gno.law

People v. Holiday CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D063985 · 2014-03-07 · Unpublished

Proceeding
appeal from an order
Trial court
Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCS183939
Trial judge
Jeffrey F. Fraser
Outcome
affirmed — Affirmed.
Area
criminal
Panel
Judith D. McConnell (author), Richard D. Huffman, Sr., McINTYRE

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T06:44Z · confidence high

The trial court extended the defendant's commitment as a mentally disordered offender, finding he posed a substantial danger and could not be safely treated on an outpatient basis, though it erroneously applied a 'preponderance of the evidence' standard to the outpatient issue. The Court of Appeal affirmed the order, concluding that the error in the standard of proof was harmless given the overwhelming evidence that the defendant was not a candidate for outpatient treatment.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Order extending commitment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO)
“We conclude the error was harmless and affirm the order.”
de novoerroragree with court
The appellate court identified that the trial court applied the wrong standard of proof ('preponderance of the evidence' instead of 'reasonable cause') for the outpatient treatment determination. However, the court found this error harmless because the evidence that the defendant could not be safely treated on an outpatient basis was overwhelming and uncontroverted, satisfying the burden of proof under any standard.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Gregerson (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 306 — Establishes that the patient bears the burden of proving entitlement to release on outpatient status under Penal Code section 2972, subdivision (d), and that the standard of proof is 'reasonable cause.' It also notes that a court generally has no duty to sua sponte consider outpatient treatment unless the issue is raised.
  • relied: People v. Rish (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1370 — Supports the proposition that a court generally has no duty to sua sponte consider a patient's amenability to outpatient treatment. It is also cited for the principle that testimony regarding voluntary medication compliance is insufficient to meet the burden of proving outpatient treatment would be safe and effective if it does not address the broader compliance and safety issues.
  • relied: People v. May (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 350 — Cited in support of the proposition that a court generally has no duty to sua sponte consider a patient's amenability to outpatient treatment.
  • relied: People v. Cosgrove (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1266 — Articulates the harmless error test applicable to violations of statutory rights in civil commitment proceedings, specifically referencing the standard from People v. Watson.
  • relied: People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 — Provides the foundational harmless error test (whether it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error) applied in this context via People v. Cosgrove.
  • relied: People v. Hill (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 646 — Cited as a contrary authority ('but see') suggesting that the Chapman v. California harmless error test might apply to civil commitment proceedings where the statutory right is protected by the federal due process clause. The court distinguished or noted this but ultimately applied the Watson standard.
  • relied: Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 — The federal harmless error standard (beyond a reasonable doubt) cited in People v. Hill as potentially applicable to due process violations in civil commitments, though the court here relied on the Watson standard.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly identifies the legal error (wrong standard of proof) and applies the appropriate harmless error analysis. It thoroughly reviews the record to demonstrate that the evidence against outpatient release was overwhelming, making the error in the standard of proof inconsequential to the outcome.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:31Z · confidence medium

