People v. Rodriguez CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from an order
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCS260464
- Trial judge
- Kathleen M. Lewis
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Judith D. McConnell (author), Gilbert Nares, McINTYRE
Analysis
The trial court imposed a $25 administrative processing fee under Penal Code section 1463.07 as a condition of probation following Rodriguez's guilty plea. The Court of Appeal affirmed the order, holding that the statute applies whenever a person is arrested and released on their own recognizance, regardless of whether the release occurred pending sentencing after a plea agreement.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Imposition of the $25 administrative processing fee under Penal Code section 1463.07“These circumstances fall squarely within the ambit of section 1463.07. Nonetheless, Rodriguez contends the court should not have imposed the fee because, when the court released him pending his sentencing, he had served all of the custody time contemplated by the parties. However, the statute contains no exception for such circumstances.” | unclear | correct | agree with court The appellate court correctly applied the plain language of the statute, which mandates the fee for any person arrested and released on their own recognizance upon conviction of a non-infraction offense. The court properly rejected the argument that the plea agreement or the timing of the release created an exception, as the statute contains no such provision. |
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it relies on the unambiguous text of the statute to resolve the issue, correctly noting that the legislature did not include an exception for releases pending sentencing. The reasoning directly addresses the appellant's argument by pointing to the absence of a statutory exception.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe trial court, after accepting Rodriguez's guilty plea to felony vandalism and placing him on three years' probation, ordered him to pay a $25 administrative screening fee under Penal Code section 1463.07 because he had been arrested and later released on his own recognizance pending sentencing. The Court of Appeal rejected his argument that the fee did not apply because he had already served all custody time contemplated by the plea bargain, holding the statute's plain language contains no such exception, and affirmed.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Imposition of a $25 administrative screening fee under Penal Code section 1463.07 on a defendant who was arrested, held in custody, and then released on his own recognizance after his guilty plea pending sentencing.“On its face, the statute applies whenever a person is arrested and subsequently released on his or her own recognizance.” | de novo | correct | agree with court The court did not expressly state a standard of review, but the question was purely one of statutory interpretation, which it resolved on the statute's plain text. Section 1463.07 requires the fee from 'each person arrested and released on his or her own recognizance upon conviction of any criminal offense related to the arrest other than an infraction.' Rodriguez was arrested, held, released on his own recognizance, and convicted of a related non-infraction offense, so each statutory element is met. His argument that the release was merely a formality because he had served all bargained-for custody time finds no textual support, and the court correctly declined to read in an exception. The court did not address whether post-plea release pending sentencing is the kind of OR release the statute contemplates, and cited no authority, but the plain-language result is defensible. |
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion answers the only argument raised by applying the plain text of section 1463.07, which contains no exception for defendants who have already served their bargained-for custody time, and that reading is correct. It cites no authority at all and does not consider whether a post-conviction release pending sentencing fits the statute's apparent purpose of recouping pretrial OR screening costs, so the analysis is thin though the result is defensible.
Opinion
Filed 12/23/13 P. v. Rodriguez CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D063583
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCS260464)
EMIGDIO SALVADOR RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Kathleen M.
Lewis, Judge. Affirmed.
Patrick J. Hennessey Jr., for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Natasha Cortina and Barry Carlton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. INTRODUCTION Emigdio Salvador Rodriguez pleaded guilty to committing vandalism causing damage of $400 or more (Pen. Code,1 § 594, subds. (a) & (b)(1)). The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed him on probation for three years. As a condition of probation, the court ordered him to pay an administrative processing fee of $25 under section 1463.07.
Rodriguez appeals, contending we must reverse the administrative processing fee because it does not apply under the circumstances of this case. We disagree and affirm the order.
BACKGROUND2
Rodriguez pleaded guilty as part of a negotiated plea agreement. The agreement contemplated Rodriguez would not serve any additional time beyond what he had served at the time of the guilty plea. Nonetheless, before the court sentenced Rodriguez, the prosecutor wanted a formal probation report. To honor the parties' agreement, the court released Rodriguez on his own recognizance at the conclusion of the change of plea hearing and ordered him to return to court for the sentencing hearing.
1 Further statutory references are also to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
2 We have omitted a summary of the facts underlying Rodriguez's guilty plea as they are not relevant to the issue raised on appeal. 2 DISCUSSION Section 1463.07 provides: "An administrative screening fee of twenty-five dollars ($25) shall be collected from each person arrested and released on his or her own recognizance upon conviction of any criminal offense related to the arrest other than an infraction." On its face, the statute applies whenever a person is arrested and subsequently released on his or her own recognizance.
Here, the record shows Rodriguez was arrested and then remanded to the San Diego county sheriff's custody, where he remained until the court released him on his own recognizance pending the sentencing hearing. These circumstances fall squarely within the ambit of section 1463.07. Nonetheless, Rodriguez contends the court should not have imposed the fee because, when the court released him pending his sentencing, he had served all of the custody time contemplated by the parties. However, the statute contains no exception for such circumstances. Rodriguez, therefore, has not established the court erred in imposing the fee.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
McCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
NARES, J.
McINTYRE, J.