denied. There is no proof of service. [¶] The court orders the entire action dismissed with prejudice."
(Some capitalization omitted.)
DISCUSSION
I
Disqualification of Trial Judge The court apparently treated the renewed motion at least in part as a motion to disqualify the trial judge under section 170.6. Woodall contends the court erred in denying this aspect of the renewed motion because the trial judge demonstrated bias and prejudice by improperly setting the order to show cause hearing.
We need not decide the matter because it is not properly before us in this appeal.
An order denying a motion to disqualify a judge is not an appealable order. The exclusive means of obtaining judicial review of such an order is by filing a petition for writ of mandate within 10 days after notice of the order. (§ 170.3, subd. (d); People v. Hull (1991) 1 Cal.4th 266, 268; Guedalia v. Superior Court (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1156, 1159-1160.)
1 Further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise stated. 4 II Denial of Request for Entry of Default Woodall next contends the court erroneously denied his request for entry of default because he supplied proof he properly served his petition. We disagree.
For Woodall to establish he properly served his petition, he had to supply proof he delivered it and a summons to "the clerk, secretary, president, presiding officer or other head" of the County by an authorized method. (§§ 416.50, subd. (a), 1107; Wagner v. City of South Pasadena (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 943, 949-950 [a writ petition must be served in the same manner as a summons and complaint and, if the petition includes a cause of action for declaratory relief, the petition must be served with a summons].)
Service by mail may be an authorized method if the service complies with certain requirements, including a requirement that the summons and petition be accompanied by a notice and acknowledgment of receipt. (§ 415.30.)
In this case, the record does not show Woodall obtained a summons or served the summons with the petition on "the clerk, secretary, president, presiding officer or other head" of the County. The record also does not show the claims division of the County was authorized to accept mail service on behalf of the County or that Woodall's mail service complied with the requirements in section 415.30. Absent at least colorable compliance with these service requirements, the court had no jurisdiction to grant Woodall's request for entry of default, even if the Department and the County had actual notice of the petition. (American Express Centurion Bank v. Zara (2011) 199 5 Cal.App.4th 383, 391-392.) Accordingly, we conclude Woodall has not established the court erred in denying his request for entry of default.
III
Release of Claims According to a declaration in the record, Woodall represented himself in a separate criminal case and had protected work product on a thumb drive pertaining to a separate petition for writ of mandate he filed with the California Supreme Court. About a month after he filed the instant action, he requested the Department provide him with copies of the work product. The Department purportedly refused to do so unless Woodall signed a release, which he did under duress.
Woodall contends we must declare the release void. However, the petition contains no allegations relating to the release and the record shows the release arose out of separate proceedings after Woodall filed the petition. In addition, as Woodall acknowledges in his opening brief, the release played no apparent role in the court's decision to dismiss the petition. Accordingly, we conclude Woodall has not established the propriety of the release is properly before us in this appeal.
IV
Fee Waiver Application According to Woodall, the court required him to submit a certified copy of his prisoner trust account in order to obtain a fee waiver. He contends the court should not have required him to go through the process of obtaining a fee waiver because the filing of a petition for writ of mandate does not require the payment of a filing fee. He is 6 mistaken. The Legislature has long required the payment of fee for filing the first paper in a civil action, including a mandamus action. (Gov. Code, § 70611.) Woodall's reliance on Marler v. Mun. Court (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 155 is misplaced as that case involved the filing of a writ petition in a criminal action. (Id. at p. 163.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. No costs are awarded in this proceeding.
MCCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
AARON, J.
IRION, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- Wagner v. City of South Pasadena B128915 · 2000-02-08
- Rio Vista Farm Bureau Center v. County of Solano A052422 · 1992-04-09
- People v. Hull S019254 · 1991-12-26
- Guedalia v. Superior Court D009794 · 1989-06-27
- Marler v. Municipal Court Civ. 22318 · 1980-08-26