The San Diego Superior Court extended Jason Holiday's MDO commitment for one year under Penal Code section 2972, finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he had a severe mental disorder not in remission and posed a substantial danger to others, and finding he had failed to prove by a preponderance that he could be safely released. The Court of Appeal held the trial court applied the wrong standard of proof (preponderance rather than reasonable cause) to the outpatient-treatment question under section 2972, subdivision (d), but found the error harmless under any standard and affirmed.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Order extending MDO commitment under section 2972, subdivision (c): findings that Holiday had a severe mental disorder, that it was not in remission or could not be kept in remission without treatment, and that he posed a substantial danger of physical harm to others.
“Indeed, the evidence on these points was overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted.”
substantial evidencecorrectagree with court
Holiday did not challenge these findings on appeal, and the testimony of Dr. Friedman and the stipulated report of Dr. Thomas (schizoaffective disorder, medication stockpiling, recent assaults and threats requiring restraints, active delusions) amply supports each statutory element. The appellate court's characterization of the evidence as overwhelming is borne out by the record it recites.
Determination that Holiday was not entitled to outpatient treatment under section 2972, subdivision (d), made by applying a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard rather than the statutory reasonable-cause standard.
“Nonetheless, having apparently considered the matter here, the court was obliged to apply the correct standard of proof. Although the court erred in this respect, we conclude the error was harmless under any standard.”
de novoharmless error (law misapplied)agree with court
Gregerson establishes that the patient bears the burden of raising a strong suspicion in a person of ordinary prudence that outpatient treatment would be safe and effective, which is a lower threshold than preponderance, so the trial court's standard was wrong and the People properly conceded it. The Court of Appeal correctly declined to choose between Watson and Chapman because the record forecloses prejudice under either: both experts opined unequivocally that Holiday could not be treated as an outpatient, he told both experts he had no interest in a supervised release program and wanted unconditional release, he had recent violence and medication noncompliance in a structured setting, and his own testimony about voluntarily taking medication, consistent with Rish, did not address how outpatient treatment would be safe and effective. No reasonable trier of fact applying the reasonable-cause standard could have found for him on this record.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Gregerson (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 306 — The MDO patient bears the burden under section 2972, subdivision (d) of establishing entitlement to outpatient release; the standard is reasonable cause, meaning a strong suspicion in a person of ordinary prudence that outpatient treatment would be safe and effective; the court generally has no sua sponte duty to consider outpatient treatment.
  • relied: People v. Rish (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1370 — A trial court generally has no sua sponte duty to consider outpatient status in an MDO recommitment, and a patient's bare assertion that he would take medication does not address how he would comply with outpatient treatment or how it would be safe and effective.
  • relied: People v. May (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 350 — A trial court may, but generally need not, sua sponte consider an MDO patient's amenability to outpatient treatment.
  • relied: People v. Cosgrove (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1266 — The Watson harmless error test applies to a violation of a statutory right in a civil commitment proceeding.
  • relied: People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 — State-law error is harmless unless it is reasonably probable a result more favorable to the appellant would have been reached absent the error.
  • relied: People v. Hill (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 646 — The Chapman beyond-a-reasonable-doubt harmless error standard applies to violation of a statutory right in a civil commitment proceeding where that right is protected by federal due process.
  • relied: Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 — Federal constitutional error requires reversal unless the beneficiary of the error proves it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellate opinion: sound — The court correctly identified the statutory reasonable-cause standard from Gregerson, acknowledged the conflict between Cosgrove and Hill on the prejudice test, and sidestepped it defensibly by finding harmlessness under any standard given unanimous expert opinion against outpatient treatment and Holiday's own stated disinterest in supervised release. The analysis answers the only argument raised with the governing MDO authorities, and the reliance on Rish for the insufficiency of a bare promise to take medication is apt.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 3/7/14 P. v. Holiday CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

PEOPLE, D063985

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCS183939)

JASON MICHAEL HOLIDAY,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Jeffrey F.

Fraser, Judge. Affirmed.

Stephen M. Hinkle, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Warren Williams, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. INTRODUCTION Jason Michael Holiday appeals from an order extending his commitment to the State Department of State Hospitals, formerly the State Department of Mental Health (Department), as a mentally disordered offender (MDO) (Pen. Code, § 2960 et seq.).1 He contends we must reverse the order and remand the matter for further findings because the court applied the wrong standard of proof to its determination he could not be safely and effectively treated on outpatient status. We conclude the error was harmless and affirm the order.

BACKGROUND

People's Evidence In 2004 Holiday pleaded guilty to assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a).). The following year, as a condition of parole, he was committed to the Department as an MDO (§ 2962). His parole ended in May 2008 and his commitment to the hospital was extended annually from then to May 2013 (§§ 2970, 2972).

Dr. Nicole Friedman's Testimony In January 2013 the People petitioned to extend his commitment another year. At a trial on the petition, psychologist Dr. Nicole Friedman testified she evaluated Holiday, reviewed his mental health records, and reviewed the records related to his underlying offense. Based on this information, she diagnosed him with schizoaffective disorder, 1 Further statutory references are also to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated. 2 bipolar type. Among his symptoms were mood swings, delusions, ideas of grandiosity, tangential thinking, pressured speech, disorganized behavior, hypersexuality, and poor hygiene. He was also experiencing auditory hallucinations and believed he had religious powers.

During Dr. Friedman's evaluation, Holiday insisted on showing her an invention he made from a milk carton, popsicle sticks, and a staple. He told her the invention was a registered computer and it could both cure cancer and help a woman get pregnant. He also told her he could earn a living by selling staples for 50 cents if he was released. In addition to being out of touch with reality, he was easily agitated and admitted getting upset during an evaluation with psychologist Dr. Lauren S. Thomas (described post). His inability to regulate his behavior in a controlled setting indicated he had poor insight into his behavior.

Dr. Friedman noted Holiday takes medication for his disorder, which has "helped him to some degree" because "his assaultive behavior has declined . . . over the years."

However, he did not always comply with his medication regimen and seven months before trial, he was caught stockpiling pills. After that, his pills were crushed to ensure he was taking them.

Dr. Friedman explained Holiday's behavior deteriorates when he does not take his medication. Around the time he was caught stockpiling medication, he attacked another patient and had to be put in restraints. More recently, within four months before trial, he had to be restrained for threatening hospital staff.

3 Dr. Friedman described Holiday's participation in therapy as "not highly compliant." He attended therapy sessions approximately 32 percent of the time.

In addition to schizoaffective disorder, Holiday also had antisocial personality disorder and rated "severe" on an assessment measuring psychopathy. People with this rating demonstrate glibness, a grandiose sense of self-worth, pathological lying, manipulation, a lack of remorse or guilt, a lack of empathy, a shallow affect, callousness, and failure to accept responsibility for their actions.

Dr. Friedman believed Holiday's mental disorder was not in remission because he was not consistently compliant with his medication, he was not attending therapy sessions, and he did not demonstrate an understanding of or maintain a regular schedule of self-care for his mental illness. Moreover, in the year preceding the trial, he had been assaultive, he threatened his peers and hospital staff, and he demonstrated through delusions and grandiosity that he was not in touch with reality.

Dr. Friedman believed Holiday was a danger to others. She based this belief on his lack of insight into his behavior's effect on others and his failure to understand he needed medication to control his behavior and impulsivity.

When Dr. Friedman discussed a supervised release program with Holiday, he had no interest in the program. She viewed his lack of interest as confirmation he did not have a full understanding of his diagnosis and believed he could be immediately released "into the community without any step-down type of program to help him monitor and self-care for himself." She believed if he were immediately released into the community, 4 he would not comply with his medication regimen and would start abusing controlled substances again.

Dr. Thomas's Report The parties stipulated to the admission of a report prepared by Dr. Thomas. The report was of an evaluation occurring a little over a month before trial. Like Dr.

Friedman, Dr. Thomas diagnosed Holiday with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type.

She also diagnosed him with polysubstance abuse not otherwise specified and antisocial personality disorder.

In her report, Dr. Thomas noted Holiday had a lengthy history of both inpatient and outpatient psychiatric treatment. Historically, his psychiatric symptoms have included auditory hallucinations, mood swings, grandiosity, delusions, disorganized and tangential thought processes, pressured and rambling speech, assaultive and bizarre behavior, and poor hygiene. During her evaluation of him, he demonstrated "perceptual disturbances in the form of 'good voices' " as well as rambling speech and "grandiose delusions about the cure for cancer and a device he invented which 'helps locate life on other planets.' "

Dr. Thomas believed Holiday did not have insight "relative to his behavior that could lead to violence," and his compliance with psychiatric treatment was inadequate.

His participation in group therapy was approximately 38 percent, rather than the required 80 percent. In addition, he sometimes refused medication and approximately four months before trial he was caught stockpiling medication.

5 Of further concern to Dr. Thomas, Holiday had a significant history of substance abuse, but did not like to attend Narcotics Anonymous or Alcoholics Anonymous programs because they were against his religious beliefs. She believed it was "likely that in a less structured environment in the community he would relapse into substance abuse," which "would most likely exacerbate the symptoms of his severe mental disorder."

Dr. Thomas also noted Holiday had a history of violence and inappropriate behavior toward hospital staff, including threatening to kill staff, hostility, and open masturbation. Twice, approximately four months before trial he was placed in restraints for threatening hospital staff. On another occasion within the same time frame, he "presented with 'anger toward women and predator-like behaviors.' " When she attempted to discuss these incidents with him, he became agitated and loudly denied any threatening conduct. After unsuccessfully attempting numerous times to calm him down, she had to end the interview.

On the question of whether Holiday could be safely and effectively treated on an outpatient basis, Dr. Thomas unequivocally responded that he could not. She explained, "In order to be a candidate for outpatient treatment through [a supervised release program], an individual must demonstrate a period of psychiatric stabilization, combined with a willingness to be compliant with a treatment plan. Additionally, one must demonstrate the ability to refrain from threatening behavior or physical violence, attend substance abuse treatment, if applicable, and must agree to [supervised release program]

placement. [¶] [Holiday] has stated he would continue taking medications if he were in 6 the community and he does not desire or plan to participate in outpatient treatment or [a supervised release program]. [¶] Due to the above-stated reasons, [Holiday] is not an appropriate candidate for outpatient treatment at this time. He continues to require the highly structured and secure treatment environment of the hospital."

Holiday's Evidence Holiday testified on his own behalf. When asked whether he believed he had a mental disorder or illness, he rambled a bit about various diagnoses doctors had given him over the years and said, he "guess[ed] they know they they're saying" and "guess[ed]

it might be true, yeah." When asked about his medication regimen, he said he voluntarily took medication and would continue taking it if released. He explained he would live with his mother and get his medication from a local mental hospital. When asked whether he needed and would continue therapy if released, he said he would probably get a job.

Regarding the reports of recent violent incidents, he explained he once raised his voice after hospital staff took his bandana away from him without cause and was strapped to a chair for 10 to 15 minutes until he calmed down. In a separate incident, another patient offered him a sandwich and then hit him when he went to get it. The two men starting fighting and then the other patient ran away. He said he did not get into any trouble for the incident because the hospital staff witnessed it.

Regarding his failure to take medication, he said one time he did not take his blood pressure medication. Otherwise, he took all of his medication. He also said he went to all of his therapy sessions, except "maybe three or four."

7 Court's Decision After considering the parties' evidence and arguments, the court found the People proved beyond a reasonable doubt Holiday suffered from a severe mental disorder that was not in remission or could not be kept in remission without treatment and, because of the disorder, he posed a substantial danger of physical harm to others. The court further found he had "failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he no longer [represents] a substantial danger of physical harm to others because he is now taking medication that controls his medical condition. In this matter, I think that it's not in your best interest to keep you in an unsupervised environment."2 Consequently, the court ordered his commitment to the state hospital extended to May 2014.

DISCUSSION

Following a trial on a recommitment petition, a court shall order a patient recommitted for one year if the trier of fact finds "that the patient has a severe mental disorder, that the patient's severe mental disorder is not in remission or cannot be kept in remission without treatment, and that by reason of his or her severe mental disorder, the patient represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others." (§ 2972, subd. (c).)

However, the court shall release the patient on outpatient status if the "court finds that there is reasonable cause to believe that the [patient] can be safely and effectively treated on an outpatient basis." (§ 2972, subd. (d).) The patient bears the burden of establishing entitlement to release under section 2972, subdivision (d). (People v. Gregerson (2011)

2 The court's remarks match almost verbatim statements contained in the "Summary of the MDO Law" section of the People's trial brief. 8 202 Cal.App.4th 306, 310, 316 (Gregerson).) Since the standard of proof is " 'reasonable cause,' " a "court shall order outpatient treatment if the patient raises a strong suspicion in a person of ordinary prudence that outpatient treatment would be safe and effective." (Id.

at pp. 310, 317, 319.)

Holiday contends we must reverse the court's order and remand the matter for further findings because the court applied the wrong standard of proof to its determination he could not be safely and effectively treated on outpatient status. More particularly, the court applied the "preponderance of the evidence" standard rather than a "reasonable cause" standard. The People concede the error, but assert it was harmless.

We agree.

A court may, but generally has no duty to, sua sponte consider a patient's amenability to outpatient treatment. (Gregerson, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 315 & fn.

3; People v. Rish (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1382-1384; People v. May (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 350, 359.) Nonetheless, having apparently considered the matter here, the court was obliged to apply the correct standard of proof. Although the court erred in this respect, we conclude the error was harmless under any standard. (See People v. Cosgrove (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1266, 1275-1276 [harmless error test articulated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 applies to a violation of a statutory right in a civil commitment proceeding]; but see People v. Hill (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 646, 652-653 [harmless error test articulated in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 applies to a violation of a statutory right in a civil commitment proceeding where the statutory right is protected by the federal due process clause].)

9 Holiday does not dispute there was sufficient evidence to support the court's findings he suffered from a severe mental disorder, the disorder was not in remission or could not be kept in remission without treatment, and he posed a substantial danger of physical harm to others because of the disorder. Indeed, the evidence on these points was overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted.

There was likewise overwhelming evidence Holiday could not be safely released into the community. Specifically, the evidence showed his mental disorder had not stabilized, he had difficulty controlling his violent behavior in a highly structured hospital setting, and he had no insight into the causes of his violent behavior. In addition, he conveyed to both Dr. Friedman and Dr. Thomas he was not interested in being released into a supervised release program and, instead, wanted an unconditional release. Both doctors agreed an unconditional release would likely lead to an exacerbation of his mental disorder.

Holiday's own testimony was not helpful to his position. When asked whether he would continue to attend therapy if released, he dodged the question and stated he planned to get a job. He also equivocated when asked whether he had a mental illness, stating he guessed he had one because his doctors told him he had one. Moreover, during his testimony, he showed active signs of mental illness, particularly when discussing his invention and the things it could do. The only evidence he offered tending to support any type of outpatient treatment was his testimony he would voluntarily continue taking his medication if released. The court implicitly found this testimony not credible and, regardless, this testimony was insufficient to meet his burden because it "does not come 10 close to addressing how [he] intended to comply with outpatient treatment and how such treatment would be safe and effective." (People v. Rish, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1385.) Accordingly, we conclude the court's error in failing to apply the correct standard of proof does not require reversal of the court's order.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

MCCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, J.

MCINTYRE, J.

Cites, in this corpus